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JAPAN'S PROSPECT

Nor need the land itself be charged with unfairness to its inhabitants. Its resources would provide bountifully for a smaller population. The number of people in Japan is a consequence of Japanese beliefs and habits of living; the rest of the world is not responsible for the fact that there are too many Japanese.

Since Japanese apologists feature the comparison of Japan's area with that of California, further comparisons are pertinent. If the Japanese cultivate 15 per cent of their area, they do much better than many other nations. California in 1939 had only 6.8 per cent of her area in crops, and not more than 13 per cent was deemed arable. The Californians, however—including the Japanese-descended Nisei—have hesitated to increase their population at the expense of standards of living. In 1940 they numbered slightly under seven millions—less than a tenth of the number the Japanese were trying to maintain in a similar area.

The ultimate issue is whether any people can expect to multiply recklessly and then demand territory from those who practice restraint in order to maintain high living standards. To the Japanese, the war has said "No!" but whoever administers Japan will face overpopulation as fact and not as academic theory. The immediate issue is not what the Japanese should have done, but the situation that actually obtains.

What can be done to support seventy million people in Japan proper? It has been argued that without the burden of military establishments, and by renouncing ambitions to heavy industry, the Japanese population could maintain prewar levels of living with little dependence on outside resources. Prewar levels of living, however, involved near-starvation in places—as in the Tōhoku—and held the peasants and laborers to an insufferable servitude. These submerged millions have become increasingly vocal about their plight. Sacrifice for the emperor was endured because of hope of more land and easier living in the territories

about to be conquered. Denied that hope, violence in all parts of Japan is a reasonable prospect. Questions of the resources available in Japan proper and of the type of industrial development to be permitted by the United Nations thus assume paramount importance.

Another stubborn fact that sets limits to policy is the psychological homogeneity of the Japanese people, rooted in generations of discipline. Racially, to be sure, they are far more diversified than their apologists admit. Psychologically, however, one Japanese resembles another to a degree that dwellers in heterogeneous America do not easily visualize. What is involved is a type of homogeneity based in disciplined acceptance of obligations which emanate from authority and in acceptance of an ideology and a view of the world from which dissenters are notably few.

Granted that no two human beings can ever be exactly alike, the fact remains that the Imperial Ministry of Education succeeded in its avowed aim of making each Japanese subject so like every other Japanese subject that *for national purposes* they are interchangeable. Geographical isolation and historical accident may have conspired to facilitate that accomplishment; but regardless of how it happened, few peoples in history have been as like minded as the Japanese. That does not imply that they universally love one another. Japanese society is shot through with intrigue, plot and counterplot, assassination, and blackmail. In broader perspective, however, all these are family quarrels and a solid front faces the world. Because of this disciplined like-mindedness, political differences seldom center in ideological battles. The issues alleged in party strife merely camouflage the struggles of rival factions, whose members owe allegiance to a personal leader or a family-clan, to obtain power for their own groups.

Homogeneity in this sense does not imply complete ignorance of ideas current elsewhere in the world. The average Japanese

knows vaguely that many contrasting ideologies occur abroad; educated Japanese know a good deal about these ideologies, but they remain convinced emotionally that every Japanese must think and feel in the Japanese way. They have gloried in the fact that, no matter how foreigners may quarrel over ideas, ideological differences never have broken the surface of Japanese life.

This psychological homogeneity is revealed in many kinds of statistical data as a sharply defined mode or most frequently occurring type. Observation discovers numerous individuals who fail to conform; it is a far cry from the *rōnin* or political thug whose mind dwells in fantasy in ancient times to the scientist in an Imperial University laboratory. These persons, however, are the extreme deviants from the clear-cut norms. The late war, in its inception and conduct, and the unanimous obedience to the emperor in defeat demonstrated the total effectiveness of the schoolbook maxim that, before all else, everyone is a *rippanu Nihonjin* (a "Splendid Japanese"). Occidental nations also exhibit fervent patriotism, but rarely with such unruffled unanimity.

This homogeneity of the Japanese people owes much to the isolation enforced by the spoken and written language. It owes more to the almost complete absence of immigration and to situations that prevent contact with foreigners. Aliens have never been able to visit Japan in numbers and fraternize with the people. Whether police supervision, difficulties of travel, standards of living, or other situations produced this phenomenon is beside the point. The Japanese people are not acquainted—in a casual neighborly sense—with the rest of the world. This can also be said of other peoples, but it characterizes the Japanese to a degree observed elsewhere only in "primitive" tribes. By books, magazines, and the cinema the present generation has learned many facts about foreign lands; such facts, however, usually continue abstract and lifeless, divorced from reality.

and unapprehended emotionally, except among the suave and cultivated few who have lived abroad. Even those few rarely forget their role as Japanese and think of themselves simply as men. They self-consciously represent their nation to the world, just as every Japanese maintains unrelaxing vigilance as a representative of his family before other and possibly hostile families.

How far this psychological homogeneity has been maintained coercively by the police is debatable. As the United Nations achieve the disorganization of Japan's police-state, individuals may gain courage to think differently from the mass and to speak their minds without feeling that they must commit suicide for having done so. Circumstances, however, will hamper the nascent diversification of opinion. Chief among these is the inhibiting power of the family system. In Japan conformity appears to be a highly cherished goal for every individual—a goal of which he scarcely is aware, since it was integrated into his emotional habits in earliest infancy. Strict policing does not explain the psychological homogeneity of the Japanese people. The police merely symbolize that conformity and provide individuals with visible assurance that their personal repressions are sanctioned by authority.

Cultural homogeneity, as a fact of Japanese society, carries important social and political implications. In the realms of daily living and political behavior, what one Japanese can do, the rest can do. Usually, what one wishes to do, his fellows also desire. To any stimulation within a well-practiced familiar range, they respond alike with vigor and promptness. Conversely, the Japanese masses exhibit general bewilderment when confronted with the unusual and the unexpected. Ordered to take up arms or to lay them down, they obey with military precision. Ordered to develop a free press and to make room in business for individual initiative, they stand agape and uncomprehending. They expect and desire to be told what to

do. The Japanese accepted with fatal literalism the premium on "correct" behavior long ago established by Confucius. And Japanese literalism has been devoid of the saving grace of amused skepticism that Taoist philosophy fostered in the more literate segments of China's population. Japanese preoccupation with formal rituals of conduct discourages the exercise of individual judgment. No *rippana Nihonjin* prefers the Occidental goal of "being right" to being proper.

Cultural homogeneity *per se* neither fosters nor inhibits attainment of a democratic social order. Psychological homogeneity, in some societies, has been apparent as democratic like-mindedness; in other times and places, it has occurred as the docile, uncritical passion to be led that underlies autocracy. The type of emotional conformity that renders the Japanese nation homogeneous may interpose barriers against democracy which, at least temporarily, may prove insuperable.

If the policy of the United Nations envisions merely a helpless, obedient Japan, that end is already achieved. The native oligarchy maintained its sway by encouraging every idea or custom that rendered the people helpless and obedient. That oligarchy, however, understood what the United Nations may not understand clearly: namely, that the Japanese can hold unanimously to a stubborn purpose that may outlast the necessity for outward show of docility.

If the policy of the United Nations envisions a democratic Japan, many new types of mind—new "behavior kinds"—are needed in the population. Democratic self-government depends upon the give and take of "many men of many minds." Urbanism and industrialization have facilitated psychological diversification in many other populations, and had begun to do so in Japan prior to the reaction of 1931. Orders issued arbitrarily by a foreign military commander, however, ordinarily do not evoke new and varied ways of thinking. The desirability of psychological diversity in the Japanese nation and the means

of achieving it provide an important topic for discussion—and in due course for vigorous action.

The word "feudal" often provides a facile characterization of many aspects of Japanese society. Professor Asakawa¹ has shown that European feudalism, despite many apt analogies with pre-Meiji Japan, cannot be regarded as an exact parallel to the social order of Old Japan. An outstanding difference is the emphasis on kinship bonds—real or fictional—and the loyalties that derive from them. In a very general sense, however, the word "feudal" provides the best English equivalent of the Japanese *hōken*. Feudalism as such was abolished at the time of the Meiji restoration. But patterns of social behavior and societal organization in modern Japan frequently derive from former habits of feudal society. In their present situation, the Japanese suffer from lack of experience in nonfeudal techniques of societal and economic organization. Their educated men indeed talk with sophistication of many other kinds of social organization. This ability should not be confused with practical ability to initiate, execute, and administer. That type of ability is limited in Japan to but one pattern of society—and its derivatives—which is essentially *hōken* or Japanese-feudal.

Feudal parallels continue in Japan, not because of diabolical cleverness on the part of those who had the power to limn the outlines of the contemporary industrial and monarchical society, but simply because the leaders and the masses they led knew but one general pattern of organization. Into that pattern they fitted the new technologies, both industrial and political—not without Procrustean mutilation. Despite the self-conscious process of borrowing from the Occident, the indigenous habits of organization and coöperation persisted.

The all-pervasive industrial combines called *Zaibatsu* illustrate the process. *Zaibatsu* is a slang term that means "the money crowd"; in an Occidental context it acquires unwanted dignity. Briefly, a *Zaibatsu* is a feudal duchy based on factories,

mines, communications, finance, and commerce instead of on land. The peasant-serfs are replaced by factory hands who sometimes work behind barbed-wire fences or concrete walls topped by broken glass. The samurai warriors have been transmuted into financial and sales agents. The executive group retains the old name of *bantō* which denoted those who performed administrative functions. A family-clan owns the industrial empire as their feudal counterpart owned a landed duchy. Each family-clan binds its members to obey a secret or partly secret code of family law.² These codes concede the supremacy of the emperor by stating that the national law shall prevail over any conflicting provision of the house law—but state also that the basic spirit and purpose of the house law shall not be superseded. As in all Japanese family-clans, the line never fails. Lack of male issue is compensated by adoption of relatives or other suitable males—perhaps in emergency even an outstanding *bantō* from one of the family-owned corporations. By marriage to a daughter of the house such a man is absorbed into the dominant family and may even become its head.

Occidentals generally are aware of the scope and power of these industrial duchies. They know also that a half-dozen of them own most of Japan—or did own it until ordered to dis-solve by General MacArthur. Of these Zaibatsu, the greatest is perhaps the Imperial Household. Japanese reverence for that sacred institution has protected the emperor's family from being dubbed a Zaibatsu. Next comes the House of Mitsui; then that of Iwasaki, whose far-flung enterprises are known by the trademark Mitsubishi (Three Water-Chestnuts); then the lesser duchies of Sumitomo, Yasuda, *et al.* The companies controlled by Mitsui, for example, require several pages for a full listing;³ they cover the range of heavy industry, banking, insurance, colonial exploitation, paper, textiles, chemicals, mining, food warehousing and merchandising, shipping, and foreign trade.

Viewed through Western eyes, the picture calls to mind a European or American family-owned trust.

Why, then, resort to the feudal analogy? Does not the word "feudal" assume the character of an epithet, since the Occidental world also contains its vast combines?

The patterning of Japanese industrial organization after feudal models may be clarified by a hypothetical example using fictitious names and places. Mr. Suzuki Gentarō (John Smith's counterpart) is a farmer in the hamlet of Tamura in Central Japan. Part of his inherited land he farms; the remainder is rented to a tenant. Another tenant farmer offers to rent the rest of the Suzuki rice land. The family council, which includes his retired father, two brothers, and his father's surviving brother, meets and discusses the issue at length. The land belongs to the family, not to Gentarō personally. He is not a free agent.

The rental from the two plots would not suffice to maintain the Suzuki household. Gentarō, however, is ambitious and he persuades the council to approve his plans. He rents out both farm plots and retains the house and lot in the village. Beside the house he erects a shed, borrows money from a banker of his erstwhile feudal clan, purchases a few simple power-driven tools, and installs them in the shed. Here, with his family, he makes metal parts for electrical switches. Another fellow-clansman, a *toiya* or merchant middleman, advances raw material on credit and supplies the specifications, buys the finished product, and pays cash for the difference. By economy and careful planning, the Suzukis pay for the original tools and install a more expensive machine. A boy of fourteen, a relative, is taken on as apprentice to help with the new machine. He lives with the family; their only cash outlay is a yen or so a month for his spending money, an occasional yen for him to send home, and a new outfit of blue jeans annually for his clothes.

In time additional machines bring in more relatives, who crowd the Suzuki household. The banker-clansman advances funds for rental of a piece of land and erection of a larger shed to house more machines. Some of the employee-relatives send for their families and all work together. Gentarō devotes his time to supervision. He discovers that by going to Ōsaka he can buy larger quantities of raw material on better terms, and that he can market the finished product more effectively without intervention of the *toiya*. All his dealings, however, flow naturally to fellow-clansmen already established in the big city. They in turn deal with corporations that stem ultimately from Mitsui control. These contacts were effected through his home banker, who also is a remote henchman of Mitsui.

On his trips to Ōsaka he is impressed with the advantages of locating there permanently. After much *négotiation* and many all-night sessions of the family council, he erects a larger factory—still built of wood and galvanized iron—in an Ōsaka suburb on land rented from another clansman. The factory in Tamura disgorges its machines together with the employee-relatives, and all start anew in the city. More hands are required, but all the employees have uncles, aunts, cousins, and other relatives eager to escape from the overburdened farms. In the larger establishment Gentarō is able to assemble parts and turn out a finished product; before long he hunts up his former *toiya* and reestablishes the relationship. This time he buys parts from the *toiya* and helps finance his operations. Now he can join a manufacturers' association sponsored by the government, but still under the aegis of the bankers, dealers in raw material, and marketing companies that he had contacted through fellow-clansmen. Superficially, and sometimes actually, these concerns are competitive, but deviously they all are related to the House of Mitsui. Success means that he will work up through one company after another within the same framework. Raw materials, machinery, insurance, banking, shipping

—all these services he obtains through one or another Mitsui-controlled enterprise. The machines were made in Mitsui factories from ore mined in Mitsui mines and processed by other Mitsui concerns. His land is rented from another Mitsui interest, his exported product goes in Mitsui ships loaded by Mitsui lighters, to a Mitsui subsidiary in London or New York backed by a Mitsui branch bank. His factory is powered by electricity from a generating company financed by the House of Mitsui. Other Mitsui firms take a profit on the rice he eats, the clothes he wears, the lumber in his buildings, the cinema he attends, and the newspaper he reads. Only in the postal savings and insurance system and the Imperial Government Railways is he unable to deal with Mitsui agencies—if indeed it should occur to him to make the attempt.

The Suzuki boys served their term in the army. Their buddies were boys from Tamura, where the Suzukis still maintain their police registration. Probably they served under officers from the same clan-area. The young officers hated all Zaibatsu and expected to break their power by conquest of foreign lands, to be administered under a system of national socialism. But when the war came, camouflaged Zaibatsu corporations took over the new resources. Among the higher officers, a few are married to Mitsui nieces—as are some naval officers. When Gentarō and his sons vote, they favor fellow-clansmen whose party in some mysterious way refrains consistently from biting the (Mitsui) hand that feeds it.

The secret conclaves of the Mitsui family—and of other Zaibatsu family-clans—determine the destiny of millions of big and little people in all walks of life. They initiate and revoke the policies of political parties and even of the proud bureaucrats of the civil service. Nor are they as innocent of army and navy influence as they sometimes assert. Always there are sons, sons-in-law, and cousins in both groups, while the bureaucracy also includes its quota of Zaibatsu personnel and their hench-

men. All this motivates many a bitter internal struggle in army, navy, and bureaucracy which passes the understanding of the foreigner.

Zaibatsu policies, determined secretly in family councils, are effected as circumstances dictate—now openly, again subtly and invisibly. Individuals die, but the councils of the great family-clans continue. These clans are so prolific of sons, cousins, in-laws, and adopted members that all types of individual occur within their ranks. Should the times require a “liberal” front, a suave graduate of Harvard, Princeton, or Yale is available as window dressing; when a militaristic or even a religious “front” suits the clan purposes, that also is forthcoming.

These dominant family-clans and their dependents in a thousand public and private positions exercise power far beyond that wielded by their feudal prototypes. This continues true despite the relative independence of many of the corporations that are controlled indirectly. The patterns of organization, however, from the humblest factory hand to the family council, remain closely akin to those that maintained the old-time feudal estates.

The Zaibatsu typify Japanese societal patterns. Here is the accustomed way to get things done; here are the men with the know-how. Here, and in the bureaucracy, is the know-how upon which the United Nations rely in governing Japan. These men cannot be expected to work in unfamiliar ways. They do not have the “feel” of other patterns of administration. But their associates wield absolute control over their actions, through channels too devious for foreign administrators to discover. These more subtle coercions are reinforced by the *sōshi* and *rōnin*—gangster terrorists, for sale to the highest bidder. In the 1920's the political parties, probably with Zaibatsu backing, kept them employed. In the thirties the army apparently outbid the field and used the gangs against liberals, political parties, and even the Zaibatsu. With the army dis-

banded, the next highest bidder for their services is an easy guess. Even without physical coercion, the Japanese who dared to stand out against the system would be a brave man—probably also a man with no family connections.

Major problems of postwar Japan, therefore, include the question of whether to disintegrate the Zaibatsu, and if so, how. General MacArthur has ordered that these family holdings be broken up. Whether a real break-up is likely to occur may be questioned. If United Nations policy envisions reorganization of Japanese industry along lines conducive to world peace, questions arise as to how that could be done. Basic to any solution is the question of how to create the skilled personnel who could administer both political life and industry in new patterns that would further domestic justice and international coöperation.

Another kind of limitation upon practical policy is defined by certain aspects of Japanese personality. Tautness and emotional strain in individual persons are so typical that recognition of this condition is a *sine qua non* of dealing with Japanese. From earliest times, at home and abroad, the Japanese have manifested unusual tension and strain—outward symptoms of inner conflict. Foreign observers frequently have resorted to words such as touchy, sensitive, easily insulted, secretive, aggressive, aesthetically gifted, moody, tricky, cruel, unpredictable, treacherous, insincere.

The anomalous combination of sensitive intelligence and sadistic brutality may be understood if the individual Japanese is regarded as emotionally repressed and at war within himself. Insecure, fearful persons are both sensitive and cruel. The mal-adjusted, inwardly tortured individual feels that the world is hostile. Inner conflict heightens his sensitivity to anything that pertains to his ego. His responses are capricious because he acts in terms of his concealed conflict, not in terms of the objective situation. He is secretive, even against his obvious inter-

ests, because he fears that his fears will come to light. Such conflict sometimes prods a man into restlessness that promotes achievement. Maladjusted people have made history—not always pleasant history—but they often start something.

During infancy the individual Japanese is indulged freely; then in childhood he encounters a regime of strict conformity to custom and constant anxiety lest his conduct bring ridicule upon his family. A favorite injunction of Japanese parents is, "Don't do that; people will laugh at our family!" In school he is not just another boy. He represents a household whose "face" depends on his conduct. The samurai proverb, "To relax unreasonably is cowardice," is dinned in his ears. Failure in examinations, athletics, or other competition annually drives several hundred students to suicide—the final desperate means of restoring face.⁴ For this reason, in Japanese primary schools, all children pass automatically to the next grade, and when prizes are given, every child receives some kind of prize.

As an adult he dominates his wife and children, but he struggles for status and livelihood in a society so tangled with intrigue and devious dealings that he continues ever on guard, lest he and his family lose both face and livelihood.

The sensitivity engendered by this unrelenting strain spurs individuals to supreme effort on behalf of family, faction, or the emperor. Lest Japan lose face her people have paid closer attention to foreign culture than have most Asiatics. They adopted far more of Chinese culture, for example, than did the Filipinos. They have borrowed Euro-American technology to a vastly greater extent than have the Chinese. Many an alien artifact or idea, however, has been altered or distorted on behalf of the fiction that Japanese can improve on anything foreigners devise. Other nations also boast self-centeredly of their superiority to foreigners, but the Japanese carry the process farther and more frequently go out of their way to change an imported idea merely for the sake of deprecating its alien origin. As a

family-nation Japan regards other nations with the same anxiety over face that a Japanese family entertains toward other families.

The average Japanese continually encounters situations that intensify his emotional tautness. From infancy he has learned never to relax and be himself. Japanese sports—*jūdō*, *kendō* (fencing), *sumō* (wrestling)—are purposefully designed to foster a spirit of win-at-all-costs or die in the effort, to teach the participant to be on guard at all times in every slightest phase of life.⁵ Polite fictions are maintained with hysterical intensity. Face cannot dispense with fictions, and one pretense demands another. Hence the tensions are cumulative. Release comes explosively and savagely in rare outbursts of temper, in alcoholic fantasy, and in the sadistic brutality of Japanese soldiers against foreigners who are beyond the pale of conventional face-saving etiquette. Because he is taut and fearful, a Japanese obeys orders with alacrity when he is sure of proper sanction, but hesitates to act independently of group support.

Perhaps no fundamental transformation of Japanese society is possible unless the family system and the training of infants can be changed completely. How that could be done and what sort of changes are desirable are subjects for debate. The only certainty is that such reforms must be devised and effected by the Japanese themselves. No foreigner can enter into their social system so thoroughly as to gain wholehearted support from the masses.

As in other nations, worry over economic matters has contributed to the tensions that plague the average Japanese. He faces even greater worries in the near future. The common people will worry over jobs and crops, rent and taxes and food. In past economic depressions, the common folk of the cities, finding no employment, have trudged back to the hamlets where their family registers were maintained. There they always could find shelter in the thatch-roofed, clay-walled

cottage of their ancestors, or in the still humbler cottages of tenant-cousins. All members of the enlarged household would go on short rations and eke out a bare subsistence until times improved. This family system has contributed to the breakdown of labor unions in times of hardship. Caught between the pressure of a houseful of nagging relatives who continually urged him to take any work whatever at any wage whatever and the union demand that wage rates be maintained, the union member has yielded to the nearer and more insistent voices. Nevertheless this system has relieved the government of heavy expenditures for relief. The next few years will witness starvation among these overloaded rural households.

In broader perspective, economic problems appear in terms of scarcity of capital for reconstruction, the need for close planning and coördination to support the population in the absence of heavy industry, problems of rationing food and clothing, and seemingly insoluble questions of public finance. The basis of taxation will need revision—hopefully, along lines of lightening the burden on the peasant and forcing industry to bear its due share of public expense. Inflation, the stabilization of the yen in foreign exchange, the extent of foreign trade to be permitted, and a host of other pressing questions will add to the problems of any Japanese government. The data essential to any useful discussion of these economic problems simply are not available at the present time in the United States—probably not in Japan. The only procedure seems to be to wait for facts.

Many economic questions hinge upon the extent of further industrialization and Westernization of Japanese society. Such issues often are discussed without regard to Japanese mentality. Long residence in Japan convinces most persons that these questions may not be divorced. The mechanical devices that originated in the Occident are not in themselves tied to any specific cultural setting. An electric motor operates just as well when turning a Tibetan prayer wheel as it does in a mechanical

refrigerator. Some contrivances—such as a fountain pen—can be adopted by individuals without any change in societal arrangements. Some, as the bicycle, merely speed up certain aspects of social life but effect no fundamental realignments. Factory production, mass transportation, and large-scale finance, however, necessitate basic changes in the place of residence and daily habits of large numbers of people. The Japanese heretofore have made such changes without abandoning their traditional patterns of societal organization. Granted that the growth of industrial cities and the redistribution of population initiate far-reaching societal changes, it seems that such changes do not necessarily involve emergence of any standard type of mentality. Many different cultural frames of reference can be adapted to life under a mechanized regime.

To the foreign sojourner in Japan, the basic similarities of all human beings—the so-called "common-human" features—combine with the visible presence of familiar Occidental mechanical devices to obscure deeper and subtler contrasts in mentality and social situations. At close range, differences in ideology and in patterns of societal organization are lost in the minutiae of everyday living. After all, as organisms human beings are alike in basic physiological and psychological characteristics and needs. The implications of contrasting patterns of societal organization do not force themselves upon the casual observer. Granting the need for emphasis upon the common-human if world peace is to be attained, the differences in mentality at least call for clear perception and sure understanding.

The adoption of Occidental inventions, mechanical or political, effects a superficial similarity despite those fundamental differences that come to focus in international strife. The Japanese have adopted machines, factories, airplanes, and a form of government that includes a constitution, a Cabinet, and a Diet. Nevertheless certain basic differences in patterns of life

and thought persist. A Zaibatsu differs in drastic fashion from even the largest American corporation with its independent, unrelated employees, its diversified stock ownership, and its ready amenability to control by a new group. The Japanese Diet and Cabinet look Occidental, especially when compared with parliamentary institutions of a century ago in Europe; but they serve different masters and have aimed at different objectives.

Whether the consequences of industrialization, urbanization, and parliamentary forms in government inevitably follow similar lines is still debatable, despite the impressive arguments for that thesis. Certainly universal compulsory education in Japan served ends quite in contrast to those of American education. Apparently urban life and factory production have broken down the age-old homogeneity of the Japanese in many ways, with realignments in class status and power, increased importance of women, and many other consequences familiar in the West. The Japanese themselves, however, have insisted that nothing Occidental has been adopted without fundamental modifications and "improvements." Careful study of this claim and its implications is demanded if Occidentals are to deal wisely and successfully with the Japanese. What are these changes? How far is Japanese society still "an Oriental society with a false front of Occidentalism"? The answers differ, and no one can afford to be too sure that the question is settled. Subtle differences in mentality may impose limits upon policy toward Japan that in the long run will be as rigid and unyielding as are geographic limitations.

For nearly two thousand years the events of history have shown the Japanese to be eager learners. They explored the culture of China and appropriated what they desired; they eagerly sought out what they could use in Buddhism; and from the early Portuguese missionaries and their contemporaries the Japanese learned about firearms and fortifications, spongecake and galvanized iron. They have approached Euro-American

civilization of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in like fashion.

Their eager adoption of foreign ideas, however, conspicuously manifests a quality that psychoanalysts would call ambivalent. They adopt while emotionally they repudiate; they admire the foreigner while they hate him. Always they convince themselves that, since Japanese culture was superior at the outset, and since they have modified and improved whatever has been adopted from abroad, Japanese must excel foreigners. What military defeat will do to that age-old frame of mind is still unknown. Japanese participation in a peaceful, ordered world, however, is contingent upon emotional reorientation. The goal of competition needs to be shifted from the deadly earnestness with which their superiority *as Japanese* is asserted, to a kind of competition that some writers have extolled in connection with American amateur sports, in which the ideal of the good loser compensates for the disappointment of defeat. These mores of good sportsmanship have been weeded out of the habits of Japanese youth most assiduously by the militarists, who branded all such nonsense as a despised importation from the decadent democracies. A shift of emphasis in competitive activity is essential if Japan is to regain the respect of the nations.

Back of much that appears in this volume is the feeling that democracy is a good way of life, that its benefits may be extended to many peoples of many cultural backgrounds with great gain to mankind. If Americans have lost the zeal for propagating democracy that flamed during the first World War, such loss may be more serious than appears superficially.

It is suggested that the American dream cannot survive in a world where it is not shared by other great democratically minded peoples. America needs friends who understand her way of life, who hate war and love peace. Those friends will not appear spontaneously. They must be created from the raw material of crumbling social orders in Asia, in Oceania, in

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Europe. Were democracy a form of tyranny, no ethical person could advocate efforts to spread its ideals. But democracy arose in the struggle against tyranny, and there is at least as much justification for advocating democracy as for advocating any other political system. Frankly, it is hoped that Japan may become a democratic nation—in her own way—and the search for ways and means to effect that result is a worthy quest.

NOTES

1. Asakawa Kanichi, *The Documents of *Iki** (New Haven, 1929); *The Early Institutional Life of Japan* (Tōkyō, 1903); "The Life of a Monastic *Shō* in Medieval Japan," *Annual Report American Historical Assn.*, 1916, 1919; "The *Shō* and the Manor," *Journal of Economic and Business History*, I, 182 ff.

2. Mitsui Gomei Kaisha, *The House of Mitsui* (Tōkyō, 1933). Oland D. Russel, *The House of Mitsui* (Boston, 1939). For a general picture of the industrial role of the Zaibatsu, see G. C. Allen, "The Concentration of Economic Control," in E. B. Schumpeter, ed., G. C. Allen, M. S. Gordon, and E. F. Penrose, *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940* (New York, 1940), chap. xviii. For the relations of the Zaibatsu to war and peace, see Andrew Roth, *Dilemma in Japan* (Boston, 1945), chap. iv. On the early organization of Mitsui, see Takekoshi Yosoburō, *The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan* (New York, 1930), II, 277-278, 524-525; III, 469-470.

3. An illuminating catalog of Zaibatsu holdings appears in James A. B. Scherer, *Japan Defies the World* (Indianapolis, 1938), Appendix.

4. Suicide creates face because it demonstrates one's sincerity. The word *makoto*, usually translated "sincerity," does not correspond to the meaning of any English word. A principal meaning is single-minded devotion to a goal, regardless of the cost or the duplicity involved. Japan's "sincerity" was demonstrated by the attack on Pearl Harbor.

5. For an excellent discussion, see Willis C. Lamott, *Nippon: the Crime and Punishment of Japan* (New York, 1944), chap. 11.

CHAPTER II

JAPAN: HAVE OR HAVE-NOT NATION?

Edward Ackerman

One of the most repeated and most effective instruments ever used in psychological warfare was the "have-not" campaign conducted from both ends of the Axis before and during the recent struggle. Japan, like Germany, presented itself as a poor but deserving nation intent only upon getting enough to keep her growing population alive.

"Enough" meant control of all the resources which Japanese leaders considered necessary in quantity for a modernized industry and agriculture. Such resources reputedly were deficient or nonexistent on Japan's home islands—coal, iron, salt, petroleum, alloy minerals, even agricultural land. These lacks formed the basis of all apologies for the stupendous venture which Japan undertook in conquering all East Asia, and for the rash moves which finally brought her to war with the United States. Since credibility greeted the have-not apologies in this country as well as elsewhere in the world, an assessment of the Japanese resource position is essential in the formation of any postwar policy. It is basic to any arguments on territorial cession, reparations, relief, industrial encouragement, and, of course, the military government of Japan proper.

In justice it may be admitted that Japanese claims of resource poverty were not entirely without factual basis. Their arguments were especially convincing in the light of the rapidly increasing population of the islands, the complete occupation of

the arable land, and the generally intelligent measures of conservation which were applied to all resource use. There was no denying that the Japanese had an apparent lack of some metals; both the principal textile fibers, wool and cotton; part of their food supply; the important fuels, coal and oil; materials for their much-needed fertilizer supply; and a fairly long list of minor items. Yet a close examination of the resources of Honshū, Kyūshū, Shikoku, and Hokkaidō shows that the lacks can very easily be exaggerated. Japan is also a "have" nation in many ways, particularly in view of certain recent technological trends.

Perhaps the best way to appreciate Japan's resources and their potential uses will be to consider a hypothetical situation. Suppose Japan were to continue a peacetime life sealed off economically from the rest of the world, very much in the manner of Tokugawa days. What would life in Japan be like? Such a view affords a clue to the wealth or poverty of the national closet and cupboard. Japan probably will not be sealed off completely, but it may be useful to consider conditions under complete sealing as the background against which trade concessions, permits for manufacturing, fishing rights, and other representative postwar policy decisions should be made.

Complete sealing of Japan occasionally has been recommended seriously as a method of postwar strategic control. Critics usually retort promptly that this would mean widespread starvation in Japan—in fact, very rapid return to an agricultural economy and the thirty million population of the early nineteenth century. There would be no support, they contend, for the forty millions who now depend on manufacturing and trade. Therefore most of them would disappear. Facts by no means support this contention.

Examine the problem first in terms of the basic necessities for any group of human beings. For present purposes this admits only food, fuel, clothing, and shelter—and the means of provid-

ing them. The standard will approximate that which prevailed or the Japanese *masses* before the late war.¹ That would mean twenty-five hundred calorie daily food allowance per person, including fifty grams of protein and minimum vitamin requirement; minimum domestic heating only—most domestic fuel would be used for cooking; housing and domestic conveniences constructed from local materials; and clothing of service weights only. These requirements will have to be met for a population of approximately seventy millions—an estimate which allows for a decline of several millions from the recent peak in Japan proper.

Most important of all is food. A disappointingly small percentage of Japan's area is suitable for cultivation of any sort. Only a quarter of the land surface of the home islands has sufficiently gentle slope to permit any kind of farming. Nearly a third of that is unfit for cultivation because of other deterrents. About a sixth is therefore considered cultivable, and nearly all of it is now farmed. A little land remains to be put into new farms, but it will be very expensive to reclaim, and of low productive capacity. The whole would add only a few square rods to each of the present Japanese farms. Most of Japan is mountain—suitable for forest, but quite forbidding to the peasant farmer. Under such conditions it is reasonable to give some credence to the claim that a Japan thrown on itself would starve. With so many thousands for every square mile of land, it would seem logical that some must be unfed. Compare statistics for countries in several parts of the world to see how plausible this sounds. Only Great Britain, which depended on the rest of the world for a major part of its food supply, approached Japan in the high ratio of people to cultivated land.

As far as production and the available food supply are concerned, however, these figures have limited significance. They provide only a general impression. Climate, nonagricultural food sources, food consumption habits, and farming practices

all occasion great variation in the amount and effectiveness of food production among the countries of this list. Japan, with high rainfall, subtropical temperatures over much of the cultivated area, and a very productive fishery offshore, naturally favors high food production. The possibility of double cropping adds about nine thousand square miles (compared to a total arable surface of twenty-four thousand) to the cultivated land.

TABLE 1

RELATION OF POPULATION TO CULTIVATED LAND AREA IN ELEVEN COUNTRIES^a

Country	Statistical Year	Cultivated Land		Population	
		AREA IN 1,000 SQ. MILES	PER CENT OF TOTAL AREA	TO NEAREST MILLION	PER SQ. MI. CULTIVATED LAND
<i>Japan Proper</i>	1938	24	17	72	3,067
Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1938	20	22	47	2,365
Germany	1939	85	40	75	878
Brazil	1936-7	51	1.6	44	865
British India	1931	661	34	353	831
Italy	1937	49	49	44	736
France	1938	88	41	42	479
United States	1938	146	18	130	238
Soviet Union	1934	922	12	170	184
Australia	1937-8	52	1.7	7	135
Canada	1938	91	2.6	11	122

^a Computed from statistics given in official sources.

The intensively pursued marine fishery adds food, for the equivalent of which at least seven thousand square miles of land would be required. Because of the abundant summer rainfall and consequently copious water supply, and the high summer temperatures, about twelve thousand square miles of the Japanese farmed area is worth about two and a half times as much as a similar area in Great Britain, Italy, France, or any other drier and more temperate land, in terms of food productivity. If one takes into consideration all these factors,

a rough calculation indicates that Japan's food-producing capacity is equal to about sixty thousand square miles of cultivated land in northern Europe or in western or northeastern United States. Reduced to equivalence with land in northern Europe, Japan thus has a population of about twelve hundred for what may be called a square mile of equivalent food-producing capacity. That is considerably less than the three thousand given on the above list.

One therefore need not be astonished when he learns that the Japanese were able to produce about 85 per cent of their required food supply on the home islands before the war. Undoubtedly they came nearer to self-sufficiency during the war. Intensive fertilization, concentration of a large part of their farming effort on grains, many land-saving labor practices, and a national diet which does not waste protein (in contrast to most American and European diets) helped to bring them within range of self-sufficiency in food. Japan, if necessary, could be self-sufficient in its food supply in the postwar period, for there are several ways in which the former 15 per cent deficit might be made to disappear. In the first place, self-sufficiency would presuppose rationing on the basis given earlier in this discussion—a twenty-five hundred calorie individual diet, including fifty grams of protein. Since before the war the national average was somewhat above that, rationing at a twenty-five hundred calorie level would leave only about a 10 per cent deficit, assuming that production continued at a prewar level. Production of food might also be increased. Part of this might result merely from diversion of land or edible materials from other uses. Approximately one-fifth of the fish catch before the war, for example, was processed for nonedible fish meal. Some of this material, at least, might have been diverted to Japanese cooking pots. Some land formerly devoted to exportable industrial crops like peppermint, pyrethrum, and mulberry might be planted to food.

In addition, and in spite of the admirably meticulous way in which the Japanese have farmed their land, there are some possibilities for increasing agricultural production. Almost every foreign agricultural expert reviewing Japan has stressed the possibilities of improving crop production through seed selection and plant breeding. Experiments by the Japanese themselves have proven that somewhat surprising increases in the yields of their staple rice are not only possible but also within the limit of economic practicability. An organization known as the Better Farming Association (*Zaidanhōjin Fumin Kyōkai*) proved as early as 1933 that under scientific management rice fields could produce three times the national average for the same year—and more cheaply than the national average per unit of weight or volume.² Allowing for human idiosyncrasies, an increase in the national rice production to twice its former amount is within the limits of possibility. Since rice alone accounts for 40 per cent of the cultivated acreage in Japan, making up the 10 per cent deficit should not be too difficult.

Under these conditions the diet of course would lack some of the exotic foods to which some Japanese have become accustomed in the immediate past, like tropical fruits, and the fish which were caught in the South Seas, but those things are not necessary. Perhaps the most serious loss would come in a reduced sugar supply. Since it is now possible to produce sugar from a great many different commodities which the Japanese will have—even wood—that too is a problem capable of solution. All things considered, the seventy million people who inhabit the islands can be fed well enough to maintain health, provided an intensive fishery is prosecuted and scientific agriculture encouraged. Indeed it should even be possible to provide for a future increased population on the islands solely on the basis of their own land and marine resources.

Provision of an adequate food supply for seventy millions or more presupposes, for a time at least, use of the entire land

resource and nearly all of the products of the fishery. There remains only a very small margin for the production of industrial crops. That would mean that very little provision will be made agriculturally for clothing. Since every nation has to make some provision for fibers, have we then not set up a condition impossible of achievement? Considering its latitude, Japan must have a clothing supply—a need met by heavy importations of cotton, and a little wool during all prewar years. A home production of silk helped only to a minor extent.

Some silk production could continue under the conditions described above, since mulberry cultivation actually takes very little land out of food production. The staple textile supply, however, would have to come from other sources. In postwar Japan that might very well be from the forests, possibly aided to a certain extent by synthetics produced from minerals.

The four-fifths of the Japanese land unsuited to cultivation can, and for the most part does, support a luxuriant forest growth. There are many different species of trees, from the subtropical evergreens and pines of the south, through the fast growing *sugi* (cedar), *hinoki* (cypress), and deciduous trees of Central Honshū, to the spruce and fir of Hokkaidō. Among all these stands there is entirely adequate basis for a sustained yield of rayon pulp sufficient to clothe seventy million people, and more. Japan in fact is clothing herself now with rayon and synthetic fibers produced from native woods. Cotton and wool imports since 1941 have amounted to little more than a trickle from North China and Manchuria. While in this country many consumers still prefer cotton or woolen goods, most of us who wear garments of synthetic fiber daily hardly consider it a hardship. Neither would the Japanese, if the quality of their synthetic fiber approached that now available in this country or England.

A domestic fuel supply and a major part of the necessary building material could be provided from the same source. In

these cases it would be without departure from past Japanese habits or traditions. Most Japanese still heat their homes (if it can be called heating!) and cook their food by charcoal which has been made from wood. Only a few urban sophisticates have thought of anything else. Since the raw material for charcoal is wood hardly desirable for any other use—dead branches collected from the forest, limbs lopped from trees felled for lumber, woody scrub growth—a charcoal domestic fuel supply does not compete with other uses of wood. The manufacture and burning of charcoal represents good conservational management—which the Japanese are likely to continue of their own accord.

If a more modern method of providing heat and domestic fuel becomes practicable or desirable, Japan has also an adequate potential for the production of electricity. In fact, her limited supply of mineral fuels and the combination of mountainous terrain and rainy climate have stimulated development of an already extensive power network based on hydroelectric stations. Most homes in Japan, even in rural areas, already are wired for electricity and use it at least for illumination.

The supply of building materials likewise leaves little occasion for public concern in the long run. The Japanese islands provide all of the materials traditionally used in housing construction—wood, bamboo, straw, and clay.

Almost every American who reads the newspapers now knows that Japanese settlements are highly inflammable. Simplicity of construction and extensive use of wood and paper render their structures vulnerable but easily rebuilt from native raw materials. Instead of some hundred or more materials which are needed in an American house, materials which must be assembled from the corners of the continent, the typical Japanese house contains only wood, paper, and tile. The need for metal is reduced to a minimum by the use of sliding doors and partitions, by the very simple plumbing arrangements, and

by substitution of wood, bamboo, or tile wherever possible. Wood also appears in the house furnishings in a dominant role—exclusively wooden or bamboo furniture, wooden bathtubs, wooden chopsticks instead of silverware, and so on. So long as wood and bamboo are available, no Japanese need be asked to undergo hardship, or even a life to which he has been unaccustomed in the past. Construction of the needed dwellings and furnishings will always be feasible.

A question will certainly arise as to the durability of the Japanese wood supply under the conditions which are here described. Wood for houses, wood for fuel, wood for fabrics, wood for shoes, possibly even wood for sugar and alcohol—how long can Japanese forests and woodlands support the drain which would fall on them as the result of such practices? This is an especially pertinent question in the light of prewar importations of timber to Japan, their generally intelligent forestry practices, and the excessively high drain which will fall on Japanese forests while the ruined cities and towns are being rebuilt. Careful studies of the Japanese forest situation, like a recent one by W. N. Sparhawk of the United States Forest Service,³ indicate that self-sufficiency in timber supply is entirely feasible. The following quotation summarizes the Japanese wood and forest outlook very well:

After the present war ends, Japan will have to have very large quantities of timber to rebuild her cities and to maintain her economy, even if certain industries are restricted in their use of wood. She will have to get this from her own forests. At the same time, she probably will be called upon to supply timber for repairing the damage done in invaded countries. This will necessitate temporary overcutting of Japanese forests. Such overcutting can and should be carried out in a manner that will maintain essential forest cover and leave the forests in a productive condition. With careful management, the forests should recover from this overcutting, so that they will continue to supply Japan's timber needs, and perhaps some of her neighbors' needs also. Eventually, say within 60 or 80 years, they ought to yield annually at least twice as much timber

as was cut in the years just before the war. . . . Actual growth probably is much less than the potential growth. . . . Several Japanese authorities believe that Japan can eventually produce a surplus of timber above her own requirements, even if the population should double in the next fifty years.⁴

In short, Japan has the major resources with which to clothe, house, and keep warm a population of seventy millions or more indefinitely—as well as the resources to feed that many people. True, Baron Narikin, the scions of the House of Mitsusaki, and their like may not be supported in their prewar style, but Suzuki *San* can live pretty much as he did before. He may not be able to look forward to retirement on an income, like some American farmers and workers in industry, and he will not be provided with the American kind of amusements. But then he never has expected any of these things. He will still have his family, plenty of scenery, the traditional game of *gō*, and whatever security his family will provide in old age.

This picture, however, omits one basic feature. There is one catch. For the maintenance of an agriculture, a fishery, and the production of textile fibers at the levels here assumed, some supporting industry—and the resources for that supporting industry—will be necessary. Commercial fertilizers must be produced for the crops to be grown, since agriculture could not meet the requirements of a scientific cultivation without them. The natural fertility of the soil over most of Japan was nearly exhausted a thousand years ago, and nonindustrial fertilizers are not adequate, even with careful conservation of human wastes. Without chemically prepared nitrates, phosphates, and potash, food enough for some of the seventy millions could not be produced.

Fertilizer production is the most important. But there also must be production of basic chemicals needed for fertilizer manufacture and for synthetic fiber manufacture. There must

be manufacture of a certain amount of transportation equipment—rolling stock, motive power, and the materials for maintaining roadways. Fishing craft and vessels for freighting will be necessary. Machinery of all sorts will be needed for all of these things, and for farm, mine, and forest work. The factories and motive equipment will have to be powered and lubricated.

This manufacturing, and in turn the food-fuel-clothing-shelter supply for Japan, will depend on the availability of certain raw materials. Do the four islands have them?

With one or two significant exceptions the answer is decidedly yes—although not in great quantities. There probably can be no manufacturing industry on the prewar scale, but there can be enough to meet the essential minimum demands of a near-closed economy.

For the basic chemicals Japan has all of the essentials. Sulphur, as might be expected from the many evidences of volcanic activity on the islands, is present in more than adequate quantities. Of coal and copper there is enough for minimum needs. Salt production, which is entirely by means of the solar process (using sea water), in the past has been sufficient to meet only half the domestic need, but it could be expanded, and industrial consumption probably need not be as large as it has been in the immediate past. And as in most other countries of the world, there is enough limestone for any possible demand.

The power, fuel, and lubrication demands similarly can be met in their probable minimum extent in postwar Japan. To be sure, there is little petroleum, but there is enough to enable the islands to meet all possible lubrication demands for some years. There can be enough coal from the mines in northern Kyūshū and on Hokkaidō to furnish all that will be required for many decades. This would include provision for the manufacture of synthetic gasoline, where gasoline could not be dispensed with. Hydroelectricity, which probably would be the

prime mover of the islands, is still capable of some expansion, even though it has already been quite intensively developed. Pressure on the coal supply could thus be relieved.

A Japan thrown on its own resources undoubtedly would feel the pinch of isolation most in phases of mineral supply. There would be two critical points—the provision of materials which go directly into the commercial fertilizers, and the supply of metals. Yet even in these it could come much closer to self-sufficiency than is generally supposed.

TABLE 2

CONSUMPTION OF PHOSPHORIC ACID AND POTASH IN JAPAN IN 1938^a

Phosphoric Acid · Potash ·		
Average application, pounds per acre	46	49
Approximate total amount applied, tons	460,000	490,000
Per cent supplied by chemical fertilizer (largely from imported material)	47	20

^a Computed from data supplied by the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture

Three mineral substances are necessary in any scientifically managed agriculture in quantities large enough so that their supply may raise a problem: nitrates, phosphates, and potash. As far as a local resource is concerned, the first is no problem now for any nation that has a power supply and technical know-how. Nitrogen fixation has freed man from dependence on the earth in this respect for all time. Nitrogen can be produced from the air in any quantity desired. The only difficulty at this particular stage in world history is the ease with which nitrogen fixation plants can be converted from fertilizer to explosives manufacture. But Japan will have to be permitted to use this resource, or importation of nitrates will be imperative.

For both phosphates and potash there are no strategic com-

plications, but the supply would be a problem without importation. About a million tons of phosphate rock and two hundred thousand of potash compounds were imported from abroad in typical years previous to 1941. These amounts represented about 47 per cent of the phosphate, and about 20 per cent of the potash application to Japanese crops. Without either of these importations there would be an unquestionable decline in yield (probably about 8 per cent), unless the difference could be made up from other sources. While added production of both these substances from native materials might be possible, it would be quite difficult in view of the effort already devoted to conservation of every scrap that might contain a fertilizing element. Apparently some might be recovered through improved utilization of by-products in industrial processes—from cement manufacture, distilling, and smelting. But chief reliance for an increase would have to be marine sources—use of animal materials and seaweed, and the final remote possibility of production from sea water. In all, the production of both potash and phosphate from local materials might be sufficient to support the seventy millions, but it is quite unlikely that it ever could reach the amount necessary for local agriculture supporting a larger population.

In respect to production of necessary metals, Japan's situation also presents some problems; but again the country could scrape by if needs are considered from the point of view of a minimum industry rather than of the prewar industry. It would have enough copper, magnesium, zinc, gold, nickel, silver, and manganese. By careful conservation, rationing, and detailed attention to substitution, iron, lead, tin, mercury, and antimony could be made to last for some decades. There would be no aluminum, and the supply of the alloy metals molybdenum, tungsten, and vanadium would be negligible. Furthermore, the necessary smelting processes could be carried on—some writers

on Japan to the contrary. In the immediate past Japan has been in the habit of importing coking coal because coke from domestic coals was high priced and poor in quality. Japanese coke, however, is usable in smelting; and smelting and refining also could be carried on partly by electrical processes. Some phases of metallurgy would be high-cost industry, to be sure; but costs might not be much higher than in the past, when

TABLE 3
JAPAN—MINERAL RESOURCES AND MINERAL PRODUCTION¹

	Estimated Reserves ^a · Production ·	
	1,000 TONS	1,000 TONS
Coal.....	16,671,000	42,803 ^d
Iron.....	55,000-80,000	620 ^d
Copper.....	Unestimated; probably adequate several decades ^b	125 ^{f, h}
Zinc.....		48 ^{d, h}
Lead.....	^b	1 ^b
Petroleum.....	40,000 ^a -100,000 ^c	2,500 ^{e, f}
Manganese.....	Widely distributed	70 ^a
Chromite.....	^b	48 ^a
Sulphur.....	Widely distributed	222 ^d
Salt.....	Unlimited—sea water	600 ^a
Tin.....	^b	2 ^{d, h}

^a Proven, probable, possible

^f 1938

^b Exact extent unknown

^g 1939

^c 1,000 barrels

^h metal content

^d 1936

ⁱ Compiled from official sources

^e 1937

liberal government subsidies alone have kept much of Japan's heavy manufacturing industry in existence.

Under such restrictions many things in Japan would be changed. Economic life would differ from the patterns to which the American people are accustomed. There would be almost no high seas merchant fleet, and steel construction, even

for coasting vessels, would be very limited. There could be no navy, and a fair number of merchant and fishing vessels would have to rely upon sails for power. Railway rolling stock would have to be constructed largely of wood, with steel reserved for more essential uses, including locomotives and rails. But with the recent developments in plywoods and impregnated wood, this need be no hardship.

There would be no automotive industry of any importance. In the past, however, no real automotive industry existed. Only by dint of great effort was such an industry created for strategic purposes. There would be little structural steel—hence bridges would have to be built of wood, and concrete depended upon for other construction where wood would not suffice. Again conditions would not differ much from Japan's immediate past. Agricultural machinery could never be manufactured in quantity. However, there probably would be none in any event. The physical conditions of cultivation in Japan discourage, and probably always will discourage, mechanized cultivation. Finally, because of the lack of some alloys, the machinery manufactured might not always be of the highest quality. Nevertheless it can be serviceable. Lack of quality in machinery, incidentally, might be considered a good guarantee against the development of future war industry.

With the manufacturing industry, the farming economy, the marine industry, and other extractive industries operating to the extent made possible by their environment alone, the many Mr. Suzukis of Japan would not fare so badly. In fact they might be somewhat better off than before the war, once the disorganized period immediately following surrender is past. They would have fewer material or imperial reasons for patriotic inspiration; they would wear rayon instead of cotton; and a bicycle would be somewhat harder to get. Measures of conservation would have to be practiced even more rigidly than before—meaning that every bone, button, and scrap of sewage

would have to be put to use. On the other hand they would have enough to eat, and they would live in houses nearly identical with those of the present, including electricity. (That is not for many people in the world.)

This is the base upon which we can determine almost any sort of life that we wish for the Japanese. But the complete sealing of Japan is hardly probable. While it would be an easily administered method of control, it would permit no reparations, and it would not be a permanent solution. Only if we wish to spare ourselves further trouble in this generation at the expense of the next should it be considered. Many of the mineral resources will last only a little more than a hundred years, in spite of the reduced rate of consumption here assumed. Beyond those hundred years some other adjustment would have to be sought.

Perhaps the most cogent argument for the operation of a sealed-economy in Japan is the effect it might have on its demographic policy. Sooner or later the Japanese, and other Far Eastern peoples as well, must realize that politically encouraged multiplication will never be recognized by other nations as an excuse for demanding control of resources. A Japan faced with the cold limits placed by reserves of minerals on its own islands might not seek strength or glory in numbers.

On the other hand, if the United Nations wish the Japanese to raise their standard of living above what it now is; if they wish to maintain Japanese manufactures as an important part of the Far Eastern economy; if, more selfishly, they wish reparations; or if they feel that Japanese have as much right to increase their numbers as anyone else—then they will have to permit Japan access to resources outside the islands. Access to those resources need be only through the normal channels of international trade, but Japan must be permitted to have them in proportion to the effect desired. It must be recognized that any Japanese hope for a better life must be based on the opportunity Japan has to exchange labor for raw materials. At one

extreme is the economically sealed Japan which has been used for purposes of illustration; at the other extreme would be a Japan permitted free access to any materials needed for non-military industries. If we seek absolute assurance of a Japan with little military potential—and a hard peace—we shall approximate the former. If we are internationally altruistic, and are mindful of the long-term solution, we shall approximate the latter. In any event it is important to realize that Japan, measured absolutely, is not a resource-poor or have-not nation. Many other parts of the earth, of similar area, have fewer resources than Japan. It is a nation made relatively poor by its fecundity. So long as there are three to four children in the average Japanese family, there will be an increasingly acute resource problem in Japanese territory.

NOTES

1. This assumption does not ignore the widespread dissatisfaction with that standard in prewar days. Nevertheless, the Japanese not only maintained health but also were able to undertake more than a decade of aggressive warfare.

2. As reported by O. W. Willcox in *Nations Can Live at Home* (New York, 1935), pp. 236-239.

3. W. N. Sparhawk, *Japan, Forest Resources, Forest Products, Forest Policy* (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Forest Service, Div. of Forest Economics Pamphlet, May, 1945).

4. Sparhawk, *op. cit.*, p. 3, p. 11.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PRESENT-DAY JAPAN

G. Nye Steiger

For a cursory summary such as is possible within the space allotted in this volume, Japanese history can be divided into five periods. The first, or formative, period of the nation dates from about the commencement of the Christian era to the end of the sixth century. Following this and extending to about the middle of the twelfth century, comes what may be called the early imperial period during which political authority, under a nominally sovereign emperor, was under the control of civilian officials. With the collapse of civilian control in the middle of the twelfth century Japan entered on the early feudal period which lasted until the establishment of Tokugawa power in 1600. The fourth, or Tokugawa, period lasted from 1600 until the resignation of the last Shōgun in 1867. The modern period covers the slightly more than three-quarters of a century since the Tokugawa. Inasmuch as the history of Japan, even more truly than that of most other countries, is a seamless fabric, these divisions should not be taken too seriously; they are admittedly arbitrary and are employed merely to indicate certain broad changes that have occurred during the course of the past two thousand years.

I. THE FORMATIVE PERIOD: 25 (?) B.C.-A.D. 593

Officially, the history of Japan begins in the year 660 B.C., when Jimmu Tennō, Japan's first human ruler, ascended the

throne and established a dynasty that has ruled the land since that time in unbroken succession. This date is solemnly taught in all Japanese schools and is promulgated from time to time in public documents, but competent historical scholars—Japanese as well as Western—have long since demonstrated its purely fictitious character and have arrived at the conclusion that the probable date of Jimmu's accession was about 25 B.C.¹

Even with this correction of its opening date, the early centuries of Japanese history are extremely hazy. Although the use of Chinese written characters was introduced into their country early in the fifth century A.D., the Japanese long remained dependent upon Korean or Chinese scribes for their paper work, and it was not until early in the eighth century that they developed a body of native scholars sufficiently skilled in the art of writing to undertake the compilation of their first volume of written history, the *Kojiki*, which was completed in 712. For the earlier centuries of their work the authors of the *Kojiki*, and of the more elaborate *Nihongi* which was completed a decade later, were forced to rely upon the accumulated legends and traditions that had been handed down by word of mouth from generation to generation. During the last three preceding centuries, however, there had been produced in Japan a considerable body of documentary material, the work of foreign or—more recently—native scribes, which provided from about the middle of the fifth century a substantial and fairly reliable foundation of facts.

For the period prior to the fifth century, some light is thrown upon Japan and the Japanese by isolated passages in the historical records of their more advanced neighbors, China and Korea. Even before the probable date of Jimmu Tennō, the people of Korea had firsthand contact with soldiers of fortune from the Japanese islands, who dominated the southern extremity of the peninsula and engaged in frequent raids upon the more northerly areas. China's earliest known contact with the island

people came in 57 A.D.—some eighty years after Jimmu's accession to the throne—when an envoy from the state of "Ito," located in the northeastern part of Kyūshū, arrived at Loyang with a tributary offering to the Han Dynasty ruler, Kuang Wu Ti. On his return to his own country the envoy was accompanied by a Chinese official who eventually returned to Loyang and submitted to the throne a brief description of the Japanese people and their institutions. During the next five and a half centuries other embassies, or "tributary missions," from Japan were noted at long intervals in the Chinese records. Until the opening of the seventh century, however, contact between the two countries was largely by way of Korea, which served as a culture-bridge for the flow of Chinese arts and sciences into Japan.

When China's first official visitor to Japan recorded his impressions of the Japanese, the descendant of Jimmu Tennō appears to have been little more than a strong local ruler of Yamato—a district lying just to the east of the Inland Sea—who had succeeded in establishing his primacy among, or supremacy over, the other clan and tribal chieftains in central and western Honshū. During the next two centuries this primacy became steadily more complete, and the Yamato ruler, whose claim to descent from the Sun Goddess had gained general acceptance, exercised suzerainty over central and western Honshū, over northern Kyūshū, and over the military leaders who had set themselves up as local rulers in the southern part of Korea.

In the course of the first century A.D., with the greater part of the Korean peninsula organized into three independent and frequently warring kingdoms, the southern extremity, a region known to the Japanese as "Kaya," was a happy hunting ground for warlike bands of Japanese adventurers and an important source for grain to supplement the food supply of Japan. These adventurers carved out domains for themselves and made a profitable business of plundering the territories of the two

Korean states immediately north of them. When the Yamato ruler succeeded in establishing his suzerainty over the war lords of southern Korea, Kaya became important to him and his successors not merely as a source of tribute grain but also as a base from which to attempt the conquest of the entire peninsula. Although Japanese history records a glorious campaign late in the fourth century, led by the semimythical Empress Jingō, no support for this account can be found in Chinese or Korean sources. All three histories agree, however, that the constantly recurring struggles between the three Korean kingdoms enabled Yamato, still backward and relatively weak, to reap a profit by coming to the aid of one Korean belligerent against its enemies.

II. PERIOD OF IMPERIAL-CIVILIAN RULE: 593-1156

In the year 593 a woman ruler, the Empress Suiko, ascended the Yamato throne, while her nephew Prince Shōtoku—"Shōtoku Taishi"—took over the administration of affairs as regent for his aunt. The new sovereign, widow of a previous ruler, was a member of the influential Soga family which held by hereditary right the highest post among the civilian officials of the court and which, for more than half a century, had been consolidating its position by marrying its daughters into the imperial clan. While thus intrenching themselves as the power behind the throne, the Soga had also been working to bring about the subordination of the quasi-independent clan chieftains and the centralization of all authority in the hands of the Yamato ruler. As a useful instrument in the achievement of this purpose the head of the Soga family, in 552, had welcomed the arrival of Buddhism from Korea and had devoted himself to the spread of the new religion at the expense of the indigenous Shintō cult. As chief of the most powerful clan and as the descendant of the Sun Goddess—ranking deity in the Shintō pantheon—the Yamato ruler enjoyed enough pres-

tige among his fellow clan chieftains to claim suzerainty over them. But these other chieftains also were heads of warrior clans, and they also claimed descent from divine—albeit less exalted—ancestors. Hence some deflation of these rival claims was necessary before the Yamato lord could attain the status of a real emperor.

Shōtoku Taishi, himself a Soga on the maternal side and married to a daughter of the Soga family, fully sympathized with the political and religious objectives of his in-laws. Unlike his Soga relatives, however, Shōtoku was a devout believer, rather than a political promoter, of the Buddhist faith. He was, moreover, one of the most competent scholars of his time in Japan, thoroughly educated in Chinese language and literature as well as in the political philosophy of Confucianism, all of which had begun to reach Japan early in the fifth century. During his twenty-eight years as regent Shōtoku devoted his unusual talents to fostering the spread of the Buddhist faith and establishing for Japan a strong centralized government patterned after that of the Chinese Empire. For the accomplishment of this twofold task more knowledge was needed—knowledge of Buddhist doctrines and knowledge of the culture and political institutions of China. Dissatisfied with indirect access to this knowledge by way of Korea, Shōtoku decided to open direct relations with China itself, and in 607 he dispatched an envoy to the Chinese court accompanied by a number of scholars who were to remain in that country until they were thoroughly educated. Other groups of students followed this first group until there were hundreds of Japanese learning from Chinese masters the arts, the philosophy, and the political ideas which their prince wished to introduce into Japan. By the time of his death in 621, Shōtoku had gone far toward the accomplishment of his aims. As regent he exercised on behalf of the empress powers which no previous Japanese sovereign had dared to assert, while the old Shintō cult, completely dis-

placed by Buddhism at the imperial court, "was rapidly losing its influence in other parts of the country.

For a while the changes brought about by Shōtoku appeared destined to benefit the House of Soga rather than the descendants of Jimmu Tennō. In 643, however, the all-powerful Soga were overthrown by a conspiracy headed by two men: Prince Naka no Ōye—who, in the closing years of his life (668-671), ruled as Emperor Tenchi—and Nakatomi no Kamatari, who was the guiding spirit and who, until his death in 669, was to be the new power behind the throne. In 645 these two, with the assistance of the many students who had returned from long years of residence and study in China, embarked upon a program of gradual but far-reaching reforms designed to complete the unfinished work of Shōtoku Taishi. As a result of this program—known as *Taikwa* or the Great Reform—the political structure of Japan, on paper at least, was completely transformed. Under an absolute emperor who claimed title to every foot of land in the country, the once autonomous clan chiefs found themselves reduced to the status of mere functionaries, executing the emperor's laws, collecting his taxes, and dependent upon his pleasure for their continuance in office. To supervise the administration of imperial affairs, numerous boards and bureaus were set up, manned by a newly created hierarchy of officials; a new system of taxation was instituted to insure the collection of an adequate imperial revenue; and an imperial university was created to provide for the training of competent officials. All these innovations were copied from the institutions of T'ang China, and in 710 the new imperial government was provided with a suitable home by the erection of Japan's first capital, the city of Nara.

Aside from their success in centralizing political power in the hands of an imperial government, the Taikwa reformers accomplished little. Even in the political field, indeed, much of their achievement was superficial and apparent rather than

real. This was particularly true of the new system of land tenure which, based on the Chinese theory that all land was part of the imperial domain, was designed to provide a permanent and adequate revenue derived from the land tax. The former clan rulers failed to pay or, for political reasons, were excused from paying the land tax; grants of tax-free land were made to favorites, court officials, and religious institutions; and, especially in the more distant provinces, ingenious means of evading the land tax were devised. Equally unsuccessful was the attempt, by the establishment of new educational institutions, to lessen the dependence of the central government upon the landed aristocracy as the source of its bureaucrats. In Japan—unlike China—admission to the university and even to the lower schools was restricted to members of the nobility and the aristocracy, and Japan's educated officials were thus bound by ties of blood and interest to the groups against which the government most needed to be on the alert. In the words of Sir George Sansom:

When the Japanese adopted Chinese administrative methods, which by the time of the T'ang rulers had developed to a high pitch of efficiency, they borrowed the forms and the terminology, but not the underlying principles. The constitution of society in Japan was now perhaps even more aristocratic than it had ever been, for the creation of new offices merely gave to the privileged classes new powers and new prestige. It is hardly too much to say that the new system merely perpetuated under other names, and often emphasized, the abuses of the old.²

The fall of the house of Soga, moreover, did not mean that the descendants of the Sun Goddess, drawing inspiration from their divine ancestress, were henceforth to exercise their sovereignty as they saw fit. As has already been noted, the guiding spirit in the plot against the Soga and the power behind the throne from that time until his own death was Nakatomi no Kamatari. In 669 Kamatari's old fellow-conspirator, now rul-

ing as the Emperor Tenchi, conferred upon him posthumously the new family name of Fujiwara (Wistaria) in memory of the wistaria arbor in which the two had met, years before, to plot their *coup d'état*.¹

For more than three centuries, by employing the tactics of their Soga predecessors, the Fujiwara family maintained its supremacy over the imperial court. Each successive emperor was compelled to accept one or more Fujiwara wives, and only sons of Fujiwara mothers were permitted to ascend the throne. If the emperor was a child, and adult emperors were usually forced to abdicate as soon as a suitable heir was available, his Fujiwara grandfather or uncle assumed the office of regent. During the period—usually short—between an emperor's attainment of his majority and his abdication in favor of an infant son, the Fujiwara regent, as Mayor of the Palace, continued to rule with unimpaired powers.

During the two centuries following Shōtoku Taishi's assumption of the regency in 593, the effects of Chinese influence were not limited to the growth of Buddhism and the introduction of new political ideas and institutions, and the by-products of Buddhism in Japan were, in some respects, more important than its purely religious effects. The hundreds of Japanese students who went to study in China, some of them for periods of twenty or thirty years, were deeply impressed by the richness of Chinese culture and returned home determined to transplant as much as possible of this culture into their native land. In the field of religion they brought back various and widely divergent concepts of the Buddhist faith and established a number of rival sects whose theological and philosophical interpretations of the scriptures gave rise to bitter conflict. But they also brought to Japan an appreciation of Chinese art which, at that time, was at the height of its T'ang glory. For a while, of course, the new art was largely the work of foreign sculptors, painters, and architects working on Japanese soil; as time went

on, however, Japanese artists, at first merely reproducing or imitating the work of their continental masters but later developing independent styles, played an increasingly important role in the development of a truly Japanese art.

In the economic field, also, contact with China had a revolutionary effect upon the Japanese way of life. New handicrafts and skills, first practiced by imported Chinese artisans but quickly taken up by native workers, made available a multitude of hitherto unknown luxuries and conveniences. And the increased production of such commodities made possible the accumulation of wealth in forms and to an extent also without precedent. Urbanization, with the consequent development of a new leisure class and—even for the workers—a rising standard of living among the urban population, upset the old economy of the nation and, especially in the outlying provinces, brought increasing hardship to the agricultural classes. For nearly three-quarters of a century Nara, Japan's first real city, was the seat of the new government and the center of a revolutionary way of life. Planned as a replica of the Chinese capital at Ch'angan, with broad streets and splendid palaces, Nara soon housed a thriving population of some two hundred thousand, of which perhaps 10 per cent were absorbed in the study or practice of Chinese art, science, literature, philosophy, and religion, while the several Buddhist sects, housed in imposing edifices, strove for imperial preference and popular favor. In 784, partly because of the overweening influence of Buddhist prelates, the emperor and his Fujiwara advisers decided to leave Nara, and ten years later, after a temporary sojourn at nearby Nagaoka, the seat of government was located in the newly built city of Kyōto.

First at Nara and later at Kyōto, the Fujiwara family was for nearly three hundred years the actual government of Japan. The continuance of its domination can be attributed to two facts: the maintenance of unbroken family solidarity and the painstaking elimination of all potential rivals for power. Not

until the twelfth century did members of the Fujiwara family oppose each other in open political controversy. And, although many non-Fujiwara officers held government posts during this period, the appearance of any conspicuously capable or ambitious individual, whether minor official or imperial prince, was a signal for his prompt removal from public life by forced retirement into a monastery, by exile from the capital, or, in extreme cases, by death.

Clever though they were as politicians, the heads of the Fujiwara were poor administrators, and their long period of supremacy at Kyōto saw the slow but steady decline of the imperial power which they had brought so completely under their control. Indeed, the very means whereby they sought to insure their unchallenged power, the constant elimination of all potential rivals, contributed both to the decay of the central government and to the growth of the forces which were destined eventually to overthrow the system of civilian-imperial rule. Their policy may have made Kyōto safe for the Fujiwara, but it also fostered an official mediocrity which left the government poorly equipped to deal with the increasingly complex problems confronting it. On the other hand, the dangerous men thus removed from official service—except for those who were put to death—either went into monastic retirement to plot against their Fujiwara enemies or, exiled to the outlying provinces, joined the ranks of the soldiers of fortune who were carving out family estates and establishing a new hierarchy of military power.

The first serious challenge to Fujiwara domination came in 1072 when the former emperor Sanjō II, having retired to monastic life, set up a rival behind-the-scenes organization to control the government of his successor. Sanjō II died in 1073, but fourteen years later his son similarly abdicated and, from the safe seclusion of the cloister, administered the affairs of state on behalf of his own infant son and successor. Through

five reigns, covering the years 1087-1156, two successive "cloistered emperors" were able to control the government in defiance of the once all-powerful Fujiwara. Then the almost comic-opera situation at Kyōto finally broke down. On the death of the second cloistered emperor, in 1156, schism occurred simultaneously in the ranks of both the Imperial and Fujiwara families. A former emperor, supported by one Fujiwara faction, repented of his abdication and attempted to reoccupy the throne in the face of stubborn opposition from the reigning sovereign and his Fujiwara adherents, and both factions called in powerful *daimyō*, leaders of the military aristocracy, to support their claims. The struggle ended with the triumph of those supporting the reigning emperor, but when the dust of battle had cleared away it was found that all real power had passed from the hands of emperor and Fujiwara alike into those of the military outsiders. The days of civilian rule were over, and the day of the soldier had come.

III. THE EARLY FEUDAL PERIOD: 1156-1600

Japan's early feudal period, as distinct from the later and more centralized feudal regime of the Tokugawa, covers approximately four and a half centuries and includes the initial period of Taira domination, the Kamakura and Ashikaga shogunates, and the transition period of national unification which led up to the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate.

Up to the moment when the rival court factions called upon the provincial war lords to aid them in their struggle, Kyōto still enjoyed great prestige as the center of wealth and culture and as the source of greatly coveted court honors. Long before this time, however, the imperial government had ceased to exercise any real authority outside the immediate environs of the capital; out in the provinces power rested upon armed strength. Among the landholding warrior families that had risen to power in the provinces during the eleventh and twelfth

centuries two names—Taira and Minamoto—were particularly prominent. Each name covered a number of related families, and each indicated imperial origin, the Taira families being descended from a son of the eighth-century emperor Kwammu, while the Minamoto families traced their descent from the younger sons of several later rulers. During the course of the eleventh century, largely as the result of victories over their Taira rivals, the Minamoto families had become the dominant power in the eastern region known as the Kwantō, and the families of the Taira group, withdrawing toward the west, had established themselves in the provinces nearer to the capital. The Kyōto affair of 1156 found Taira and Minamoto warriors, ignoring for the time their long-standing family rivalry, fighting side by side in both camps, and after the fighting was over, the vanquished—whether Taira or Minamoto—were ruthlessly exterminated by their victorious kinsmen. Four years later, however, the old Taira-Minamoto feud split the victorious coalition and, after a brief struggle, the Minamoto element was defeated and annihilated, leaving the Taira in complete control.

Except for the fact that power had passed from the polished courtier to the rough-handed man of war, Taira rule at Kyōto was a mere continuation of what had gone before. Imitating his Fujiwara predecessors as they, in their time, had imitated the Soga, the head of the Taira family—Kiyomori—employed the matrimonial technique to buttress his position of power. In 1169 he assumed the posts of chancellor and regent for an imperial nephew, and eleven years later he had the proud pleasure of placing a three-year-old grandson upon the imperial throne. So far as administrative policy was concerned, Kiyomori was interested only in securing for himself and his favored followers the greatest possible amount of the nation's tangible wealth. At Kyōto the effects of the Taira regime were like those of a plague of locusts, nor were the effects in the provinces much more beneficial; and in 1181, when Kiyomori died, the

Kwantō was already aflame with a revolt destined to bring to an end his family's brief tenure of power.

By 1185 the Kwantō revolt, which was headed by Minamoto Yoritomo, had completely succeeded, and Yoritomo at the head of his victorious forces was in a position to take over control of the government. Unlike his Taira predecessor, however, the Minamoto leader treated the imperial court with great respect and, instead of establishing himself at Kyōto, retired to Kamakura in the Kwantō. Here in 1192 he received from the emperor a commission as *Sei-i-tai-shōgun* (Barbarian-subduing-great-general), a post which conferred upon him supreme authority over all the armed forces in the empire.

The post of *Sei-i-tai-shōgun* (more briefly "Shōgun") was not new; since early in the ninth century it had been conferred upon military commanders for brief periods of great national emergency. But Yoritomo's appointment was without time limit. He was to hold office for life with the right of designating his successor, and this provision for hereditary supreme command over the nation's fighting men made it possible for Yoritomo and his successors to exercise for a hundred and forty-one years effective administrative control over the entire empire. At Kyōto the emperor still sat upon his throne, surrounded by his intriguing courtiers; but the actual government of the country was now centered at Kamakura where the Shōgun and his advisers, setting up a military headquarters known as the *Bakufu* (literally, "camp office"), laid down the law to the fighting men and, through them, to the nation.

Originating as a simple military general headquarters designed to issue orders and instructions to the scores of *daimyō* who owed allegiance to the Shōgun, the *Bakufu* never lost this all-important function. But it soon became evident that the maintenance of harmony among the Shōgun's vassals called for a satisfactory body of laws dealing with feudal rights and duties, for competent courts to administer such laws, and for a staff

of trained officials to handle the ever pressing problems of finance. Moreover, as the network of shogunal authority spread over the western parts of the empire in which the direct vassals of the Shōgun were relatively few, it was necessary to appoint in these districts military governors and tax collectors to enforce the decrees of the *Bakufu* and to insure adequate contributions for its support.

During the lifetime of Yoritomo his chief adviser was his astute father-in-law, Hōjō Tokimasa, who, after Yoritomo's death in 1199, assumed complete control of the administration under the title of *Shikken* or regent. Six years later Tokimasa's son succeeded him as regent, and from this time until the end of the shogunate in 1333, Hōjō regents, holding office by hereditary right, were the actual heads of the Kamakura *Bakufu*. Thus, while the Japanese emperor, a puppet in the hands of his court officials, sat upon the throne at Kyōto, all real power was exercised in his sacred name by a military headquarters at Kamakura where the nominal commander-in-chief, the Shōgun, was himself a puppet of his subordinates.

For nearly a century the Kamakura shogunate gave the Japanese a more efficient government than they had hitherto known. The Hōjō regents were unusually able administrators, and the various *Bakufu* bureaus were staffed by capable officials, many of them scholars who had left the sterile decadence of Kyōto to seek worth-while employment with the new Kamakura regime. The establishment of order throughout the provinces, under officers appointed by the *Bakufu*, made possible a revival of industry and trade, and Japanese culture, in this atmosphere of peace and rising prosperity, entered a period of fresh activity with important developments in the fields of art, religion, and literature.

It was during this period that Japan and the shogunate were twice called upon to turn back the menace of Mongol invasion sent against the coast of Kyūshū by Kublai Khan. In 1274,

almost immediately after the initial Mongol landing, and again in 1281, after desperate beachhead struggle lasting for seven weeks, the forces of nature in the form of typhoons—referred to by Japanese writers as *Kamikaze* or “divine wind”—aided the defenders by wrecking and dispersing large parts of the invading fleets. But on each occasion the Kyūshū representatives of the *Bakufu* had rallied the local *daimyō* to meet the attack while the authorities in far-off Kamakura had promptly set in motion toward the threatened point their fighting men from all parts of the empire.

The successful repulse of the Mongol threat marked the beginning of the end for the Kamakura regime. The long period of alert and preparation between the two invasions—which continued with little relaxation for several years after the repulse of the second attack—paralyzed Japan’s new economic activity and wrecked her new prosperity. At the same time the *Bakufu* was faced with the impossible task of providing adequate rewards for those of its vassals who had borne the brunt of the fighting against the invaders. So long as the shogunate was expanding its power against domestic opposition, loyal vassals could be rewarded by apportioning among them the property of defeated enemies. But the repulse of a foreign invader provided no comparable spoils of victory, and the half century following the Mongol attacks saw growing bitterness and disaffection among the once loyal vassals of the Shōgun.

The decline of shogunal power was fully appreciated at Kyōto, and early in the fourteenth century the emperor’s supporters began to hope and plan for an imperial restoration. In the spring of 1333 Emperor Daigo II, rallying to his cause all the disaffected *daimyō*, placed his forces under the command of Ashikaga Takauji, himself a Minamoto and a former high official of the *Bakufu*; and in July of that year the imperial army defeated the Kamakura forces and overthrew the shogunate. Any hope that the destruction of Kamakura would restore

to permanent power the emperor and his civilian advisers, however, was doomed to speedy disappointment. Early in 1336 Ashikaga Takauji, having built up his own combination of *daimyō* supporters, entered Kyōto at the head of a conquering army. After a brief struggle Daigo II was replaced by a new emperor, and in 1338 Takauji received from his imperial puppet appointment to the office of Shōgun.

From its inauguration in 1338 until it finally faded out of the picture in the latter part of the sixteenth century, the Ashikaga shogunate never really ruled—indeed, hardly even pretended to rule—the country. Unlike the founder of the Kamakura shogunate, Takauji could number few, if any, loyal vassals among the combination of disaffected *daimyō* upon which he had ridden to power. Unlike Yoritomo, moreover, he chose to locate his shogunal “camp office” inside the imperial city rather than at some safely distant point from which he could watch and control, but not become involved in, the intrigues of the court. Once established at Kyōto, the Ashikaga Shōguns devoted themselves to the patronage of art, literature, and Zen Buddhism, while the empire entered upon more than two centuries of uninterrupted civil war and political chaos.

Shortly after the middle of the sixteenth century there appeared in the provinces just to the east of Kyōto a new military combination which was destined to end the political chaos and to unify Japan under a strong stable government. Oda Nobunaga, who held a small but strategically located estate at the head of the Gulf of Owari, allied himself with a young *daimyō* of Minamoto ancestry named Tokugawa Ieyasu, who held lands in the adjoining province of Mikawa. To this small and seemingly insignificant partnership must be added a third name, that of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, a young peasant who had entered Nobunaga's service as a common soldier but who soon rose from the ranks to become one of the most spectacular military and political figures in Japanese history.

During the early '1560's Nobunaga succeeded in bringing under his control a number of his neighbors to the West, while Tokugawa Ieyasu was similarly successful in expanding his power eastward into the Kwantō. In 1568, responding to an imperial summons, Nobunaga entered Kyōto at the head of his forces to put down a palace revolution. Order was restored, and a "legitimate" Ashikaga Shōgun—the last of his line to hold the title—was installed, but Oda Nobunaga as vice-Shōgun now became the dominant figure at the capital. Between this time and his death by assassination in 1582, Nobunaga, with the aid of Hideyoshi and the loyal support of Ieyasu, succeeded in bringing under central control about one-half of the war-torn land. After his death the unfinished task of unification was taken up by Hideyoshi with the continued support of Ieyasu, and by 1590 the entire country, from the northern island of Yezo to the southern extremity of Kyūshū, acknowledged the authority of Hideyoshi as regent for the emperor.

Less than two years after the last recalcitrant *daimyō* had submitted to his rule, Hideyoshi set forth upon what proved to be his last and most ambitious adventure: the attempted conquest first of Korea and then of China and the southern parts of eastern Asia. Hideyoshi had first announced his intention of invading the continent some fifteen years earlier, and his reasons for the undertaking—apart from a desire to emulate the legendary Empress Jingō—appear to have been political. The Kamakura and Ashikaga Shōguns had failed to solve the problem of providing suitable peacetime occupations and rewards for their *daimyō*; Hideyoshi apparently hoped to solve this problem by wars of foreign conquest which would keep his fighting men permanently engaged in plunderable areas far from the domestic scene. Although the invading Japanese quickly overran the whole of Korea, Hideyoshi's dreams of world conquest were bitterly disappointed. After their first brilliant successes the Japanese armies found themselves hope-

lessly mired down and attacked from all sides, and on the death of Hideyoshi, in September 1597, the remnants of his armies were brought back to their homeland.

Following the death of Hideyoshi a struggle soon developed between those who supported the political claims of his infant son, and Tokugawa Ieyasu who, as the associate of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, had become lord of the Kwantō and the most powerful *daimyō* in all Japan. The decisive battle in this struggle was fought in October 1600 at Sekigahara; the Tokugawa forces were completely victorious, and the opposing *daimyō* either died on the field of battle, committed suicide immediately thereafter, or made submission to Ieyasu as the new military overlord of Japan.

IV. TOKUGAWA PERIOD OF CENTRALIZED FEUDALISM: 1600-1867

In the spring of 1603 Tokugawa Ieyasu received an imperial commission as *Sei-i-tai-shōgun*. But Tokugawa supremacy actually dates from Sekigahara, and Ieyasu, even before the receipt of his commission, had already taken important steps toward providing Japan with a new and remarkably stable administrative system. Since 1590 Ieyasu's personal headquarters had been located at Yedo (modern Tōkyō), and here after the battle of Sekigahara he began the organization of a *Bakufu* that was designed to administer not merely the military but also the political and economic affairs of the empire. The two and a half centuries of unbroken Tokugawa domination—despite the mediocrity of several of its *Shōguns*—testifies to the meticulous care of its founder in planning its organization and in providing against the possibility of any hostile armed combination which would be strong enough, with or without the collaboration of the imperial court, to challenge the authority of Yedo.

The *daimyō* who survived Sekigahara comprised two clearly

defined groups; the *fudai*, or hereditary vassals, who had loyally supported the Tokugawa leader throughout his long rise to power, and the *tozama*, or outside lords, who had submitted to him only after the battle. In a general redistribution of territorial holdings the branches of the Tokugawa family and their *fudai* supporters were established in central and eastern Honshū, thus constituting a solid territorial block which extended eastward from the Inland Sea to include the Kwantō and adjoining provinces. The *tozama* lords, relegated to the outer provinces, were assigned to fiefs so located that the lands of each *daimyō* adjoined those of one or more bitter hereditary foes.

In the early days of the new regime the more powerful of the *tozama* lords were treated with careful consideration, but in the spring of 1601 Iyeyasu issued a decree requiring all *daimyō*—*fudai* and *tozama* alike—to bind themselves by a solemn oath to obey all his commands and to refuse aid or shelter to anyone charged with being his enemy. Fourteen years later the now ex-Shōgun had his son and successor promulgate a set of "Laws for the Military Houses" imposing new and important restrictions upon the actions of all *daimyō*. All social intercourse between neighboring fiefs was forbidden; marriages between *daimyō* families, the building of castles, and even the repair of existing strongholds were permissible only if approved in advance by the Shōgun; each *daimyō* was to keep a close watch upon his neighbors and report any tendency toward innovations or disregard of shogunal orders. The last important step in establishing complete control over the feudal lords was the law of "alternate residence," promulgated in 1626, whereby every *daimyō* was required to spend half his time at Yedo and, when returning to his fief, to leave behind as hostages his wife and eldest son.


Like all other *de facto* rulers of Japan—before or since—Iyeyasu and his successors fully appreciated the utility of the

emperor as a divinely established sovereign in whose name absolute authority could be exercised. But they also realized that the emperor and his court were, by that fact, an ever potential threat to their own continuance in power. In their relations with Kyōto, therefore, the Tokugawa Shōguns, while maintaining the ceremonial dignity of the emperor and providing adequately—even generously—for his support, took every precaution to keep both the emperor and his court under their supervision and control. The "Rules of the Imperial Court and the Court Nobles," issued in 1615, forbade any communication between the emperor and persons outside the court except through channels designated by the Shōgun, and laid down the law that all appointments to or dismissals from high court offices must be formally approved *in advance* by the Yedo administration. Meticulous observance of these and other restrictions was insured by stationing at Kyōto trusty *Bakufu* representatives to observe and report all significant occurrences.

The consolidation of Tokugawa power was further assured by various other devices. Ōsaka, Nagasaki, Sakai, and other commercial cities were placed under the rule of shogunal governors. Buddhist and Shintō religious organizations were transformed into agencies for controlling the people. Numerous *metsuke* (inspectors or spies) kept the *Bakufu* well informed with regard to affairs in all parts of the country, and any of the *tozama daimyō* whose fief was reported as being unusually prosperous would promptly receive from Yedo orders to undertake some costly public work calculated to exhaust all of his accumulated wealth.

Like the earlier *Bakufu* at Kamakura, the Tokugawa *Bakufu* was a true military headquarters. At Yedo the Shōgun and his trusted supporters—members of *tozama* families being carefully excluded—directed the affairs of a military dictatorship. Although the Tokugawa Shōguns, unlike those at Kamakura, seldom became puppets in the hands of their subordinates,

Feudal Duchies Early Tokugawa Period



much of the administrative work was carried on in the Shōgun's name by a trained officialdom. Under the supervision of a chief minister and two great councils—the Council of State and the "Junior" Council—numerous boards and bureaus directed every aspect of the nation's life and drew up regulations for the maintenance of discipline among the fighting men upon whose armed strength the regime depended.

The carefully devised Tokugawa system of checks and controls faced one possible source of danger: uncontrollable and disrupting influences from the outside world and especially from the West which, by this time, was playing an increasingly active role in Eastern Asia. The first Europeans, Portuguese merchants, had found their way to Japan in 1542, the year of Iyeyasu's birth, and the first Christian missionary, Francis Xavier, reached Japan seven years later. During the next half century the Portuguese built up a flourishing trade, particularly in Kyūshū and western Honshū, while missionaries of the Catholic Church, first the Jesuits and later Spanish Franciscans from Manila, spread Christian doctrines in the same regions. 1600 saw the arrival of Dutch and English who were interested solely in commerce. Nobunaga's attitude toward the newcomers had been favorable; the merchants brought firearms, an innovation of obvious utility to his conquering armies, while he regarded the Christian missionaries as valuable allies against the powerful Buddhist sects which were opposing his work of political unification. Hideyoshi also recognized the benefits of foreign trade but was less enthusiastic with respect to the foreign religion. In 1587, after having conferred marked favors upon the missionaries for some five years, he became alarmed at their growing influence in Kyūshū and suddenly issued a decree ordering their immediate departure from the country. The decree was never enforced, but it remained on record as a sort of suspended sentence, liable to be enforced if or when the

missionaries and their converts should become involved in any dangerous political activity.

Iyeyasu's attitude toward Christianity was similar to that of Hideyoshi; the missionaries and their converts were regarded as a potential danger and were kept under constant supervision. In 1612, following the discovery of a political intrigue involving several Christian *daimyō*, the then ex-Shōgun issued his first anti-Christian decree, and two years later he ordered the expulsion of all missionaries. It was not until 1617, the year after Iyeyasu's death, that a foreign priest was executed by the Tokugawa authorities, but from that date the persecution of Christians continued with increasing intensity. While regarding Christianity with cautious suspicion, Iyeyasu was enthusiastically interested in the development of Japan's foreign trade, especially if such trade could be centered in his own city of Yedo. Even before he became Shōgun he made efforts to induce the Spanish, Dutch, and English to open trade at Yedo; but the Spanish were not interested in commerce, while the Dutch and English, after a few experimental years, abandoned their Kwantō trading posts in favor of the more active commercial ports of Kyūshū.

During the early years of the third Tokugawa Shōgun (Iyemitsu, 1622-1651), Japan's foreign trade was thus carried on almost exclusively through Kyūshū. But this southwestern island, occupied by the fiefs of *tozama daimyō*, was also the region in which Christianity had gained its strongest foothold. Even though Nagasaki and the other principal ports were governed by shogunal officials, Kyūshū's monopoly of foreign trade meant that this distant and least strongly held section of the country would be the most deeply and—so far as the Tokugawa regime was concerned—most dangerously affected by foreign influences. Foreign weapons, foreign ideas, and the benefits of foreign trade, spreading among the *tozama* lords of

Kyūshū, might easily upset the favorable balance of power and bring about the destruction of the shogunate. Faced by these considerations, the *Bakufu* proceeded by successive decrees and prohibitions to cut off the nation's overseas commerce until, in 1640, a small Dutch trading post and a few Chinese merchants, both strictly confined to Nagasaki, provided the only contacts between Japan and the outside world.

For slightly more than two centuries Tokugawa Japan remained in almost complete isolation. Until 1720, when the ban was lifted except on books relating to Christianity, the importation or possession of Western books was strictly prohibited. Attempts of Western ships to enter Japanese ports—even, as in the case of Russian and American vessels, for the purpose of repatriating shipwrecked Japanese sailors—were brusquely repulsed. Only through Nagasaki, where the chief of the Dutch trading post was required to make periodic reports to the *Bakufu* and where some news was brought in by Chinese merchants, did the Japanese receive any information about world affairs.

Throughout this long period of self-imposed seclusion, however, the nicely balanced system created by Tokugawa Ieyasu could not remain unchanged. By the middle of the eighteenth century, partly as a result of the compulsory residence of the *daimyō* and their families, Yedo had grown from a small country village into one of the most populous cities—perhaps the most populous—in the world and from an austere military headquarters into a metropolitan center of wealth, art, and conspicuous luxury. At the same time, the concentration of wealth at Yedo had reduced the outlying provinces to a condition of economic anemia, and the general misery of the peasantry manifested itself in repeated popular disturbances throughout the land. On the political side, while the seclusion policy appears to have facilitated the development of national unity

under centralized authority, these two centuries saw the growth of powerful forces destined eventually to destroy Tokugawa supremacy.

The most dangerous of these forces, the revival of the emperor cult, must be attributed to one of the devices employed by the first Tokugawa Shōgun to lessen the danger of civil war and thereby to insure for his successors a peaceful tenure of power. The codes drawn up in 1615 for the military houses and the imperial court had ordered the warriors and court nobles to devote themselves to literary pursuits. As a result of these rules, designed to divert one group from excessive military activity and the other from political intrigue, the period was marked by a revival of interest in the nation's literature and early history. Much of this interest was superficial, but a few serious historians, being led by their studies to the conclusion that the Shōguns were mere usurpers, began to expound the true sovereignty of Japan's divinely descended imperial family. The "rediscovery" of the emperor fell upon fertile ground in the domains of the *tozama daimyō* who, by Ieyasu's injunctions, were barred from holding posts in the *Bakufu*. Embittered by their exclusion from the central administration, the outside lords and the educated *samurai* (followers) who managed their affairs favored the theory of imperial sovereignty as offering an alternative to Tokugawa dictatorship.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century numerous *judai* and *tozama daimyō* and even some members of the *Bakufu* were questioning the wisdom of remaining isolated from the rest of the world. The failure of the *Bakufu* to take action on this matter reflects a weak indecision that stands in marked contrast to the vigorous confidence of earlier years. The seclusion policy had been adopted by the third Tokugawa Shōgun, on his own responsibility, to meet what he regarded as the needs of his day. But his nineteenth-century successors at Yedo feared to act

on their own responsibility; conscious of their lack of actual power, they dared not make decisions on this or any other controversial question.

Such was the situation in July 1853 when Commodore Perry with an American naval squadron entered Yedo Bay and presented the request of the United States for "friendship, commerce, a supply of coal and provisions, and protection for our shipwrecked sailors." The Shōgun and the *Bakufu*, knowing that Japan could not offer resistance to foreign armed force, submitted the question to their hereditary retainers for consideration. When an overwhelming majority of the *fudai daimyō* advised rejection of the American request, the matter was referred to the emperor. On being assured that the abandonment of isolation was a temporary necessity in order to gain time for rearmament and the eventual expulsion of the intruders, the emperor gave his assent to the treaty concluded with Perry in March 1854 and to those subsequently negotiated with the British, Dutch, and Russians.

• By allowing the emperor to assume responsibility for these first treaties, the Yedo authorities avoided giving their enemies a pretext for immediate hostile action, but the days of their power were now numbered. In 1858 new and more elaborate treaties were concluded with the four foreign powers and, when the emperor refused his assent to these, the shogunate was reduced to carrying water on both shoulders, pledging itself to carry out the imperial commands for the expulsion of the foreigners and assuring the foreign governments that it would take effective action to insure the fulfilment of all treaty obligations. At the same time the anti-Tokugawa elements under the leadership of the so-called *Sat-Chō-Hi-To* bloc—the four western *daimyōtes* of Satsuma, Chōshū, Hizen, and Tosa—rallied their forces under the slogan of *Son-Ō-Jō-I* (Extol the Emperor and Expel the Barbarian).

For nine years, 1858-1867, the shogunate struggled against the

inevitable, then, in November 1867, the fifteenth and last of the Tokugawa Shōguns submitted to the young Emperor Mutsuhito, who had recently ascended the throne, a memorial surrendering his administrative powers.

V. MODERN JAPAN: 1867- ?

The overthrow of the Tokugawa regime and the "restoration of direct imperial rule," although nominally the work of the four great western *daimyō*, were actually engineered by some twenty or thirty shrewd and energetic samurai who directed the affairs of their respective lords. Acting at first in the names of their lords, this small group quickly established itself as a new power behind the throne, and on New Year's Day 1868 an indication of what could be expected was provided by an imperial proclamation that the "reign-period" of the young emperor had received the official designation of *Meiji* (Enlightened Government).

Like the seventh-century Taikwa reformers, the nineteenth-century statesmen of the Meiji era embarked upon an ambitious program of political, social, and economic reorganization; but, also like their Taikwa prototypes, they took full advantage of developments that had occurred during the period immediately preceding their assumption of power. Two and a half centuries of centralization under the Tokugawa; a growing tendency, at least among educated Japanese, to think along national rather than local lines; notable progress in the development of money and credit economy with the consequent emergence of an influential merchant-capitalist class; and the resumption of intercourse with the outside world—all these provided essential material for the construction of modern Japan.

The first task of the Meiji leaders was to build up the emperor, and this involved an interesting reversal of the means employed, more than twelve centuries earlier, for the same purpose. In their campaign against the autonomous tribal chief-

tains, the sixth- and seventh-century promoters of imperial authority—the Soga family, Shōtoku Taishi, and the Taikwa reformers—had fostered the spread of Buddhism and had striven to destroy the influence of Shintō. Although not destroyed, Shintō was pushed into the background and, in the eighth and ninth centuries, took the form of *Ryōbu* ("Two-part", i.e., combined) Shintō, in which the native *kami* or spirits were identified with the bodhisattva of Buddhism. During the Middle Ages this marriage of convenience was dissolved, and the anti-Tokugawa scholars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries turned to Shintō for religious arguments with which to support their attack on the Tokugawa usurpers. After the fall of the shogunate the old Shintō myths, especially those relating to the imperial family, were exploited to the utmost. Cautiously at first but with growing assurance, the decrees issued in the name of the young emperor dwelt upon "the glorious line of Our holy ancestors," "the Throne which has been occupied by Our Dynasty for over 2500 years," "Our ancestors in Heaven" who "watch over Our acts," and "the lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal."

While thus building up the divine nature of imperial authority, the Meiji reformers were carrying out other and equally important points in their program. In September 1868 Yedo was renamed Tōkyō—"Eastern Capital"—and two months later the imperial government was transferred eastward to its new home. Between the spring of 1869 and late summer of 1871 the last vestiges of administrative authority were taken from the local *daimyō* and placed in the hands of salaried officials. Accompanying the *daimyō* into the discard went their samurai retainers, who were pensioned off and encouraged to go into industry or trade, while their former role as defenders of the state was filled by the creation of a modern army recruited by nation-wide conscription. Steps also were taken to develop a modern navy, and in 1872 separate War and Navy departments

were set up to administer the affairs of the armed services. At the same time hundreds of students were sent abroad and scores of foreign specialists were brought to Japan to speed the introduction of modern methods in industry, communication, commerce, finance, and any other field of activity that would contribute to the national strength.

One of the earliest pronouncements of the young Meiji emperor—the so-called “Charter Oath” of April 6, 1868—opened with the promise that “the practice of discussion and debate shall be universally adopted, and all measures shall be decided by public argument.” This must be regarded, however, merely as a pledge that no other one-family clique would be permitted to replace the Tokugawa. Instead of experimenting with democracy, the Meiji statesmen provided substantial support for their reform program and for the reassertion of divine, imperial authority by building up a new oligarchy in which they, as administrative officials or bureaucrats, shared power with the officers of the armed forces and with the merchant-capitalist, landowning and money-lending elements among the civilian population. Nor was the oligarchical character of Japan’s government essentially changed by the promulgation, in February 1889, of a constitution. This new “fundamental law of State to exhibit the principles by which We are to be guided in Our conduct,” to quote from its preamble, reaffirmed the absolute sovereignty of the emperor, i.e. of those who spoke in his name, while the Imperial Diet which it provided was utterly devoid of authority or effective influence.

Under its new political structure the Japanese nation embarked upon a period of unprecedented growth and progress. In little more than half a century after the accession of the Meiji emperor, Japan was transformed from a small, backward, isolated country into one of the world’s great powers, and by the middle of the 1930’s her population had increased from the Tokugawa figure of some 25,000,000 to upwards of 70,000,000.

over the Liu Chius, and in 1874 a punitive expedition against Formosa to secure reparation for the murder of shipwrecked Liu Chiu fishermen threatened to bring on a war with China for which the Japanese leaders did not feel thoroughly prepared.

The war with China came, twenty years later, by way of Korea, once the happy hunting ground for Japanese adventurers and, for many centuries, a vassal or protectorate of the Chinese empire. Beginning in 1876 with a treaty which secured for their subjects rights of residence and trade in the peninsular kingdom under extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Japanese were soon actively engaged in political intrigue at the Korean capital. In 1882 and again in 1884, the activities of the Japanese stirred up violent popular demonstrations, and the second of these outbreaks led, in the following year, to a Sino-Japanese convention establishing a condominium over Korea. The arrangement worked successfully for nine years, but in July 1894 the Japanese government proposed that China coöperate in forcing Korea to adopt certain administrative reforms. When China rejected the proposal Japan seized control of the Korean government, sank a troop-laden Chinese transport, and then, seven days after this overt act of belligerency, formally declared war. Much to the surprise of the western world China was overwhelmingly defeated and in April 1895 was compelled to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which provided for the independence of Korea, the payment of a heavy war indemnity, and the cession to Japan of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands together with the Liaotung district of southern Manchuria.

Joint diplomatic action by Russia, Germany, and France—backed by a thinly veiled threat of armed intervention if diplomatic pressure proved to be ineffective—forced Japan to waive her claim to Liaotung. But, even so, the Japanese had made a handsome profit out of their first modern military venture. "Independent" Korea, during the fifteen years before its final annexation, came increasingly under Japanese domination and

exploitation; the acquisition of Formosa and the Pescadores completed Japanese control over an off-shore chain of islands reaching from Kamchatka to the Philippines; and the war indemnity provided Japan with the foreign credits needed to put her monetary system on a gold basis. The outbreak of the war with China, moreover, coincided with an important diplomatic success, for on July 16, 1894, a British-Japanese treaty provided for Britain's surrender of extraterritoriality and the other unilateral privileges hitherto enjoyed in Japan. Following the close of the war Japan's treaties with the other powers were similarly revised, and in 1899, when the new treaties came into effect, Japan became a fully accredited member of the family of nations.

During the years immediately after the China war there was some divergence of opinion in high official circles concerning the future course of Japanese policy. All favored continued expansion, but one group, headed by Ito Hirobumi, believed that Japan's objectives could best be achieved by friendly understanding and coöperation with the Russian Empire, while their opponents argued that Japan must prepare to take from Russia by force of arms supreme power in Manchuria and the adjoining regions. The latter view eventually prevailed, and in January 1902 Japan concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as insurance against the danger of having to wage singlehanded war against the combined strength of Russia and one or more other European powers. Two years after the signing of the Alliance treaty, the Russo-Japanese War broke out, and once again, as in the case of the Chinese war, Japan's declaration was prefaced by a surprise attack designed to gain substantial military advantage.

*The Russian war strained Japan's military and economic resources to the breaking point. By land and sea the Japanese forces won a series of spectacular victories, but in May 1905 the Japanese government found it necessary to approach President

Theodore Roosevelt with a confidential request that he invite both parties to enter upon negotiations for the restoration of peace. Mr. Roosevelt promptly complied with the Japanese request, and the war ended with a treaty signed on September 5 at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Although disappointed in their hopes for a war indemnity, the Japanese emerged from the war with substantial gains. The Portsmouth treaty provided for the cession to Japan of that part of Sakhalin lying south of the fiftieth parallel and the grant of fishing rights in the territorial waters of Siberia, Russian recognition of Japan's "paramount political, military and economic interests" in Korea, and the transfer by Russia to Japan—subject to China's approval—of the Liaotung leasehold which Russia had obtained in 1898 together with all of Russia's railway and mining concessions in southern Manchuria. In addition to these material gains, the outcome of the Russian war raised Japan to the status of a world power, one that would have to be taken into account in all future international arrangements, especially such as had specific relation to the Pacific Ocean and Eastern Asia.

Throughout the East Asiatic world the Japanese success against Russia was hailed with enthusiasm. From India and other lands under European rule, as well as from nearby China, thousands of students flocked to Japan in the hope of learning and adapting to the needs of their own countries the secrets of Japan's material progress and military strength. To these visiting thousands and, through them, to the dissatisfied millions in their homelands, Japanese publicists, with governmental approval and support, began to preach the doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics" and to spread the idea that the downtrodden peoples of Asia could achieve their freedom only by accepting the leadership of Japan. While thus unofficially running with the hares, however, Japan chose officially, for the time at least, to hunt with the hounds. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, revised in 1905 and again in 1911, the French-Japanese treaty of

1907, and a series of semi-secret Russo-Japanese treaties relating to spheres of interest in Manchuria made the Japanese Empire an active partner of these three Western powers in the exploitation of its less modernized Asiatic neighbors.

The Chinese revolution of October 1911 and the establishment of the Chinese Republic created a new and, in some respects, alarming situation for Japan. If the Chinese succeeded in organizing their economy along modern lines, Japan's pre-eminence in Eastern Asia would inevitably be menaced, while the mere establishment of democratic institutions on the nearby mainland threatened to undermine the very foundations of the Japanese theocratic-authoritarian state. On the other hand, the confusion and internal conflict in republican China, arising from the difficulty of setting up an entirely new political system, provided Japan with opportunities to fish in troubled waters and, at the same time, to pose before the Western world as the one stabilizing force that could prevent political and economic chaos in the Far East.

For Japanese industry and trade the outbreak of the first World War inaugurated an era of unprecedented expansion and prosperity. With her Western competitors—including, eventually, the United States—diverted to a war economy, Japan enjoyed throughout the war years an almost complete monopoly of trade in southern and eastern Asia, while the military requirements of Russia and the world-wide demand for merchant shipping were reflected in a spectacular expansion of Japanese heavy industry. In the eyes of Japan's ruling elements—bankers and industrialists as well as military leaders—even these advantages were completely overshadowed by the opportunity which Europe's "civil war" provided for the satisfaction of imperial ambitions on the Asiatic continent and in the Pacific. Tokyō's ultimatum to Germany on August 15, 1914, and the subsequent declaration of war paid lip service, indeed, to obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but this exten-

sion of the war into the East Asiatic area was decided upon in defiance of Britain's expressed wishes and for the avowed purpose of "enhancing the international position of Japan."

Nor did it long remain a secret that the destruction of German influence in eastern Asia was regarded by the Japanese themselves as merely the first step in a campaign intended to eliminate or undermine all other western influence, including that of Japan's British allies. By the Twenty-one Demands of 1915 and the treaties subsequently imposed on China; by financial arrangements designed to transform Chinese political figures into Japanese puppets; by a series of secret agreements in the spring of 1917 with the British, French, Italian, and Czarist Russian governments; and by the Lansing-Ishii exchange of notes in November 1917, the Japanese worked throughout the four years of war to establish an unshakable hegemony over China and an unassailable claim to Germany's Pacific islands north of the equator. Chaotic conditions in Russia after the revolutions of 1917 opened new vistas of empire, and the Japanese—first as participants in a joint intervention and later by singlehanded action—strode to bring under their rule those portions of Siberia lying to the east of Lake Baikal.

The 1914-1918 drive for empire, supported by almost every shade of public opinion and prosecuted under the specious slogan of "A Japanese Monroe Doctrine for Asia," was only partially successful. The Siberian adventure was a costly fiasco from which Japan's only apparent gain was a reputation—fully exploited in later years—for inveterate hostility to Russian communism. On the other hand, Japan's secret treaties with her European allies secured for her a mandate over Germany's north-Pacific islands which, in violation of the terms of the mandate, were promptly transformed into a chain of fortified outposts dominating the western Pacific. With respect to China—also thanks to the secret treaties—the Versailles settlement provided for the transfer to Japan of Germany's Kiaochow

leasehold and other rights and concessions in Shantung province. The value of Japan's gains in China was discounted, however, by the fact that China had refused to sign the Versailles Treaty and denied the validity of Japan's claims not only under this document but also under the wartime treaties which had been imposed upon China by Japanese threats.

From the close of the Versailles Conference until the spring of 1927 control over the Japanese government was in the hands of "conservative" or "moderate" leaders who, confident that the war had left Japan in a position of unassailable power, believed that the domination of eastern Asia could be achieved by following policies more cautious than those advocated by the "radicals" or "extremists." Under this moderate leadership Japan, at the Washington Conference of 1921-22, accepted the 5:5:3 ratio for capital ship tonnage laid down by the Five-Power Naval Treaty, agreed that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be replaced by the Four-Power Treaty relating to the Pacific, and signed the Nine-Power Treaty in which the signatories, other than China, pledged themselves to respect China's territorial and administrative integrity and "to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." Between meetings of the Conference, moreover, the Japanese and Chinese delegates reached agreement with respect to the former German leasehold and concessions, thus removing much of the cause for friction between the two nations. In the fall of 1922, Japanese forces were withdrawn from the Siberian mainland, and early in 1925 the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was followed by the withdrawal of Japanese forces from northern (i.e. Russian) Sakhalin Island. These conciliatory moves did much to lessen the suspicion with which Japan had been regarded at the close of the war and definitely improved her international standing. The "extremists" were dissatisfied with the government's re-

treat from the more vigorous 1914-1918 policy, but, so long as China continued to be weakened by internal dissension, a majority of Japan's leaders—bureaucrats, businessmen, and even military authorities—believed that the moderate policy would enable Japan to extend her control over China quietly, inexpensively and without arousing serious opposition from the West.

The middle 1920's saw the rise in China of a new Nationalist government under which, for the first time since the inauguration of the Republic, that country was united under a single administration. A modernized and efficiently governed China would not merely put an end to Japanese political influence and special interests south of the Great Wall; it would eventually regain control of the rich and populous Manchurian provinces and would rival, if not actually replace, Japan as the leading nation in Eastern Asia. Faced by the possibility of such developments, the leaders of Japanese opinion did an abrupt about face, and in April 1927, while the unification of China was still uncompleted, the "moderate" Wakatsuki cabinet was replaced by a new ministry headed by General Tanaka, the leading advocate of a "strong" policy toward China. The so-called "Tanaka Memorial" which General Tanaka is alleged to have submitted to the throne three months after assuming the joint role of premier and foreign minister is of doubtful authenticity. But this famous document forecast with remarkable accuracy the course upon which Japan, under the leadership of Tanaka and his fellow-extremists, was about to embark.

The strong policy of General Tanaka, which took the form of landing Japanese forces in China and interfering with the operations of the Nationalist armies, did not prevent China's unification and served only to arouse Chinese feeling against Japan. As a result of this failure the Tanaka cabinet was forced to resign in July 1929 in favor of a more "moderate" ministry. The return to moderation, however, was short lived. The policy

of Nationalist China became a matter of increasing concern, and by midsummer of 1931 it was apparent that Sino-Japanese relations in Manchuria were approaching the breaking point. On the night of September 18, 1931, Japanese forces in Manchuria, taking advantage of a flagrantly trumped up incident at Mukden, set out to eliminate all vestiges of Chinese authority and to bring that region permanently under Japanese control.

Upon the outbreak of the Manchurian affair the Chinese promptly appealed to the League of Nations. For almost a year and a half that august body strove in vain to convince the Japanese government that its actions in Manchuria were a matter of international concern and that its relations with China were subject to adjudication by the League. On February 24, 1933, the Assembly of the League formally condemned Japan's action, and on March 27 Japan withdrew from the League, because, to quote from the note of withdrawal, "the majority of the League have attached greater importance to upholding inapplicable formulae than to the real task of assuring peace, and higher value to the vindication of academic theses than to the eradication of the sources of future conflict."

In withdrawing from the League of Nations, the Japanese government served notice upon the rest of the world that Japan, and Japan alone, would assume responsibility for "keeping the peace" in East Asia. To maintain this position, which was frankly stated in April of the following year by the Foreign Office spokesman, the Japanese were prepared, if necessary, to wage war against all comers. But they seem to have believed that, instead of their being called upon to fight for recognition of this claim, the growing international complications in the West would eventually bring from the leading Western powers full acceptance of Japan's East Asian hegemony in exchange for her good will. Relying upon the hostility of the Western democracies toward the Soviet Union, the Tōkyō government made especial efforts to encourage the belief that its operations

in Manchuria—now transformed into the puppet state of “Manchoukuo”—were inspired solely by Japan’s fears of Bolshevism and that Japanese power on the continent was the one sure guarantee against the spread of communism throughout East Asia.

For about four years the Japanese devoted themselves to the task of consolidating their gains on the continent. At the end of this period conditions at home and abroad set the stage for the next forward step. In Europe the gathering storm clouds of war seemed to assure Japan a free hand in East Asia. At home the costs of the Manchurian venture and the consequent increases in the burden of taxation threatened to overthrow the extremists unless they could produce fresh triumphs to arouse popular enthusiasm. And in China the loss of the Manchurian provinces had been followed by even more rapid progress along the road of national unity and modernization. On the night of July 7, 1937, another “contrived incident,” this time at Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge), marked the opening of an undeclared war which, although apparently planned as a limited operation for the annexation of the Chinese provinces north of the Yellow River, quickly involved Japan in an attempt to conquer the whole of China.

Even in the heat of this “war that was not a war,” Japan’s expansionist leaders did not lose sight of the general world situation. Until September 1938 they continued to confine their military activities to the Yangtze Valley and North China and gave repeated assurances of their intention to respect the rights and interests of other nations having treaties with China. After the Munich settlement, however, the zone of military operations expanded rapidly toward the south, and the Tōkyō government, asserting its intention of establishing a “New Order in East Asia,” began officially to warn the Western powers that their treaty rights in China were no longer in accord with the actualities and must therefore be discarded. Upon the outbreak

of war in Europe Japanese activities in the extreme southern parts of China were greatly accelerated, while the campaigns in North China and the Yangtze Valley were allowed to settle down into an apparent stalemate.

The collapse of France in June 1940 was regarded almost universally as signalizing the arrival of Japan's great opportunity. Now, at last, the dreams of Hideyoshi, the ideas of Yoshida Shōin, and the program of the Tanaka Memorial were to be fulfilled. Since November 1936 Japan had been a partner with Germany in an Anti-Comintern Pact to which Italy had adhered a year later, but thus far the Japanese government had preferred to remain free from any binding military commitment with the European Axis. In September 1940, however, the Tōkyō authorities found themselves in a situation in which the European Axis could be very useful and, in exchange for German pressure upon France which secured for Japan without recourse to open hostilities the right to station military forces in Indo-China, the Japanese ambassador at Berlin was instructed to sign the Tri-Partite Pact of September 27, 1940, providing for joint action by the three powers against any neutral power—i.e. the United States or the Soviet Union—which should enter as an adversary in the European war or the Sino-Japanese conflict.

Six and a half months after the signature of the Tri-Partite Pact Japan canceled in part the check with which she had paid for German assistance in securing the foothold in Indo-China. For on April 13, 1941, after a journey to Europe on which he became convinced of the imminence of a break between Germany and the Soviet Union, the Japanese foreign minister signed a neutrality pact with the Soviet government.

France had collapsed; Britain was too hard pressed in Europe and the Mediterranean to be a serious factor in eastern Asia; the Soviet Union was immobilized by a neutrality treaty, and after June 1941 by its war with Germany. There thus remained

but one country, the United States, whose opposition might interfere with Japan's plans for a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." If possible, the United States was to be brought by diplomatic persuasion to acquiesce in Japan's program, otherwise Japan must eliminate the American naval forces in the Pacific and proceed to set up her "Prosperity Sphere" by force of arms. Between April 1941 and the end of November, Japanese representatives at Washington endeavored to reach an agreement whereby Japan, in exchange for a promise of continued neutrality if the United States entered the European war, would secure from the United States a free hand in China. At some point in the fall of 1941—perhaps as early as October, when General Tōjō replaced Prince Konoye as premier, or perhaps not until early in November, when Mr. Kurusu was sent to aid Admiral Nomura in the "conversations"—the Japanese government became convinced that diplomatic persuasion was not going to succeed. The conversations were continued through November and into the opening days of December, but on December 7 at 7:50 A.M. (Honolulu time) a strong force of Japanese bombing planes launched a devastating attack upon the fleet lying at Pearl Harbor, and ten hours later,⁵ at Tōkyō, the Japanese emperor signed an imperial rescript formally declaring war upon the United States.

For five months after the initiation of war, the Japanese forces swept forward by land and sea in a carefully planned and well-executed campaign which put them in command of the entire Indo-Chinese peninsula, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, British New Guinea, Guam, Wake Island, and the Admiralty, Solomon, and Gilbert Islands. Not until the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in May and June 1942 did they meet with serious reverse. For a moment of time "Greater East Asia" appeared to be an accomplished fact. Then the tide turned. Caught between a China that would not be defeated and the growing sea, air, and land strength of the United States, and

attacked in its outposts by British forces from India and by resourceful guerrilla fighters in the Philippines, the outposts of this hastily constructed empire gradually crumbled. On August 14, 1945, the end came; three years, eight months, and a week after the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese government acknowledged defeat. On September 2 Japan's foreign minister and the chief of the Japanese General Staff, on the deck of an American battleship in Tōkyō Bay, signed articles of surrender by which Japan, stripped of all her acquisitions since the beginning of the Meiji era, was to be reduced to the four main islands of Hokkaidō, Honshū, Shikoku, Kyūshū, and such other nearby minor islands as her enemies might allow her to retain.

NOTES

1. For a full discussion of this chronological question, see Yoshi S. Kuno, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937-1940), I, 198-214.
2. Sir George B. Sansom, *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (New York: Century Co., 1932), p. 102.
3. Kuno, *op. cit.*, II (1940), 352-353. Quoted by permission of the publisher, The University of California Press.
4. Also transcribed as Kido Takayoshi (ed.).
5. The Japanese allege that the rescript was signed on December 7, Tōkyō time. December 7 in Honolulu was December 8 in Tōkyō.

CHAPTER IV

POPULATION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE ²

Talcott Parsons

The structure and trends of population of an area constitute both an important index to the deeper-lying social structure and situation, and a very important set of conditions which will affect its future development. The population situation of Japan reflects the most fundamental fact about Japanese society: that it has been a society in transition from a "feudal" pre-industrial organization—of a very distinctive type—to a modern urbanized industrial society closer to the social type of the great industrial countries of the West than any other Oriental country.

Available evidence indicates that before the Meiji restoration the population of Japan had long been relatively stable at a level of approximately thirty millions. As in practically all other preindustrial societies this stable balance was achieved in terms of a high birth rate balanced by a high mortality rate, with all the familiar concomitants of that situation, such as high infant mortality and high disease rates in many fields. The most authoritative recent study states: "The pattern of mortality in Japan . . . was similar to that of mediaeval Europe, or that of the isolated regions of contemporary China. The ultimate controls to growth were famine and epidemics. . . . Even abortion and infanticide appear to have been techniques that flourished after the great calamities—not techniques . . . to forestall the calamities."¹

With the dramatic change in Japan's situation in the mid-nineteenth century, there began a rapid process of industrialization and urbanization. As in the corresponding phases of the process in the Western world, it was marked by a rapid increase of population, to a total of over seventy millions by 1940. Only in the latest recorded census period—between 1935 and 1940—did the rate of increase begin to slacken.

Certain notable facts stand out in the more detailed picture. Apparent increases in death rates are almost certainly explicable in terms of improved registration of deaths. Hence the increase seems almost wholly due to a progressive lowering of death rates without a compensating reduction of birth rates—again typical of the earlier stages of industrialization in the Western world. A further striking fact is that the rural population, as closely as can be ascertained, had remained almost exactly constant during the period. The whole increase has gone to the cities, and until the most recent period to the largest cities. A very large part of this urban increase, however, came from the surplus of rural births. Finally, the process which has marked all Western industrial countries also has set in unmistakably in Japan—the decline in birth rates in urban communities. By 1940 the total rate of growth was beginning to slacken, but it still was very rapid. On the basis of extrapolation of the curve, a stage comparable to the approaching stabilization, or actual decline, in Western countries would not be reached for a long time.

Thus the process of declining rate of increase has probably been setting in more slowly than in the West. But the above are the fundamentals of it. Nothing could better reflect the basic importance of Japan's emergence from rural isolation to industrialism, nor the fact that the social consequences, at the outbreak of the war, were very far from complete.

The population history of the Western world seems to indicate that even a major war does not necessarily change the fun-

damental course of development of a population. In both Germany and Great Britain the birth and death rates continued to decline after 1918, though the process probably was accelerated by the war. For Japan, however, defeat may mean a profounder population crisis very closely connected with the major problems of her whole society.

The great urban population has not been supported primarily by interchange with the countryside of the home islands; "foreign trade," whether in the free markets of world trade or in a closed imperial system, has played an essential part. The very stability of the rural population seems to indicate great tenacity in a rural standard of living which has risen only gradually during the period of great economic expansion. If Japan is forced back economically upon herself, the rigidity of the whole structure is such that it might force her population balance back into the old pattern of high rural-type birth rates compensated in a correspondingly high death rate—with eventually a new stabilization at a figure probably somewhere between the thirty millions of Tokugawa and the seventy millions of the present. If this happens, however, it will both condition and reflect profound changes in Japanese tendencies of social development—a drastic check to the process of internal change which has dominated the society for the better part of a century.

The recent characteristics of Japanese social structure and its potentialities of adaptation to the consequences of defeat must be understood in terms of the dynamic consequences of this process of industrialization. This process, curiously, has combined features resembling the Western counterpart with striking differences and peculiarities of its own. To understand this in turn it is necessary to sketch briefly the main outline of the older authentically Japanese components and the particular type of Western industrialism which has come into Japan.

The base, and the part which has been changed least fundamentally, is the social structure of the rural villages in which,

on the eve of the war, about 70 per cent of the population still lived. In main outline this base has been similar to that of peasant societies in many parts of the world. The basic unit has been the kinship group responsible for the tillage of an agricultural holding. With a good many local variations this still is the common element. The kinship unit is patrilineal, with status inherited by primogeniture, so that the normal household contains three rather than two generations. The eldest son remains in his father's household, brings a wife from outside, and with the retirement or death of the father becomes proprietor and head of the household. Younger sons must find places outside since the holding is passed down intact and undivided. In the last couple of generations much the commonest outlet for younger sons has been migration to the cities, without complete severance of ties with the home village and family. Daughters always go out, either to marry into a similar farm family—perhaps in a neighboring village—or to migrate to the city. Until she is married a daughter is very strictly under the control of her parental family.

The tradition of continuity of family on the ancestral holdings is very strong. If there is no son to inherit, it is common practice to adopt a young man to marry a daughter. In this case the usual pattern is reversed. The new son-in-law takes the name of his wife's family and becomes a member of their household. Holdings are so small that doubtless there have been processes of subdivision in the past. Recently, however, the dominant facts are the tenacity with which they are kept together, and the stability of the village community as a group of family units which have held this status for an indefinite period and intend to maintain it indefinitely in the future.

This fundamental pattern has not depended on the extent of independent proprietorship or tenancy. Though varying in different places, the general situation in that regard has been mixed. A very few farmers have owned enough land to rent

some of it to others, and there has been a fairly large class who have owned all that they and their families have cultivated. The largest class includes those who have owned some land but have rented the rest in varying proportions. A substantial minority have been entirely tenants with no land of their own. This situation has been facilitated by the fact that most holdings are split up; a family cultivates a number of different plots scattered through the village lands, not a single consolidated "farm" in the American sense.

In spite of the prevalence of tenancy, modern rural Japan is characterized by relative lack of a prominent rural landowning class in the social structure. At first sight this is surprising in view of her feudal history. The explanation lies largely in the fact that the samurai of the Tokugawa period were not a landed gentry in the European sense, but were attached to the court of the *daimyō* who owned the land and paid them "rice stipends" out of the proceeds. Continuity of status bound to specific holdings of land thus applied to the peasantry and the high feudal nobility, but not to the gentry class.

In modern Japan there are landowners in the villages who are "gentlemen" rather than cultivators. But they are not decisively important to the social structure. Of the rural land owned by noncultivators, town- or city-dwelling landlords probably hold a larger proportion. A certain prestige seems to attach to landownership as compared to other sources of income, but by no means a decisive one when compared to China or "county" England. On the whole, owners of rural land tend to merge with the larger middle class of people of business and professional status, which, though much smaller and weaker, is very similar to our own in basic social characteristics.

The most distinctive feature of rural Japanese social organization, which it shares with the rest of the society, is the family council. The most important structural implication of this is the solidarity of a considerable number of household units

which are related by kinship on both the paternal and maternal sides, though the former tends to predominate. All major decisions—such as the purchase or sale of land, marriage of a child, unusual steps in education, a new business venture—must be referred to the family council. The prestige of seniority or other high status works effectively in attaining unanimity within the family council.

Through the mechanism of the family council, kinsmen whose places of residence have become scattered are kept close together in mutual support. Property is managed in the light of common interest. The most promising youths of the various collateral lines may be picked for united backing in getting higher education or in a business venture. In particular the branches of rural families that have migrated to the cities are kept closely bound to relatives in their native villages. This pattern has certainly done a great deal to preserve the old patterns of life in the urban population and to slow up the process of social change which urbanization inevitably sets in motion. Finally it should be noted that the system of family councils produces an interlocking network of overlapping kinship groups. There is a slightly different council for each household. Members who are central for one will be peripheral for another. This seamless web binds every individual in a very tight system of traditional obligations.

On top of this peasant base in preindustrial Japan were erected a highly stratified class system based on rigid primogeniture and continuity of kinship groups in their hereditary status. The family council system and the sharp subordination of the individual have been at least as marked on this level as on that of the peasantry. The two most important elements of this higher structure were the *daimyō* nobility and the samurai gentry.

The most important features of these older upper classes for the understanding of modern Japan account both for the sur-

prising lack of resistance to "modernization" in the Meiji period, and for certain peculiar features of the society which merged as a result. The Tokugawa regime was a unique kind of feudal dictatorship. Though built up on a decentralized feudal structure of society, it did not in fact put the *daimyō* in a very firm position in the total society, largely because the principle of the regime was that of divide and rule. The "inner lords" (*fudai daimyō*) who were directly integrated with the regime were made so heavily dependent on it that their position was inherently weak. At the same time they were set in opposition against the "outer lords" (*tozama*) who were kept in tension by exclusion and isolation from each other. The initiative for the restoration came from the latter; but the situation did not encourage a new equilibrium on a feudal basis. Having set the delicate balance of the Tokugawa regime itself, they set up a highly centralized structure in which the socially dominant classes and the government were bound up closely with each other.

The samurai class, as noted above, were in a slightly different position, the dominant characteristic of which was their lack of independent roots in the land and the local community, with corresponding direct dependence on the *daimyō* to whom each was bound by ties of personal loyalty. One consequence was sharp differentiation in the power and wealth of different *samurai*. The most prominent and powerful were those who held positions of trust and influence at the courts of outstanding *daimyō*, especially the outer lords. In the restoration these men were in fact more influential than the *daimyō* themselves, though each acted in his lord's name. Already they constituted a kind of higher civil service group.

With the success of the political overturn it was natural that the nobility—including the *kuge* or court nobility—should be amalgamated with these ambitious and influential samurai to form a new centralized national nobility. Outside their tradi-

tional loyalty to their particular *daimyō* the samurai had no vested interest to bind them to their local community. The position of the *daimyō* was weak, so it did not prove very difficult to deprive them of their special feudal status, to buy out their rights, and set up almost overnight one of the most highly centralized political structures of modern times.

One additional important group was involved. In the absence of modern technology, transportation, and communications, there had been little organization of production in Japan beyond the handicraft level. But, as is common in such societies, an upper class with considerable wealth and everything that was to be found in the capital of a centralized regime in Yedo had produced a situation favorable to a considerable growth of mercantile trade and finance. This was further favored by the long period of internal peace of the Tokugawa regime. As a result mercantile houses of very considerable wealth and extensity of interests grew up. Even the *daimyō*, especially the outer lords, engaged in manufacturing and commerce—at first surreptitiously, then openly.

Here was an extreme example of such a new “bourgeois” class having to fit into the interstices of the existing social structure. “Feudal” Japan was dominated by aristocratic classes of the type which idealized the military virtues and a corresponding code of honor and looked with extreme contempt on the merchant and tradesman. Traditionally even the humble peasant ranked higher in the social scale than the merchant. In fact considerable wealth and influence developed, but in a setting which promoted maximum dissatisfaction with the existing regime.

The wealthier merchant classes thus were natural allies of the rebellious elements and played a prominent part in financing and otherwise facilitating the restoration. They were rewarded by admission to the new national aristocracy, with seats in the House of Peers, patents of nobility for many of the

most prominent and a general tendency to intermarry and fuse with the older families. This, however, was very different from the "bourgeois revolutions" which took place in much of Europe. In various respects the older aristocratic groups remained dominant; it was their values and patterns of life which set the principal tone for the new Japan. Important as the mercantile elements were as the direct vehicle of Japan's economic modernization, it was only for brief periods, as in the 1920's, that they acquired anything like the upper hand.

Japan thus made the transition to modernization with minimum immediate disturbance of her preindustrial social structure. The peasant base remained essentially intact. The old upper classes faced greatly altered conditions, but on the whole as a group remained in the top positions of prestige, wealth, and power. The military values and code of the samurai had an opportunity for a new field of expression in the form of the armed forces of a modern nation, supported by a nationalistically tinged system of universal education.

With these older patterns and values there also remained intact the Japanese family system with its rigid system of obligations subordinating all individual interests to those of family units. Through long centuries of conditioning by a hierarchical social system, these patterns of subordination of the individual to his larger family, of the young to the old, of women to men, shaded almost imperceptibly into a subordination of people of lower to those of higher status in a highly crystallized class system, and of general predisposition to accept legitimate authority. The imperial institution—master symbol of this highly hierarchized and integrated system—not only remained intact but was also exalted to a new position of prestige which was exploited systematically by the new ruling group.

The dynamic significance of this older component of Japanese social structure is greatly heightened by its exceedingly

close integration with the magico-religious tradition of Shintō, which is treated extensively in another chapter of this volume. It is important to understand the radical difference of this from the Christian tradition in its relation to social obligations. The rather sharp segregation of spiritual from temporal affairs which is characteristic of the Occident is unknown to Japan. From the highest pinnacle of government in the person of the emperor to the humblest household, virtually every status has at the same time a magico-religious and a secular aspect. The obligations of everyday social life are not merely derived ultimately from religious authority, they are immediately and directly ritual obligations. The pressure to conformity which inheres in every well-integrated system of social relationships is greatly heightened by this situation as long as general acceptance of the whole pattern of Shintō remains untouched.

While much of ordinary social obligation in Japan carries a directly sacred character unknown to Occidentals, at the same time it involves an attitude toward these sacred sanctions quite different from our own. The Western emphasis is on the individual's own responsible conscience; social pressures are minimized and submission to them is felt to be unworthy. Our concept of moral heroism idealizes the person who stands up for his convictions *against* others and against tradition. The predominant feeling of the individual who transgresses his obligations is that of guilt—while that of others is one of moral indignation.

In Japan the emphasis is quite different. Obligations are not imposed by a principle in which one "believes" but by specific acts of oneself or others in traditionally defined situations, or by the accepted patterns of one's status. "Responsibility" is the willingness to accept the implications of these obligations and carry them out regardless of personal cost. The individual's own emotional reaction to transgression is shame that the honor due to his status is besmirched, while that of

others is that he has disgraced the *group* with which he is identified—the consequences are not personalized in his *own* character. Moral idealism is to take responsibility in the above sense, not to stand out for principles. Moral conflict is a matter of being caught between conflicting obligations, not of conflict between principle and pressure of practical necessity as it is predominantly with Occidentals.

This mode of incidence of sacred sanctions in a "moral" context is an indispensable background for understanding Japanese behavior in the situations presented by the social structure. Though highly formalistic it is a system characterized by a moral rigor in many respects greater than in Western societies.

There is every reason to believe that the rigor is so great that, even apart from the special insecurity introduced by the consequences of Westernization, it does not operate without severe strains on most individuals. Whatever these may be there is no doubt that they are intensified by the juxtaposition with radically different Occidental values.

There is a good deal of evidence that, with all its outward stability, the Tokugawa system had been accumulating tensions over a long period and in fact was far from completely static. However that may have been, the new society was inherently dynamic. It not only grew rapidly in population, in industrial organization and productive facilities, in foreign trade and political prestige—emerging as the only Oriental unit in the system of great powers—but it also underwent a rapid and drastic internal social transformation. Many of the tensions generated by this internal change were certainly expressed in heightened nationalistic feeling and thus formed the popular basis of Japanese expansionism.

The new régime speedily created a highly centralized organization into which all the most influential social elements were drawn. Second only to consolidation of its own power, it was dedicated to a program of swift modernization of the

country through adoption of Western patterns of organization and technology, both industrial and military. The combination of centralization and modernization set the fundamental pattern of those aspects of recent Japanese society which most closely resemble the West.

Very early there was established a system of universal education following the Continental European model. Schools on all levels were organs of the state. Teachers of even the village schools were appointed and controlled by the prefectural governments. Fundamental policies were determined by the Ministry of Education in Tōkyō, which closely supervised both prefectural agencies and local schools. On the higher levels an important immediate objective was the training of a civil service after the Continental model. The primary entry to that civil service was through attainment of academic distinction in the universities, particularly the Imperial University of Tōkyō. Once on the ladder a very strict merit system prevailed. For a considerable period, however, the class balance was not upset very seriously; considerations of status and wealth were so important in controlling access to higher education that in fact sons of the higher groups predominated.

Industrial development, to an extent quite unfamiliar in the Anglo-Saxon world, was conducted in direct collaboration between the business firms and the state, which supervised and subsidized. Conditions generally favored the rise to power of a relatively small number of large firms with widely distributed holdings and interests. The top financial control of these firms remained in the hands of family groups, the famous *Zaibatsu*, which were organized and governed in traditional Japanese fashion through family councils. New talent indeed was brought into these families from time to time through the adoption of able young men of humble origin—often through marriage to a daughter. But lower down, with steady expansion of the scale of operations, there was increasing need for tech-

nical and administrative personnel too numerous to fit into this traditional pattern. Here also the tendency was to organize the firms bureaucratically, to recruit, relatively regardless of origin, from able, well-trained graduates of the institutions of higher education, and to open to talents opportunities for a career that might lead far.

Rapid expansion of industry led to growth of cities even more pronounced in their concentration than in other industrial countries. To these cities flocked the surplus population of the rural areas. There was opportunity for rise in status to a degree unknown to a relatively static, predominantly rural society. Urban conditions and exposure to Western cultural influences undermined in many elements the traditionalism and familialistic solidarity of the older rural population, and this even began to have repercussions in the rural areas themselves. Individualism on the Western model seemed to be—and indeed was—making great strides in Japan. To be sure, the country was governed largely by an aristocracy headed by a rather antiquated type of emperor, but this was not so very different from several European countries.

In two respects, however, even on this level there was an important difference from Europe, to say nothing of the United States. In the first place, even in the cities large elements of the population clung tenaciously to the old patterns of organization. Not only small retail shops, but also innumerable manufacturing processes were carried on in households by family units working together much as peasant families work. Such units were bound together by family ties with each other and with peasant units in country villages. Within the limits of the pattern of primogeniture, children remained with the family. Unless numbers were too large, hired help was virtually taken into the household or slept on the work premises. As an observant European writer remarked, the Japanese working class resisted proletarization to an extraordinary degree. It is not

inappropriate to refer to very large elements of them as an "urban peasantry." With all this went a tenacious clinging to many old Japanese customs and patterns of life such as type of house, kimono, and the like. Too rapid acquisition of Western habits was undoubtedly checked by the low income levels of the masses—in turn a function of the swift increase of population.

In the second place, the very resistance to the spread of individualistic and directly competitive patterns served to accentuate certain strains in the society which presumably were present already in considerable degree. In its contrast with Western types of individualism, social scientists tend to assume that a strong system of group solidarity—subordination of the individual to the family, for instance—protects and supports the individual in such a way that breakdown of this solidarity intensifies insecurity. There can be no doubt of the strength of Japanese group solidarity, especially in the family, but its relation to the security of the individual seems to be the reverse of that usually assumed. Instead of protecting the individual member and giving him security, the tendency, according to his status, is to push him into relations outside the group where he functions as a representative of the entire group rather than as an individual. He carries responsibility for its good name in the above sense. His success reflects credit on the group and is admired by them; but if he fails he disgraces the whole group and he is blamed and punished by their disapproval or in extreme cases by ostracism.

An inevitable tendency of Westernization in Japan has been to widen progressively the area of competitive relationships. This is just as characteristic of a merit system of promotion within large-scale organizations as it is of the "individualistic" competition of businessmen in the market. Participating in such competition as a representative of his family and other groups, the Japanese experiences heightened insecurity that has

been an important factor in the remarkable dynamic energy evidenced in the speedy transformation of his nation. But at the same time all this increases a level of anxiety which already must have been relatively high. The consequences to the individual of failure to succeed are so serious that he *must* not fail; in the extreme case his position becomes completely intolerable.

The growth of nationalistic sentiment in Western countries has been associated with rising levels of insecurity resulting from the breaking up of the old traditional structures and solidarities of preindustrial society. In Japan the very refusal of these structures to break up has contributed to the increase of insecurity. This certainly has much to do with the susceptibility of many of the urban elements to a nationalistic appeal, since other aspects of the situation were favorable.

In Japan, however, nationalism has assumed a special character through its relation to the religio-magical traditions of State Shintō. These have provided a pattern for a definition of the situation which was ideally suited to symbolize and canalize nationalistic sentiment. The imperial restoration not only symbolized the religio-political unity and solidarity of the nation, but also provided the rationale, in the increasingly prevalent and official interpretation, of giving the Japanese nation as a whole a position of special prominence among other nations. In Western nations—short of the Nazi revolution—violent nationalism was a kind of pseudo-religion in sharp conflict with the universalistic elements of Christianity. In Japan it could fuse with a major indigenous tradition to give a peculiarly powerful sacred sanction to the goal of military aggrandizement.

Nevertheless, to many Western observers the development of Japan seemed to be following broadly the path of "liberal industrialism" which in time might be expected to overcome both mass tendencies toward nationalism and the influence of older patterns inherited from the earlier background in the

upper groups. There probably was much wishful thinking in this judgment. But in the absence of another set of factors it might have been much more nearly correct than events proved it to be.

A major aspect of Japanese feudalism, as of its Western counterpart, lay in the position of prestige and privilege occupied by a specifically military class—the samurai. Considering this background, the part played by the feudal classes in the overturn, and the circumstances, it is not surprising that strengthening and modernization of the armed forces was one of the cardinal early policies of the new regime. In implementing this policy, however, there were two particularly significant features of the new Japanese military structure. First the European system of universal military service was adopted. Second, officers were to be selected and promoted by a relatively rigid merit system. In so rigidly aristocratic a society with a military background it is remarkable that a decision, apparently deliberate, was taken that an officer did not need to be a "gentleman" • in the sense in which that was true of practically all European armies at the time.

Conscription meant that army service was the most important connection the ordinary village youth had with the big outside world—and the considerable majority of conscripts have remained rural, with many more from small towns. He had this experience under rigidly controlled conditions highly favorable to indoctrination. Moreover, through the veterans' associations the army reached down into the daily life of the village. Along with the schools, this provided a channel of propagandistic influence over the masses of a population already predisposed to accept authority. This influence was exceedingly powerful. Only a government in which army and civil authority saw eye to eye could command this double channel—and that, given the tone of the Japanese armed forces, was apt to mean one in which the military predominated.

In the circumstances, especially with the background of Shintō nationalism, it was almost inevitable that this power over the masses should be used in an anti-Western sense. By their very constitution the armed forces were bound peculiarly to the imperial institution with its embodiment of what was distinctively Japanese in a traditional sense—to say nothing of the pronounced ethnocentrism of the myth of the Sun Goddess. On top of this, however, the predominantly rural composition of the army was bound to put a premium on a type of reaction well known in the Western world: that of simple rural folk against the corruption and wickedness of the cities. The profound tensions which the process of urbanization and industrialization was inevitably creating in Japanese society could very readily become polarized about the rural-urban antithesis—secondarily about the antithesis of a wealthy exploiting class (the predominantly urban Zaibatsu) and the poor and struggling masses. In this situation the army naturally became the champion both of traditional Japanese values and of the people, who after all were mostly peasants, against the moneyed interests and against the corrupting influence of the West.

In this setting considerable tension would certainly have developed anyway. Conceivably an urbane and cosmopolitan aristocracy in full control of the armed forces might have held it in line. This did not happen. The free road to talent in the armed forces opened the opportunity for a new type of element to rise to the top within the army. These no longer were the aristocratic Chōshū samurai of earlier days, but men of humble origin, sons of small town businessmen or even peasants. They were proud of their professional records and of the fact that they could rise and compete with their erstwhile betters. At the same time they were caught up in a cause. They were the champions of the little man and of the best religiously sanctioned traditions of old Japan against the destructive influence of the foreigner. They, predominantly, were the "militarists" who

upset the more stable equilibrium of Japanese affairs at home and who initiated the career of conquest abroad which was the primary dynamic precipitating factor of Japan's clash with the powers.

The rise of this new group culminated in the early 1930's. It was not surprising that, given the situation, the whole Japanese social structure should swing over into their control and accept the path of conquest on which they were bent. They acted in the name of the emperor; this gave them a formal legitimacy far stronger than in most societies. They appealed to sentiments which went very deep in the masses of the population. Finally the whole structure—government, business, and the dominant social classes—had become very highly centralized. There was such a close integration of interests that, despite severe internal conflicts between different elements, the structure as a whole virtually had to follow the lead of the element which was able to gain the highest political control. The only kind of opposition which could have hoped to be effective would have been so disruptive to the system that it would have dragged down its leaders with the rest. Only when faced with disastrous and imminent defeat in war could the break come.

The Japanese society which was caught up into the war thus was undergoing a highly dynamic process of change and was in a state of unstable equilibrium. The fundamental components of that situation certainly are still present. The question of the future is in large part the question of what are the principal possibilities of re-structuring which the new situation will allow, and what kinds of further dynamic change may be expected under the conditions which probably will exist. Obviously there are so many unknown factors that there can be no question of an attempt at "prediction." The best that can be done is to make a contribution to clarification of the problems which will have to be faced by all who deal with policy toward Japan. This includes the humblest American citizen who by

his vote and expressed opinion exercises influence even as an individual.

Clearly there is no formula by which measures taken in the immediate future—short of extermination—could remove, certainly and permanently, the possibility of revival of a Japanese militarism which might become a future threat to American security. There seem to be three major possibilities of the direction Japanese social development might take. All three have the potentiality either of making the Japanese more amenable to adjustment in a peaceful world order, or of their again becoming truculently aggressive and, in the absence of adequate repressive controls, acquiring the means to make themselves unpleasant. In all three cases, the alternative that works out will depend substantially on the international environment of Japan rather than on her internal development alone.

The first of the three major possibilities is reversion to an essentially preindustrial agrarian society in which an overwhelming majority are peasants. In this case the structures with higher integrative functions might vary within a wide range of alternatives. Secondly, it is conceivable that power should be secured by a revolutionary regime of the communist type which, within a relatively short period, would drastically liquidate the older traditional patterns. What might emerge from such a situation in positive terms is exceedingly difficult to foresee. Finally, it is possible that the fundamental trend of development since the Meiji restoration should be continued, but that the nationalistic-militaristic element should be prevented from predominating. Then the general evolution should take the direction of approximation to the Western “democratic” type of society with emphasis on either its individualistic or its socialistic version.

Certain fundamental features of the situation, relevant to selection among these possibilities, can be taken for granted. First is the fact that, whatever the losses resulting from the war

and from immediate postwar economic and social chaos, the fundamental factors making for rapid increase in population would still operate. The only immediate alleviations of this tendency to be expected involve the incidence of higher death rates from disease, malnutrition, and the like, and the kind of decline in birth rates associated with chaotic social conditions in which levels of insecurity are exceedingly high. Even if such conditions should lead to an absolute decline the prospect is that with restoration of order and a minimum of security the upward tendency would be resumed immediately—unless held in check by very nearly absolute limitations of resources.

Secondly, there may be a very serious crisis in the economic sphere—not merely a cyclical depression—caused by the interruption of foreign trade and the cutting off of the islands from the foreign raw materials and markets on which the economy has been dependent. The magnitude of this crisis is indicated elsewhere in this volume. The present concern is only with its social consequences. It will mean a considerable period of economic contraction, lowering of standards of living, diminishing fields of individual opportunity, and insecurity.

Finally it may be assumed that there will be rather thorough demilitarization. This includes not only removal of armaments and certain potential facilities for their production, but also complete demobilization of the armed forces, prohibition of the renewal of universal military service, and elimination of the privileged constitutional position of the service ministries. The principal specific social mechanisms which in prewar Japan were instrumental in tipping the balance in favor of aggressive militarism will thus be eliminated from the picture—at least for as long as control is effective.

The combination of the first two factors is certain to mean that there is a heightened state of general insecurity and, for a considerable period, a contracting rather than expanding field

of opportunity for the majority of individuals. There also will be an initial revulsion from the regime, and to some extent from the values which are associated with the disastrous defeat. Whether this is of long-run significance will depend on the subsequent development of the situation. The case of Germany after the last war should not be forgotten.

If Japan is permitted to stew in her own juice after demilitarization by being virtually cut off from international trade and cultural relations, it will almost certainly serve to consolidate the traditional indigenous patterns more firmly than ever. The urban and industrial sector of the society has provided the main focus of the forces making for their weakening, and this sector would be diminished greatly in relative significance. Millions of urban people would be forced back into the villages and absorbed into the traditional kinship groupings.

Such a situation would produce many explosive tensions, starting with sheer overcrowding of the land. Perhaps the most important, however, would result from the system of inheritance. The powerful tradition of primogeniture would inhibit subdivision of holdings; but at recent rates of population growth—which, as noted, are likely to be resumed—there would be no satisfactory status available in the rural community structure for the surplus—to say nothing of food. The system certainly could give here and there, but it is sufficiently rigid so that probably one of two major outcomes is probable. On the one hand the lid may be kept on; i.e., discipline might be maintained in terms of the old patterns and the explosive tensions mastered. The result of these pressures then would be to bring population into balance, presumably on a pre-industrial basis with reduced rate of increase through higher death rates rather than fewer births. Presumably some reduction through postponement of marriage is also possible. On the other hand the lid may blow off and some kind of an

internal revolution occur which would break up the traditional peasant system.

Which of these possibilities is actually realized and what the consequences may be will not depend mainly on the social structure of the masses of the population, but on the higher integrative structures. In this respect the situation is such that a stable situation in a sense favorable to the United States is not likely. A foundation for a revival of aggressive tendencies would probably be laid which could be kept in check only by an external system of political order so strong that any challenge to it would be suicidal.

Tensions within the masses will be so powerful that only a relatively strong higher structure will presumably be able to master them. It is of the first importance that the basic traditions of Japanese society are strongly hierarchical and authoritarian. Any appeal to order is certain to include this aspect in a prominent place. In detail it is impossible to predict just what the outcome might be. With the relative disappearance of the armed forces, of the industrial organizations of the Zaibatsu and their like, the highly centralized structure of Japan might give way and local elements rise to considerably greater prominence. Whatever the emphasis as between centralization and decentralization, hierarchy and authority seem certain to be prominent. The dominant groups, whoever they are, will certainly have to depend largely on force for maintenance of their position. This will favor crystallization of a rigidly stratified social system on the pattern of old Japan, with reestablishment of aristocratic groups. It is also very difficult to see how it could avoid reinstating the militaristic values among these dominant tone-setting groups. It should be remembered that the genesis of these values was not primarily in nationalistic ambitions against the outside world, but in the internal situation in Japan, in the interest of advantage over feudal rivals in the chronic civil wars and of

maintenance of a position of dominance over a demilitarized and hence politically impotent peasantry. Hence the outcome might well be a Japan impotent to make war in the modern sense—even more so in the coming atomic age. A Japan genuinely peaceful in sentiment, however, cured of the combination of a propensity to resort to force with an oversensitive suspicious attitude toward others, would seem to be very unlikely. It would be a Japan which, given another Meiji restoration to unify and modernize the nation, and a favorable external situation, could be expected almost automatically to embark on another career of conquest. Such a Japan would offer a maximum of resistance to integration with the cosmopolitan community of world society, since maintenance of its precarious internal equilibrium would depend on keeping intact a set of ideological and symbolic patterns continuous with those of old Japan. It would have to insulate itself from the cultural currents of the world.

Particularly in the earlier stages, however, the equilibrium of such a system would be very precarious. Almost certainly the masses would be seething with unrest. The relative weakness of the middle class has been one of the most important facts of modern Japan, relative to other industrial countries. This middle class has been small numerically and lacking in cultural, political, and economic autonomy, and has been very open to influence from above. It has offered, for instance, practically no resistance to being taken along in the militaristic-nationalistic wave of the last generation. If and when the highly centralized structure on which the integration of the nation has depended is weakened sufficiently, the way may well be open for a revolutionary movement.

If internal disorders once get under way—which is quite likely after withdrawal of occupation forces—there will probably be some kind of struggle for power. Thorough demobilization will have operated to cancel the advantage of the

groups previously dominant. A small, well-organized group might be able to seize and consolidate power. Under the circumstances it is overwhelmingly probable that such a group would hold communist ideology and would have affiliations with the communists in Soviet Russia and North China.

It should be remembered that the Russian Revolution did not take place in a maturely industrial country. In the first instance, its position was based on the discontent of the peasantry in an overwhelmingly agricultural country. In Japan too there exists much agrarian discontent which will be accentuated enormously by forcing so much of the urban population back onto the land. Moreover, in the nationalistic phase this has already had an anti-capitalistic animus against the Zaibatsu. This agrarian anti-capitalism and anti-urbanism can be exploited without too much difficulty in a radical rather than a conservative direction. Secondly, though the Japanese industrial worker has been far less proletarized than his Western brother and there has been no strong labor movement, there is no reason to believe that the mass of workers and "urban peasantry" would resist such a movement or would not indeed be strongly susceptible to its propaganda. Russia in 1917 had no strong labor movement, whereas in Britain with a powerful and well-established trade unionism there is only a negligible communist movement.

If such a revolutionary movement should gain control in Japan one inevitable consequence would ensue. The basic patterns of authoritarianism would not be eliminated but would be reincarnated in the new system. In Japan a radical dictatorship, as readily as a reactionary one, would find conditions relatively favorable. Most of the basic patterns of Japanese social tradition could be maintained despite radical changes in the system of ideological symbols. Two generations of relative Westernization certainly have gone far to lay the foundations of such a change.

A conservative, traditionalist Japan would tend to isolation from the rest of the world as the only possible way of maintaining its system. A communist Japan, of course, would not do so. It would have natural allies on the continent of Eastern Asia. But in addition its consolidation as a system would be highly dependent on a return to industrialization and urbanization. In the Japanese case this is allied particularly closely with the question of foreign trade. Relations with the Soviet sphere of influence would open up possibilities which do not exist in the older capitalist sphere. It could and probably would offer a prospect of hope to the Japanese masses which the traditionalist possibility could not.

Just as Japan's underlying authoritarianism would not disappear but would reappear in another form in a communist system, so also her tendency to militarism probably would remain. It is of the first importance that modern Japanese militarism has not rested on aristocratic foundations but has developed deep roots in the masses of the people; the army itself is a popular organ of protest against the "interests." Preservation of this tendency is not in the least incompatible with a communist system. If, as seems entirely possible, communism generally tends to an aggressive policy backed by force, a communist Japan would almost certainly play a prominent role.

The third possibility of development is one that would bring Japanese society closer to the model of the Western democratic nations. The foregoing analysis indicates that this, of the three possibilities, is the most difficult to effect and would require the most favorable—which presumably means the most carefully regulated—conditions. This is not only because there are serious factors of instability involved in such a development in any society, but also because of two types of specific features of the Japanese case. First, the immediate practical situation which must be expected is peculiarly un-

favorable, and second, from a long-run point of view, the obstacles in the pre-Westernized Japanese society and the part of it which has survived are more formidable.

If the development which came closest to being the dominant trend in the 1920's is to go forward to a stage of relative stability, it is indispensable that conditions should favor the continual extension of "individualism" in the fundamental sense. This is not incompatible with the British Labour Party's kind of socialism. It means fundamentally a situation where the individual can become emancipated from the pressure of the particularistic group solidarities which have been so prominent in traditional Japanese society. It means that he must learn not only to take responsibility in the sense of preserving his group, but also to be responsible for independence *from* such group pressures, to value achievement as such, not merely as the enhancement of his family's (or nation's) prestige.

The conditions of peasant society of the Japanese type are such that it is impossible for this type of value to become predominant. By far the most favorable conditions are those of the Westernized type of urban society with occupational roles of the type best exemplified in modern industry. Therefore a situation is essential that places large masses of the population in a position where their fundamental interests and security are bound up with further extension of this type of pattern. This condition cannot be given where the general field of opportunity is contracting. Opportunity for reasonable economic expansion along peaceful lines is an essential prerequisite.

A second fundamental prerequisite touches the higher integrative groups. Demilitarization, including elimination of the privileged position of the armed services, goes without saying. Also a definite change in the previous trend of centralization of the top integrative structure is very important. The monopoly position of the Zaibatsu families should be

broken up and governmental subsidy to their firms eliminated. In many different fields governmental administration should be decentralized and responsibility at lower levels built up.

It seems highly undesirable, however, to attempt to secure these ends by means that are too abruptly revolutionary. Restoration of relative stability which can enhance security is essential to such a development. Conditions should be organized so as to weaken the older undesirable elements gradually rather than to eliminate them by violent action, since this would arouse a reaction which probably would endanger the whole policy. Above all conditions should aim at building up into a progressively stronger position those persons who have an important stake in a liberal system: professional and technical people, individuals with substantial administrative positions either public or private, small and moderate businessmen, trade union leaders, and the like.

It goes without saying that a major factor in tipping the balance of prewar Japanese development in the wrong direction was the system of repressive controls which inhibited the natural expression of many of the aspects of a movement of "liberalization," especially the control of "dangerous thoughts." Above all there must be regular cultural and intellectual contact with the outside world so that the roles which are favored by the situation can become integrated with ideological and cultural factors.

The above argument is not in any simple sense a defense of the imperial institution, of Shintō, and all the other things which democratic people feel have been objectionable in Japan. It is hoped profoundly that the course of development will be such as progressively to weaken those elements and correspondingly to strengthen those which are more in line with democratic values. But the evidence of the above analysis does point to the conclusion that an attempt at drastic and sudden elimination of these things by action of the victors is not likely to

produce the result desired. A democratic society in the best sense cannot be produced by fiat; it has to grow relatively slowly through the influence of favorable conditions. Drastic intervention of the type so often advocated is likely to drive Japanese society into one of the two other alternatives discussed above.

Perhaps the most important condition of a democratic direction of development in Japan is sufficient stability so that the forces which can effect the desired change have opportunity to operate steadily over a long enough period. Continuity with the situation which has brought Japan as far as she went before the war seems essential. There is no fundamental reason why that continuity should involve "selling out" the aims for which Americans fought—if it is combined with steady, responsible pressure to keep Japan on an even keel by preventing a revival of the tendencies that previously interfered with this development. This means, above all, prevention of revival of the militaristic trend with a new position of privilege and prestige for the militaristic element, while keeping open the channels for outside cultural and ideological influence, and finally giving Japan economic opportunities sufficient so that the hope which is essential to embark on new ventures will not be lost.

NOTES

1 Irene B. Taeuber and Edwin G. Beal, "The Dynamics of Population in Japan," *Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth* (New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1944), p. 6.

2. Emil Lederer and Emy Lederer-Seidler, *Japan in Transition* (New Haven, 1938).

THE JAPANESE FARM-TENANCY SYSTEM

Seiyei Wakukawa

| Despite the rapid industrialization of recent decades, Japan remains primarily an agrarian nation. Together with Hungary, Austria, Spain, and Italy, Japan ranks high among the modern nations with the greatest proportionate farm populations. According to the 1930 census, 47.74 per cent of all gainfully occupied were engaged in agriculture.¹ This figure was exceeded only by British India (65.8 per cent in 1931) and Finland (65.7 per cent in 1930).² Modern industrial workers numbered only 19.8 per cent of the total, while commercial pursuits were reported for but 16.6 per cent.³

Since 1919, it is true, industrial production has surpassed agricultural production severalfold as the chief source of national income.⁴ The proportion of agricultural households in the population has declined consistently for more than half a century.⁵ Nevertheless, these developments do not alter the important fact that in Japan the lives of more people are tied to agriculture than to any other pursuit—a fact significant in dealing with her internal problems.⁶

Analysis of the farm-tenancy system probably affords the most fundamental and comprehensive approach to agrarian Japan. | Because of its universality and deep social implications, tenancy has offered the most knotty agrarian problem to confront every incoming Japanese cabinet for the past twenty-five

years. As the chief source of rural unrest the land question has become increasingly acute with the years. Much of the continued dominance of feudal remnants that permeate every aspect of Japanese life finds an economic basis in the semifeudal tenancy system. Tenancy has epitomized everything reactionary

TABLE I
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF TENANT
AND NONTENANT FARM HOUSEHOLDS, BY YEAR*

Year	Number of Farm Households . . .				Percentages . . .		
	TOTAL	OWNER-CULTIVATOR	TENANT	PART TENANT	OWNER-CULTIVATOR	TENANT	PART TENANT
1908	5,408,363	1,799,617	1,491,733	2,117,013	33.27	27.58	39.15
1911	5,419,992	1,761,296	1,501,933	2,155,763	32.51	27.71	39.78
1914	5,456,231	1,731,247	1,520,476	2,204,508	31.73	27.87	40.40
1918	5,476,784	1,697,037	1,550,324	2,229,423	30.98	28.31	40.71
1921	5,455,681	1,659,090	1,534,667	2,231,924	30.59	28.50	40.91
1923	5,440,020	1,664,516	1,535,799	2,239,705	30.60	28.23	41.17
1926	5,555,157	1,732,180	1,508,539	2,314,438	31.18	27.16	41.66
1930	5,599,670	1,742,993	1,486,133	2,370,544	31.13	26.34	42.33
1932	5,642,509	1,754,537	1,498,596	2,389,376	31.10	26.60	42.30
1934	5,617,486	1,740,219	1,508,319	2,368,948	30.98	26.85	41.17
1936	5,597,465	1,731,139	1,517,701	2,348,625	30.93	27.11	41.96

* TNN (1935 ed.), p. 49 (for 1908 figures); NTTN (40th ed.; 1921), p. 68 (for 1911-1914 figures); *ibid.* (45th ed.; 1926), p. 77 (for 1918-1923 figures); *ibid.* (49th ed.; 1930), p. 71 (for 1926 figures); *ibid.* (52nd ed.; 1933), p. 73 (for 1930 figures); *ibid.* (55th ed.; 1936), p. 81 (for 1931-1934 figures); NRN (1938 ed.), pp. 83-84 (for 1936 figures). For abbreviations, see p. 165.

and retrogressive in Japan since the Meiji revolution.¹ Without a firm grasp of the broad implications of this aspect of Japan's complicated rural economy, any attempt to evaluate Japan's social and political systems is futile. It is impossible otherwise to comprehend the sphinxlike psychology of her people, so deeply submerged in medievalism though outwardly determined to exploit modern technology.

I. EXTENT OF FARM TENANCY

In 1936, 5,597,465 Japanese households derived their living from agriculture. Of these 1,731,139 (30.93 per cent) were classified as *jisakunō* (landed peasants or owner-cultivators) engaged in tilling their own small holdings; 1,517,701 (27.11

TABLE 2

AREA OF OWNER- AND TENANT-OPERATED FARM LAND, BY YEAR
(IN UNITS OF CHŌ FOR 1903-1914, THE REST IN HECTARES)*

Year	Area of Farm Land			Percentages	
	TOTAL	OWNER-OPERATED	TENANT-OPERATED	OWNER-OPERATED	TENANT-OPERATED
1903	5,266,170	2,923,161	2,342,909	55.5	44.5
1909	5,680,352	3,126,818	2,553,535	55.1	44.9
1914	5,878,109	3,227,035	2,651,174	54.9	45.1
1919	6,021,707	3,252,314	2,769,393	54.0	46.0
1921	6,047,529	3,249,549	2,797,980	53.7	46.3
1923	5,989,112	3,204,304	2,784,808	53.5	46.5
1926	6,029,803	3,268,730	2,761,073	54.2	45.8
1929 ^b	5,849,488	3,036,887	2,812,601	51.9	48.1
1930	5,867,101	3,066,147	2,800,954	52.2	47.8
1932	5,942,563	3,138,033	2,804,530	52.8	47.2
1934	5,987,747	3,172,580	2,815,167	53.0	47.0

* TNN (1935 ed.), p. 37 (for 1903-1914 figures); NTTN (49th ed.), p. 70 (for 1919-1923 figures—these do not include figures for Okinawa); NTTN (55th ed.), p. 80 (for 1926-1934 figures). For abbreviations, see p. 165.

^b Result of a special survey conducted in September of that year.

per cent) were *jun kosaku* (tenant farmers)—true landless peasants who depended entirely on land hired from others. The remaining 2,348,625 (41.96 per cent) were *jisaku ken kosaku* (part owner, part tenant), who supplemented meager holdings with lands rented from larger landowners.⁶ Numerically, part tenants far outnumbered the other two groups. Between owner-cultivators and out-and-out tenants the numerical difference was insignificant.⁷ Tenants and part tenants combined, how-

ever, constituted nearly 70 per cent of all agricultural households. For well-nigh thirty years this figure has remained stationary. Only Great Britain and Belgium report so high a tenancy rate.⁷ In the latter countries, however, a more modernized system long ago broke the fetters of feudalistic tenure. Their conditions differ vastly from those of Japan.)

TABLE 3

AREA OF OWNER- AND TENANT-OPERATED PADDY LAND, BY YEAR
(IN UNITS OF CHŌ FOR 1903-1914, THE REST IN HECTARES)*

Year	Area of Paddy Land	Percentages			
		TOTAL	OWNER- OPERATED	TENANT- OPERATED	OWNER- OPERATED
1903	2,831,697	1,437,150	1,394,547	50.75	49.25
1914	2,961,640	1,455,977	1,505,663	49.16	50.84
1919	2,996,906	1,453,005	1,543,901	48.48	51.52
1923	3,041,176	1,469,752	1,571,424	48.33	51.67
1929	3,166,170	1,468,153	1,698,017	46.37	53.63
1929 ^b	3,165,874	1,418,483	1,747,391	44.81	55.19
1930	3,177,750	1,471,616	1,706,134	46.31	53.69
1932	3,193,346	1,490,421	1,702,925	46.67	53.33
1934	3,191,841	1,493,518	1,698,323	46.79	53.21

* NN (1935 ed.), p. 37 (for 1903-1914 figures); NTTN (49th ed.), p. 70 (for 1919-1923 figures—these exclude Okinawa); NTTN (55th ed.), p. 80 (for 1929-1934 figures).

For abbreviations, see p. 165.

^b Result of a special survey conducted in September of that year.

The area of cultivated land under tenancy in Japan provides a further index of the situation. In 1934 the total area of cultivated land—both paddy and upland fields—was 5,987,000 hectares, a figure slightly above the average of the preceding five years. Of this total, 47 per cent was tenant operated, and 53 per cent owner operated.⁸ With slight fluctuations this ratio has remained fixed since the early 1920's. These figures, however, do not convey fully the significance of tenancy in Japan's rural economy.

Unlike most countries, Japan's non-paddy farm land (so-called upland fields or dry farms) is not only smaller in total area than the wet-farm land, but also it is much less important in total production value. Livestock raising is negligible, confined mostly to one district of Hokkaidō; in contrast to England, France, Yugoslavia, or Norway, grassland plays an infinitesimal part in Japan's land economy. In part sericulture takes the place of stock raising; land devoted to mulberry trees, however, includes only about 10 per cent of the total cultivated area.⁹ Farming in Japan may be regarded as almost synonymous with cultivation of a few selected grain crops such as rice, wheat, rye, and barley. Together these grains occupy nearly 80 per cent of all farm land and provide about 75 per cent of the total value of agricultural products.¹⁰ Rice alone normally occupies about 53 per cent of the cultivated land and contributes 65 per cent of all agricultural production.¹¹ Rice cultivation thus constitutes the backbone of Japan's agricultural economy. Precisely here tenancy is most prevalent; the percentage of tenancy in paddy land far exceeds that in dry-farm land. In 1934 more than 53 per cent of all paddy land was under tenancy,¹² while slightly under 40 per cent of the dry fields fell in that category.¹³

The farm population, therefore, comprises 70 per cent tenants in whole or part, and 30 per cent full owners. Forty-seven per cent of the total farm area and 53 per cent of the paddy land—the choicest land—are under tenancy.

Patterns of tenant occupancy differ with the region. The differences stem partly from historical backgrounds and partly from local economic conditions. Tenant farming is most extensive in Hokkaidō, where almost half of the farm households are pure tenants and nearly 64 per cent of the paddy land is under tenancy.¹⁴ After Hokkaidō, tenancy is most common in northern Honshū, then successively in the region facing west to the Japan Sea, the Kwantō and Kinki districts (Kwantō

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGES OF TENANT AND
NONTENANT FARM HOUSEHOLDS FOR 1934, BY PREFECTURE*

Prefecture . . .	Total Number of Farm Households	Percentages			
	%	OWNER- CULTIVATOR	TENANT	PART- TENANT	
Kagawa	87,767	17.90	39.17	42.93	
Akita	94,652	18.26	38.56	43.78	
Tottori	57,706	19.52	38.94	41.54	
Miyagi	104,180	20.16	40.12	39.72	
Yamagata	101,440	22.42	33.91	43.67	
Ōsaka	81,984	23.40	46.62	29.98	
Niigata	206,345	23.73	31.93	44.34	
Toyama	77,032	23.87	27.09	49.04	
Yamanashi	84,220	25.74	34.85	39.41	
Saitama	169,910	26.49	30.95	42.56	
Hyōgo	181,780	26.65	29.55	43.80	
Ibaragi	186,648	26.83	30.92	42.25	
Fukuoka	148,583	27.68	29.87	42.43	
Kumamoto	142,808	27.76	26.24	46.00	
Chiba	160,862	27.86	33.46	38.68	
Gumma	119,585	28.30	28.45	43.25	
Shimane	106,126	28.41	26.18	45.41	
Tochigi	110,239	28.60	29.71	41.69	
Aomori	87,495	28.61	33.70	37.69	
Okayama	159,609	28.74	29.43	51.83	
Kanagawa	78,188	28.97	26.16	44.87	
Saga	65,971	29.24	20.56	50.20	
Shizuoka	162,826	29.83	20.34	49.83	
Ishikawa	79,855	29.88	18.90	51.22	
Tōkyō	60,143	31.43	28.60	39.97	
Aichi	189,027	31.56	20.30	48.14	
Gifu	138,498	31.70	22.81	45.49	
Miyazaki	82,166	31.83	24.48	43.69	
Nagano	108,480	32.51	24.06	43.43	
Fukushima	139,777	32.84	29.34	37.82	
Hokkaidō	198,527	33.55	49.24	17.21	
Shiga	87,924	33.67	22.98	43.35	

THE JAPANESE FARM-TENANCY SYSTEM 121

TABLE 4 (Continued)

Prefecture . . .	Total Number of	Percentages	OWNER-CULTIVATOR	TENANT	PART-TENANT
	Farm Households				
Kyōto	79,124	34.41	21.85	43.74	
Nara	64,151	35.39	27.66	36.95	
Miye	119,668	35.45	19.76	44.79	
Ehime	129,407	35.60	24.73	39.67	
Hiroshima	189,363	35.68	19.31	45.01	
Iwate	109,523	36.58	21.98	41.44	
Kagoshima	210,244	36.73	17.65	45.62	
Ōita	123,357	36.98	20.59	42.43	
Fukui	69,071	37.42	23.94	38.64	
Kōchi	73,355	37.03	19.94	43.03	
Nagasaki	107,098	38.35	15.19	46.46	
Yamaguchi	118,923	38.42	19.93	41.65	
Tokushima	80,908	39.17	18.85	41.98	
Wakayama	80,259	39.19	24.75	36.06	
Okinawa	92,482	64.92	9.91	25.17	
Entire nation	5,617,486	30.98	26.85	42.17	

* Based on figures in NTTN (55th ed.), p. 81. For abbreviations, see p. 165.

centers in Tōkyō, Kinki in Ōsaka), and northern Kyūshū. Tenancy is least prevalent in southern Kyūshū and Okinawa, southeastern Honshū facing the Inland Sea (centering in Hiroshima), the Tōkai district (centering in Nagoya), and the greater part of the island of Shikoku.

Tenancy attains its maximum in Kagawa prefecture. Here more than 80 per cent of the farm households are tenants partly or wholly;¹⁵ 62 per cent of the cultivated land and 67 per cent of the paddy fields are held in tenancy.¹⁶ Other prefectures reporting high tenancy are Tottori, Niigata, Toyama, Shimane, and Ishikawa on the Japan Sea coast; Akita, Miyagi, Yamagata, and Aomori in northern Honshū; Yamanashi, Ibaragi, Saitama,

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGES OF LAND UNDER TENANCY FOR 1934, BY PREFECTURE
(AREA IN HECTARES)^a

Prefecture	All Cultivated Land . . .	Paddy Land . . .		
	TOTAL AREA	PERCENTAGE OF AREA UNDER TENANCY	TOTAL AREA	PERCENTAGE OF AREA UNDER TENANCY
Kagawa	50,876	62.06	39,083	67.10
Tottori	48,041	60.52	30,900	64.76
Hokkaidō	934,173	52.41	211,534	63.52
Yamanashi	52,943	51.03	18,550	62.84
Ōsaka	58,561	59.10	47,849	62.02
Niigata	141,541	56.32	180,939	60.90
Tōkyō	49,282	48.52	10,230	60.72
Akita	142,491	55.86	114,747	60.70
Miyagi	144,620	54.05	99,470	60.46
Yamagata	141,047	53.19	100,677	59.53
Gifu	101,821	44.41	63,866	57.08
Saitama	161,614	47.50	68,046	56.93
Aomori	131,801	48.73	71,644	56.78
Toyama	89,883	54.60	80,397	56.52
Shimane	81,801	49.96	55,905	56.47
Ehime	90,284	42.82	45,042	56.31
Kumamoto	155,980	47.91	79,815	56.06
Ibaragi	216,552	51.00	94,880	54.51
Kanagawa	68,815	48.02	21,336	52.46
Chiba	191,278	49.99	109,713	52.37
Gumma	113,529	44.51	34,444	52.25
Fukuoka	141,423	48.75	111,690	51.85
Ishikawa	70,200	47.53	53,694	51.63
Hyōgo	128,247	48.94	106,322	51.23
Shizuoka	131,724	45.23	60,652	51.00
Nara	44,466	44.90	32,994	50.39
Kōchi	66,914	38.35	34,014	49.25
Aichi	160,855	44.61	98,657	49.14
Tokushima	52,509	40.40	47,803	49.06
Tochigi	143,310	46.38	77,450	48.95
Kagoshima	183,520	39.18	63,361	48.63
Oita	91,405	42.63	58,040	48.59

TABLE 5 (Continued)

Prefecture	All Cultivated Land . . .	Paddy Land		
	TOTAL AREA	PERCENTAGE OF AREA UNDER TENANCY	TOTAL AREA	PERCENTAGE OF AREA UNDER TENANCY
Okayama	122,644	43.22	86,911	48.52
Wakayama	49,193	40.50	30,602	48.47
Fukui	61,616	45.65	50,183	48.11
Fukushima	189,820	40.62	102,487	47.84
Kyōto	39,379	41.84	41,712	47.68
Nagano	171,147	39.86	71,391	47.17
Shiga	78,159	43.65	67,679	46.24
Saga	71,526	42.95	54,840	46.24
Nagasaki	87,765	35.57	34,003	46.13
Miyazaki	93,368	40.92	47,738	45.69
Hiroshima	109,382	38.75	76,067	43.88
Yamaguchi	106,142	39.81	81,832	43.58
Miye	103,239	39.53	71,101	43.33
Iwate	142,202	34.44	65,279	40.96
Okinawa	59,656	13.71	6,272	12.73
National averages and totals:	5,987,747	47.01	3,191,842	53.21

^a Based on figures in NTTN (55th ed.), p. 80. For abbreviations, see p. 165.

Tōkyō, Chiba, and Tochigi in the Kwantō; Ōsaka and Hyōgo in Kinki; and Fukuoka and Kumamoto in northern Kyūshū. Okinawa forms a category by itself; about 65 per cent of the farm households are small owners, and less than 14 per cent of the cultivated area is under tenancy.¹⁷


II. RISE OF THE TENANCY SYSTEM

Japanese farm tenancy is traceable to the eighth and ninth centuries A.D. when the system of land nationalization and allotment instituted in the Taikwa reformation (645 A.D.) gradually broke down. In its stead arose a manorial system as local grandees began to claim private ownership of reclaimed

land and newly cultivated virgin soil.¹⁸ The spread of private ownership facilitated land tenancy, though early forms were crude. Private manors (*shōen*) developed illegally and clandestinely as devices to evade taxation.¹⁹ By stealth, threats, and bribery, in connivance with powerful court officials who held manors themselves, various temples, shrines, and powerful individuals contrived to hold back the hand of the tax collector from their domains.²⁰ These tax-free estates provided "the safest refuge" and "a paradise of liberty"²¹ for farmers who placed their holdings under the protection of the manors to escape oppression by local governors or to resist encroachments by neighboring grandees. The simple peasants had no definite concept of private title to land; to them the right of tillage was synonymous with ownership. Readily they yielded nominal title to their lands in return for sure protection, without which ownership meant little when powerful individuals were annexing lands by force. With establishment of the warrior government at Kamakura in 1192, the *shōen* system rapidly developed to the point where it became increasingly necessary for a large estate to hire out land to the actual tillers. This swelled the numbers of the peasant forerunners of the modern tenant farmer. As feudalism developed this tendency increased, but not until the establishment in 1603 of the Tokugawa regime did tenancy become a widespread agrarian institution. During this period the term *kosaku* (farm tenancy or tenant) first came into use.

Under the feudal regime—the Tokugawa shogunate in particular—all land theoretically was controlled by the Shōgun. Actually private ownership continued to develop in various forms.²² In 1643, to curb the growth of large estates and also to prevent peasants from deserting the land, an edict prohibited the sale and purchase of farm land. Despite the edict, well-to-do farmers continued to expand their holdings clandestinely—also despite subsequent similar edicts.²³ In time these holdings grew

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too large for economic use, and letting out all or part of one's land became more and more a common practice. In exceptional cases, clan governments assumed the role of sole landowners,²⁴ and in these instances farmers theoretically became tenants of the clan. The Shōgun himself, like the other feudatories, became a great landowner.²⁵ By and large, however, actual tenancy was a matter between individuals,²⁶ and the number of tenants of various classes probably did not exceed one-fifth—certainly not more than 30 per cent—of the entire peasantry, judging from the number of tenant farmers at the beginning of the Meiji era.

The Tokugawa Shōguns reduced the whole peasant class to serfdom. The sole *raison d'être* of the peasantry was to till the soil so that feudal lords, court nobles, Buddhist and Shintō priests, and literati might idle away their time on the exorbitant taxes extorted from the peasants.²⁷ Though the condition of the general peasantry was miserable and wretched, the lot of the tenant farmer was much more pathetic. "The most pitiful sight under creation," wrote Nakai Riken (1732-1817), a Confucian scholar who lived in Ōsaka, "is the lot of the poor tenant. He possesses no rice field of his own; he plants rice on land hired from the rich. If the land produces six *koku* of rice three *koku* are given up to the government by way of tax; two *koku* are paid to the owner of the land, leaving only one *koku*²⁸ at home with which to sustain his family."²⁹ Actually, it is believed, the prevailing practice demanded 37 per cent to the feudal prince, 28 per cent to the landlord, and left the tenant 35 per cent for his family.³⁰ Out of his own share the tenant was obliged further to meet various surcharges on the rice tax; the final residue probably did not exceed one-third of the produce.

If the lot of the "water-drinking peasant"—as tenants were called derisively—was woeful, one factor favored him. Unlike his modern successor, he had comparatively little worry that he

might be alienated from the soil. Tenure of tenancy was relatively secure; the tenant's rights were uncontested, if for no other reason than that the feudal system left rights of cultivation and ownership ill defined. Tradition rather than law governed the cultivator's right over the soil, and tradition usually favored the cultivator. Tenancy continued undisturbed for the most part from generation to generation. Some types of land still were owned communally and joint ownership of farm land was not uncommon.³¹ The rights of those tenants who held perpetual leases (emphyteuses) were practically coextensive with those of the owners.

With the Meiji restoration in 1867 the situation changed radically. The feudal lords relinquished all power to the new imperial regime and in theory returned to the emperor all the people and land they had held. Retrocession of fiefs and establishment of the new order were attended by much bloodshed. Eventually the chaos gave way to a "modernized" state—a new order that was a hodgepodge of medieval paternalistic absolutism and late eighteenth-century individualism. For the agrarian class all this amounted to an actual revolution. Some of the changes favored the new peasantry. Others were inimical to their continued existence—particularly that of the landless peasants, whose position was petrified legally and actually by the revolutionary land policy of the new government.

III. THE LAND REFORM OF MEIJI

Within a few years after assuming power, the Meiji government issued a series of proclamations setting forth its agrarian policy. One of the most sweeping—that of December 1868—declared that henceforth all village lands, except for imperial grants and lands owned by shrines and temples, should belong to the farmers and peasants.³² For the first time in two thousand years Japan accorded outright legal recognition to private ownership of land. All previous titles had only a *de facto*

existence based in tradition and usage without statutory sanction. Such a step was necessary to gain popular adherence to the new regime, and also to prepare the way for a new taxation system that was to become the cornerstone of the government's fiscal policy. For this system, based primarily on the land tax, to operate effectively the determination and confirmation of private titles was absolutely necessary. The proclamation of 1868 was intended to achieve this end.

To supplement this, all feudal restrictions regarding the selection of crops to be cultivated were removed in 1871. The following year the much abused edict of 1643, prohibiting sale or purchase of farm land, was abolished and a new system of issuing title deeds was inaugurated.³³ In 1873 the right of the owner to mortgage his land was recognized,³⁴ and all previous restrictions regarding the sale of farm products were declared null and void.³⁵ Bans on land subdivision were lifted together with the restrictions on individual ownership that formerly had prohibited a farmer from owning land in excess of an area capable of producing more than ten *kokū* of rice.³⁶ With these basic principles established, the government's land program made real headway.

During the first few years the government had no choice but to permit continuation of the old tax system. In July 1873, however, it put into effect an entirely new land tax that revolutionized the whole land system. Feudal taxes had been paid in kind, chiefly in rice; the rate was determined on the basis of the estimated productive capacity of the land. Now both of these practices were abolished.¹ Henceforth the land tax was based on the cash value of the land and all taxes were paid in money. The rate was fixed at 3 per cent of the assessed value of the land and was not to be altered with good or poor harvests.²

Determination of land titles throughout the nation proved to be most difficult, as the systems of land tenure under the previous regime had varied widely in different clans and prin-

cipalities. The gigantic work of issuing title deeds had to be accomplished in a little more than three months after promulgation of the order in July 1872.³⁷ The one guiding principle was elimination of all ambiguities of ownership and establishment of legal title over all privately controlled land. The government proceeded with unflinching determination and speed; at times all past usages and customs were overlooked and undue losses were inflicted while undeserved benefits accrued to others. Equity and justice appeared secondary in importance to the urgent need of establishing titles in order to levy taxes.

The first step was to determine boundaries. Then all lands were classified as government owned or privately owned. During the feudal era individuals had occupied and cultivated land to which they held no title in the modern sense. Titles to some of these squatter lands were conferred on individuals; where title was unconfirmed the land was incorporated into government property.³⁸ In the case of temple and shrine lands, the priests were left sufficient land for self-support and title to the remainder was granted to the tenants who actually had been engaged in its cultivation.³⁹ As for communal lands, joint or communal ownership by one or more villages was recognized and deeds issued to the villages concerned.⁴⁰ Thenceforth they were known as "publicly owned lands."

Rival claims led to countless legal suits. In many localities mass riots occurred between contestants. The most perplexing problem arose in connection with tenant-occupied lands and lands held and cultivated in rotation. The latter system, prevalent in many parts of Kyūshū, Shikoku, and northwestern Honshū,⁴¹ had recognized no outright individual ownership; cultivation had been rotated among the peasants at fixed intervals. In dealing with this type of land, the government in many cases arbitrarily conferred ownership certificates on those who happened to occupy the land when the deeds were issued.⁴²

The speed of the reform and the disregard of local custom resulted in injustice to many individuals and groups. On the other hand, in one instance where the interest of a landed class was involved, funds were appropriated from the national treasury to compensate persons whose ownership had been repudiated five years before the restoration.⁴³

The reform confirmed the farmers in ownership of the land they tilled, but this was by no means an outright gift. For the erstwhile warrior-rulers were compensated for loss of their feudal privileges with government bonds, cash, and subsidies amounting to Y379,000,000⁴⁴—an enormous sum for the time. This outlay was assessed on the landowners in the form of a new land tax. Income from the new land tax constituted over 80 per cent of the total tax revenue of the government from 1875 to 1879⁴⁵—the period during which the major part of the compensation bonds were financed. During the four years preceding 1876 these bonds and cash payments consumed 30 per cent of the total governmental revenue.⁴⁶ Not a few ex-feudal lords invested their bonds in land; their hold on the peasantry thus shifted from feudal overlordship to modern landlordship. Some of them, by questionable means, had succeeded in having their feudal holdings recognized as private properties by the new regime. This was the case with such former lords as Hosokawa, Nabejima, and Shimazu; another group—Hachisuga, Kuroda, and others—newly secured vast areas on the island of Hokkaidō as token payments.⁴⁷ They had worked in collusion with the clan bureaucracy whose corruption culminated in Matsukata's notorious Hokkaidō government property disposition scandal.

The continuing privileged status of these former feudal princes contrasted vividly with the unimproved virtual servitude of the tenant farmers, who in many instances even suffered new setbacks.

The recipient of the ground rent usually obtained title from

the government when tenancy was involved in problems of ownership. This procedure inflicted a grievous wrong on at least one group of rent payers—those who, in order to circumvent the feudal prohibition of the sale of farm land, had mortgaged their holdings and had agreed to pay rent to the mortgage holders in return for continued use of the land.⁴⁸ In such instances the mortgage holders, rather than the actual owners, obtained title, although in some cases the latter received partial compensation under a system of limited emphyteusis. Those already holding tenancy under emphyteuses, however, were reduced completely to ordinary tenancy and deprived of privileges and rights held under their former permanent tenancy. In many cases emphyteusis had been established during the Tokugawa era by reclamation of barren or marshy land; the laborer had reserved full right in perpetuity over the reclaimed land, either to farm it in consideration of a rental, or to sell or sublet his rights. By common practice similar rights of emphyteusis had been granted to tenants who for more than twenty years had farmed the same land.⁴⁹ The Meiji land reform nullified these acquired rights. To the nominal owners the government granted the option either to purchase the tenants' rights or to sell title to the renters. Failing such settlement, the government disposed of the knotty problem by providing in the subsequently adopted civil code an article reducing all rights of perpetual tenancy to terms that ranged from twenty to fifty years.⁵⁰ No obstacle was tolerated in the way of the policy of commercializing all realty holdings.

Tenants not only were deprived of security of tenure but also fared the worst in the transition from feudal economy to monetary economy. Rents continued high; 68 per cent of the tenant's total produce was considered normal even by the government at the time of the tax reform of 1873⁵¹—no higher than under the feudal regime, to be sure. The situation was actually much worse; for at a time when everything else was changing rapidly

from barter economy to money economy, the tenants alone were left with the feudal mode of rent payment in kind. This outmoded feudal tenancy practice continued undisturbed. Consequently the rapid rise in the price of rice during the currency inflation of early Meiji profited only the landowners.⁵² Thus when the new land tax took effect in 1873, the landlord's net share after deducting the land tax was 34 per cent of the total cash value of the produce; during the three years 1874-1876 it averaged 55 per cent; and in the six years 1878-1883 it reached 58 per cent.⁵³ The tenant's share in his own produce remained constant at 32 per cent. The rise in cash value of rice intensified the situation; in 1873 half of the amount paid by the tenant (33 per cent of the crop out of a total rental of 68 per cent) was paid by the landlord as land tax—an item that claimed only 16.9 per cent of the total in 1878-1887. Stated otherwise, the landlord's net income from rent increased from half of the rent receipts to more than four-fifths thereof as rice prices rose.⁵⁴ The landlords gained still more when, in 1877, the tax rate dropped from 3 per cent to 2½ per cent. Such a high profit from landownership boosted the price of land⁵⁵ which in turn tended to maintain high rent rates.

Not all landowners benefited from the Meiji land policy. Especially favored were the large landowners whose extensive holdings enabled them to live as absentee or noncultivating owners. The small holders, however, fared no better than the landless tenants under the clan-controlled bloc government of a corrupt bureaucracy, a landed aristocracy, and a rising bourgeoisie. In the mad scramble for land that followed the rising price of rice in the early eighties, many small holders incurred heavy debts by buying small parcels of farm land. In the ensuing deflation, these heavily indebted farmers lost their holdings and joined the ranks of the landless tenants.⁵⁶

For the first decade of the new era statistical data of the extent of farm tenancy are lacking. Careful estimates indicate that by

the fifth year of Meiji (1872) approximately 31 per cent of all cultivated land was under tenancy.⁵⁷ This figure rose rapidly to 36.75 per cent in 1883, 39.34 per cent in 1887, and 39.99 per cent in 1892.⁵⁸ For paddy land, the increase was from 40.28 per cent in 1883 to 44.95 per cent in 1892.⁵⁹ Simultaneously the percentage of proprietor-cultivators decreased from 39.93 to 32.12; partial tenancy increased from 38.65 per cent to 45.14 per cent; and pure tenancy rose from 21.94 per cent to 22.69 per cent.⁶⁰ In the ensuing two decades proprietor-cultivators gained slightly in number (33.27 per cent by 1908), but a large number of part tenants joined the ranks of full tenants, who constituted 27.58 per cent of the total by 1908.⁶¹

For more than another decade this process continued. By 1921 the proprietor-cultivator percentage had dropped to 30.59, pure tenants made up 28.50 per cent, and part tenants 40.91 per cent.⁶² This was the peak for full tenancy; during the next decade the number showed a slight decline. A few tenants had risen to part tenancy in consequence of the inauguration of a low-rate farm loan policy by the government. Nevertheless, the percentage of tenant-operated land continued to rise, and the increase was particularly marked for paddy land.⁶³

The dominant fact is that ever since the imperial restoration, tenancy has increased steadily. Japanese farmers have experienced alternate periods of respite and of extreme hardship, but on the whole their lot has deteriorated progressively. The tenancy system has continued semifeudal, harsh, and oppressive; in the hands of a usurious landed aristocracy it serves as a lever to squeeze dry the peasants' Lilliputian ownership.

✓ IV. BASIC FEATURES OF JAPANESE AGRICULTURE

| The Japanese tenancy system depends on certain basic features of Japan's agriculture—some geographical, others social and technological. Chief among these is the extremely limited amount of farm land. At the end of 1935, the cultivated land

area totaled about 6,000,000 hectares (14,820,000 acres), approximately 16 per cent of the land area of the islands. Of the remainder, 51 per cent consisted of forests and 9 per cent of pasture.⁶⁴ Any prospect of large-scale expansion of the cultivated area must be discounted; the mountainous topography for the most part forbids even pasturage. Japan is one of the countries with the least amount of arable land. Before the war all the major European countries had two or three times as much cultivated land. France had nearly four times as much; Germany and Poland had more than three times, Spain almost three times, Italy and Rumania more than twice as much.⁶⁵ Great Britain's cultivated area is slightly less than that of Japan—but she has almost four times the area of good pasture land.⁶⁶

In terms of per capita area the facts are even more significant. The per capita cultivated area in Japan is less than 0.10 hectare (0.247 acre)—4 per cent of the Canadian figure, 6 per cent of the Australian, less than 1/11 of that in the United States, less than 1/7 of that in Denmark, Spain, or Rumania, less than 1/6 that in Hungary and Poland, and less than 1/5 of the figures for France, New Zealand, and Ireland. Even overpopulated Java reports a higher figure.⁶⁷ Climatically Japanese agriculture has advantages over many of these countries, but even double cropping does not offset the inescapable limitations of low acreage.

Infinitesimal farms, intensive cultivation, high land prices, high ground rent—these are the results. In 1934, as ever since the first World War, nearly 70 per cent of Japan's farmers operated farms averaging less than 0.99 hectare (2.45 acres) in size. Half of these farmed less than one and a quarter acres. Twenty-two per cent of all farms ranged between 2.45 and 4.89 acres. About 6 per cent farmed between 4.89 and 7.36 acres; less than 2½ per cent between 7.36 and 12.25 acres; and only a few more than 1 per cent of all Japanese farmers operated farms larger than 12.25 acres.⁶⁸ A few farms covered from 50 to 75

TABLE 6

NUMBERS OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS
ACCORDING TO SIZE OF FARM OPERATED, BY YEAR^a

Year	Total Number of Households	Numbers of Households Operating					
		LESS THAN 0.50 HECTARE	0.50 TO 0.98 HECTARE	0.99 TO 1.97 HECTARE	1.98 TO 2.97 HEC- TARES	2.98 TO 4.96 HEC- TARES	4.96 OR OVER HECTARES
1908	5,408,363	2,016,286	1,763,890	1,055,243	348,153	162,889	61,902
1914	5,456,231	1,999,199	1,819,916	1,088,463	332,875	149,580	66,258
1918	5,476,784	1,946,619	1,823,903	1,133,921	346,624	154,236	71,481
1923 ^b	5,440,020	1,910,130	1,827,562	1,163,617	319,613	139,786	79,302
1926	5,555,157	1,951,380	1,885,723	1,190,233	455,664	72,357	
1930	5,599,670	1,939,404	1,916,367	1,227,417	316,525	129,056	70,901
1932	5,642,509	1,936,419	1,933,219	1,242,863	324,194	129,523	76,191
1934	5,617,486	1,918,307	1,921,420	1,250,818	321,088	129,209	76,444
1936	5,597,465	1,896,357	1,914,018	1,262,106	320,675	126,540	77,829
Percentages for the above							
1908	100	37.28	32.61	19.51	6.44	3.01	1.15
1914	100	36.64	33.35	19.95	6.10	2.74	1.22
1918	100	35.54	33.30	20.70	6.33	2.82	1.31
1923	100	35.11	33.59	21.39	5.88	2.57	1.46
1926	100	35.13	33.94	21.43	5.79	2.41	1.30
1930	100	34.63	34.22	21.92	5.65	2.31	1.27
1932	100	34.32	34.26	22.03	5.75	2.29	1.35
1934	100	34.15	34.20	22.27	5.72	2.30	1.36
1936	100	33.88	34.19	22.55	5.73	2.26	1.39

^a TNN (1935 ed.), p. 51 (for 1908 figures), NTTN (45th ed.), p. 78 (for 1914-1923 figures), NTTN (49th ed.), p. 71 (for 1926 figures), NTTN, 55th ed. p. 81 (for 1930-1934 figures); NRRN, 1938 ed., p. 84 (for 1936 figures). For abbreviations, see p. 165.

^b Figures up to 1924 are exclusive of Okinawa.

acres; insignificant in number, these were confined almost solely to Hokkaidō.⁶⁹

Land ownership in Japan thus affords a typical example of *Parzelleneigentum*.⁷⁰ Ownership of the 14,820,000 cultivated

TABLE 7

NUMBERS OF HOUSEHOLDS OWNING
CULTIVATED LAND ACCORDING TO SIZE OF HOLDING, BY YEAR^a

Year	Numbers of Households Owning							Total
	LESS THAN 0 50	0 50 TO 0 98	0 99 TO 2 97	2 98 TO 4 95	4 96 TO 9 91	9 92 TO 49 58	49 59 HECT- ARES OVER	
HECTARE	HECTARE	HEC- TARES	HEC- TARES	HEC- TARES	HEC- TARES	TARES OR		
1908	2,278,317	1,287,876	925,930	279,100	123,125	39,746	2,574	4,936,768
1914	2,349,991	1,217,040	880,288	259,100	122,149	41,428	3,399	4,873,395
1923 ^b	2,476,058	1,180,593	883,286	227,784	117,550	48,503	5,078	4,878,852
1926	2,492,235	1,221,261	889,814	230,106	114,114	45,917	4,145	4,997,592
1930	2,524,633	1,256,899	895,932	224,844	112,941	45,812	3,884	5,064,945
1932	2,546,089	1,286,050	903,415	222,327	112,449	46,270	3,738	5,120,338
1934	2,519,322	1,289,449	900,677	223,977	112,681	46,542	3,547	5,096,195
1936	2,556,630	1,305,400	909,933	218,851	110,549	45,580	3,277	5,150,220
Percentages for the above								
1908	46.15	26.09	18.76	3.65	2.49	0.81	0.05	100
1914	48.22	24.97	18.06	5.32	2.51	0.85	0.07	100
1923	49.52	24.20	18.10	4.67	2.41	1.00	0.10	100
1926	49.87	24.44	17.81	4.60	2.28	0.92	0.08	100
1930	49.85	24.81	17.69	4.45	2.23	0.90	0.07	100
1932	49.73	25.12	17.64	4.34	2.20	0.90	0.07	100
1934	49.45	25.30	17.67	4.39	2.21	0.91	0.07	100
1936	49.64	25.35	17.67	4.25	2.15	0.88	0.06	100

^a TNN (1935 ed.), p. 53 (for 1908 figures), NTTN (45th ed.), p. 79 (for 1914-1923 figures), NTTN (49th ed.), p. 71 (for 1926 figures), NTTN (55th ed.), p. 81 (for 1930-1934 figures), NRN (1938 ed.), p. 85 (for 1936 figures). For abbreviations see p. 165.

^b Figures up to 1924 are exclusive of Okinawa

acres is divided among 5,120,000 families; the average owner holds less than three acres. Almost half of all landowners actually own less than half a hectare (1.245 acres); 25 per cent from 1.245 to 2.45 acres; 18 per cent from 2.45 to 7.34 acres; in other words, 75 per cent of all landowners hold less than 2.45

acres apiece and 93 per cent own less than 7.34 acres each.⁷¹

Despite these indications of wide dispersion of ownership, a high degree of concentration in a few hands is characteristically part of the Japanese agricultural system. In 1935, 3,415 individuals each owned 50 *chō* (122.5 acres) or more of cultivated land. Although they constituted but sixty-six thousandths of one per cent of the landowning class, they owned a total of

TABLE 8

NUMBERS OF CULTIVATING AND NONCULTIVATING LANDOWNERS, BY YEAR^a

Year . .	Number of Landowners . .			Percentage . .	
	TOTAL	CULTIVATING OWNERS	NONCULTIVATING OWNERS	CULTIVATING OWNERS	NONCULTIVATING OWNERS
1909	4,916,443	3,910,212	1,006,231	79.5	20.5
1914	4,873,395	3,935,755	937,640	80.8	19.2
1919	4,922,543	4,012,877	909,666	81.5	18.5
1923 ^b	4,956,598	3,981,553	975,045	80.3	19.7
1926	4,997,592	4,046,618	950,974	81.0	19.0
1930	5,064,945	4,113,537	951,408	81.2	18.8
1932	5,120,338	4,143,913	976,425	80.9	19.1
1934	5,096,195	4,109,167	987,028	80.6	19.4
1936	5,150,220	4,079,764	1,070,456	79.2	20.8

^a TNN (1935 ed.), pp. 55-56 (for 1909-1932 figures), SNMJ, p. 25 (for 1934 figures), NRN (1938 ed.), p. 85 (for 1936 figures). For abbreviations, see p. 165.

^b Includes figures for Okinawa, the same for all succeeding figures.

980,000 acres—about 7 per cent of all the cultivated land—on which lived more than 620,000 tenant farmer households.⁷² Thus about 16 per cent of all tenant families were under the control of this small number of landlords.⁷³

Paradoxically, Japanese farm ownership exhibits both high concentration of ownership and a vast number of middle-class owners divorced from actual cultivation. Normally about 20 per cent of the landlords—more than a million—are classed as

noncultivating owners.⁷⁴ Not a few of these so-called *jinushi* (landlords) live parasitically on the income from their rents. They are not "large-scale landowners" in the Prussian or English sense of the phrase; only about 380,000 of them own more than 7.36 cultivated acres apiece. The rest of the non-cultivating owners—some 680,000—hold less than 7.36 acres each. In Japan even landlordism is on a molecular scale. Not a few of these noncultivating owners supplement their incomes by working as salary earners, merchants, officials, money lenders, or hotel and brothel keepers. Even the large owners—with as much as 125 acres—include some actual cultivators; 35 per cent of them operate on the average as much as 12 acres of their land and rent out the remainder; 30 per cent live solely by rent; and the other 35 per cent derive additional incomes from money lending, commerce, brewing, and governmental or private employment.⁷⁵

Tiny individual farms, endless division of ownership into minute parcels, the large number of landless peasants—these are determining factors in Japanese agriculture. They hinder the introduction of scientific farming and keep farming where it was more than a century ago.⁷⁶ The minuteness of the farms precludes commercial profit as a basis of farming. With a majority of the peasants it is not a question of profit or no profit from their endeavors. The primary concern is to eke out a scanty subsistence. They are driven to the most intensive cultivation and manage to obtain two crops a year—in a few areas, three—under conditions which in many other countries would appear to permit but one crop. The peasant concentrates on production of food crops, and the idea of crop rotation hardly enters his mind. In selecting the kind of crops to grow, his first consideration is satisfaction of immediate needs at home; marketing values are secondary. Any surplus after meeting family needs is converted into cash to meet payments for taxes, fertilizer, tools, clothing, education, medical care, etc. As it

often turns out, the income from farming not only fails to meet these expenditures, but income from such sources as domestic handicraft, day labor, or remittances from sons or daughters employed in factories has to be applied to operating expenses to keep the farm going. This is so not only with tenant farmers but also among a large majority of owner-cultivators.

Annual surveys by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry revealed that even under "normal" conditions in prewar years, Japanese farmers operated year after year under chronic deficits. Table 9 offers a typical example.⁷⁷ According to these figures the average net loss incurred by pure tenant families in one year's farm operations between March 1, 1935, and February 29,

TABLE 9

BALANCE SHEET OF THE JAPANESE FARMER, 1935-36 (IN UNITS OF YEN)*

Class of Operator	Income	Expenditures	Net Profit (+) or Loss (-)
	OPERATING EXPENSES	LIVING EXPENSES	TOTAL
Owner-cultivator	1,147 28	381 01	793 81
Part tenant	1,192 07	490 34	694 81
Pure tenant	1,086 93	583 69	627 03
Average	1,142 09	485 35	705 22
			1,175 82
			- 18 54
			+ 6 91
			- 123 79
			- 48 48

* NRN (1938 ed.), pp. 89-94. For abbreviations, see p. 165.

1936, was ¥123.79. The average loss for an owner-cultivator farmer was ¥28.54. The part-tenant farmers alone barely came out with an average "profit" of ¥6.91. The usual outcome was a net loss, despite the fact that in these calculations the daily food allowance was only fourteen sen per person, assuming an average household of 6.5 members. Nor did the operating expenses listed include wage calculations for the 3.7 members of the family regularly engaged in operating the farm.⁷⁸ Living

expenses, therefore, actually constituted the wages earned. For a total man-day labor of 739 days, the 3.7 working members of the family earned an annual total of Y705.22. This equals an average monthly wage per person of Y15.88, or Y0.95 per working day.⁷⁹ Under such a starvation economy only side incomes earned by the farmer and his family prevented total bankruptcy. These side incomes were derived from intermittent day labor outside their own farm, the housewife's piece work at home, etc. Government statistics represent these extra items as meeting the farm deficit and still providing an average surplus or net earning per household of Y132.79 for all three classes.⁸⁰

These figures may be taken for what they are worth. The fact is that the government survey selected the more prosperous farmers in each category. Even these, however, did not all enjoy surplus earnings. Nearly 30 per cent of those surveyed showed net deficits ranging from a few yen up to six hundred yen per family, even when outside income was included in the final calculation.⁸¹ The tenant farmers led the list of those with unfavorable balance sheets; they constituted 48 per cent of the deficit group. Owner-cultivators and part tenants composed the remainder in about equal numbers. This was the condition of above-average farm households at a time of comparative economic stability.

Figures of mounting farm debts further reflect the plight of the peasant. From an estimated total of Y250,000,000 in the early years of Meiji, these debts rose to Y746,000,000 in 1912, and to Y4,585,000,000 in 1929—an average annual increment of Y241,000,000.⁸² As of July 1932, a government survey placed the total at Y4,717,000,000.⁸³ By 1937, farm debts were estimated variously at between Y5,000,000,000 and Y6,000,000,000.⁸⁴ Roughly, the average debt of the Japanese farm household was Y1,000.

An integral aspect of these debts is the high interest rates, which in some districts have exceeded 15 per cent.⁸⁵ Total

annual interest payments have been estimated at between ¥400,000,000 and ¥500,000,000—equivalent to 20 per cent of the total annual value of agricultural products.⁸⁶

The destitution of the debt-ridden Japanese farmer can be imagined with little effort. In this milieu of growing poverty the tenant farmer must cope with the other problems peculiar to his status which render his position doubly insecure.

V. TENANCY PRACTICES

Tenancy practices in Japan today are by no means simple and uniform.⁸⁷ In complexity and diversity they inherit the manifold characteristics of their feudal antecedents with ambiguities and local peculiarities preserved in varying degrees. Certain elements, however, are more or less common throughout the nation and tend to become rules rather than exceptions.

In a great majority of cases tenancy is established by an oral agreement between tenant and landlord. It is estimated that not more than 30 per cent of tenancy agreements involve written contracts.⁸⁸ With more farmers than land to farm, this indicates the inferior position in which tenants are placed in bargaining with landlords. Even when written contracts exist, they are usually initiated and the terms dictated by the landlord, so that any protection afforded is definitely one sided. The only exceptions are the contracts that cover the interests of *emphyteutae*—holders of long-term tenancy.

Because oral contracts preponderate, terms of tenure, as a rule, are left to chance. In recent years some tenants have begun to insist upon definition of the period of tenure, but it is believed that between 80 and 90 per cent of the tenant farmers still hold the so-called indefinite tenure.⁸⁹ Under this system of tenancy at will the tenant operates the land on a yearly basis. Provided the landlord has no other plans for the land and the tenant abides by his contract, he is permitted generally to retain tenancy year after year. But the factor of uncertainty presents a

continuing threat. When a landlord decides to end this type of tenancy the usual practice is to give advance notice of six months to a year.⁹⁰ In written contracts terms usually are fixed at from three to five years, but always with an inescapable proviso that the contract is terminable whenever the landlord himself decides to cultivate the land.⁹¹ Terms run much longer on land devoted to mulberry trees, tea shrubs, or fruit trees—usually ten to fifteen years.

The emphyteuta, noted previously as an exception to the rule of uncertain tenure, still occupies a privileged position among tenants. His rights are no longer the same as those his predecessors enjoyed in feudal days. His term of tenure has been reduced from irrevocable perpetuity to one of limited duration. Nevertheless, this term is guaranteed by law and can continue anywhere from twenty to fifty years. He also is guaranteed against any possible disturbance incidental to change in land ownership. He is less subject to the landlord's supervision than other tenants. In return for defrayment of expenses of repair and improvement on the farm, he enjoys lower rentals.⁹² Numerically, however, emphyteusis has had very limited application, owing to many legal barriers against its establishment.⁹³ Even those rightly entitled to emphyteuses have been denied their privileges by owners who refuse to grant them under the existing law.

In general, a chief weakness of Japanese farm tenancy is lack of long-term tenure. Landlords may terminate contracts at their own convenience, with no adequate legal protection of tenants against the resulting losses. When tenancy is terminated suddenly during the life of a contract and after crops have been planted, custom requires the landlord to reimburse the tenant for seeds and fertilizer invested in the current crop, but no compensation is made for improvements effected at the tenant's expense in raising the productivity of the soil.⁹⁴ For many years repeated efforts to remedy this situation have aimed at enact-

ment of a "Tenant Farming Act" but without tangible results. The government has been unwilling to face the opposition of the landed classes.

Tenancy rights vary widely in practice. In certain districts, as a heritage from the past, tenants enjoy considerable control over their holdings. For example, in both Higashi Tonami *Gun* and Nishi Tonami *Gun* of Toyama prefecture, the right of a tenant to continue farming the land on which his ancestors had lived or to sell such tenancy to a third party has stood inalienable for generations. It has been treated accordingly as a right *in rem*, for all practical purposes almost equal to the landlord's right of ownership.⁹⁶ So firmly is this local custom established that no landlord has been able to invalidate it to this day.⁹⁷ This unique practice has no basis in the existing law of the nation; it represents a very exceptional case and only a few other localities cling to similar practices. Equally rare is the tenant's right to sublet land to another tenant. Under *emphyteusis* this right invariably has been recognized. Under other forms of tenancy, however, it exists only in a few localities.⁹⁷ Always the tenant is required to obtain the landlord's permission before subletting his land, and the incoming tenant must abide by the original contract.

For the mass of tenants neither the right to sublet nor the right to sell tenancy privileges exists. It is common practice for the landlord to impose restrictions on the tenant's freedom to determine the way the land is utilized. A landlord is considered justified in terminating contract for such actions of the tenant as the following: use of the land for purposes other than raising crops—for example, as a building site or for growing mulberry; indiscriminate use of lime on the soil; wilful neglect of the land, permitting it to lie waste for a long time, etc.⁹⁸ |

! Rates of rental are also determined by contract, written or oral. The amount paid depends on whether the contract provides for a stated quantity of product or cash, or whether it stipulates payment on a percentage basis. If the former, the

actual payment in kind or cash is agreed upon definitely in advance; the tenant is stimulated to greater exertion in hope of increased income. This form is used most widely. The percentage arrangement imposes varying rentals from year to year, depending on the volume of the crop; if payment is due in cash, the amount is computed on the basis of the current rice price, or the average over a given period. The tenant and landlord divide the harvested crop or its cash equivalent on the stipulated percentage basis; this method works against the tenant in time of good harvest and thus discourages him from efforts to improve soil productivity.

Share tenants are called *kariwake kosaku* (equivalent to share cropper) and occupy a rather inferior position among tenants. They are most numerous in the remote districts of Iwate, Aomori, Gifu, Nagano, Kumamoto, Kōchi, Yamanashi, and Shimane prefectures. In the nation as a whole, however, they are comparatively few.⁹⁹ Akin to the share tenants are the *tsukuriko* (cultivators or growers), found chiefly in Hiroshima, Okayama, Yamaguchi, Shizuoka, Akita, Kumamoto, and Fukuoka. They really are the Japanese counterpart of the American cropper; they differ from the *kariwake kosaku* and other tenants in that the landlord provides not only land but also living quarters, farm equipment and facilities, livestock, fertilizer, and seed.¹⁰⁰

¹ By far the most conspicuous feature of the Japanese tenancy system—one that distinguishes it from similar institutions in most countries—is the extraordinarily high rent and the continued practice of payment in kind. This latter aspect resembles the system that existed in England before the middle of the fourteenth century.

¹ With a few exceptions, Japanese tenant farmers pay their rents chiefly in rice, whether for paddy fields, dry-farming land, mulberry land, or horticultural gardens. For paddy fields rent is paid almost exclusively in unpolished rice. Otherwise pay-

ment may be in unhulled rice, or a combination of rice, wheat, soy beans, or millet—even in cash, though rarely. But cash payments have been increasing in recent years, particularly in the Kwantō for land devoted to truck farming or mulberry. Rice is still the chief medium of payment, with wheat and soy beans as occasional substitutes.¹⁰¹

Payment in labor survives in some localities. The tenant offers the landlord the labor of his household to cover all or part of the rent. Until the Meiji restoration this system was widespread, but today it survives chiefly in the Tōhoku and San'in districts.¹⁰²

The *Naturalpacht* system offers certain advantages to the tenant in times of falling prices, or in places where labor power exceeds the point of economical employment. It frees the tenant from the trouble of converting his product into cash in order to pay rent. In times of bad harvest it permits him more effectively to ask for rent reduction or remission. On the whole, however, the advantages to the tenant are outweighed by the disadvantages. It deprives him of power to influence the rice market. By custom he has been required to pay rent early in the fall immediately after harvest—precisely when the price of rice is at rock bottom. He cannot benefit from the better market prices some months later.

The existing system maintains the landlord's keen interest in the quality of the crop paid him. Prefectural governments thus have been encouraged to establish rice inspection offices to improve the quality of rice. Ostensibly this was designed to insure the reputation of the local product. In practice the system has worked considerable hardship to tenant farmers. It maintains standards in respect to quality of grain and methods of packing. To the tenant this means added labor and a substantial decrease in the volume of rice he can market. Price increases consequent upon inspection favor the landlord at the expense of the tenant; the landlord is in a position to

market his share of the rice, but the tenant may be compelled to purchase inspected rice at a higher market price later in the season when the rice stored for his family is exhausted. This often happens. The tenants' dislike for the inspection system has risen to the point where landlords in some prefectures have been compelled to offer bonuses to tenants in order to secure coöperation.

The extortionate nature of ground rents appears in examination of the relation of rent to total crop. On single-crop paddy land rents sometimes average 51 per cent of the total yield, while on two-crop lands they have averaged 56 per cent.¹⁰³ Rents on non-paddy lands have been more reasonable—from about 28 per cent to 40 per cent, depending on type of payment. Rents have been lowest when paid in cash and highest when paid in kind.¹⁰⁴ As for regional variations, the highest rents characterize the prefectures of Kagoshima, Kōchi, Shimane, Okayama, Nagano, and Hiroshima—from 56 per cent to 58 per cent on single-crop fields; the lowest occur in Hokkaidō, Okinawa, and Tōkyō—from 32 per cent to 40 per cent.¹⁰⁵ On the average, rent approximates 50 per cent of the tenant's operating expenses in the case of rice paddy,¹⁰⁶ and 30 per cent in the case of all agricultural enterprises combined.¹⁰⁷

A system of surcharges over and above the regular rent survives in some districts. These include: *komemai* (added rice), *kuchimai* (mouth rice), *sashimai* (inserted rice), *koboremai* (spilled rice), *warimashimai* (premium rice), etc. By feudal custom farmers were required to add to the tax rice additional amounts as insurance against loss or spoilage en route to the tax office, or against possible inferior quality or weight deficiency. No legitimate excuse now justifies these surcharges, and with establishment of strict inspection they are gradually disappearing. Meanwhile they continue to plague overburdened tenants, and the insistence of landlords on their continuation has occasioned many tenant disputes. Where the customs per-

sist, surcharges sometimes equal 10 to 25 per cent of the original rent.¹⁰⁸ Another disappearing feudal holdover is the *keiban* or *aze* rent levied on the narrow strips of land between the rice fields, used as footpaths by the peasants.¹⁰⁹ The landlord neglects no opportunity to lay his hands on the last chaff of the tenant's harvest.

As for public levies, by universal practice the landlord assumes all taxes and land assessments, including water fees, village assembly assessments, etc. Exceptions occur; in certain districts of Akita and Kōchi prefectures the tenant is required to bear all land taxes and public assessments in addition to his rent.¹¹⁰ Permanent improvements generally constitute the landlord's responsibility if cash outlay is required, while the tenant must supply the labor. This applies particularly in flood control and other major construction on the land, such as building and repair of irrigation and drainage canals, stone fences, bridges, and roads.¹¹¹

Since the economic panic of 1929 a tendency toward general decline in rents has been noted.¹¹² By general practice in times of economic depression or unavoidable disaster such as floods, droughts, and pestilence, landlords concede rent adjustments through temporary rent reduction or partial remission. This practice is dictated by sheer necessity; under normal conditions the tenant is so completely exploited that there can be no reserve against possible contingencies.¹¹³

When for any reason a tenant defaults in payment of rent, the landlord may resort to one of the following procedures: (1) assessment of interest on the amount in arrears;¹¹⁴ (2) computation of the unpaid rent in terms of cash and submission by the tenant of a promissory note for the amount; (3) termination of tenancy; (4) common action by the landlords of a district to boycott a tenant who fails to fulfil his contract; and (5) legal proceedings involving seizure of standing crops or trespassing.¹¹⁵ Landowners organize associations to safeguard

their common interest against delinquent tenants and defaulters and to combat the tenants' collective power. Expenses of such associations are borne by the members in proportion to the amount of rents received or the total acreage rented out by each member.

The tenants' countermeasures against collective action by the landowners have involved concerted action through tenant unions in refusing to pay rents or to return disputed land to the legal owners; refusal to negotiate individually; violence; joint storage, control, or sale of disputed rice; bringing official pressure to bear on owners by protracted legal proceedings, boycott of public schools and industrial associations, refusal to pay taxes or to serve in public office; etc.

Japan has her share of absentee landlords. The exact number of such persons is difficult to determine. According to a survey made in 1921, of the one million-odd noncultivating owners, about 10 per cent managed their land through overseers. Together these overseers had control over approximately 18 per cent of the total number of full- and part-tenant farmers.¹¹⁶ The overseers who act for absentee owners in collecting rents, supervising the land, and in drawing up contracts are known variously as *kanrinin* (caretaker), *sewanin* (agent), *shihainin* (manager), *kuramoto* (godown keeper), *bandai* (deputy watchman), *toritatenin* (collector), and *chōmoto* (book-keeper). They receive fees ranging from ¥5 to ¥1,500 a year, depending on the area supervised. Abuses seem to have been rather few, though in some districts rents are higher on overseer-managed lands.¹¹⁷

This system of tenancy bears heavily on the tenant; he becomes a mere tool of production with no adequate share in the product and no fair opportunity to better his condition or to improve his means of production. Between the dying barter economy of feudalism and the expanding monetary economy the tenant is caught as if in the jaws of a vise. And uncertain

tenure fosters uneconomic exploitation of the soil, contributes to economic instability, and aggravates social unrest.

VI. THE TENANT MOVEMENT

Within the past two and a half decades a tenant movement has grown to proportions disconcerting to the landed class and to the government. The Japanese tenant farmer no longer is meek and servile as he was. He has learned to organize unions and fortify his bargaining power even as his city brothers had begun to do with their labor unions. He is discovering the power of collective action in demanding rent reduction and in refusing to give up the land.

The tenant union is the center of this organized effort. In 1937 there were nearly 4,000 such unions with a combined membership of over 220,000.¹¹⁸ Another 3,000 unions with about 250,000 members had been organized and supported jointly by tenants and landowners.¹¹⁹ While the latter organizations occupy a position somewhat analogous to that of a company union, the former group is founded strictly on a class basis. The tenant movement, in consequence, has centered around the class-conscious unions. In former years they were associated closely with the farmer-labor parties and other more or less militant agrarian groups. With the compulsory dissolution of these affiliated organizations, the tenant unions have become the peasants' only rallying point in the fight for freedom and security.

As a class-conscious movement, the tenant movement is rather recent; it dates from the years immediately following the first World War. Its precursors were the peasant uprisings of the Tokugawa period¹²⁰ and the early Meiji years. Nearly two hundred and fifty peasant uprisings and disturbances occurred in the first seventeen years of the Meiji era;¹²¹ of these one hundred and ninety occurred in the first ten years.¹²² In most of these peasant disturbances tenants participated in one way or

another. The uprisings were directed variously—against the new government's monetary policy; against military conscription; against usurious farm debts; or against the new land

TABLE 10

NUMBERS OF TENANT UNIONS, LANDLORD-TENANT JOINT ASSOCIATIONS, AND LANDOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS, BY YEARS^a

Year	Tenant Unions		Landlord-tenant Joint Associations		Landowners' Associations	
	NUMBER	MEMBERSHIP	NUMBER	MEMBERSHIP	NUMBER	MEMBERSHIP
1921	681	—	85	—	192	—
1922	1,114	—	176	—	247	—
1923	1,530	—	347	—	290	—
1924	2,337	—	542	—	414	—
1925	3,496	307,106	1,371	142,429	532	34,559
1926	3,926	346,693	1,491	164,585	605	47,425
1927	4,582	365,312	1,703	174,106	734	57,051
1928	4,352	330,406	1,909	190,358	695	55,695
1929	4,356	315,771	1,986	244,943	655	55,138
1930	4,208	301,436	1,980	247,880	640	53,278
1931	4,414	306,301	2,047	255,088	655	50,558
1932	4,650	296,839	2,098	258,613	662	50,454
1933	4,810	302,736	2,309	279,431	666	49,645
1934	4,390	276,246	2,219	272,434	633	48,836
1935	4,011	242,422	1,748	202,785	531	38,171
1936	3,915	229,209	2,878	254,907	513	35,702
1937	3,879	226,919	2,849	251,056	497	35,054

^a TNN (1935 ed.), pp. 365-366 (for 1921-1932 figures), NRN (1936 ed.), p. 550 (for 1933-1935 figures), NRN (1938 ed.), pp. 360, 513-514 (for 1936-1937 figures). For abbreviations see p. 165.

and taxation measures. Not a few were opposed to abolition of traditional emphyteusis rights, or to continued payment of rents in kind, or simply to high rents.¹²³

As early as 1875, in Gifu and Kōchi prefectures, a movement arose to organize tenant farmers into unions. About 1888 the

movement spread to Kyōto. The next ten years witnessed sporadic attempts at tenant organization in Nagasaki, Shimane, Tochigi, and Kagawa. Between 1897 and 1907, twenty-two tenant associations were formed. By the time of the first World War the number had increased to about sixty,¹²⁴ tokens of a nascent struggle by an overexploited class. Sporadically the associations appeared and disappeared, spontaneous in origin but lacking continuity and clarity of purpose. The war changed the whole perspective.

In that four-year European war Japan enjoyed all the rights and privileges of a belligerent in return for token participation in combat, and her economic activities expanded tremendously. The "modern" industrialists established their monopolies firmly. The landed class amassed abundant capital in consequence of an unprecedented rise in the price of rice, and strengthened their hold on the peasantry by expanding their land holdings. In the general deterioration of the position of the peasants, the tenant farmers suffered most from the soaring cost of living. The simultaneous experience of a war boom and a miserable condition of life profoundly altered the minds of even the backward Japanese peasantry. In the cities an organized worker's movement sprang into being, and echoes of the Russian revolution shook the countryside. Then occurred the greatest mass uprising in modern Japanese history: the rice riots of 1918, three weeks of nation-wide near rebellion.¹²⁵ Shaken from their stupor the peasants gained consciousness of their latent power; in the voice of the new intelligentsia they heard the expression of their own discontent and rancor. Some of the more intelligent peasants began to talk of class struggle. The hope of self-liberation was beginning to dawn among them.

A surging wave of tenant disputes became nation-wide within a few years. The number of disputes rose from 84 in 1917—the first year for which data are recorded—to 296 the following

TABLE II

NUMBERS OF TENANT DISPUTES, BY YEARS*

Year	Number of Disputes	Land Area Involved (in <i>Chō</i>)	Number of Landlords Involved	Number of Tenants Involved
1917	84	—	—	—
1918	256	—	—	—
1919	326	—	—	—
1920	408	27,000	5,000	34,000
1921	1,680 (1,680) ^b	88,000	33,000	145,000
1922	1,578 (1,578)	90,000	29,000	125,000
1923	1,917 (1,865)	89,000	32,000	134,000
1924	1,532 (1,260)	70,000	27,000	110,000
1925	2,206 (1,354)	95,000	33,000	134,000
1926	2,751 (2,529)	95,000	39,000	151,000
1927	2,052 (1,344)	59,000	24,000	91,000
1928	1,866 (1,099)	48,000	19,000	75,000
1929	1,343 (1,531)	56,000	23,000	81,000
1930	2,478 (1,723)	39,000	14,000	58,000
1931	3,419 (2,231)	60,000	23,000	81,000
1932	3,474 (2,083)	39,000	16,000	61,000
1933	4,000 (2,677)	30,000	14,000	48,000
1934	5,818 (3,849)	85,000	34,000	121,000
1935	6,824 (5,004)	70,000	28,000	113,000
1936	5,769 (5,714)	36,000	17,000	58,000
1937	5,364 (4,792)	28,000	5,000	48,000

* NNR (1938 ed.), pp. 159-160, 357 (for 1917-1919 and 1935-1937 figures), NNKR, p. 149 (for 1920-1934 figures). For abbreviations, see p. 165.

^b There are two sets of statistics on tenant disputes, one contained in the Labor Bureau (formerly Social Welfare Bureau of the Home Ministry) reports of the Welfare Ministry and the other contained in the reports of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Figures in parentheses represent the former, tabulated from reports received by the Labor Bureau from its field agents up to April 10 of each succeeding year. The Agriculture and Forestry Department figures are based on complete annual reports submitted by the prefectural governments. The Labor Bureau figures used in this table were drawn from *Kōseishō, Kōsei Gyōsei Yōran* (Essential Facts of the Work of the Social Welfare Department) (Tōkyō, 1938 ed.), p. 237.

year, to 408 in 1920, and leaped to 1,680 in 1921.¹²⁶ Tenant unions appeared first in Niigata, Yamanashi, Gunma, Nagano, Saitama, and Ōsaka prefectures, and soon spread to the rest of the nation. In 1922 the Japan Farmers' Union—the first national body—was organized. The havoc wrought by the 1923 earthquake, the financial panic of 1924, and the general economic crisis of 1929 all added impetus to the movement. In the year of the great earthquake tenant disputes rose to 1,917; in 1926 they numbered 2,751. The number of tenant unions in 1927 was 4,582—an increase of nearly sevenfold within six years.¹²⁷

The outstanding event in the history of the Japanese tenant movement probably was the founding in 1922 of the *Nippon Nōmin Kumiai* (Japan Farmers' Union, mentioned above). Tenant unions formed the backbone of the new organization. From that day on the movement ceased to be purely a tenant movement, and became part of a larger effort designed to improve the lot of the entire peasant class. Measures advocated included the socialization of land, laws to protect farm tenants, a legal minimum wage for agricultural labor, universal suffrage, revision of the notorious Peace Preservation Law, etc. The peasants responded to the program; by 1924 the Union had 508 branches with a total membership of 53,000. Under the leadership of militant intelligentsia the Japan Farmers' Union took the lead in many tenant disputes, including the famous Kizakimura dispute in Niigata prefecture.¹²⁸ In a number of cases it succeeded in abolishing surcharges on rents; in many cases rent rates were reduced permanently or temporarily. The Union also participated actively in local political campaigns; in 1925, 339 out of 408 candidates were elected to local assemblies. It was the first mass organization to advocate alliance between the urban proletariat and the rural poor in a farmer-labor party.

The *Nōmin Rōdōtō* (Farmer-Labor Party) was formed in

December 1925. Within three hours of its birth the new party was dissolved by order of the Home Minister because of suspected radical affiliations. In the following March it was revived as the *Rōdō Nōmintō* (Labor-Farmer Party) with four left-wing organizations excluded to insure legality in the eyes of the police. The Farmers' Union continued as a chief supporting organization of the revived party.¹²⁹

The subsequent history of both the Farmers' Union and the Labor-Farmer Party, however, was one of the repeated schism, due on the one hand to police suppression and on the other to incessant internal dissension. Within the Union itself, the first defection followed immediately upon formation of the Labor-Farmer Party: the extreme right wing broke away from both Union and Party and formed the *Zen Nippon Nōmin Kumiai Dōmei* (All-Japan Federation of Farmers' Unions)¹³⁰ and the *Nippon Nōmintō* (Japan Farmers' Party.) Another right-wing group, supported by the Japan Federation of Labor, left the Labor-Farmer Party in December 1926 to form the *Shakai Minshūtō* (Social Democratic Party). This at first had no organized agrarian support, but soon it organized a farmers' union, *Nippon Nōmin Kumiai Sōdōmei* (General Federation of Japan Farmers' Unions). This second split was followed in February 1927 by defection of a center wing, which formed the *Zen Nippon Nōmin Kumiai* (All-Japan Farmers' Union) supported by a center-wing proletarian party, the *Nippon Rōnōtō* (Japan Labor-Farmer Party).

Amidst these kaleidoscopic changes the movement grew with vigor and enthusiasm. In the prefectoral elections of 1927—the first under universal male suffrage—the Labor-Farmer Party, supported by the Japan Farmers' Union, elected many candidates to prefectoral assemblies in régions where the farmers' movement had been most vigorous—Kagawa, Niigata, Akita, Hyōgo, etc. In the parliamentary election of the following year, the proletarian parties elected eight of their candidates

to the Diet—a historic event in the class-liberation movement of Japan.

Alarmed by the phenomenal start of the labor-farmer movement, the government lost no time in applying oppressive measures. On March 15, 1928, one month after the election, the first large-scale arrest of radical leaders occurred. This was followed by forced dissolution of three left-wing organizations, including the Labor-Farmer Party. In the general roundup the Japan Farmers' Union lost several hundred of its most aggressive leaders. This prompted a reunion with the center-wing All-Japan Farmers' Union. The merger of these two agrarian organizations—the former with 70,000 members, the latter with 16,000—resulted in organization of the *Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai* (National Farmers' Union), better known as *Zennō*.

The farmers' movement seemed well on the way to recovery when, on April 16, 1929, another mass arrest netted several thousand more prisoners. Thereafter the story of Japan's agrarian movement was one of hide-and-seek between the police and the underground organizers. Internally the story was split and merger, especially within *Zennō*, within which heated rivalry continued between the communists represented by the *Zennō Zenkoku Kaigi* (*Zennō* All-National Congress Group) and the center- and right-wing social democrats. Politically the latter rallied around the *Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō* (All-Nation Labor-Farmer Mass Party) formed by the more moderate section of the defunct Labor-Farmer Party.

The "Manchurian Incident" of 1931 initiated a period of extreme reaction in Japan, hardly distinguishable in completeness and severity from the rule of Fascist-Nazi totalitarianism in Europe. Whatever distinction existed between totalitarian rule and that of Kōdō militarism vanished rapidly after the resumption, in 1937, of the undeclared war with China.

Under such conditions all social movements were forced to change their course. Left wingers of all shades were driven

more and more deeply underground; even after 1933 their very existence became obscure. The public heard only of frequent arrests of persons suspected of "dangerous thoughts." Those workers' and farmers' parties that were permitted a legal existence made a hundred-and-eighty-degree about-face in methods and policies. In this process the ultra-right section of the Social Democratic Party took the lead; immediately after the Manchurian incident, this group broke with its party and endorsed state socialism and all-out support of the military expansionist program. The other so-called proletarian parties also were soon to move further and further to the right—just as the German Social Democratic Party had done in 1914.

The agrarian movement persisted tenaciously throughout all the internal feuds, splits, fusions, and official hostility—in some respects activity even increased. Tenant disputes continued to increase in number during the darkest days of 1929-1932, as also during the years immediately preceding 1937. In fact, the number of disputes reached its all-time high of 6,824 in 1935.

In the 1936 elections, the labor-farmer parties, supported in strength by organized peasants, sent 24 representatives to the Diet. In a special general election in 1937 this number increased to 38; these parties thus became an influential third-party opposition in the national legislature. In local elections the *Shakai Taishūtō* (Social Mass Party), successor to the All-Nation Labor-Farmer Mass Party—alone sent 58 members to prefectural assemblies and 161 to municipal assemblies.¹³¹

On the organizational side, however, setbacks continued. After 1934 tenant unions declined steadily. *Zennō* continued active but gradually retreated from its militant policy until, early in 1938, self-liquidation occurred. Out of this liquidation arose two separate organizations—*Dai Nippon Nōmin Kumiai* (Great Japan Farmers' Union) and *Nippon Nōmin Renmei* (Japan Farmers' League)—each of which claimed over 70,000 members.¹³² The former adhered to the Social Mass Party; the

latter placed itself at the service of the *Tōhōkai* (Eastern Society), an out-and-out imperialist group. Even this arrangement was short lived. In the summer of 1940 the two agrarian organizations dissolved "voluntarily" in the name of national unity as the General Federation of Japan Farmers' Unions had done.¹³³ Their affiliated political parties soon shared this fate. By December 1941, Japanese farmers had no national organization of their own. They did have the government-supported *Teikoku Nōkai* (Imperial Agricultural Association), the local tenant unions, and numerous ultra-reactionary organizations such as The Imperial Farmers' League, The Imperial Farmers' Self-Governing Alliance, etc. In view of the bitter struggle between tenants and landowners throughout the years of reaction prior to the war, it need hardly be argued that this sudden disintegration of the agrarian movement was effected by compulsion.

Until 1929, tenant disputes arose largely in demands for rent reduction. The tenants were on the offensive, backed by their unions and other agrarian organizations, and by labor-farmer parties. In subsequent years the condition was reversed. Ruthless official suppression of all radical peasant organizations, together with the chronic war conditions that followed the Manchurian invasion, greatly strengthened the landed class; it became the landowners' turn to assume the offensive. Consequently in these latter years tenant disputes revolved around the landlords' attempts to wrest land from tenants. Between 1932 and 1939, nearly 54 per cent of all tenant disputes were occasioned by owners' attempts to eject tenants.¹³⁴ In the ten prefectures with the largest numbers of disputes, this cause of trouble accounted for 77 per cent of the disputes in 1939; for the nation the corresponding percentage was 56.¹³⁵ The reasons reported for the owners' attempts to evict were recorded as: change of ownerships; default in rent payment; owner's desire to cultivate the land personally; expiration of

contract; etc. The first two accounted for close to 45 per cent of the ejection cases.¹³⁶ For the tenants the situation approached desperation. Despite the government's heated war propaganda, such tenant unions and agrarian organizations as were permitted to exist began in 1939 openly to demand complete nationalization of all tenant lands.¹³⁷

TABLE 12
CAUSES OF TENANCY DISPUTES, BY YEAR*

Year . . .	Tenants' Demands for Lease Renewal and Tenancy Rights	Tenants' Demands for Temporary Reduction of Rents	Other Causes
1932	53.8%	42.0%	4.1%
1933	59.1	31.7	8.2
1934	47.1	38.1	15.2
1935	52.1	37.1	10.8
1936	62.0	22.1	15.9
1937	63.1	20.2	16.7
1938	63.8	20.6	15.6
1939	57.5	19.0	23.5

* Based on Labor Bureau statistics in RN (1940 ed.), appendix, p. 104. For abbreviations see p. 165.

The fact that numerous landlords were seeking to oust tenants in order to engage in cultivation for themselves simply reflects the economic instability of the noncultivating small owners. Many of them are reduced to the position of owner-cultivators each year. In a period of war boom the increasing numbers of ejections and attempted ejections due to rent default emphasize the acuteness of the tenant situation and portend future developments no policy of expediency can forestall.

VII. THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY

Since the early 1920's, farm tenancy has come up for discussion at practically every session of the Imperial Diet. Thus far little has been done by legislation to alleviate the hardships of the tenant farmer. The government's efforts have been confined to (1) a policy of arbitration in matters involving tenant disputes, (2) a program of low-interest loans to increase and maintain the numbers of owner-cultivators, and (3) lukewarm efforts to ameliorate the conditions of tenancy by restricting certain arbitrary practices of landlords.

The Tenancy Mediation Law of 1924 embodies the first policy. It seeks to apply principles of prevention as well as arbitration. The first responsibility for preventing trouble rests on an official called the *kosakukan* (farm tenancy officer), who with several assistants is attached to the economics department of the prefectural government. He and his staff conduct surveys of local tenancy practices and keep in close touch with the condition of tenant farmers. It is his duty to smooth out tenant-landlord differences before they develop into serious disputes.

Should this first step at mediation fail, either party may appeal to the nearest district (*chihō*) or local (*ku*) court. This may be done directly or through the executive head of the municipality, the *chō* (town), or *son* (village) government. A judge previously assigned to that duty by the presiding judge of the district court either acts personally as arbitrator or, more commonly, creates a board of arbitration consisting of himself as chairman and two or more members. These members may be selected by the presiding judge of the district court or may be recommended by the parties to the dispute. When a case is accepted for arbitration, all pending litigation ceases automatically until the conclusion of arbitration proceedings. The duty of the board is to conduct a fair hearing of all sides

of the question. In addition to the parties to the dispute, the tenancy officer and the local government head also submit testimony, reports, or recommendations either voluntarily or by request. If the disputants fail to reach an agreement, the board is empowered to make recommendations which become binding unless either of the parties objects within a month after notification. Unless the board's recommendations prove definitely to be unfair, the court also is required to accept them as final.¹³⁸

This arbitration policy has been by far the most successful of the three major government policies. When disputes arise, the usual practice of the tenants is to resort to organized action, especially in matters concerning rent. The landlord replies by engaging a lawyer and by rallying the landowners' association to his support. Not infrequently bloodshed ensues. In a majority of cases, however, compromise settlements have been effected through timely intervention by the tenancy officer or the board of arbitration. In recent years more than 60 per cent have been settled by arbitration and compromise. Of the rest a majority resulted in complete victory for the tenants; the others ended in stalemate.¹³⁹

The policy of converting tenant farmers into owner-cultivators through government-subsidized farm loans began feebly in 1922. The scale of the original program was so small that during the first four years the loans advanced from the Postal Insurance Fund amounted to but ¥14,000,000—an insignificant sum for so vast a problem.¹⁴⁰ A new regulation was promulgated in 1926 and an expanded program was launched as a twenty-five year plan. This program envisaged a total loan of ¥468,500,000 to be financed by an interest subsidy estimated at 101,900,000 yen. The aim was to enable tenants to buy 117,000 *chō* (about 286,650 acres) of land, equivalent to about 4 per cent of the land area then under tenancy. At the same time the tax law was amended to exempt from the national land

tax single holdings evaluated at less than ¥200—a measure intended to aid the owner-cultivators created under the plan.

By 1936 some ¥155,000,000 had been loaned, enabling 193,000 tenant families to purchase 85,700 *chō* (210,000 acres), an average of slightly over an acre per family.¹⁴¹ The year 1935, however, witnessed a record number of tenant disputes, with almost as many in 1936. Because of the mounting tension the loan program was revamped and in 1937 a new twenty-five year plan went into effect.

The recast scheme calls for a total loan of ¥1,000,000,000 to be advanced at the rate of ¥40,000,000 annually. The funds are to be drawn in equal amounts from the Postal Insurance Fund of the Ministry of Communications and the Deposit Bureau Fund of the Finance Ministry. Approximately a million tenant and part-tenant farmers are to be aided in acquiring 417,000 *chō* (1,021,650 acres), roughly one-seventh of the land now under tenancy. Loans are to be made first to prefectural governments at 4.5 per cent interest on Postal Insurance money, and 3.2 per cent on Deposit Bureau funds. Prefectural governments in turn make loans to individual farmers either directly or via *chō* or *son* governments, industrial coöperatives, or *nōkai* (agricultural associations), at an annual rate of 3.2 per cent.¹⁴² The national government subsidizes the prefectures in meeting the difference in interest rates—estimated at ¥107,000,000. Besides the individual farmers, prefectural and other local governments, other public bodies, and private organizations are entitled to use this loan system to acquire land, whether cultivated or uncultivated, for the purpose of subdividing it among tenant farmers. Fifty million yen are earmarked from this fund for grants-in-aid to tenants who migrate to open new lands.¹⁴³ Loans are to be repaid over a long period of time in installments not exceeding current rates of rent.

There is a psychological appeal in any plan to make land-owners out of tenant farmers, and the expanded scale of the

new plan adds to its attraction. When it is considered, however, that the lot of the small holder is scarcely better than that of the tenant, and the amount of land assured to a family of six or seven is hardly more than an acre, the program appears less impressive. In the past, the plan has tended to boost the price of agricultural land and thus has reacted adversely to the tenant farmer. This helps to explain the curious absence of opposition from the landed class. Perhaps the drawbacks are only transitional. Even if the program succeeds completely, however, three million tenant and part-tenant families will continue untouched. Consequently some of the more progressive agrarian organizations have expressed complete disapproval of the program.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, during 1926-1936 when the first plan was in operation, the number of owner-cultivators actually decreased from 1,732,180 to 1,731,139 and tenant farmers increased from 1,508,539 to 1,517,701.¹⁴⁵ And from 1931-1936 the number of owner-cultivators dropped by more than 25,000 with a corresponding increase of 22,000 in tenant farmers. Small holders are being cast into the ranks of the tenants faster than the government is able to convert tenants into owner-cultivators.

Governmental reforms of existing tenancy practices have been even more ineffective. A bill designed to create a tenancy act was introduced in the Diet in 1931—eleven years after a committee to make such a recommendation had been established in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The House of Peers, packed with landed interests, tabled the measure.¹⁴⁶ That was the year of the Manchurian invasion. Six years later, in view of the approaching war with China, a new bill purporting to afford some protection to tenants against arbitrary termination of tenure and in respect to compensation for improvements made on leased land was submitted by the Hirota Cabinet. No action was taken, owing to dissolution of the Diet.¹⁴⁷ Under the succeeding Konoye Cabinet the "Agricultural Land Adjustment Act" was enacted,¹⁴⁸ and in December 1939 a decree

designed to control further rate increases was promulgated in accordance with the general price-control provision of the National Mobilization Law.¹¹⁹ These, however, were designed as war measures; up to Pearl Harbor no comprehensive law afforded effective protection to the interests of tenant farmers.

A comprehensive tenancy act is needed urgently by the tenants. This means more than the prospect of owning a small parcel of land in a remote future. Three out of four tenant farmers would continue to be such even were the government's twenty-five year plan entirely successful. Judged by results the plan to create a new landed peasantry is hardly more than a pretext to delay much-needed reforms. It is difficult to see how a policy so fraught with internal contradictions and so oblivious to the larger aspects of the problem can mitigate the existing acute situation or effect permanent improvement.

By way of recapitulation, the Japanese farm-tenancy system is a social institution of the first magnitude in the lives of more than 25,000,000 people and represents the most onerously antiquated order in a nation of outworn institutions. The tenant farmer has been forced to bear a major portion of the burden of a rapid industrialization program relentlessly pursued by a semifeudal militaristic regime. The persistence of a usurious, outmoded rent system that leaves no surplus for essential improvements has held him to the drudgery of medieval farming. He is a farmer with a spade, a hand plow, and a sickle for tools, with the most primitive fertilizers, with hardly a beast of burden to ease his labor. His one-acre plot cannot supply even four American cents' worth of food a day for each member of his seven-person household. Debt-ridden, tax-burdened, undernourished, miserably housed, his wretchedness defies comparison. The absence of an enlightened governmental policy caps his misery.

No single program within the limits of immediate practicality, however, can solve his difficulties. There is no panacea.

Certain aspects of the problem are obvious. The recent war invalidated any solution based on Japan's imperialistic territorial expansion. Nor does emigration offer a better prospect. Birth control affords no solution, for such a policy is contingent upon elevation of the general standard of living and diffusion of knowledge; these in turn depend on the improved economic condition of the tenant farmer. The problem must be solved within the home territory and independently of the population question. The possibility of technological improvement should not be overlooked. Greater use of farm machinery and chemical fertilizers can doubtless increase productive capacity—how much, it is difficult to say. Geographical factors hamper large-scale scientific or mechanized farming, and under the existing tenancy system tenants cannot afford the luxury of mechanized farming. Even if mechanization were possible with outside capital, under existing high rents the benefits would accrue to the landowners. To permit introduction of mechanized farming and at the same time to benefit the tenant farmer, the way must be prepared by creating conditions of tenure that will make farming a going concern. Granting this premise, there seem to be two alternatives left for the Japanese tenant:

1. Further industrialization and greater exploitation of all available natural resources, based on a strictly peacetime economy—however that may be interpreted—in order to reduce the number of farmers and increase the acreage available to those who remain on the land.

2. Denied that possibility, the whole land system must be changed to give increased acreage to each tenant. At the same time the tenancy system must be completely modernized. The latter alternative involves expropriation and redivision of all unused lands, whether they are under private or governmental control, and the breaking up of large individual holdings—particularly those of absentee and noncultivating owners. It also

means a radical reduction of rents and thorough revision of terms of tenure, together with other phases of the system.

Failing these measures, the future of the Japanese tenant farmer presents an ominous picture.

NOTES

Certain Japanese sources, frequently cited, are identified by abbreviations. These are:

INSR: Ono Takeo, *Ishin Nōson Shakaishi Ron* (History of Rural Society in the Restoration Period) (Tōkyō, 1932).

NNKR: Seida Hitoshi, *Nippon Nōgyō Keizai Ron* (Japanese Agricultural Economics) (Tōkyō, 1938).

NNN: Nippon Nōgyō Kenkyūkai, *Nippon Nōgyō Nempō* (Japan Agricultural Annual) (Tōkyō, annually).

NRN: Ohara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūsho, *Nippon Rōdō Nenkan* (The Labor Year Book of Japan) (Tōkyō, annually since 1921).

NSHG: Tsuchiya Takao and Okazaki Saburō, *Nippon Shihonshugi Hatatsushi Gaisetsu* (An Outline History of the Development of Japanese Capitalism) (Tōkyō, 1937).

NSSK: Hirano Gitarō, *Nippon Shihonshugi Shakai No Kikō* (The Social Structure of Japanese Capitalism) (Tōkyō, 1934).

NTTN: Naikaku Tōkeikyōku, *Nippon Teikoku Tōkei Nenkan* (Statistical Yearbook of the Empire of Japan, issued by Central Statistical Bureau) (Tōkyō, annually).

RN: Kyōchōkai, *Rōdō Nenkan* (Labor Yearbook) (annually since 1933).

SNMJ: Ono Takeo, *Saikin Nōgyō Mondai Jikkō* (Ten Lectures on Recent Agricultural Problems) (Tōkyō, 1938).

TNN: Teikoku Nōkai, *Nōgyō Nenkan* (Agricultural Yearbook, issued by Imperial Agricultural Society) (Tōkyō, annually).

1. Naikaku Tōkeikyōku, *Rōdō Tōkei Yōran* (Labor Statistics Abstract) (Tōkyō, 1938), p. 1.

2. NTTN (55th ed.; 1936), p. 442.

3. *Rōdō Tōkei Yōran*, p. 1.

4. Inoma Kiichi, *Nippon Keizai Zuhyō* (Japanese Economic Statistics, Charts, and Graphs) (Tōkyō, 1930), p. 152. In 1919, industrial production occupied 50 per cent and agricultural production 38.5 per cent of the nation's total production value; in 1924 the figures were 55.1 per cent and 32.5 per cent; in 1928, 61.3 per cent and 26.9 per cent, respectively.

5. In 1873, of the 7,167,000 households in the nation, 78.69 per cent, or 5,640,000, consisted of agricultural households. The percentage dropped to

64.07 per cent in 1903, 49.31 per cent in 1925, 46.03 per cent in 1930 and to 43.12 per cent in 1936. NSSK, p. 15 (for 1873 figures); (TNN 1935 ed.), p. 46 (for 1903-1930 figures); NRR (1938 ed.), XIX, 83 (for 1936 figures.)

6. See Table 1.

7. The percentage of tenant farmers in Great Britain was 89 per cent in 1916, and 79.7 per cent in Belgium in 1895. Sawamura Yasushi, "Nippon no Nōgyō oyobi Nōgyō Mondai" (Japanese Agriculture and Agricultural Problems), in Kaijōsha, *Keizaiigaku Zenshū*, XLII (Gendai Nippon Keizai no Kenkyū) (Tōkyō, 1930), 597.

8. See Table 2.

9. NTTN (55th ed.; 1936), pp. 80, 83

10. Sawamura, *op. cit.*, pp. 570-571; NTTN (55th ed.), pp. 6 (Summary), 80-85.

11. NTTN (55th ed.), pp. 80, 83.

12. See Table 3.

13. NTTN (55th ed.), p. 80.

14. See Tables 4 and 5.

15. See Table 4.

16. See Table 5.

17. See Tables 4 and 5.

18. Takekoshi Yosoburō, *The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan* (London, 1930), I, 124.

19. Takikawa Seijirō, *Nippon Shakaishi* (A Social History of Japan) (rev. ed.; Tōkyō, 1935), pp. 58-59.

20. Takekoshi, *op. cit.*, II, 43-44.

21. *Ibid.*, I, 121, 123.

22. Ono Takeo, *Eikosakuron* (A Treatise on Emphyteusis) (Tōkyō, 1937), pp. 26 ff.

23. Bureau of Taxation, Ministry of Finance, *Dai Nippon Sozeishi* (Source Materials on the History of Taxation in Japan) (Tōkyō, 1926), I, pt. 1 (Tochi Seido—The Land System), 439-445.

24. Ono, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

25. Takekoshi, *op. cit.*, III, 409.

26. Ono, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

27. Speaking of the conditions of the peasants during this period, Takekoshi, *op. cit.*, III, 408, writes: "The long suffering of our farmers under such miserable conditions and their unceasing labours are unparalleled in the history of cultivators of the soil in any country."

28. One *koku* is equivalent to 5.119 American bushels.

29. Takikawa, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

30. NSSK, p. 28; NNN (10th ed.; 1937), p. 38.

31. INSR, pp. 229 ff.

32. *Dai Nippon Sozeishi*, I, 452 ff.

33. *Ibid.*, I, 453-454; INSR, pp. 111 ff.

34. *Dai Nippon Sozeishi*, I, 527 ff.; INSR, pp. 124 ff.
35. NSHG, pp. 22-23.
36. NNN (10th ed.), p. 7.
37. INSR, pp. 190-191.
38. INSR, pp. 177-178.
39. This expropriation of shrine and temple lands, however, was duly compensated by the government. INSR, p. 180; *Dai Nippon Sozeishi*, I, 507-509.
40. INSR, pp. 195-196, 231-235.
41. INSR, pp. 219-226.
42. INSR, p. 220.
43. Ono Takeo, *Kyū Saga-han no Kinden Seido* (Land Apportionment System in the Old Principality of Saga) (Tōkyō, 1928); INSR, pp. 230-231.
44. NNN (10th ed.), p. 10. Cf. also NSHG, pp. 26-46. The largest single payment was made to Prince Shimazu of Satsuma who received ¥1,322,000. Three other former lords (Maeda of Kaga, Mori of Suwo, and Hosokawa of Higo) each received over a million yen. Fifteen others received between ¥780,000 and ¥300,000. NSSK, p. 258.
45. NSSK, p. 19; NSHG, pp. 48-49, 71; Ono Takeo, *Nōson Shi* (Rural History), in the *Gendai Nippon Buummei Shi* series (Tōkyō, 1941) IX, 77-78.
46. NSHG, p. 30.
47. NSSK, p. 258. Cf. NSHG, pp. 37 ff.
48. INSR, pp. 227-230.
49. Ono, *Eikosakuron*, pp. 81-123.
50. J. E. deBecker, *Annotated Civil Code of Japan* (London and Yokohama, 1909), pp. 243-249.
51. Yamada Seitarō, *Nippon Shihonshugi Bunseki* (An Analysis of Japanese Capitalism) (Tōkyō, 1934), p. 193; NSSK, pp. 28, 34; cf. also NSHG, pp. 63-64, 68. At the time of the tax reform some attempts were made to adjust rent rates, but the result did not seriously change the general situation, for rates still ranged from 60 to 85 per cent of the total produce. NNN (10th ed.), pp. 40, 47, 58-59. A government survey made in 1885, however, gave the average rate of rent as 60 per cent of the tenant's total produce. NSSK, pp. 34-35; Ono, *Nōson Shi*, pp. 84-86.
52. The price of rice rose from ¥4.80 per *koku* in 1873 to ¥7.28 in 1875, to ¥8.01 in 1879, to ¥11.20 in 1881, dropping to ¥6.26 in 1883. NSHG, p. 67; Ono, *Nōson Shi*, pp. 77-78.
53. NSHG, p. 68; NSSK, pp. 30, 37-38.
54. NSSK, p. 29.
55. The tremendous rise in the price of farm land may be seen from the following index figures: 100 (based on the government's assessed value for taxation purpose) for 1873; 134 for 1890; 281 for 1899; 645 for 1913; and 1,543 for 1919—more than fifteen times the figures of 1873. NSHG, pp. 66-67.
56. Ono, *Nōson Shi*, pp. 65, 74-77; NNN (10th ed.), pp. 12-16.

57. NSSK, pp. 54-55. Udo Eggert (1848-1893), a German economist who went to Japan in 1887 at the invitation of the Imperial University of Tōkyō, and who later served as an adviser to the Japanese Ministry of Finance, observed in his book, *Land Reform in Japan* (Tōkyō, 1890), p. 4, that about one-third of Japan's farm land was under tenancy during the early years of Meiji.

58. NSSK, p. 78.

59. NSSK, pp. 78-79.

60. NSSK, p. 77.

61. See Table 1.

62. See Table 1.

63. See Tables 2 and 3 above.

64. NNNR, p. 121; Sawamura, *op. cit.*, p. 561.

65. NTTN (55th ed.), pp. 448-450.

66. Sawamura Yasushi, "Nippon no Nōgyō oyobi Nōgyō Mondai" (Japanese Agriculture and Agricultural Problems), in Kaizōsha, *Keizaiigaku Zenshū*, XLII (Gendai Nippon Keizai no Kenkyū) (Tōkyō, 1930), 563.

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 564-565. For Java, cf. F. V. Field, ed., *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area* (New York, 1934), ch. ii.

68. See Table 6.

69. NNNR, p. 131; NNN (10th ed.), p. 5.

70. NNNR, p. 121.

71. See Table 7.

72. NNNR, p. 131.

73. According to Professor Arizawa Koki, 1 per cent of the landowners own 27.3 per cent of the entire cultivated land, while 74.49 per cent of the owners, consisting of all those owning less than 2.45 acres, own only 20.9 per cent of the cultivated area. NNN (10th ed.), p. 3.

74. See Table 8.

75. NNNR, p. 131.

76. The use of modern agricultural machines has been introduced to a very limited extent. This has been confined almost exclusively to some special types of agriculture. According to a survey made in 1935 by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, there were some 144,000 power-operated farm machines in use. This meant one such machine to every thirty-nine farm households and to every 103.15 acres of cultivated land. Moreover, these machines were of the smallest size, ranging from one-fourth horsepower electric-operated to three horsepower kerosene-operated machines, close to 70 per cent being kerosene operated. NNN (10th ed.), pp. 88 ff.

77. Cf. the tables in NNR (1938 ed.), pp. 76-83, 174-177.

78. NNR (1938 ed.), p. 87.

79. *Ibid.*

80. NNR (1938 ed.), p. 95.

81. NNR (1938 ed.), p. 96.

82. NNKR, pp. 257-259.

83. NNR (1938 ed.), p. 97.

84. SNMJ, p. 399; NNKR, p. 259.

85. In 1930, rates on loans secured by farm lands were as follows: Hypothec Bank of Japan 7.2 per cent; Nōkō Ginkō (Agricultural-Industrial Bank) 8.4 per cent; Takushoku Ginkō (colonization banks) 8.7 per cent; other banks 9.7 per cent. The average rate on private loans was 11.35 per cent (and close to 60 per cent of the farm debts consisted of private loans). In Hokkaidō the annual rate in 1932 was as high as 15.64 per cent, in Okinawa 15.19 per cent and in Tōhoku district 13.3 per cent. SNMJ, p. 98.

86. NNKR, p. 260.

87. Since the Meiji period three government surveys have been made on the customs and practices of farm tenancy. The first survey was made in 1885, the second in 1912, and the third in 1921. Of these, records of the first survey had not even been put into proper shape when they were completely destroyed at the time of the 1923 earthquake. The second survey is by far the most complete and rich in historical data. In recent years limited surveys have been conducted from time to time by the *Teikoku Nōkai* (Imperial Agricultural Association).

88. NNN (10th ed.), p. 46.

89. NNN (10th ed.), p. 46.

90. NNN (10th ed.), p. 71.

91. SNMJ, p. 68.

92. NNN (10th ed.), pp. 73-74.

93. The actual number of tenants under emphyteuses, according to a government survey made in 1921-1926, was only 39,339, or about 2.6 per cent of the total number of tenant farmers. Together they held an area of 29,061 *ekhō* of cultivated land, equivalent to slightly over one per cent of the total amount of tenant land. NNN (10th ed.), p. 74.

94. SNMJ, p. 69.

95. This is not peculiar to Japan: "Tenants by emphyteusis, holding perpetual leases, have been hardly distinguishable from owners in some parts of Europe." A. W. Ashby, "Farm Tenancy," *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1931), VI, 120.

96. Kawata Shiro, ed., *Nippon Gakujutsu Shinkōkai Dai 21 Shōin-Kai Hōkoku: Jikyoku To Nōson* (Current Crisis and the Farm: Report of the Twenty-first Sub-committee Meeting of the Japan Assn. for Advancement of Science and Learning) (Tōkyō, 1938), I, 66-67.

97. SNMJ, pp. 73-74.

98. SNMJ, p. 74.

99. NNN (10th ed.), pp. 74-75.

100. NNN (10th ed.), pp. 75-76.

101. NNN (10th ed.), pp. 48-52.

102. NNN (10th ed.), pp. 45, 52-53; SNMJ, p. 62.

103. SNMJ, p. 71.

104. NNKR, p. 142.

105. NNN (10th ed.), pp. 56-57.

106. NNKR, p. 140.

107. NNN (10th ed.), 56-57.

108. Yagizawa in Heibonsha, *Dai Hyakka Jiten* (Great Encyclopaedia) (Tōkyō, 1932), IX, 480; NNN (10th ed.), p. 49.

109. SNMJ, p. 64.

110. SNMJ, pp. 74-75.

111. NNN (10th ed.), pp. 70-71.

112. For the Japan Hypothec Bank figures on this, cf. NNN (10th ed.), p. 57; NNKR, p. 144.

113. NNN (10th ed.), pp. 62-68.

114. The usual rate is between 10 and 15 per cent. NNN (10th ed.), p. 69.

115. SNMJ, p. 73.

116. NNN (10th ed.), p. 72.

117. NNN (10th ed.), p. 73.

118. See Table 10.

119. See Table 10.

120. Records of close to six hundred of these uprisings have been discovered to date. For these uprisings in general see Hugh Borton, "Peasant Uprisings in Japan of the Tokugawa Period," *The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* (Tōkyō, 1938), second series, vol. XVI; Takekoshi Yosaburō, *Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan*, III, 134-140; Kimura's article in Heibonsha, *Dai Hyakka Jiten*, II, 242-248; Kokushō Iwao, *Hyakushō Ikki no Kenkyū* (A Study of Peasant Uprisings) (Tōkyō, 1928); *Hyakushō Ikki Shōdan* (Stories of Peasant Uprisings) (Tōkyō, 1929); Ono Takeo, *Tokugawa Jidai Hyakushō Ikki Sōdan* (Stories of the Peasant Uprisings of the Tokugawa Period), 2 vols. (Tōkyō, 1927); Kimura Seiji, *Nippon Nōmin Sōdō Shi* (History of the Japanese Peasant Disturbances) (Tōkyō, 1925).

121. For these uprisings the following are the more important Japanese sources: Tsuchiya Takeo and Ono Michio, *Meiji Shonen Nōmin Sōjō Roku* (Records of the Peasant Uprisings and Disturbances of Early Meiji) (Tōkyō, 1931); Ono Takeo, *Ishin Nōmin Hōkidan* (Stories of the Peasant Uprisings of the Restoration Period) (Tōkyō, 1931); INSR; Ono Takeo, *Nōson Shi*, pp. 185-198; Tamura Eitarō, *Meiji Shonen no Seijiteki Nōmin Ikki* (Political Uprisings of the Peasants during the First Years of Meiji) (Tōkyō, 1931); Kimura, *op. cit.*; Honshō Eijirō, ed., *Meiji Ishin Keizaihi Kenkyū* (A Study of the Economic History of the Meiji Restoration) (Tōkyō, 1930), pp. 705-742; NSSK, pp. 104-140.

122. Kokushō's article in Honshō, *op. cit.*, p. 707.

123. Inaoka Susumu, *Nōmin no Jōtai Oyobi Nōmin Undō Shōshi* (Conditions of the Farmers and an Outline History of the Farmers' Movement) in

Iwanami, *Nippon Shihonshugi Hattatsushi Kōza* series (Tōkyō, 1933), pp. 4 ff.; NSSK, pp. 35-36.

124. Inaoka, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-13; Honsho Eijirō, ed., *Nippon Keizaishi Jiten* (Dictionary of Japanese Economic History) (Tōkyō, 1940), I, 557.

125. These riots manifested directly the popular discontent of the time. During the first two years of the war Japan's foreign trade was almost at a standstill, bringing about a temporary depression. Beginning in 1916, however, there arose a tremendous demand for goods on the part of the European belligerents. This led to wartime prosperity of unprecedented scale. Simultaneously commodity prices shot sky high, including the price of rice. This rose from 16.37 yen per *koku* early in 1917 to 23.86 yen toward the end of the year. By July 1918 it had risen to more than 30 yen. The Terauchi cabinet endeavored to counteract this development by issuing a decree designed to suppress profiteering, by sounding warnings against cornering the rice market, and by exercising control over imported rice. But the cornering of rice by irresponsible dealers had become a nation-wide affair; throughout the country rice exchanges closed one after another. Shipments of this all-important commodity from farm districts continued to drop. On August 7 the retail price of white rice soared to 50 sen a *shō*—equivalent to 50 yen per *koku*. On the other hand, the earnings of the common people remained far behind the rising cost of living. Under such circumstances, the uncontrolled rise in the price of rice menaced the living of a rice-eating people. To this was added the psychological effect of the poor yield of the previous year and the hoarding of this staple by unscrupulous merchants.

On the night of August 8, 1918, some fifty-odd fishermen's wives in the town of Namerikawa in Toyama prefecture paraded about the town calling on wealthy landlords and merchants and imploring them to sell their stored rice at a reduced price. Their example was followed in the neighboring towns of Higashi Mizuhashi, Nishi Mizuhashi, and Uotsu. These demonstrations had ceased by the ninth. When the news of their action was published in the press, however, the whole nation was stirred. On that day riots broke out in the fishing town of Yuasa in Wakayama prefecture, in the city of Nagoya, and in the towns of Miyoshi, Yatsugi, and Furuichichō in Hiroshima prefecture. Riots broke out on the tenth in the pariah districts of Kyōto; on the eleventh in Ōsaka and the city of Hiroshima; and on the twelfth in Kōbe and Tōkyō. Once started, rioting spread like wildfire and engulfed virtually the entire nation.

Originating in protest against the soaring price of rice, the riots, in the course of their development, were directed more and more against the capitalist class. The homes of prominent capitalists and wealthy merchants and business buildings were set on fire, the attacks on the Suzuki family of Kōbe being the most noted example. Pillaging and plundering and wanton destruction of property, particularly storches, went on day after day and night after night in different parts of the country. The lowest strata of

society and the malcontents took the most active part. In forty-two localities the government was compelled to call out the army. After the first few days of the rioting a news blackout was declared; popular assemblies and the massing of people in groups were forbidden. Throughout the nation some eight thousand people were arrested. The government's countermeasures proved so effective that by the end of the month, with riotings in Fukuoka marking the end, the whole country was at peace again.

Immediately after the restoration of peace and order, the government clamped down on the price of rice, causing it to drop radically within a few days. The government also called for funds for social relief and adopted other measures of appeasement, while some wealthy individuals began to contribute money to social welfare work for the first time in their lives. This popular uprising was a great shock to the rulers of the nation. It marked a turning point in the social consciousness of the masses and gave rise to many social movements. Its effect on the minds of the peasants was especially profound. And finally, as a crowning victory for this spontaneous, unorganized, and leaderless popular action, the military-dominated Terauchi government was forced to resign on the 21st of September, giving way to the first "Commoner Cabinet" in Japan, headed by Hara Kei.

126. See Table 11.

127. See Table 10.

128. This tragic dispute was waged for four years during which several lives were lost. For a time some seven hundred children of the tenants boycotted the public school and a separate school was run for them by the farmers' union. The dispute started when the landlord, who was president of the prefectural landowners' association, attempted to stop the tenants from entering their land after he had declared their leases terminated.

129. For source materials on the history of the agrarian movement see Inaoka, *op. cit.*; Aoki Keiichi, *Nippon Nōmin Kumiai Undō Shi* (A History of the Japanese Farmers' Union Movement) (Tōkyō, 1929); Kyōchōkai, *Saikin No Shakai Undō* (Recent Social Movements) (Tōkyō, 1928); articles in NRN; RN.

130. This name was changed in 1928 to *Nippon Nōmin Kumiai* (Japan Farmers' Union).

131. NRN (1938 ed.), pp. 280-281, 294-295.

132. NRN (1938 ed.), pp. 275-276.

133. RN (1940 ed.), appendix, pp. 11-12.

134. RN (1940 ed.), p. 259; SNMJ, pp. 79-81, 85; NRN (1938 ed.), pp. 357-358.

135. RN (1938 ed.), p. 255.

136. RN (1940 ed.), pp. 258-259.

137. RN (1940 ed.), pp. 248 ff.

138. Suehiro Gentarō and Tanaka Kotarō, ed., *Hōritsugaku Jiten* (Dictionary of Jurisprudence) (Tōkyō, 1935), II, 911-912.

139. NNN (10th ed.), pp. 82-83; NRN (1938 ed.), pp. 359, 491-494.

140. SNMJ, p. 99.

141. NRN (1938 ed.), p. 465.

142. Under the 1926 plan the rate for the prefectural government was 4.8 per cent while that for the individual borrower was limited to 3.5 per cent. SNMJ, p. 99.

143. NRN (1938 ed.), pp. 465-466.

144. NRN (1938 ed.), p. 244.

145. See Table 1.

146. NNN (10th ed.), p. 109; *Hōritsugaku Jiten*, II, 912.

147. NRN (1938 ed.), pp. 458-462; NNN (10th ed.), pp. 110-112.

148. For a digest of the law see NRN (1938 ed.), pp. 463-465. This law is intended primarily to implement the government's established policy of creating new owner-cultivators and also to strengthen the court's arbitration power. A novel feature of the law is the establishment of an "agricultural land committee" in every local administrative district. The committee is charged with the duty of furthering the government's policy toward the establishment of a new landed peasantry and with the duty of smoothing out difficulties arising between the tenant and the landlord. On the whole its function is advisory; great reliance is placed on the spirit of coöperation and wartime patriotism of the people.

149. The decree empowers the prefectural governor to make rent adjustments where unreasonably high rates prevail. RN (1940 ed.), pp. 244, 252-253, appendix, p. 28.

THE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROSPECT

Edward Ackerman

✓In 1940, more than twelve million workers were employed in Japanese manufacturing industries and trade. At that time they comprised nearly 40 per cent of all the gainfully employed in Japan, and they produced a significant part of Japanese national wealth. Their efforts made possible the creation of a modern war machine, for they not only fabricated all the needed military equipment but they also provided foreign exchange for the new materials demanded by that manufacture.) Their employment and eventual disposition will form a key part of the postwar Japanese problem. The broad lines of the Japanese social and economic picture can be determined by the freedom allowed or the restrictions imposed on manufacturing and trade.

In modern times manufacturing and trade¹ in Japan have been so closely connected that a discussion of one inevitably refers to the other in details. (All of Japan's prewar exports were manufactured or partly processed articles; a very high percentage of imports was raw materials for manufacture, many of them destined for eventual resale abroad. Although a minimum manufacturing industry could be supported in Japan with no foreign trade, as suggested in Chapter II, a well-balanced national economic life would demand trade and the manufacturing which trade both makes possible and depends

upon. But they probably will differ considerably from pre-war days.

Since Japanese manufacturing is so closely related to the problem of international security, unrestricted or locally determined manufacturing in Japan is highly unlikely during an indefinite period. For the same reason controlled trade, especially on the import list, is a certainty. Furthermore, dislocation of normal trade and manufacturing activities is now nearly complete. Japan's long separation from her normal raw material sources and markets and her concentration on the 1937-1945 "empire" for recent needs will require another start from scratch in developing trade. The loss of industrial facilities is probably the greatest among industrial nations, considering the intense destruction of plants on the islands and the separation of the war-developed Manchurian and Korean facilities from Japan. Allied forces can expect to find facilities nearer nil than those of Germany. Thus it is not so much a question of what is to be suppressed as what will be encouraged.

Once the United Nations have settled matters of high policy as to Japan's economic relations with the rest of the world, the general position of Japanese industry can be forecast with relative ease. The case of a Japan thrown on its own resources has already been made clear—almost no trade, production below prewar levels in both quantity and quality, and high costs of production on some critical items. Industry and trade in a Japan able to compete in the world for markets and materials will be more complicated, but feasible developments are generally predetermined by the social and physical environment. They can be best illustrated and explained by an examination of the structure of Japanese manufacturing and trade in the recent past.

Japan was considered a runner-up to at least six other industrial nations in prewar days. Even prewar France was more highly industrialized than Japan. Japan's late start in modern

manufacturing (which dates only from 1870) and its lack of fuel resources and major raw material supplies gave it a great handicap compared to other large and technically advanced nations. Nevertheless by 1940 Japan was an industrial factor of prime importance in the Far East in both heavy and light industry. Its products were distributed the world over. Japanese cloth was likely to be found on the backs of Borneo Dyaks and Zanzibar Arabs, Filipino workmen rode on Japanese bicycles, London stevedores ate Japanese canned salmon, South American children played with Japanese toys, and not a few North American rooms were lighted by Japanese electric bulbs.

Within the islands almost every type of manufacturing known was to be found. However, the several different types operated with varying degrees of success, and not all of them owned their existence to their efficiency. Economically they have had very different problems, different forms of growth, and distinctly different possibilities for future development.)

The basic distinction among prewar Japanese industries is of great importance in future planning. It was that between the industry built up for strategic reasons, manufacturing which had a relatively poor competitive position in world markets, and the industries which could stand more or less on their own in the prewar competitive international economy. In the main this distinction referred on the one hand to heavy industry and on the other to light industry. (Japan was relatively more efficient in her light manufacturing and less efficient in heavy industries.² Not all heavy industries, however, were certain high-cost producers. In general, the industries which had to be subsidized before the war were precisely those which we shall wish to keep Japan from developing in the future. Japan in the past has provided a good key to future administration of manufacturing.)

✓ All Japanese manufacturing between 1870 and 1945 benefited from preferential attention by the government. While it is

exceedingly difficult to get any clear picture of the detailed influence of the hand of government in manufacturing, a few generalizations nevertheless can be made about the past.

1. Manufacturing industry did not bear its fair share of taxation. Even as late as 1934 an investigation by the Imperial Agricultural Society showed that 35 per cent of a farmer's ¥300 income was required for taxes; 12½ per cent of a merchant's, and only 1½ per cent of the typical manufacturer's.³ The tax revision of 1940 by the central government still preserved a differential rate between income from real estate and income from capital invested in other sources, in favor of the latter. In a very real sense, therefore, manufacturing has been supported at the expense of the rest of the nation, and at the expense of the farmer especially.

2. Most manufactured goods were consistently protected in the home and empire market. Duties from 30 per cent to 50 per cent were common, even on those goods which Japan could market at prices far below those of any other nation. On the other hand agriculture received no such protection, and all raw materials generally were on the free list. The manufacturer thus was benefited at the expense of other producers and the consumer at large.

3. Manufacturing was encouraged by direct government financial aid. Although the relative importance of subsidies to manufacturing as a whole is questioned by some students,⁴ their significance to certain types of manufacturing cannot be passed over lightly. Furthermore, while it is true that funds earmarked as subsidies for agriculture and other nonmanufactural phases of the Japanese economy appear in all of their past budgets, in other countries most disbursements on these accounts would be considered either welfare expenses or cost of public works. (On the other hand, some manufacturing enterprises were financed, owned, and managed by the government; some were partly owned and financed by the government; and

others received annual grants to keep them in operation. The iron and steel industries, several branches of the chemical industry, several types of machinery fabrication, automotive manufacture, and shipbuilding all received this special form of encouragement in addition to the previously mentioned ones.)

(4. Finally, there was special encouragement for any industry which had ambitions for, and could maintain, an export market. There were "export subsidies" (cotton textiles, silk, iron manufactures, canned foods); appropriations for the maintenance of export associations; exemptions or rebates on taxes (rayon dyestuffs); rebates on freight rates (textiles, toys, canned goods, and others); and direct subsidies for shipping.)

While few industries did not benefit in one way or another from government aids, the most consistent attention and the strongest helping hands were required for the strategic industries.

The classic example of this situation in Japan was the prewar iron and steel industry, which was characterized by government supervision and control from the very beginning. It was the only steel industry of any size in the world which was dependent upon both imported ore and coal, so one may readily see why it was uneconomic and a matter of concern to an imperialistic government. About 90 per cent of the ore supply came from abroad—principally China, Malaya, and the Philippines. Even a high percentage of the necessary scrap had to be imported from western nations; and without a 30 per cent admixture of Chinese or Manchurian coal, coke made from Japanese coal was very expensive. Furthermore even the coal which was mined in Japan would not have been brought up for the steel industry if many of the mines had not been subsidized. Many Japanese mines are very high-cost producers, since they work small seams, which are often quite broken. A number of the mines also require very heavy pumping because of underwater locations. A great deal of effort and money was

required by the government to keep production at the levels which it recently reached—about fifty-five million tons—or about one-fifteenth that of the United States.

The first modern iron and steel works in Japan was that of the Imperial Iron Works at Yawata, government owned, and constructed in 1901. Until as recently as 1932 this concern produced three-quarters of the pig iron and over half of the steel made in Japan proper. But the smaller private plants were also dependent on government initiative, since all of them were encouraged by protective tariffs, tax exemptions, and outright subsidies.

The government hand was apparent down to the very beginning of the war, and its role probably increased greatly during the war. In 1934 the Imperial Iron Works was merged with the six other largest pig-iron producers to form the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company (*Nippon Seitetsu Kabushiki Kaisha*). The government held about 44 per cent of the capitalization of this corporation, which in the middle 1930's accounted for 95 per cent of the pig iron, half the raw steel, and nearly half of the finished steel products manufactured in Japan and Korea. Like the United States Steel Company, the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company engaged in most of the activities related to iron and steel production. Besides its iron and steel plants it owned iron and coal mines, coke ovens, coal-tar by-product plants, and metal processing plants. But even with this size and integration it is not likely that it would have survived very long in open competition with steel industries located elsewhere in the world.

¶ Other examples of government initiative and enterprise occurred in the manufacture of transportation equipment and in the machine-tool industry. In spite of the fact that plants in these industries had available to them material from a subsidized iron and steel industry, they too had to be watched over in varying degrees. Machine-tool manufacture, strategically

quite important, is interesting as an illustration of a privately managed industry which nonetheless depended on the government for its existence.)

Japan has had some sort of machine-tool industry ever since the 1880's. For many years it did not amount to much, depending on foreign models and turning out an inferior product. Output was very small, except when Japan was engaged, or about to engage, in a war. (Then the industry received special impetus. Even up to the present it is unlikely that Japanese machine tools could compete with many of those made in other countries. Very few improvements or innovations are said to have been made by the Japanese themselves.)

Government policy in the machine-tool industry was quite clear in the period which led up to the recent war. Up to 1935, a number of small plants were concerned with machine-tool manufacture, kept in operation by orders from the army, the navy, and the Imperial Government Railways, but they had lagged so far behind similar industries in other countries that the necessity for improvement became obvious. Between 1935 and 1940, therefore, the government purchased samples of the best Swedish, Swiss, German, and American tools to be used as prototypes, brought in foreign engineers acquainted with these machines, and encouraged experiments in their production by large manufacturing companies. After that a strict system of licensing for production was adopted, and production of various types of machine was allocated only to those firms which proved best suited to manufacturing them. (Large-scale capital was enticed into the industry by guarantees of government orders, and a general reorganization of the industry took place.) The Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Nissan interests dominated by 1945, and production was increased to five times what it was in 1937.) Units of the most intricate design were turned out after 1939. Until the great fire raids of 1945 Japan had a nearly adequate supply of this basic machine.)

The manufacture of almost all modern transportation equipment and all sorts of other heavy machinery followed the same or similar patterns. Some of the factories were entirely government owned, like the large plant for the manufacture of railway equipment at Ōsaka, and another in Kōbe, but generally the government hand was shown in the material encouragement which it gave to the Zaibatsu and a few other private entrepreneurs.¹ Shipbuilding, aircraft manufacture, and automotive manufacture have all been carried on primarily or entirely by the large capital interests but have depended on government support for continuance in any size.

Shipbuilding in Japan owed its prewar size (capacity about one million gross tons) to an expanding navy and to a subsidized program of building merchant ships for subsidized shipping lines which went on for fifteen years previous to the war. This also meant that other related manufactures, particularly of heavy machinery, were indirectly subsidized. Steam and Diesel engines and their parts; turbines, boilers, etc., all fell into this class. Indeed most of them were manufactured by the same companies which did the shipbuilding or the railway equipment construction, like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the Kawasaki firm.

One of the weakest parts of all Japanese industry came in automobile and truck manufacture. Even though there was a duty of 42 per cent on imported motor parts, one of 35 per cent on engines, and an even higher duty on completed motor cars, army and other government subsidies, and "purchase awards" to private car owners, the Japanese motor industry was reported to be so backward before the war that it could not even produce durable trucks for the army. Only one of the six main companies seemed able to manufacture a truck which met field tests. These trucks were made in a plant which had been bought *in toto* by the Japanese in Detroit, shipped, and reassembled in Tōkyō. Presumably if the American concern

had been a particularly successful one, the Japanese Army would have had even more difficulty getting trucks than it did.

For all of these industries the postwar prospect is in general quite clear. Without further government support, they cannot rise again to anything near their prewar stature, even if there are no specific prohibitions on anything but armaments manufacture.

For some other industries, which in the past also benefited from subsidy and government encouragement, the case is not so easily analyzed. They appear to be on a somewhat sounder basis, looked at from our traditional economic point of view. Opinions of observers of Japan's economy differ, however, on the comparative position of these industries. Some of them may be ruled out on strategic grounds, but on economic grounds alone they are to be considered possible, although questionable, components of Japan's manufacturing from now on. Among these are the processing of some of the metals other than iron, and the chemical industry. In the manufacture of aluminum and magnesium, for example, notable expansion has come only with the demands which have been imposed by the armament program, but one can say the same for similar industries in the United States. But these are industries which, because of the nature of their product, the nature of processing, might hold their own in Japan and even engage in some export. In all of them a sizeable plant has been built up in recent years.

In spite of recent bombings it is likely that Japan still has an aluminum industry. It probably will more than suffice for the peacetime needs of the country, since the principal consumers of its product, the aircraft industry, will undoubtedly cease to exist. The very wide scattering of the individual plants, a situation unique among the important Japanese industries, may have left some capacity available which could be put to good use in manufacturing a metal which can be used in restoring power lines, in other electrical equipment, and as a substitute

for some of the stronger metals in other uses. Japanese production in 1944 probably was—at least on the islands—somewhere around one hundred and fifty thousand tons, divided among twenty different plants in as many sections of Honshū, Kyūshū and Shikoku, and Korea. Its equipment was thoroughly up to date, and many of the plants will not be troubled by coal supply, which may be a problem in postwar Japan, as they depend on hydro-electricity for their power supply.

Another industry which should be of interest is the heavy chemical manufacture. The rehabilitation of agriculture and the operation of the textile industry will both be dependent on the amount of basic chemicals available. Furthermore most of the products are not materials shipped very far under any circumstances.

Even though it was assisted by tariffs and some subsidies, Japan's chemical industry before the war was the most flourishing of its basic manufactures. Although it had started much later than similar manufacture in other countries, Japanese chemical plants had reached the point in the 1930's where they were exporting, and supplying raw material to other exporting industries, such as match manufacture. Here again supplies of hydro-electric power favored manufacture, and some raw materials of usable quality like sulphur, limestone, and coal were available locally. Local markets in some of the efficient light manufactures, like textile processing, also helped.

Modern plants producing all of the basic chemicals were operating in Japan at the end of the war. There are plants for the manufacture of chlorine (used in gas, bleaching powder, water purification, drugs, dyestuffs), soda ash (glass, drugs, soap, bleaching, and dyeing), caustic soda (soap, rayon, staple fiber, bleaching, oil refining), hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid (fertilizers, rayon and staple fiber, oil refining, metallurgy, dyes, paints, drugs, etc.), and nitric acid (explosives, dyes, medicines, etc.). The chemical fertilizer industry is also well developed.

Besides the heavy chemicals Japan also had before the war active producers of nearly all of the light chemicals, like dye-stuffs, pharmaceuticals, celluloid, soap, and cosmetics. In a very few of them she was the world's largest producer; in others she dominated the whole Far Eastern market. In nearly all she produced enough for domestic demands. There is no reason to suppose that Japan might not retain *some* of these manufactures under straightforward competitive conditions, although the exact extent is uncertain.

For most of the remaining types of industry the prospect is more definite. They can be developed, subject to certain conditions. (1) The first condition, as before, is strategic importance. Evaluation of this factor is not possible here. It concerns several of the thus far undiscussed industries just as much as those previously mentioned. (2) Some manufactures can be developed to the limit of local resources on which they depend. (3) Others can be developed to the extent that is permitted by the importation of raw materials, the limit of the labor supply, or the size of foreign markets. (4) A few, formerly important and economically sound, may be restricted in the future by recent technological developments.

Examples of manufacturing industries which may be limited in their development only by the extent of local resources occur (1) in the mining, smelting, or processing of products made from available Japanese stone or ores; (2) in the processing of food products, particularly the preservation of marine foods; (3) in the manufacture of wood products, including lumber itself, furniture, wood pulp, and paper.

In the first group the smelting and processing of copper and the manufacture of cement are outstanding. Japan has produced copper for hundreds of years, and even in modern times has had enough to meet ordinary civilian demands at home. Considering the low-wage labor supply, the future of this processing would seem assured as long as the resource holds out.

Cement manufacture, which Japan started only recently, was developed to meet demands all over the Far East. The heavy demands for postwar construction in Japan itself and elsewhere in the East, a probably increased domestic use of concrete, and ample local supplies of both power and raw materials should make this industry prosper for as many years after the war as it is permitted to operate.

In the second group Japan can always be an important producer, so long as it is permitted fishing fleets on the high seas. Before the war Japanese canned salmon and canned crab were known the world over, while many less valuable marine foods had local markets in foreign countries as well as in Japan. The country's location in the midst of a naturally very prolific fishery and the relatively high quality low-wage labor supply made these products an excellent value in almost any market in the world. Any reasonable amount that Japan could spare from its own food needs might be absorbed elsewhere. Much less important were some products of the other food industries. Fruit preserving, tea manufacture, brewing and distilling all had a foreign sale as well as almost complete domination of the home market.

Japan's greatest hopes for an industrial future should, however, lie in other fields—in those industries which have been limited in the past only by the size of foreign markets, and might be limited in the future only by the markets or the size of the labor force.

Before the war people in many other nations were familiar with the trade-mark "Made in Japan." For the variety of articles on which it was displayed, there was only one possible rival, "Made in Germany." For the low price at which the articles were sold, there was no rival.

Some of these articles were manufactured by types of industry previously mentioned, particularly in the marine-foods industry, but most of them were put out by factories in other phases of

light industry. Generally they were articles which required comparatively large amounts of labor in their manufacture, and in many cases comparatively little capital investment. Indeed, as contrasted with her rather limping heavy industries, Japan was a marvel of efficiency in the production of hundreds of small and common consumers' goods. Some of them were of Japanese invention and pattern, and more were copies of things made in America or Europe; but whatever the article it was always amazingly cheap and usually a good value for the price paid. All of the industries turning out these goods will be worth some consideration in planning Japan's manufactural future. Most of the heavy industries in Japan will be worth toleration only in so far as their products are necessary to maintain the factories or shops turning out these inexpensive consumers' goods.

If any one group of products were to be taken as representative of these manufactures, or for that matter, of all industrial Japan, textiles would easily be the first choice. Just before the outbreak of this war they made up nearly 30 per cent of the total value of all manufactured goods in Japan each year; and nearly 40 per cent of all the people working in Japan's factories had jobs in textile plants. About three million workers turned out well over a billion dollars' worth of yarn and woven goods.

Among the textiles before the war cotton easily stood first. Cotton spinning and weaving was the most important Japanese enterprise, even though extremely little cotton was grown on the islands. The place which cotton held in the industrial structure and the profit which it provided is illustrated by the fact that all of the Zaibatsu holding companies had subsidiaries organized for the production of cotton goods.

In some respects, particularly in the production of the cheaper goods, Japan was the most advanced of all the cotton manufacturing countries, and in cost alone no other country could compete. Two main features contributed to this: (1) a certain

and low-wage labor supply; (2) comparatively high efficiency in their whole process of production. Most of their mills were modern, as contrasted with the many obsolete plants in the British and American industries. They also had some technical superiority, through the invention of an automatic loom, the Toyoda, reported to be the best machine in operation for that particular part of the process. Spinning machinery was also developed which could successfully use the chcap but very short-staple Indian cotton and still turn out a fairly durable yarn. Nearly all of the spinning and over a third of the weaving were done in modern mills of the latest design. Air conditioning was widespread. Individual power drives, overhead carriers, and other modern methods were known and widely used in all of the larger units. In the years just before the war Japanese cotton producers did not need to look up to anyone in the way their mills were handled.

Japanese cotton manufacturers were also much assisted by the low wages which prevailed in their industry, as in all Japanese industries. There are conflicting statements on the ultimate value of low wages in Japan. The answer to the importance of wages, however, seems to come in the amount of cotton goods which Japanese manufacturers were able to export in competition with other manufacturing countries.

Over half of their output of cotton piece goods was exported in the 1930's, and almost invariably the phenomenon is explained simply with a mention of low prices. Japanese controlled currency was also a factor in producing the low prices, but there seems no doubt that wages were a critical factor in the competitive situation, especially when one considers the efficient organization of most of the exporting mills and the great difference between the wages of Japanese textile workers and those of other countries.

The wage element in Japanese cotton-textile production costs, roughly estimated, was around one-twentieth of what it was in

the United States during the same period. In other words, for the same expenditure in wages, the Japanese manufacturer would produce twenty yards of cloth when the American would obtain one. Of course, this differential was counterbalanced slightly by higher raw material costs in Japan than here, but only very slightly.

Low wages in Japanese textile manufacture—this pertains to other textiles as well as to cotton—were consequent mainly upon the generally lower standard of living in Japan. In part, however, they resulted from a situation peculiar to the textile industry. The use of female labor, the apprentice system, and contract labor had a unique development in Japanese textile manufacturing. Almost 20 per cent of the textile workers, and probably an even higher percentage in the cotton industry, were girls under sixteen, who had been sent from farm families under contract with the fathers. There were many hundreds of thousands more between sixteen and twenty. About 83 per cent of the labor force of the textile industry was composed of women, most of them young women. In a typical factory, their income, everything included, amounted to about fifteen cents per capita per day in United States money.⁵ They were among the lowest paid labor in Japan—only a few paper workers or toy makers received less. That meant also that they were among the lowest paid in the world for their kind of work.

At the present time, of course, the cotton industry, dependent as it was on foreign raw material, is only a shadow of its former self. Much of the machinery is reported to have been scrapped, and only a few key plants have been kept in operation. The same reports, however, state that the machinery which has been melted down is mostly of older design and that the most recent equipment, particularly the automatic looms, has been saved. So in spite of conversion and the present low state of the industry, Japan may very well have enough equipment and skilled operatives to start another cotton-goods exporting industry. It

would seem one of the few bright hopes in her industrial picture for the postwar period. We can raise little objection to it on strategic counts, and it is likely to be economically sound.

A very similar history and a very similar situation have prevailed in the woolen industry. This is so true that instead of talking about cotton one might equally well substitute the word wool. The woolen industry was not nearly as large as the cotton industry, because of lesser demands for woolen goods throughout Asia, but it helped to add to the trade balance which Japan needed so desperately at all times. Although Japan never succeeded in turning out high quality goods, her woolen manufacturers had unbeatable prices on low quality materials. Their raw wool had to come from Australia, however, so the wool industry also has been a wartime casualty. The same scrapping of plant equipment has occurred as in the cotton industry, the better equipment being stored. One may assume, therefore, that Japan has the makings of a lower-capacity but fairly efficient wool manufacturing industry.

During the war the gap which was left in Japanese textile production by the near disappearance of the cotton and woolen industries was closed largely by increased synthetic fiber production, just as it was in Germany. More than half of the Japanese home consumption of such goods just before the end of the war was supplied by rayon and staple fiber products, while more than four-fifths of production was with the use of synthetic fibers. The synthetic industry is larger than it was before the war, when for a few years it was the largest one in the world. It commanded a considerable export market.

The rayon industry is interesting because it may be one of the few which now are set up and ready to go, in recent operation, and with a local source of raw materials. Much of the equipment for the cotton and woolen industries will have been dismantled and stored, and a great part of it out of use for years, the labor forces scattered in other work. It will also be some

time before raw materials for either cotton or woolen manufacture can be brought in, since shipping space from the United States, India, or Australia probably may be slight for many months. The Japanese synthetic fiber industry, however, has developed local pulp supplies during the war, along with some in Manchuria, so that its raw material can be obtained in large measure from the islands. Aside from silk, it may be the only answer to the islands' textile problem, which is going to become even more acute as the months go on.

The rayon industry also offers interesting export possibilities in the longer run. Whenever any surplus is available, it is likely that it can meet competition on an open market, especially in the Far East. Japanese manufacturers were reported to be able to produce synthetic yarn for a third of its cost in the United States before the war, and half of what it cost in Italy, which was considered a fairly low-cost producer. It is not likely that the rayon competitive position will have changed any for the worse. For the Far Eastern market, at least, the Japanese products will continue to be the most desirable because they are so cheap, even though the quality in the past has not always been high compared to articles from other countries.

The situation for the last of the principal Japanese textile industries—silk—is apt to be much more complicated. This oldest and formerly one of the most profitable of Japanese industries has entered a critical period. This is one of the manufacturing industries, in fact the chief one in Japan, which may be restricted by recent technological development. Although domestic consumption of silk has increased considerably during the war, the industry as a whole has declined greatly because of the loss of export markets, and in particular the American market. About nine-tenths of the total production of silk, up to the very beginning of the war, used to be sent to this country, much of it for hosiery manufacture. Japan was easily the largest silk-producing country in the world, and raw silk

formed one of the two most valuable of all its exports. It exceeded the total even for the large cotton-goods industry in some years, and that in spite of the fact that most of the product had gone through only one stage of processing, the separation of the filament from the cocoon, known as reeling. There was little spinning or weaving of silk for export carried on in Japan.

Even considering the pressure for textile fiber supply in wartime Japan, the Japanese government did not see fit to continue silk production on the scale of prewar days. Mulberry plantings were torn up wherever practicable, and the ground planted to food crops; silk-reeling mills are reported to have been closed or put to other uses in many instances. Furthermore much of the increased domestic consumption has been for army needs. It seems to have been much more desirable to meet civilian needs by the increase in synthetic-fiber production.

The importance of the silk problem in postwar Japan and the difficulties which it offers are evident when one considers in summary the main points which bear on the situation: (1) The great importance which silk had in the foreign trade picture, and Japan's probable continued need of every bit of exchange it can muster. (2) The importance of silk as a source of income to the already hard-pressed Japanese farmer (16 per cent before the war). (3) The undoubtedly great, although at present unmeasurable, decline in silk consumption in this country, due to the competition of synthetics like nylon. The effects of this decline will be intensified by the fact that Japanese silk production had been geared before the war to the making of a fiber which was especially suitable for hosiery manufacture and not so well adapted to weaving. (4) The extreme unlikelihood of the discovery of any other market except the United States. Finally (5) the possible rise of some competitors in silk production, like China, provided there proves to be more of a market for silk than there seems to be at the present time.

A solution to part of the problem of the silk industry after the

war may be assisted by one of the peculiarities of Japanese manufacturing enterprise, hitherto unmentioned, namely, the importance of small plants in the final processing of goods, and particularly in weaving. One of the remarkable features of Japanese industries of the past, and undoubtedly the present also, has been the existence of a small-scale, almost handicraft, type of enterprise alongside the large modern industrial establishments. This phenomenon was by no means limited to the textile industries, but it is particularly surprising there, since in most other countries textile processing has been taken over almost completely by the larger units. In Japan, however, small shops have been able to exist in competition with the larger establishments making the same type of goods. In the silk industry two-thirds of the textile output came from shops employing under five people. One-third of the cotton piece goods, one-third of the wool, four-fifths of the hosiery, and one-third of the rayon piece goods were from establishments employing less than fifteen persons. Although part of the reason for the existence of these small shops was the demand for a great variety of patterns on the home market, they manufactured for export as well. They seem to have been able to turn out as good a textile product as the larger mills, and they showed no signs of discontinuance before the war. In the silk industry particularly they are supposed to have turned out superior work. Many of the workers were really artisans and worked with a high degree of skill and a great deal of taste and individuality. A number of different silk fabrics unknown to most of us are produced in these shops, and it may be that some of them would bear development for an export market to a greater extent than in the past. They would seem the only hope for maintenance of the silk industry on any scale.

Small-scale manufacturing units offer possibilities in other industries as well. Japan may have even more difficulty in the postwar period raising sufficient capital for mass-production

industries than it has had in the past, and it has been a notable difficulty. These small-scale operations require very little investment, and they can make almost as good use of Japan's principal asset, relatively skilled, adaptable, low-wage labor, as more elaborately provided factories.

The number of other articles which were made by the small units and the place which they held in Japanese light industry as a whole are really quite astonishing. The share of industry for the small plants was often greater in other lines than for textiles. More than two-thirds of the production of these articles took place in plants with less than fifteen workers: bicycles; all kinds of woodwork, including furniture; pencils; chinaware and porcelain; and toys. At least half of the hats, jewelry, marine products, buttons, brushes, and umbrellas were made in small shops. Rubber goods, enamelled ironware, copper, and aluminum utensils are also on the list of important small-plant manufacturers.

Small-plant manufacture is even more characteristic for some of the traditional necessities in Japan which are not familiar to us. Most of the native food products which require any processing, like bean curd, or noodles, are on a widely scattered, very small-scale basis. The manufacture of the omnipresent reed mats or *tatami* is an industry employing an estimated million and a quarter people, all in small units. So is the manufacture of bamboo ware and the making of clogs.

In some of the Japanese traditional manufactures, for example the ceramics industry and the paper industry, there is a definite division between the large factory and the small unit, depending somewhat on the market served, but primarily on the particular type of product manufactured. These are other industries which offer some moderate export possibilities. They will also be needed for the home market, and they have no strategic implications.

The paper industry is especially interesting because it has

both of the extremes of organization as far as we are concerned. Paper manufacture usually requires a moderately large capital investment and a fairly large factory unit for successful operation. Japan in one respect is no exception. One concern controls thirty-three different mills, and about 95 per cent of the output of all newsprint, book, and other so-called "foreign-style" papers. This is the Ōji company, a Mitsui-owned concern.

But at the same time there are scattered through the country literally thousands of small paper makers and processors of paper products, specializing in types developed in Japan and most used there. Together they employ several times as many employees as the large paper mills, and they are supposed to manufacture nearly eight hundred different kinds of paper, which must be nearly a world record. Their most important single product is probably the paper used in the *shōji*, or sliding partitions, which are found in every Japanese house; but they also manufacture what we call facial tissue (the Japanese used paper handkerchiefs long before we did), many different types of paper for writing and artistic work (the Japanese writing brush is used best on soft paper), and paper for umbrellas, lanterns, and raincoats (all widely used). They made many articles of papier-mâché, which has a much wider use in Japan than here; and they had even an export market, particularly for papier-mâché articles and a cottony paper most often seen as a packing for jewelry. Since the beginning of the war these small paper makers are also reported to have been manufacturing several different types of paper garments, in addition to the traditional raincoats. They seem to be just as adaptable as the colossus on the other side of the industry.

A somewhat similar, although not quite as extreme, situation holds true for the ceramics industry, which has had a continuous history in Japanese export trade and has always managed to take care of the home market for all types of goods, traditional or newly demanded. The contrast is not as great in this case as in

the paper industry, because there is a fair number of firms of medium size as well as the large ones. Nevertheless there is an interesting division on the basis of market and of product type. Nearly all of the ceramic ware associated with recent industrial demands, like insulators, chemical baths, laboratory ware, lavatory equipment, and glazed tiles, is made in large and medium-sized factories. Foreign-style porcelain tableware was also turned out on a mass-production basis. At the same time more than 70 per cent of the workers in the industry were in small shops, and they had the major part of the domestic market in all types of goods, fine as well as poor.

The industrial organization which has favored the survival, and even the health, of these small-scale shops in the ceramics industry is interesting and typical of small size enterprise in all manufacturing in Japan, though simpler than the others.

In the ceramics industry survival of the small shops has been permitted only by the specialization of each on a very narrow range of articles or even of steps in the production. An organization is of course needed to coördinate the processes of the various specialists. This is supplied very simply by a merchant, or *toiya*. In the production of a foreign-style porcelain tea set, for example, the *toiya* contracts for the production of the several types of articles with various small manufacturers. One shop will make cups, another saucers, still another the teapot, and so on. The small potteries, furthermore, do only one part of the process; their product is a white undecorated article. The decoration is done in still other shops, which in turn fall under contract to the *toiya*. The *toiya* in his turn collects the finished product and arranges for sale.

The merchant, or *toiya*, is not merely a distributor. He is really the manager of the group of manufacturers or artisans who deal with him, telling them what to do at any given time. The *toiya* is even more important as the manufacturers' financier. Not only does he finance the shops by holding stocks

of finished articles, but he often makes advances, setting off the price of the finished goods against the advance. This arrangement is typical of many industries in Japan; there is nearly always a close link between trading, finance, and manufacturing. It holds true even up to the *Zaibatsu* and is one of the most interesting relics of feudalism in the country.

The combination of *toiya* and small manufacturer is something more than a relic. The system has much more vitality than most relict forms have. This is proven by one additional illustration, taken from one of the newer trades.

One of the most often described of all the Japanese light industries is the manufacture of electric bulbs of various sorts. Although bulb manufacture was started in 1890, it was only a tiny industry until the first World War, when it received some stimulus because of the cutting off of imports from Germany. But even after that it was for the most part a one-company industry; the *Tōkyō Electric Light Company*, which held some General Electric patents, was the only concern that mattered. But the patents expired in 1927, and thereafter a remarkable development not only of medium-sized but also of very small concerns took place. This proceeded so rapidly, under the initiative of numbers of *toiya* who saw opportunity in the industry, that by the middle thirties a third of the workers were in family shops of one to four persons.¹ Two-thirds were in shops of less than fifty workers. Most of the parts used by the bulb shops, like bases, filaments, lead-in wires, special paper boxes for packing, etc., are made in other small shops.

While it is true that many of these shops depended on sweated labor, the rapid growth of the *toiya* system in the bulb industry is ample proof of the adaptability of the system to almost any demand in light industry. The fact that the small shops could start up and survive in competition with an already established large company shows successful completion of about as severe a test as they could have.

It is hard to say what the war has done to the *toiya* organization and these small shops. Obviously where they depended heavily on imported but now inaccessible raw materials, as for cotton and wool weaving, they have ceased operation, like the larger mills or factories. Where they depended on export markets, as for sections of the ceramics industry, they may have curtailed operations somewhat. On the other hand, there are many wartime operations which would lend themselves admirably to the *toiya* system of operation. All of the numerous small-shop workers making and assembling bicycles and bicycle parts and other small mechanical devices must have been shifted to munitions production. For the sake of decentralization alone the government must have encouraged such production. The fact that England, which did not have this kind of industry before the war, turned to it, provides some basis for guessing what must have happened in Japan. Probably the small manufacturer-*toiya* system is still a firmly entrenched part of Japanese industry.

Whether the character of the industry has caused it to increase or decline during the war, the possibility of resumption of small-scale manufacturing in many different lines now is a very good one, and is one which we should seek to encourage. The nature of consumer demand in Japan, with highly individualistic taste and appreciation of artistic merit; the ease with which Japanese workmen take to many types of skilled work; and the relatively small amounts of capital required for many of these enterprises, all are factors favoring it—not to mention the familiarity their merchants have with organizing such a manufacturing economy. We should encourage it not only because it offers the easiest start in solving some problems of civilian supply and employment, but because it has also some ideological possibilities. We want to encourage individualism and personal independence as much as we can in Japan to get the people to break away from traditional modes of thought.

The fact that many Japanese are willing to engage in these small-scale industries shows that they have some feeling for economic independence. It may be a far cry from this to a feeling of individual political independence, but it would seem a start at least.

The future of nearly all of Japan's industries, then, hangs on the eventual policy decisions of the victorious nations. The character of those decisions of course will depend in part on the military potential which Japanese manufacturing has, and on the standard of living the United Nations wish the Japanese to have. Ease of administrative control may also be a criterion. Essential parts of those decisions will concern: (1) the least costly, least irritating, most effective general means of eliminating the industrial part of any military potential; (2) the character and amount of raw materials to be imported; and (3) the nature and extent of markets to be opened to Japan. Elimination of the principal industrial parts of a military potential can be accomplished very easily. There will have to be outright prohibitions on any sort of munitions or aircraft manufacture, of course, but an effective way of eliminating the main part of the potential is to see that the steel and heavy-machinery industries are much curtailed. The easy method of doing that is simply to see that no government financial aid is extended to those industries in any way, by differential tax rates, by tariffs, by differential freight rates, by government financing, or by direct subsidies. Under such a policy the iron and steel industries, shipbuilding, automotive manufacturing, much heavy-machinery manufacture, and some of the chemical industries (soda ash, some light chemicals) will either disappear or be very small compared to their 1941 or 1944 extent. The chief part of the Japanese military potential will thereby have been eliminated.

The extent of each of all the other industries will depend upon combinations of the amount of local resource and the market allowed; or the amount of raw-material imports per-

mitted and the market allowed. For some, like those depending on copper or other locally mined nonferrous metals, or lumber and wood products, the domestic market and the extent of the local resource will determine the moderate size of the industry. Others, like the rayon-pulp and marine-products manufacture, will have their size determined by the existence of foreign markets and the amount of material which can be spared from home demands. Still others, with some strategic value, and dependent on imported raw materials, will probably be very limited because of controlled import of material—allowances being made only for essential Japanese needs. The aluminum industries are good examples.⁶

Many Japanese manufactures, however, will have little strategic importance, and will have their size determined finally by the market they are permitted abroad. All of the light manufactures—textiles, ceramics, small metal goods, toys, rubber goods, and hundreds of other things—can probably be manufactured cheaply enough in Japan to meet competition from industries in other nations, provided impossible tariff barriers and preferential trade agreements do not exclude them. Given enough scope, Japan could certainly maintain her prewar standard of living and very likely increase it by the maintenance of these light industries.

The provision of the markets, however, other than in Japan itself, is a problem which should be faced realistically in any prediction or provision. Japan and the rest of the nations will be facing a world considerably different from that of 1939, and markets for manufactured goods are likely to be somewhat changed. Russia in the future may reach a point where her industries will have provided for the home market and will have an export potential. The countries of the Far East upon which Japan has depended heavily for markets in the past have ambitions for manufacturing. Both China and India have plans of their own. The reception of Japanese goods in the British Empire and the United States is questionable. Many other

previously nonmanufacturing countries, like Turkey, Chile, Argentina, or Brazil, plan to avoid some of the "exploitation" by foreign manufacturers.

On the whole, however, the market worries should be long run rather than of immediate postwar concern. Japan now has a skilled labor force and the know-how in manufacturing organization as well as trading experience. Organization of manufacturing in previously nonmanufacturing countries is likely to be slow, whereas there is a decade of stored-up demand in some. If Japan is allowed the cotton, wool, rubber, metals, and other raw materials necessary for its light manufactures, they are likely to be received elsewhere for a while at least. Another point of optimism for the Japanese also is that industrialization of other areas need not exclude or even diminish trade. Trade between highly industrialized countries often has been great in the past, and it may continue to be.

The United Nations have a single very responsive instrument for their postwar Japanese policy. On the country's manufacturing, the foreign markets, and the imported materials permitted for it depend many features of Japanese domestic life. The standard of living generally—the kind of clothes and the amount of food Suzuki *San* eats, Japanese contributions to science, the appearance of Japanese towns and cities, the size of its trade, birth rates and the size of the Japanese population, and political attitudes—all will be influenced measurably by the kind of manufacturing Japan is allowed. Japan has the manufacturing potential. The United Nations have only to decide what kind of effect they wish to create.

NOTES

1. Trade as discussed in this chapter will refer principally to the most critical aspect—foreign trade.

2. Heavy industries are generally taken to mean those which are typically and best located near sources of power or raw material. They are the capital-intensive industries. Light industries are those in which labor costs are relatively prominent—the labor-intensive industries. They are much less re-

stricted in their location, as far as physical resources are concerned. Typical heavy industries are the manufacture of iron and glass, cement, lumber, etc. Textiles, porcelain, bicycles, tools, instruments, toys, are light manufactures.

3. W. Ladejinsky, "Agrarian Unrest in Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, XVII, 429 (January 1939).

4. E.g., G. C. Allen, "Economic Policy: Public Enterprise, Tariffs and Subsidies," in Schumpeter and others, *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo* (New York, 1940), chap. xxi, pp. 728-740.

5. Accurate wage statistics for Japanese textile manufacturing were difficult to obtain. The above estimate is based mainly on a reliable inquiry by Helen Mears, reported in her *Year of the Wild Boar* (New York, 1942), pp. 283-284.

6. Suggestions of forthcoming policy have appeared in the press from time to time. The following are examples: "Col. Raymond C. Kramer, director of the economic and scientific section of Allied Headquarters, revealed that in the future Japan would be merely a handler of goods within her own borders. The foreign end of all trade will be arranged by Allied Control. . . . The basic scheme is to allow Japan to import raw materials and process them and then export that portion of finished goods necessary to repay the raw material cost" (*New York Times* dispatch from Tōkyō, November 25, 1945).

"An interim program of plant removals for reparations, designed to strip Japan of its war-making capabilities . . . contemplates severe cuts in Japan's machine-tool industry, arsenals, steel mills, shipyards, power plants, chemicals, light metals, and external assets" (*Christian Science Monitor*, December 7, 1945).

TABLE I

COMPARATIVE DATA ON THE JAPANESE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES*

A. Occupational Classification of All Japanese Workers, 1936		1,000 WORKERS
Total occupied.....	31,896	
Agriculture.....	14,131	
Manufacturing.....	7,813	
Commerce.....	5,176	
Public service and professions.....	2,022	
Transportation and communications.....	945	
Domestic service.....	885	
Fisheries.....	651	
Mining.....	363	
Miscellaneous.....	375	
Total unoccupied (children, aged, retired on income, etc.).....	37,897	
Total population.....	70,258	

TABLE I (Continued)

COMPARATIVE DATA ON THE JAPANESE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES^a

B. Occupational Division within Japanese Manufacturing Industries, 1939

	THOUSANDS	PER CENT
Total population, 1940.....	73,114	
Total, all manufacturing.....	8,422	100
Textiles and clothing.....	1,858	22.5
Machinery and tools.....	1,253	14.8
Civil engineering and building.....	1,225	14.4
Metal manufactures.....	1,045	12.4
Food and drink processing.....	614	7.5
Wood, bamboo, etc.....	605	7.2
Shipbuilding and vehicles.....	360	4.3
Chemicals.....	354	4.2
Paper, printing.....	280	3.3
Instruments, precision manufacture.....	231	2.7
Ceramics.....	204	2.4
Gas, electricity, etc.....	158	1.8
Leather, shell, bone, etc.....	35	0.4
Salt.....	25	0.3
Others.....	155	1.8

C. Value of Production for Selected Industries, 1936

Approximate total value of manufactures.....	\$4,155,000,000
Percentage for major industries, by value	
Textiles.....	28.5
Chemicals.....	18.7
Metals and metal products.....	18.0
Machinery and tools.....	13.6
Processed foodstuffs.....	10.6
Ceramics.....	2.6
Lumber and wood products.....	2.1
Printing and binding.....	1.9
Other industries.....	3.8

^a Sources: Schumpeter, E., ed., and others, *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo 1930-40* (New York, 1940); International Labor Office, *Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1942*; *Japan Yearbook, 1939-40*; and Japanese language sources.

Section B, with the exception of the figure on total population, should be taken as a near approximation only. Most of the figures were arrived at by interpretation of indices of employment for 1939 and previous years.

TABLE 2

IMPORTS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES INTO HONSHŪ, KYŪSHŪ, SHIKOKU,
HOKKAIDŌ, AND KARAFUTO^a

Articles	Statistical Year	Unit of Quantity	Values (Thousands of Yen)
<i>Textiles and Textile Materials</i> 1939			
Total			
Cotton, raw	1,000 lb.	1,335,102	643,926
Wool	"	106,089	462,007
Pulp for rayon	"	315,123	72,590
Manila hemp	"	82,543	48,879
Jute	"	37,964	10,433
Ramie	"	26,985	7,028
Woolen goods	"	—	7,909
All others	"	—	63
<i>Ores and Metals</i> 1936			
Total			
Iron and steel:			374,892
Scrap iron	Metric tons	1,497,060	192,040
Pig iron	"	972,000	80,866
Sheets, iron and steel	"	83,340	42,064
Ingots and slabs	"	207,780	18,861
Special steels	"	9,720	15,852
Pipes and tubes	"	42,900	7,251
Iron ore	"	3,780,120	6,901
Copper (ingots, slabs, & other)	"	53,340	40,043
Lead	"	97,800	36,221
Zinc	"	61,800	27,189
Tin	"	4,620	16,428
Aluminum	"	10,260	15,097
Nickel	"	2,580	13,229
All others	—	—	8,514
<i>Metal Manufactures</i> 1939			
<i>Oils, Fats and Waxes</i> 1936			
Total			
Petroleum:	1,000 kiloliters	—	197,109
Crude oil	"	—	182,769
Other (gasoline, kerosene, etc.)	"	3,913	129,688
All others	—	—	53,081
		—	14,740

TABLE 1 (Continued)

IMPORTS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES INTO HONSHŪ, KYŪSHŪ, SHIKOKU,
HOKKAIDŌ, AND KARAIUTO^a

Articles	Statistical Year	Unit of Quantity	Values (Thousands of Yen)	
			Quantity	Quantity
<i>Machinery, Vehicles, etc.</i> 1939				
Total				288,272
Machinery and parts				249,896
Vehicles, instruments, etc				38,315
<i>Chemicals, Dyes and Drugs</i> 1939				
Total				148,461
Fertilizers:				
Ammonium sulphate 1,000 kiloliters			82,339	8,240
Chloride of potash "			72,158	11,016
Sulphate of potash "			90,271	13,589
Nitrate of soda "			27,069	2,865
Phosphorite "			782,991	13,050
Soda ash "			19,260	2,246
Caustic soda "			—	—
Tanning materials & extracts			59,460	15,933
Dyes and pigments			—	9,961
Carbon black "			4,740	2,118
Other chemicals, dyes & drugs			—	71,561
<i>Paper</i> 1939				
Total				11,370
Pulp for paper	Metric tons		27,180	7,659
<i>Foodstuffs, Stimulants</i> 1939				
Total				230,731
Beans and peas 1,000 lbs.			1,815,808	123,576
Rice "			96,432	6,286
Sugar "			1,852	140
Salt 1939	Metric tons		1,892,687	41,515
Rubber 1939	Metric tons		43,020	57,490
Lumber	—		—	32,326
Coal	Metric tons		3,855,425	78,364
Oil seeds	"		153,720	30,988
Oil cake	"		935,700	104,639
Hides and skins	"		30,420	30,573
All other items	"		—	144,393
Total (includes re-imports)	—		—	2,917,666

^a Compiled from annual and monthly returns of the foreign trade of Japan

TABLE 3

EXPORTS FROM HONSHŪ, SHIKOKU, KYŪSHŪ, HOKKAIDŌ, AND KARAFUTO—1939⁴

Articles	Unit of Quantity	Unit of Quantity	Values (Thousands of Yen)
<i>Textiles and Textile Materials</i>			
Total			1,503,018
Silk, raw	1,000 lbs.	51,060	506,845
Cotton, piece goods	1,000 sq. yds.	2,445,537	403,946
Cotton, yarn	1,000 lbs.	82,857	71,090
Silk piece goods	1,000 sq. yds.	39,666	47,397
Rayon piece goods	" "	309,971	137,358
Rayon	1,000 lbs.	36,774	29,348
Woolen piece goods	1,000 sq. yds.	26,103	51,821
Woolen yarn	1,000 lbs.	8,069	18,619
All others	— —	— —	236,594
<i>Cladding</i>			
Total			168,466
<i>Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco</i>			
Total			439,971
Canned and bottled foods	1,000 bls.	401,602	332,009
Fishery products	"	256,888	61,935
Sugar, refined	"	246,173	28,677
Wheat flour	"	457,027	54,228
Tea	"	51,721	23,463
All others	"	— —	139,659
<i>Machinery, vehicles and instruments</i>			
Total			370,323
Machinery and parts			209,206
Bicycles:			
Cycles and frames	Thousands	193	4,385
Parts	Metric tons		15,928
Automobiles and parts			53,472
Railway cars and parts			20,791
All others			66,611
<i>Ores and Metals</i>			
Total			139,031
Iron	Metric tons	500,940 (1936)	76,410 (1935)
Copper and brass	" "	9,268	11,211
<i>Metal Manufactures</i>			
Total			147,816

TABLE 3 (Continued)

EXPORTS FROM HONSHŪ, SHIKOKU, KYŪSHŪ, HOKKAIDO, AND KARAFUTO—1939*

Articles	Unit of Quantity . . .	Quantity . . .	Values (Thousands of Yen) . . .
<i>Oils, fats, etc.</i>			
Total			88,264
Vegetable oils	1,000 lbs.	89,024	77,254
Fish oil and animal oil	" "	22,223	5,802
Hardened oil	" "	48,150	4,393
Soaps	" "	— —	17,413
All others	" "	— —	43,402
<i>Chemicals, Drugs, etc.</i>			
Total			107,503
<i>Miscellaneous</i>			
Chinaware			48,624
Glass			27,055
Paper			77,946
Toys			11,020
Wood			128,647
Lamps and posts			17,745
Coal		679,737	9,665
Cement		698,580	11,549
Dyes			18,532
All other items			250,185
Total (includes re-exports)			3,576,370

* Compiled from annual and monthly returns of the foreign trade of Japan.

CHAPTER VII

RELIGION, MAGIC, AND MORALE

Douglas G. Haring

When Walter Bagehot published *Physics and Politics* (1873), he could foresee neither the new knowledge that would upset part of his speculations nor the apt illustration of his keener perceptions which the Japanese were about to provide. His scheme of political evolution can be toppled deftly by many an ambitious young academic of the twentieth century. But his picture of magico-religious conformity in aggressive nations fits the Japanese situation with uncanny accuracy. Whether the Japanese people are capable of breaking what Bagehot called "the cake of custom" to attain that freer order which he termed "the Age of Discussion" remains indeterminate.

Bagehot's interest focused upon that passion for conformity which renders a people sufficiently homogeneous to maintain complex societal and political organization. His explanation of this phenomenon assumed that primeval man possessed no ability for concerted effort. Religious and magical beliefs, however, engendered superstitious awe and profound fear, with consequent habits of conformity that enabled some groups to develop tribal organization. Led by despotic chiefs, such tribes emerged victorious in the age-long struggle for existence. Generations of fear-nurtured order finally bred offspring who inherited the disposition for conformity acquired by their forebears. Thus equipped by heredity for social organization, these latter-day humans could afford to dispense with magic and

superstition, which handicap individuality because they foster tyranny. These speculations collapsed under the impact of growing knowledge of primitive custom, of genetics, and of the neuro-chemical basis of routine and habitual conformity.

The new knowledge indicates that the urge to ritual, routine, and conformity is native in living matter. Human beings share this trait with all animals whose nervous systems facilitate individual modifiability in behavior.¹ The word "conformity" fails to convey adequately the compulsive aspect of habitual routines. Study of neurotic personalities yields clear pictures of compulsive behavior: the subject's inner constitution irresistibly impels him to repeat the same pattern of behavior again and again. Compulsive behavior routines characterize all persons who participate in organized social living. Those individuals who become unpleasantly aware of some compulsive aspect of their behavior and who attempt to break that routine attain the distinction of being dubbed neurotics. Psychoanalysts and psychiatrists extend the diagnosis of "compulsion neurosis" to all mankind and announce gloomily that civilization is mass neurosis.

A shift to broader perspective is overdue. Compulsive routine or ritualized performance of learned patterns of behavior makes possible all culture, all civilization. The psychological mechanism of endless neurotic repetition of an inane ritual, such as avoiding cracks in the sidewalk, chain smoking of cigarettes, or washing one's hands, in a different mental context holds the scientist to his research, the musician to his practice, and the worker to his job. The distinction between productive concentration and neurosis may become very tenuous.

Bagehot singled out these rituals of self-coercion as the basis of all societal order. His striking phrase, "the cake of custom," despite its abuse by persons who incorporated it into their own mental rituals, denotes a very significant phenomenon. Subsequently William James' discussion of habit called attention to

the facts of self-coerced repetition of behavior. Abundant observations support the assertion that human behavior actually is conformist to the point of unreason.² Bagehot also perceived accurately that conformity is far more rigid when sanctioned by magico-religious ideology. He rested upon history in his assertion that in some times and places men attain a modicum of insight into the drawbacks of conformance, become self-critical, and voice their doubts in debate. His "Age of Discussion" may not be inevitable, but it is possible. Its achievement is a major goal—perhaps the major goal—of democracy.

II

Against this background Japanese religion, magic, and government merit critical analysis. Japanese morale is another name for mass conformity which finds in compulsive rituals of behavior.³ In peace and in war morale is an aspect of the homogeneity of the Japanese population.⁴ Despite apparently flagrant differences in conduct, education, and sophistication between coolie laborer and intellectual, all Japanese feel and act "like Japanese." On this statement foreign observers agree. In attempting to state what is meant by feeling "like a Japanese" they often disagree. The crucial aspect is habitual emotion, not ideology; Japanese themselves are hard put to state clearly what they think and how they feel. Pressed to explain, they fall back on reciting Shintō myths or the tale of the Forty-seven *Rōnin*. A tenable conclusion is that Japanese homogeneity involves similarity of emotional habits that resist intellectual clarification and critical analysis.

The ritual compulsions of Japanese cultural behavior call to mind the magical habits of many peripheral or "primitive" tribes. Japanese mass emotions, however, are fostered artificially by the schools, the press, Shintō festivals, the cinema, folklore, mythology, and the omnipresent police. This elaborate coercive apparatus seems remote from the naïve eager conformity of the

so-called primitive. Nevertheless the words *magic* and *religion* are pertinent and apt.⁵

The Japanese are not a people of one religion. In recent decades officially inspired spokesmen have extolled Shintō as Japan's indigenous, heaven-bestowed cult, tolerated Buddhism as a foreign faith dignified by association with their ancestors, and condemned Christianity as an exotic, subversive cult ill fitted to Japan's needs. Professor Steiger has shown, however,⁶ that prior to the tenth century A.D. Buddhism served to exalt the emperor in the face of Shintō opposition, while in modern Japan a Shintō emperor-cult rallied patriots about the throne and Buddhism was repudiated as subversive of patriotism. Evidently religious forms and hierarchies may serve quite contrasting ends; something other than doctrine determines practice.

To the man in the streets of Tōkyō or the rice fields of Tamura religious distinctions are exceedingly vague. No one deity or creed monopolizes his devotion. For some purposes Suzuki *San* worships at a Shintō shrine; for others he summons a Buddhist priest; in argument he appeals to Confucian authority; he may not be averse to installing a Christian symbol on the household god-shelf—just in case there might be something in it. If he is a peasant or a craftsman—such as a carpenter, boatbuilder, stonemason, swordmaker, or potter—he relies upon Shintō priests for the age-old formulae that govern every detail of his ritualized techniques. If he is a laborer on a modern construction project, he will not lift a finger to his task unless the entire project has been initiated by a formal Shintō ceremony that removes the threat of evil supernatural forces and insures divine protection to the workers. All the traditional crafts and much of the technique of modernized production can be understood only when it is perceived that every step in the processes is a formal ritual of supernaturalistic import. The Shintō rituals not only guarantee transmission of the secrets

of the craft from generation to generation, they also guarantee the success of the enterprise by supernatural participation. Spiritual power is beneficent; only those denizens of the spirit world evoke fear who in life worked harm to the nation, or who have become "hungry ghosts" through extinction of the line of their descendants. Against such evil genii, however, Buddhist and Shintō rituals afford countermeasures. Despite the need for vigilance against occasional fox-women, vampires, and hungry ghosts, most spirits are helpful. Theological distinctions concern the Suzukis no more than they disturb a New Yorker—perhaps less.

Suzuki *San* feels profoundly that his ancestors require attention. They must have descendants in the next generation, and they reward his solicitude with prosperity. As head of a household he presents offerings and announces events—such as the birth of a child—before the Shintō god-shelf, perhaps also at a domestic Buddha-altar. When a baby is a few days old, especially if it be a boy, it is presented to the supernatural world at the nearest Shintō shrine. At O-Bon season the ancestral spirits return and join in a family feast; the presence of the more recently deceased is very vivid to the Suzuki children.⁷

The Suzukis go on picnic pilgrimages to famous places, including those beauty spots which convention recognizes as famous. No shrine or temple along the route is neglected. Meticulously they observe the festival calendar⁸ that outlines the cycle of the year. When a local shrine or temple holds a festival, Suzuki *San* is there with his wife and children. He has climbed holy Mt. Fuji and visited the Grand Shrine at Ise. In Tōkyō he bows before the Imperial Palace and pays reverence to the heroes of battle at Yasukuni Shrine. Sometimes he visits a famous temple or shrine to offer prayer and consult a diviner as to his prospects; perhaps he will top the day by getting drunk at a nearby *yūkaku* (brothel). For charms, amulets, divination, and other magical gadgetry his demand is insatiable. No

observer may be certain, however, that any of this holds for Suzuki *San* a meaning deeper than that of Halloween for John Doe. The important fact is not that he *believes*, but that he *does*. Every one of these acts carries the compulsive quality of ritual.

If Suzuki *San* cannot explain his magico-religious behavior, how can anyone else fathom his motives? The religious history of Japan offers an answer of a sort. Belief in a god-king, ancestor worship, Buddhism, Confucianism, divination, and many other Japanese religious and magical practices originally came from abroad. With wearisome iteration the Japanese assert that whatever they adopt from foreign sources, they invariably change to suit the unique genius of Japan. Yet they continue unable to state unambiguously the nature of that alleged national genius. Granted that they change what they borrow—but how are the changes directed? What are the criteria of adaptation?

Close scrutiny of the history of Japanese adoption of foreign ideas and practices from this point of view might discover some uniform trend or pattern of modification that would indicate the nature of "Japan's unique national genius." The Japanese have borrowed extensively from the cultural resources of Oceania, Asia, and the modern Euro-American world. Would study of the alterations in borrowed cultural elements indicate that the changes have occurred fortuitously and at random, or that they manifest a self-consistent pattern? Possibly the criteria of alteration are intangible; they may be found in unconscious feelings of "rightness" and in compulsive rituals of habit—i.e., inarticulate like-responses of many individuals reared to think and feel alike. Discovery of a more or less uniform pattern of modification of cultural borrowings might clarify that much-abused concept, "the soul of a people."⁹

An exhaustive test of this hypothesis would exceed the limits of this chapter and might occupy a lifetime. The hypothesis is suggested, however, and outstanding facts are examined in

search of insight into the compulsive rituals of conformity that constitute Japanese morale.

III

The quest for historical beginnings is no less baffling in Japan than elsewhere. Archaeological findings and early documents indicate cultural practices reminiscent at times of Oceania, again of the Amur region and Mongolia, and also of Chinese colonies in Korea. Questions of which group first reached Japan, routes of diffusion of specific cultural forms, and the extent to which cultural parallels imply immigration from an area of earlier provenance are immaterial here. It suffices to examine non-Japanese forms of specific cultural features and to compare them with their Japanese counterparts. There is little if any question of such features having arisen in Japan and spread to Asia and Oceania, or of independent parallel invention; detailed documentation attests an overwhelming number of direct importations. The cultural drift uniformly moved from Asia and Oceania to Japan.

The institution of the divine emperor is regarded by the Japanese as without an earthly parallel. Even a cursory study of the history of Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, Indonesia, or China disposes of this claim. In early times god-kings were the only kind of rulers conceivable in these Asiatic societies. Dismissing questions of priority of varying forms of the institution, features that differentiate the Japanese emperor from other Asiatic god-kings are outlined.

The Hindu form of divine kingship appears historically in Indonesia, Cambodia, Siam, and Polynesia—logically enough, in view of the prolonged migration from the Pallava kingdom in India to Oceania and southeastern Asia.¹⁰ Since Japan lay within reach of Oceanic and southeastern Asiatic influence and well out of range of Egypt and Mesopotamia, the Hindu type of kingship invites comparison with the Japanese type.¹¹ In the

Indian literature—for example, the *Satapatha Brahmana*—the theology and ritual of divine kingship are stated explicitly. The current vogue of that theology and ritual from Siam to Fiji is attested in ethnographic literature.

Though born of royal stock, the god-kings of India acquired divinity through a priestly miracle. Magically the prince died as a man and in the "Quickening" or coronation ceremony he was reborn as a god. Only the Brahmins could effect this miraculous transformation. The newborn deity was washed and anointed as a babe, imbibed the divine essence in a sacred potion, and thenceforth functioned as a god. Without the priesthood the king was powerless; without the king the priesthood remained ineffectual. Magically any god can become any other god; therefore the god-king could become any of the gods. By his edicts and ritual actions he regulated the Universe; when he arose the sun rose, when he retired the sun set. As he performed the ritual of his office, sunshine alternated with rain, man and beast waxed fertile, and the kingdom basked in the "king's justice." Ritual blunders were fraught with dire peril. Kings whose magic went amiss presumably were killed, and a fresh priestly miracle created a new deity in their stead. Thus ultimate power was vested in the priest-magicians, and India's Brahmins took full advantage of their status.

China's emperors also manifested divine characteristics. The Chinese emperor, to be sure, was not Heaven; he was Heaven's representative. Nevertheless the royal ritual was believed to regulate the Universe and to insure the welfare of the empire by its magical virtue. He could sway the balance in the eternal struggle of *Yang* and *Yin*, dual powers of light and darkness, so that the advantage lay now with one, now with the other, and thus he effected the alternation of the seasons. He even promoted in rank those gods who gave ear to prayers, and demoted those who continued deaf to petitions.¹²

Evidence from early Japan indicates that the country was

occupied by several—perhaps many—competing tribes, each led by a magically potent chieftain, some of whom were female.¹³ A plausible modern parallel appears in Oceania, especially native Polynesia, where king and nobles stand apart from commoners because of their mystical powers. Elaborate etiquette, a special language of chiefly address, dual government by a sacred king and a politically able executive, special taboos to protect ordinary folk from the fatal power resident in the chief's person, occur in many parts of Polynesia. There also is a sacred drink served with complex ritual, to renew and sustain the divinity of chiefs and nobles. The drink is made by chewing a narcotic root and fermenting the liquid in wooden troughs. Work such as building canoes and houses is monopolized by esoteric guilds whose craftsmen guard the secrets of a supernatural ritual. Trained reciters preserve traditions and genealogies; these are vitally important because divinity passes by descent to both kings and nobles. A slight variation in a sacred genealogy or myth may wreck the social status of one family and enhance that of another. Since kings are born divine they owe no debt to the priests.¹⁴ Ritual dances magically augment the supernatural resources of the tribe and its head; in some parts of Oceania, though not in Polynesia, the dances are performed on a resonator that amplifies the sound of the feet.

The earliest Japanese writings depict striking parallels to some Polynesian practices, although there is marked divergence in other respects. Because sanctity of Japanese chiefs and nobles was hereditary, supreme importance attached to genealogy and tradition. Guilds of professional reciters preserved the sanctioning mythology¹⁵—sometimes, perhaps, they manipulated the genealogies to benefit a generous patron. Etiquette of approach to divine personages, a special language of chiefly address, dual government by a magical ruler and a political go-getter, taboos to guard the sacred person of the chief—all these were common-

place in early Japan and still survive. Traditionally a screen protects the eyes of petitioners from the divine effulgence of the emperor, and elaborate ritual precautions attend his public appearances—perhaps originally to protect the commoners. Ritual serving of a supernaturally potent drink underwent modification when tea was introduced; but until very lately the tea ceremony was a prerogative of the divine upper class. The ancient chronicles (*Kojiki*, 712 A.D.; *Nihongi*, 720 A.D.) refer to chewing as the method of preparing the divine potion, with use of "broad troughs," probably for fermentation. Among the esoteric craft guilds was a body of food-chewers to the king. These vulgar allusions have annoyed sophisticated scholars, who labor to explain away such primitive elements by textual reconstruction.¹⁶ The determination of social status and degree of divinity of the nobility by reference to mythology and genealogy survives to the present. Ritual dances performed on a resonator appear in the *Kojiki* account of the divine magic that lured the sulking Sun Goddess from her heavenly rock-cave, and also in the modern *Nō* drama.

Japanese origin myths also parallel the Polynesian. The creator deities Izanagi and Izanami, "standing upon the Floating Bridge of Heaven, pushed down the jewelled spear and stirred with it, whereupon, when they had stirred the brine till it went curdle-curdle, and drew the spear up, the brine that dripped down from the end of the spear was piled up and became an island Having descended from Heaven onto this island, they saw to the erection of a heavenly august pillar, they saw to the erection of an hall of eight fathoms."¹⁷ In the hall they consummated sexual union in accordance with a magical ritual. Promptly Izanami gave birth to the islands of Japan, mountains, mists and rocks, flora and fauna, and many deities, including Fire. The entire creation resulted from sexual unions of the gods and related magical rituals.¹⁸ Both the idea of fishing islands out of the sea and the doctrine of creation by

divine sexual activity are reiterated in Polynesian mythology.¹⁹ Japanese myths also touch upon another Polynesian theme: the propping up of the sky-father to permit growth of living creatures on the body of the earth-mother.²⁰

Japanese and Polynesian traditions thus agree in a concept of creation that differs from ideas prevalent in Asia generally. Other Asiatic creation legends are known in Japan; the myths of the Sun Goddess, for example, show close Asiatic affiliations. The Asiatic and Polynesian affiliations of the phallic cult also are extensive but remain to be worked out in detail.

The concept of *kami*, however, stands out as the central theme of Japanese supernaturalism from earliest times to the present. *Kami* has been expounded variously; no one, however, has stated it more clearly than did the great Japanese scholar of the eighteenth century, Motoori Norinaga:

I do not yet understand the meaning of the term, *kami*. Speaking in general, however, it may be said that *kami* signifies, in the first place, the deities of heaven and earth that appear in the ancient records and also the spirits of the shrines where they are worshipped.

It is hardly necessary to say that it includes human beings. It also includes such objects as birds, beasts, trees, plants, seas, mountains and so forth. In ancient usage, anything whatsoever which was outside the ordinary, which possessed superior power or which was awe-inspiring was called *kami*. Eminence here does not refer merely to the superiority of nobility, goodness, or meritorious deeds. Evil and mysterious things, if they are extraordinary and dreadful, are called *kami*. It is needless to say that among human beings who are called *kami* the successive generations of sacred emperors are all included. The fact that emperors are also called "distant *kami*" is because, from the standpoint of common people, they are far-separated, majestic, and worthy of reverence. In a lesser degree we find, in the present as well as in ancient times, human beings who are *kami*. Although they may not be accepted throughout the whole country, yet in each province, each village and each family there are human beings who are *kami*, each one according to his own proper position. The *kami* of the divine age were for the most part human beings of that time and, because the people of that time were all *kami*, it is called the Age of the Gods (*kami*).

Furthermore, among things which are not human, the thunder is always called "sounding-*kami*." Such things as dragons, the echo, and foxes, inasmuch as they are conspicuous, wonderful and awe-inspiring, are also *kami*. . . .

In the *Nihongi* and the *Manyōshū* the tiger and the wolf are also spoken of as *kami*. Again there are the cases in which peaches were given the name, August-Thing-Great-*Kamu*-Fruit, and a necklace was called August-Storehouse-shelf-*Kamu*. There are further instances in which rocks, stumps of trees and leaves of plants spoke audibly. They were all *kami*. There are again numerous places in which seas and mountains are called *kami*. This does not have reference to the spirit of the mountain or the sea, but *kami* is used here directly of the particular mountain or sea. This is because they were extremely awe-inspiring.²¹

As in all translations from the Japanese, the indefiniteness of the original cannot be reproduced in English. The absence from Japanese grammar of distinctions of number and gender applies especially to the *kami* concept, which is neither masculine nor feminine, singular nor plural. Japanese also uses no articles. Hence all English translations, by introducing number, gender, and definite or indefinite articles, reflect the unconscious bias of the translator. At some sacrifice of conventional style, this paper attempts to convey the Japanese feeling in using the word *kami*.

Kami is homophonous with words for deity, hair, paper, higher, noble, the government, social superior, and ruling official. As a verb in ancient usage it is untranslatable ("to god" or "to supernatural"); in modern times the verb *kamu* means "to chew" (cf. ancient associations with sacred drink), and "to blow the nose." *Susa-no-wo*, storm god of the *Kojiki*, was born magically when Izanagi blew his nose. All these things are emotionally important to Japanese. Paper charms hang from every Shintō shrine; the beams of a Buddhist temple are hoisted into place by ropes of human hair; and for centuries warriors and personages of note attached the suffix *no kami* to their titles. The Protestant translation of the Bible renders

"God" as *Kami*. The emperor's many names include *akitsu kami* (Manifest Deity), *ara huto kami* and *ara mi kami* (In-carnate *kami*), and *kami go ichi nin* (Exalted Upper Deity). Divine beings to the number of "eight hundred times ten thousand"¹⁷ are *kami*; there also are Earthly *kami*. Anything to which mystic potency can be imputed—trees, rocks, beautiful scenery, the ocean, winds, waterfalls, mountains, horses, lightning, sex, food—in magical context becomes *kami*.

Ethnologists and students of religion recognize in *kami* the familiar *mana* concept. The word *mana* is derived from the Melanesian and Polynesian languages. Bishop Codrington's classic description of *mana* among the Melanesians, published in 1891, influenced all subsequent studies of magic and religion.²² By *mana* the Melanesians denote supernatural power—impersonal, invisible, contagious. Canoes, warriors, mountains, storms, animals, sorcerers, witches, deities—all sorts of objects may possess *mana*. Through appropriate contacts *mana* is gained or lost. A person or object charged with *mana* endangers the unwary who have not been prepared ritually for the contact. That which contains *mana* is *tabu* or *tapu*, i.e., "dangerous, keep away." At his death a warrior or magical practitioner may bequeath his *mana* to a person; he may deposit it at a spot which automatically becomes *tabu*; or he may take it with him to the spirit world and become a ghost that must be propitiated or worshipped. The New Zealand Maori attribute *mana* to the sexual organs; they also leave small polished semi-precious stones in sacred places to acquire *mana*, and reciters of tradition hold the stones in their mouths to prevent errors in ritual.²³

Abundant and detailed evidence indicates identity of the concepts *mana* and *kami*.²⁴ The Japanese counterpart of *tabu*, in early times, was *imi*. An esoteric guild of "abstainers" performed magical ritual involving abstention and purification from the pollution of *imi*; they were called *Imbe* (i.e.,

imi-be, tabu guild).²⁵ Sexual functions accomplish the supernatural feat of creating life, hence they are both *kami* and *imi*. Here is the basis of the phallic cult that is ubiquitous in Japan; many a rural grave is marked by a stone phallus to symbolize the victory of life over death. The Three Sacred Treasures that the Sun Goddess conferred on the first emperor in token of his status as manifest deity included a divine mirror, a *kami* sword, and an "augustly complete string of curved jewels eight feet long"²⁶—all of which had figured prominently in the magical ritual of coaxing the Sun Goddess from her cave to restore light to the world—and they still attest the imperial divinity. The string of curved jewels seems to have been made of semi-precious stones shaped like kidney beans and used to convey *kami*. These are the *magatama* whose function has puzzled some archaeologists.²⁷

While belief in contagious magico-supernatural power is almost universal, the special feature of both Polynesian *mana* and Japanese *kami* is extravagant attribution of these mystic powers to chieftains and nobles who inherit divinity from their ancestors. Even the Ainu aborigines of Japan who used the word *kamui* to denote the same concept apparently failed to impute hereditary *kamui* to an upper class.²⁸ Demonstration of cultural affiliations between Japan and Polynesia—a process capable of considerable extension—is not at stake here. The point is that to the extent to which these two areas are alike, they both differ from well-established Asiatic models. In diffusion to Japan and Polynesia, the dogma of a divine king and court has suffered change at a vital point; in neither of these areas are priests able to make god-kings. Divinity is hereditary and attested by genealogy. The chieftain and the nobility cannot be deposed and only their offspring can succeed to their prerogatives. The two most sacred documents of modern Japan—the Meiji Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on Education—are adamant on this point: "a line of Emperors

unbroken for ages eternal," "The Emperor is sacred and inviolable," "Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth."²⁰

In both areas dual government insures the magical and ritual status of the king, who maintains the country by his *mana* or *kami*, while those who by combat or intrigue are able to seize power run the government by his sanction. Politically the divine king is a puppet. Ritually the prime minister (in Samoa, the "talking-chief") is a creature of the ruler. Priests serve the king; his word takes precedence over theirs. Despite differing emphases, the pattern has never been abandoned for a moment in Japan.

The distinction between Heaven and Earth in early Japanese writings has been attributed by some writers²¹ to adoption of Chinese Yin-Yang dualism. Perhaps, however, the distinction antedates cultural borrowings from dynastic China. Study of the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* prompts the hypothesis that Heaven was the region settled by immigrants from Oceania or South China who had drifted northward via the Black Current in canoes—"the Floating Bridge of Heaven" of the *Kojiki*. In those far-off days the rest of Japan seems to have corresponded to Earth—particularly Izumo, home of tribes with a continental background, perhaps from Korea or the Amur Valley. The Oceanic immigrants possessed divine chieftains and a sophisticated system of status in the hierarchy of *kami*. The Izumo tribes were impressed by the glamour of divinity. Significantly, many of the Heavenly Deities sought and won in marriage daughters of the Earthly Deities. Perhaps the sea-borne immigrants were short of women; and what fond mama can resist the prospect of a titled son-in-law? At any rate the Earthly Deities capitulated to the Heavenly Deities with relatively slight pressure;²² no indication of protracted warfare between the two groups appears in the records.

A ritual distinction of Heavenly Offences from Earthly

Offences supports this speculation. This distinction is preserved in official rituals and appears in modern schoolbooks. The Heavenly Offences imply a rice-growing people from the south; the Earthly Offences smack of a continental background. Both are magical pollutions, not moral transgressions. Both types of pollution demand extended rituals of purification. The verbal formulae of such purification persist as a conspicuous aspect of contemporary official Shintō—the *norito* or prayer-formulae.³²

Traditions of this preliterate Age of the Gods afford glimpses of the wars and intrigues by which the tribe of *Yamato* or *Wa* gained ascendancy over the other tribes. The supernatural assets of the king (or queen) of *Wa* appreciated in value as those of the defeated chieftains declined. Surviving chieftains of other tribes became "clan heads" without total loss of *kami*; that which is conferred by divine ancestry may burn dim but it cannot be abolished by decree. When combat, always decisive, demonstrated that their *kami* could not prevail over the great *kami* of *Yamato*, some chieftains preferred to support the nascent court and thus maintain the divinity of aristocracy.

IV

By the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. a new concept was being introduced by Korean immigrants who knew something of the Chinese Empire. These Koreans could write Chinese and could keep accounts. They found steady employment in the service of Japan's *kami* aristocracy. Their learning and their ability to impart to official documents the style and sophistication of Chinese forms made a profound impression.

The new concept which they fostered was that of a unified country regulated magically by a single emperor. They did not need to promote the idea as an organized political group. This idea precisely suited the interests of the *Yamato* rulers, who shortly convinced themselves that "since ages eternal" they had

been practicing that very system in Japan. Chinese rhetorical extravagance became literal fact in the land of *kami*. Henceforward the current Chinese passion for "the rectification of names"—i.e., readjustment of official titles and prerogatives to accord with ritual formulas—characterized the Yamato court. At frequent intervals imperial edicts rebuked minor grandees who "arrogantly" claimed divine prerogatives. Probably the alleged upstarts were former chieftains, *kami* by genealogical tradition. Evidently they had backed the wrong factions on earth and chosen the wrong ancestral *kami*. Thus the Yamato court eliminated rival claimants to superior *kami*. To this end the ordeal was employed freely as final test of the possession of *kami*.³³ Traces of former tribal organization were purged indefatigably. Japan was now a nation with a god-king and divine nobility.

Simultaneously ancestor worship, Chinese style, was gaining acceptance in Japan. In China, ancestors, like the gods, gain in supernatural potency as they receive worship. The Japanese put their own stamp on the ancestor cult. Since the magical weal of the land depended on the *kami* of its ruler, and since his ancestors had been the very highest *kami*, worship of the emperor's ancestors took precedence over that of lesser spirits. The head of the humblest household might indeed be *kami* by virtue of his headship, and after death his *kami* was augmented by the rites performed by his descendants. But in the spirit-world he was in the presence of those mighty *kami* to whom he did obeisance when on earth. These *kami* increased in efficacy through constant worship by their great *kami* descendants—mighty magic indeed. If the welfare of a household depended on the favor of its ancestral *kami*, so much the more was the fate of all Yamato at stake in the propitiation of imperial ancestors.

These practices rendered the imperial succession invulnerable. In view of the inferior *kami*—ancestral and personal—of any

possible pretender, a change of dynasty became unthinkable. The Imperial *kami* was enhanced as each successive emperor joined the imperial ancestors. "Since ages eternal" the imperial *kami*, attested on earth by the Three Sacred Treasures and the physical presence of the emperor (*akitsu kami*), had been accumulating in the ancestral realm as static electricity accumulates in a thundercloud. China could offer no comparable magical virtue. The Chinese emperor wields great powers as Heaven's representative, but he still is a representative, not a deity; and Chinese dynasties have changed many times. In the technical ritual of government, however, the Chinese had much that the Japanese were eager to adopt. "The little witch sees the great witch" and would fain learn her magical repertory.

That the art of writing ever served magical functions few persons realize in these days of universal literacy. In China and Japan, however, calligraphy is more than a fine art—it is a ritual fraught with mystic power. The verb "to write" (*kaku*) may have come from the same *ka* root as *kami*. To this day children learn that bodily posture, frame of mind, method of preparing ink, position of the brush, and even the correct rhythm of breathing are equal in importance to the ideas written. There is a vast body of lore about the ideographs—which ones are graceful, well balanced, lucky, strong, or vigorous, and which are ungainly, topheavy, unlucky, weak, or treacherous. Choice of personal names, brand names for advertised goods, telephone numbers and street addresses, and other symbols depends on the mystic properties of ideographs. The art of calligraphy affords a wealth of apt illustrations of compulsive ritual actions and feelings. No adequate translation of Chinese or Japanese writings is possible; the overtones cannot be rendered apart from the ideographs. Small wonder that Chinese writing was seized upon avidly in early Japan, that the scribes held enviable status, and that the *kami* of the court could not afford to be ignorant of writing. The meanings and

uses of Chinese ideographs were changed profoundly in the effort to adapt them to writing a language almost as different from Chinese as it is from English. Those changes, many of which are pertinent to this discussion, constitute another story that cannot be included here. Imperial rescripts and edicts are *kami* in their own right—not simply that they are on paper (*kami*) but because they are *written*, and written in the most elegant and magically potent ideographs. Written prayers, written charms, written doctrine, written commands, mottoes, poems, threats, spells, horoscopes—all these are doubly effective, for the ritual of writing and the symbolism of the ideographs enhance and often eclipse the bare meaning.

Despite the assassinations and intrigues that surround the Yamato dynasty in the earliest accounts, the rising supernatural prestige of the emperor tended to remove the imperial family from overt participation in the endless struggle for temporal power. The importance of the emperor lay not in his political acts but in his ritual and symbolic status coupled with his role as repository of the most potent *kami* in the land. Traditions of dual government placed the administration of mundane affairs in whatever capable hands might win control of the emperor. The consistent pattern of Japanese political history has been the struggle to control the emperor and thus gain supernatural sanction for the administration. To the extent that ritual and magic sustained the government it became the business of the government to maintain the magic. The imperial *kami* laid the golden eggs—but notoriously, no goose eats its own eggs. Remote from the world and too holy for the political arena, many an emperor suffered poverty and virtual eclipse. A similar fate has overtaken less tangible gods in many another land. But no matter how exalted the *kami* of the house that did the actual ruling, the superior *kami* of the House of Yamato never was challenged effectively.

When at length an official embassy from Japan reached the

Sui court of China (607-608 A.D.) the Chinese were horrified at the impudent words of the envoy: "The Wa Prince considers Heaven his elder and the Sun his younger brother. At dawn he goes out to hear matters of government sitting in state cross-legged. On the Sun appearing he ceases the conduct of business and leaves it to me [*sic*] his younger brother."³⁴ The outraged Chinese could not tolerate the thought of a second magical regulator of the Universe in competition with their emperor, but superstitious fear of unknown possibilities in the legendary land beyond the sunrise seems to have saved the envoy's life. Over a thousand years later Motoori Norinaga was to comment that the Japanese had treated the Chinese far too civilly. A Japanese hardly could feel otherwise.

From the seventh to the tenth centuries A.D. adoption of Chinese culture proceeded intensively in Japan. The same limitations that have necessitated selection of a few aspects of the *kami* cult for discussion operate even more rigidly to confine the story of that process to a few selected topics.

The attempt to recast Japan's government along Confucian lines resulted in reforms typified by that of Taikwa (645 A.D.).³⁵ The Chinese system combined a modicum of hardheaded objectivity with a ritual efflorescence that in many respects had outlived its original purposes and had become a compulsive routine performed for its own sake. The magical significance of the whole, however, was indubitable: it constituted a ritual renewal that sustains the world. Even as Confucius' "superior man" regulated his every act in accordance with "propriety" and tradition, so the official rituals of government regulated the Universe. Meticulous adherence to the magical cycle of his prescribed duties created and manifested the "virtue" (*mana*) of the emperor. His example supposedly held courtiers and officials to their corresponding routines, and through them influenced the people to insure the conformance of "all under Heaven."

Confucian virtue tolerated no relaxation of compulsive ritual morality in favor of ethical self-determination; a cynical appraisal might apply to Confucius the diagnosis of "compulsion neurosis." Even music stirred him because it afforded the well-regulated joys of age-old magical routine. Confucius perceived in ritual the perfect regulator of the people that could guarantee governmental stability. He was too credulous of the magic innate in ritual to have set himself cynically to develop religion as an "opiate of the people." His sayings are explicit: "Govern them by moral force, keep order among them by ritual, and they will keep their self-respect and come to you of their own accord"; "A ruler in employing his ministers should be guided solely by prescriptions of ritual."³⁶

By the time the Japanese discovered Chinese culture the magical ritual of Confucian government, in the course of a thousand years, had gathered heavy accretions of Taoist magic, alchemy, geomancy, divination, horoscopy, and every device that ingenious shamans and seers could invent. Fortunate contrary tendencies in Chinese life rescued the nation from the morass of compulsive routine to create the glory of T'ang. In Japanese eyes, however, China's glory lay in its magical rituals, its punctilious etiquette and ceremony, its refinement of government by *mana*. Their enthusiasm for these things equalled their zeal for Chinese fine arts; but in Japan the futile round of mystic ceremony was unrelieved by any counterpart of the undertone of skeptical, whimsical practicality that kept the Chinese sane.

The Taikwa edicts instituted two supreme councils equal in status: the *Dajō-kwan* (Council of State) and the *Jingi-kwan* (Council of *kami* of Heaven and Earth). The *Jingi-kwan* administered all shrines, temples, magic, and ritual. The *Dajō-kwan*, headed by a chancellor and two supporting ministers, controlled eight ministries of governmental administration. Four of the eight, however—Ceremonies, Civil Affairs, Imperial

Household Finance, and Imperial Household—ranked highest because they served the emperor and the courtiers.³⁷ With half of the ministries that Occidentals would regard as the government, and all of the *Jingi-kwan* devoted to *kami* in the flesh and in the spirit, the entire system was biased heavily on the magical side. The Chinese model had been reproduced, to be sure, but the little witch had outdone the big witch. *Japan's government was, and still is, government by symbolic ritual that scarcely differs from magic.*

Certain aspects of Confucian and Mencian doctrine and certain Chinese governmental practices were foredoomed to rejection in Japan: the Mencian doctrine of revolution, and the merit system of appointment to public office.

Confucius had implied and Mencius had taught explicitly that an emperor whose conduct belied his role as Heaven's viceroy should be overthrown.³⁸ Such heresy met with emotional rejection in Japan. This repugnance became most articulate a thousand years later, when Motoori Norinaga wrote:

The "Holy Men" of China were merely successful rebels. The Mikado is the Sovereign appointed by the pair of deities, Izanagi and Izanami, who created this country. The Sun-Goddess never said, "Disobey the Mikado if he be bad," and therefore, whether he be good or bad, no one attempts to deprive him of his authority. He is the immovable ruler who must endure to the end of time, as long as the sun and moon continue to shine. In ancient language the Mikado was called a god, and that is his real character.³⁹

But in Taikwa days the prestige of things Chinese forestalled so explicit an attack; the Japanese simply ignored the Mencian doctrine and followed their habitual feelings.

Civil service examinations were a central feature of Chinese administration. Anyone of any class could compete, and the result was to discourage the rise of a hereditary governing class in China. To the Japanese the idea of a low-born person entering the government was repugnant in the extreme. Officials would

stand before the emperor, and how could an inferior fail to pollute the Sacred Person? Government was for those who by birth were *kami*. So the paper scheme of Chinese administration was adopted minus the merit system of professional civil service; the consequences were disastrous both politically and economically. The pertinent fact, however, is that in borrowing Chinese governmental patterns the Japanese modified them basically.

Another important alteration of Confucian morality is less tangible. The Chinese emphasized the "five relations"; parent and child, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, ruler and subject, friend and friend. Through the ages, despite exhortations to honor the throne, the Chinese have focused primary loyalties within the family. In practice one's ancestors, parents, family council, siblings, children, and relatives come first. The Japanese never wavered in maintaining primacy of the *kami*. In Japan's long feudal period, feudal lords and *ujigami* (clan *kami*) received loyalty before one's own family. At other times the imperial house, incarnate *kami* of the nation, has taken precedence over local obligations. Never has family or friend merited loyalty in competition with overlord or emperor. Witness the sacred words of the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors: "Ever since the ancient times there have been repeated instances of great men and heroes who, overwhelmed by misfortune, have perished and left a tarnished name to posterity, simply because in their effort to be faithful in small matters they failed to discern right and wrong with reference to fundamental principles, or because, *losing sight of the true path of public duty, they kept faith in private relations*"⁴⁰ (not italicized in the original). Chinese practice involved a reversal of the channels of loyalty that is unthinkable in the Japanese cosmos.

The Chinese acknowledged a vague philosophical monotheism in the doctrine of *T'ien* (Heaven) and *Shang-ti* (Upper

Ruler). Back of the visible Universe they sensed a shadowy ultimate Power. Heaven selected emperors. Heaven could, and did, withdraw the imperial mandate. Heaven loved the common folk and hated indulgence, extortion, bad faith, and exploitation. This belief has sanctioned the moral idealisms of Chinese history.

The Japanese, however, could see no value in this concept. They adopted the word *Ten* (Heaven) to denote the residence of the Heavenly *kami*. Never did they acknowledge any power greater than *kami*, nor did they admit any personal responsibility transcending ritual punctilio and purity.

Japanese cultural borrowings from China manifest certain clear-cut shifts in emphasis and content related to maintenance of the indigenous *kami* and associated magical ritual. Whatever profited the divine aristocracy was accepted eagerly. Whatever threatened their supremacy and status as *kami* was suppressed, as repugnant to the whole compulsive routine of magical and ritual conformity. As *kami* the emperor and the aristocratic oligarchies have accepted as their due everything that could be extorted from the people in material goods and psychological loyalty and sacrifice. No return, no responsibility is involved; *kami* cannot incur obligations.

v

Buddhism embodied a basic challenge to the entire *kami* cult. Here were greater gods and universally potent magic: a pantheon; heavens and hells; superior magical formulae in sacred literature and *mantras*; profound philosophy and doctrines of fate and rebirth; sculpture, painting, calligraphy, and imposing architecture; gorgeously appareled priests, monks, and nuns who wielded power over souls in the hereafter; and ritual beside which the magical spells and neurotic purificatory rites of the *kami* paled into insignificance.

Not all of this Buddhist panoply, however, reached Japan simultaneously. In the sixth century a Korean king under attack by neighboring princes appealed for Japanese aid; as incentive he offered the magical virtues of a new religion. A statue of the Buddha, some sacred books, a few monks, and scholars learned in Chinese were presented to the Yamato emperor with a memorial extolling the new cult: "This doctrine is among all doctrines the most excellent . . . Every prayer is fulfilled and naught is wanting."¹¹

At that time the temporal branch of Japan's dual government—the power behind the throne—was in the hands of the Nakatomi clan of ritualists and the Mononobe clan of warrior-police. But the rising Soga clan was threatening their monopoly of the imperial *kami*. Shrewdly they suggested to the emperor that the Soga clan be ordered to worship the image and test the new magic. Confident that foreign magic could not prevail over *kami*, they awaited the collapse of the House of Soga under the vengeance of the Heavenly Deities. They underestimated the wiles and the fighting power of the Sogas and the magical virtues of Buddhism. After a series of ups and downs in the conflict, the Nakatomi and Mononobe clans were ousted from their control of the throne to make way for the Soga.

Thus favored by the magical virtue of the Buddha, the Soga clan propagated the cult energetically, even though their methods revealed no trace of Buddhist gentleness and other-worldliness. The prestige of all things Chinese favored Buddhism, which shortly became the court religion. Cleverly the Sogas maneuvered the Nakatomi ritualists into a position of opposition to imperial centralization of power. Now in control of the emperor, the Sogas combined the magical power of Buddhism with that of the imperial *kami*, and thus laid the foundation of the centralizing reforms of Taikwa.¹² Buddhist magical power did not aid the Sogas to the extent of enabling

them to supplant the House of Yamato, but by the device of marrying successive emperors to Soga daughters they were able to control the secular functions of Japan's dual government.

In 645 another rising clan, the Fujiwara, broke the power of the Sogas, instituted the Taikwa reforms, and continued as the dominant power in Japan till the twelfth century. Throughout that period all imperial consorts were Fujiwara daughters. By the time the Fujiwara clan assumed the power the prestige of Buddhism was unquestioned. Emperors and Fujiwaras alike worshipped the Buddha, and the Nakatomi ritualists gradually faded from the picture.

The transformation may be perceived dramatically in the contrasting words of an imperial edict issued in 697 by an emperor conscious of the *kami* tradition, and an edict issued in 749 by a Buddhist emperor. The Edict of 697 includes the following:

Hearken all ye assembled August Children, Princes, Nobles, Officials and People of the Realm-under-Heaven to the Word which He speaks even as the Word of the Sovereign that is a manifest *Kami* ruling over the Great Land of Many Islands.

Hearken ye all to the Word of the Sovereign who proclaims thus: We have listened with reverence to the noble, high, broad, warm Words of the charge vouchsafed to Us by the Sovereign Prince of Yamato.

Who is a Manifest *Kami* ruling over the Great Land of Many Islands in performance of the Task of this High Throne of Heavenly Succession, in the same wise as the August Child of the *Kami* of Heaven, as it was decreed by the *Kami* which is (are) in Heaven, that from the beginning in the High Plain of Heaven, through the reigns of our Distant Ancestors down to these days and onwards, Sovereign August Children should be born in succession for ever to succeed to the rule of the Great Land of Many Islands.

And, even as a *Kami*, it is Our wish to give Peace and Order to this Realm-under-Heaven and to deign to cherish and soothe its People.⁴³

Contrast the tone of the edict of the Buddhist emperor:

This is the Word of the Sovereign who is the Servant of the Three Treasures, that he humbly speaks before the Image of Roshana [Buddha].

In this land of Yamato since the beginning of Heaven and Earth, Gold, though it has been brought as an offering from other countries, was thought not to exist. But in the East of the land which We rule, the Lord of Michinoku Kudara no Kyōtoku of the Junior Fifth Rank, has reported that in his territory, in the district of Ōda, Gold has been found.

Hearing this we were astonished and rejoiced, and feeling that this is a Gilt bestowed upon us by the love and blessing of Roshana-butsu, We have received it with reverence and humbly accepted it, and have brought with Us all Our officials to worship and give thanks.

This We say reverently, reverently, in the Great Presence of the Three Treasures, whose name is to be spoken with awe. [749 A.D.]⁴⁴

Sansom observes in the notes accompanying his translation: "It will be noticed that the language used by the Sovereign is very humble. He does not refer to his divine ancestry, but describes himself as the servant (*yakko*) of the Three Treasures, that is Buddha, the Law, and the Priesthood."⁴⁵

The *kami* cult failed to pass into its *Götterdämmerung*, however. All these Buddhist goings-on at court aroused fear among the rural *kami* or clan leaders, and among the tax-paying commoners. A compromise was needed desperately. Hitherto nameless, the *kami* cult had come to be known as *Shintō*, a Sinicized reading of the ideographs for *kami* and *michi* (road) — "the *kami*-way." *Shintō* persisted as the cult of the masses; Buddhism had penetrated but slightly beyond court circles. In the eighth century, the monk Gyōgi, bearing a holy Buddhist relic as votive offering, spent seven days and nights in prayer to the Sun Goddess at the Grand Shrine of Ise. She rewarded his importunity with a direct oracle in Chinese verse (!), in which she gratefully accepted the relic and displayed fluent knowledge of Buddhist doctrine. Thenceforward *Shintō*

ritualists participated in Buddhist rites and Buddhist priests joined in Shintō ceremonies.

Gradually, from both Buddhist and Shintō sources, the doctrine took form that the Sun Goddess, *Amaterasu-ōmi-kami*, was identical with the Buddhist deity *Maha-Vairocana*, the Great Illuminator, whom the Japanese called *Dainichi Nyorai*. Thus arose the hybrid cult of *Ryōbu Shintō* (Both Parts of the *Kami-Way*) which combined Buddhism and Shintō almost inextricably until the Shintō revival of the eighteenth century. Other Shintō *kami* soon achieved identification with Buddhist deities—notably Hachiman, God of War. By a play on words, his name came to symbolize the "Noble Eightfold Path" of Buddhist morality, and the Shintō wolf wore his Buddhist sheep's clothing most becomingly as guardian of the Tōdaiji "cathedral" at Nara.⁴⁶ If commoners worshipped the guardian more ardently than they adored the Buddha, their donations at least converged in the same holy treasury.

The growing power of the priests engulfed the imperial court at Nara in continuous backstairs intrigue. Through his intimacy with an empress, the monk Dōkyō almost succeeded in displacing the Yamato dynasty in his own favor. The virtue of the imperial *kami*, however, maintained itself. The Fujiwaras learned a lesson from the incident. They moved the capital, first to Nagaoka, then to Kyōto, and left the intriguing priests at Nara. Then they sent to China for some form of Buddhism more amenable to control. The result was the establishment of two new sects at Kyōto: Shingon, which fostered magic and ritual of all sorts; and Tendai, an eclectic teaching that promoted assimilation of Buddhism and Shintō by the doctrine that all ideas and rites are aspects of the same Truth.⁴⁷

Buddhist and Shintō establishments benefited enormously by the largesse of the Fujiwara-controlled court. Magnificent temples adorned the successive capitals. Mount Hiei, selected by geomancers as the appropriate site for holy institutions to

guard Kyōto from evil, was studded with hundreds of temples and monasteries. The monks of the holy mount, however, ultimately devoted more energy to sword practice than to *sutras*, and attained a bandit-like ascendancy over the court. Economically, the importance of temples, shrines, and monasteries lay in their exemption from taxation. As tax burdens mounted and Fujiwara administration weakened, landholders rushed to "donate" their property to the nearest temple, under a gentleman's agreement that the original ownership would continue unimpaired. In time the pious holders of the land deeds forgot about the agreements and achieved the status of great feudal duchies. So also did many of the *kami* nobility whose lineage exempted them from taxes. In eastern Japan, however, still greater estates evolved out of reach of the Fujiwara tax collectors. In the twelfth century, the emperor summoned one of these eastern clans to deal with the monks on Mount Hiei. They came, defeated the monks, and then ousted the Fujiwaras. The ascendancy of these Taira clansmen was brief. The other great eastern clan of Minamoto engaged the Taira in a bloody and protracted civil war for control of the magical virtue of the emperor. Each side maintained an emperor—both "legitimate"—until the Minamoto emerged victorious. Yoritomo, the Minamoto leader, achieved a clear separation of matters secular and sacred by leaving the divine emperor to perform ritual in Kyōto, and organizing a "camp government" in Kamakura to keep a firm hand on the feudal nobles.

Yoritomo was not insensitive to the role of *kami* in sustaining the nation. Dutifully he maintained the emperor in Kyōto while a vigilant guard made certain that the *kami* stuck to ritual and remained aloof from secular matters. When Yoritomo died, his wife's family, the Hōjō, took over and obtained imperial sanction for their rule through appointment of a scion of Yoritomo as *Shōgun*. Their government was the most

efficient and all-inclusive thus far in Japanese history, but the name of Hōjō still is anathema because of their neglect of the emperor. One divine emperor was reduced to selling his autograph in the streets, and another lay unburied for months because of lack of funds to conduct the funeral rites.

As for Buddhism, Yoritomo's policy recalls that followed when Kyōto was founded and the priests and monks were left behind in Nara. He favored new and politically unimportant sects, and from China he obtained a new cult. The new doctrine was the meditative, philosophical Zen sect of Buddhism. The popularity of Zen among Yoritomo's hardened warriors has puzzled many students of Buddhism. In explanation some cite the Zen doctrine of direct action: in meditation one experiences an inner illumination, and acts straightway to carry out that inspiration regardless of the cost. To the ideal Japanese warrior, "sincerity" means attainment of a goal despite all obstacles and by any means. Without question the Zen ideal of direct action unencumbered by words was congenial to the Japanese, who by habit and training value emotion above reason.

Other students argue that Yoritomo, having established peace in the nation, was left to deal with thousands of fighting men who knew no life but war. In the meditative and aesthetic aspects of Zen he saw ways of occupying their attention and cultivating gentler habits. At any rate, Zen aestheticism has made notable contributions to Japanese culture. But the popularity of the new cult has not received a full explanation.⁴⁸

Zen, however, held no religious monopoly under the camp government. Two new sects—Jōdō and Shinshū—competed for popular and official favor. These sects had emerged in a Japanese Buddhist Reformation of the late twelfth century that invites analogies with the Protestant Reformation in Europe. Some Chinese Buddhists had developed the worship of Amida, a mythical saint who maintains a glorious Western Paradise for all those who in life called upon his name in faith. In Japan

this doctrine had gained followers ever since its importation under the eclectic aegis of Tendai. The Buddhist reformation occurred when two outstanding reformers, Hōnen and Shinran, left the established sects of Tendai and Shingon to found new sects dedicated to Amida Buddha. The two were co-operative rather than antagonistic. Shinran, a pupil of Hōnen, founded Shinshū with his master's blessing even though Hōnen continued to lead Jōdō. Both sects were anti-ecclesiastical, abjured theological hairsplitting, and preached to the common people. Both proclaimed free salvation by grace of Amida, since all who called upon his name were justified by their faith. Both stressed the simple prayer, *Namu Amida Butsu* (Hail Amida Buddha!), but differed as to the need for frequent repetition of the holy formula. Shinran, however, repudiated monasticism. He married and raised a family, and Shinshū clergy have married ever since. According to one account, Hōnen actually arranged Shinran's marriage and sanctioned the new practice for the new sect, but he never approved of marriage for his Jōdō clergy.⁴⁹

If Buddhism ever actually threatened the *kami* cult, these reformed sects perhaps came closest to establishing new supernatural sanctions that might have superseded *kami*. Neither sect could be regarded as conforming to the traditions of primitive Buddhism; in fact, they displaced Sakyamuni, founder of Buddhism, in favor of Amida Buddha. Both Jōdō and Shinshū were definitely theistic; both proclaimed a universal deity who saves mankind without magic or ritual; both extolled moral excellence as evidence of Amida's grace. Both appealed to the common people and won slight notice from the aristocracy. In time, both suffered degeneration. The holy prayer became another magical formula to which virtue was imputed in its own right. The temples waxed rich and the priests lazy on the income from sacred rites and masses for the dead.

The reaction came during the Hōjō period, when if ever the

believers in the imperial *kami* needed to rally about the impoverished court. A monk who took the religious name of Nichiren received a divine vision appointing him to attack corruption in high places and usurpers of power. Boldly he condemned the Jōdō and Shinshū priests for neglecting Sakyamuni the founder of Buddhism to exalt Amida the impostor. In vivid language he denounced Hōjō tyranny and neglect of the emperor.⁵⁰ His life was constantly in danger, but the commoners and minor gentry (who, after all, were *kami*) rallied to his leadership. Condemned to death, he stopped before the shrine of Hachiman and loudly denounced that deity for failure to discharge his duty to the Heavenly Buddha by preventing the execution. As the executioner raised his sword, a huge meteor flashed across the sky, the terrified officer fled for his life, and the frightened Hōjō dictator commuted Nichiren's sentence to banishment. On the remote island in the Japan Sea whither he had been sent, his life was saved again. A devout adherent of the emperor, also an exile, determined to kill the heretic; but he overheard Nichiren praying for restoration of the imperial dignity, and carried the starving prophet to his own home. Nichiren was restored temporarily to Kamakura when the Mongol threat loomed over Japan. He already had prophesied that the *kami* and the Buddha would punish Japan's apostasy by a foreign invasion. The Mongol attacks in 1274 and 1281 were broken up by a combination of Japanese valor and a typhoon.⁵¹ Nichiren, however, accepted no favors from the Hōjōs and continued to thunder denunciations of their usurpation.

This preaching roused in the minor gentry and commoners a fanatical zeal for the imperial *kami*. Nichiren proclaimed the supremacy of the Eternal Buddha of Vulture Peak as against Amida the usurper; but the people seized upon his explicit analogy with the emperor and the upstart Hōjōs. After Nichiren's death a wave of loyalty to the emperor swept the

Hōjōs from power, and established the Ashikaga clan in Kyōto with the imperial mandate as Shōguns. The Ashikaga Shōguns set an all-time high for brilliant incompetence. Their regime ended in civil war that raged with increasing fury until a strong government emerged late in the sixteenth century. The Nichiren sect continued intolerant and aggressively devoted to the divine emperor. The rejuvenation of the *kami* cult through the Shintō Revival of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had its precursor in Nichiren. Among the assassins who goaded Japan toward war with the United States in the 1930's were fanatic disciples of the turbulent Nichiren. His concepts had been Buddhist; his emotions were Japanese.

The fate of Buddhism in Japanese hands is summarized less readily than that of Confucianism. Buddhism offered an entirely different set of supernatural sanctions that contrasted strongly with the *kami* cult. Confucianism had raised few basic issues; after all, it was a system of government by magic and ritual that simply reinforced the *kami* cult. Overwhelmed by the initial impact of Buddhism, the *kami* at court succumbed at first to the new doctrine as they interpreted it. But *kami* continued real for the people at large, who never ceased visiting shrines to obtain the virtue of *Inari* (food and fox *kami*), Hachiman, and the Heavenly *Kami*, and who continued to revere familiar trees, mountains, archaic phallic stones, and other *kami*-charged spots. The ancestor cult had been adopted so completely that even the anti-Chinese scholars of the subsequent Shintō revival never suspected its Chinese antecedents. So the people worshipped their ancestral *kami* and maintained the ancient festivals and rites of purification, divination, harvest, and fertility—all of which hew close to everyday human needs.

This meant that any revolt which deposed the civil oligarchy around the throne and substituted a new one opened the way for a resurgence of *kami* magic and ritual as court sophisticates were ousted in favor of leaders from the hinterland. If Bud-

dhism gained favor by magical enhancement of the imperial *kami*, it stood to lose whenever Buddhist interests threatened imperial prestige. In fact, Buddhism survived only by the device of *Ryōbu Shintō* which identified the Heavenly *kami* with Buddhist deities and saints.

The new civilization that swept Buddhism into Japan from the continent complicated the problem enormously. Japan's population increased. The capital, at least, became thoroughly urban. The simple world of primitive tribal life and *kami* supernaturalism no longer existed for the rulers and the court. That simple world, however, continued very real among the peasants and rural gentry. When, beginning with Nichiren, restoration of the potency of the imperial *kami* became a goal for the masses, Japan entered upon that frantic struggle to deny reality to all foreign ideologies and yet to adopt foreign inventions and gadgets which eventuated in the cactaclysm of the 1940's.

Some of the tendencies evident in Japanese modification of Chinese political and moral patterns appear also in the warping of Buddhism to fit the Japanese milieu. Buddhism was altered at every point where it failed to serve the interests of the aristocracy of *kami*. Only Jōdō and Shinshū succeeded in bringing a new theism to any considerable number of people beyond the fragile aesthetes of the court; Nichirenism reached the masses in certain localities, but to them it simply reinforced the *kami* cult with Buddhist vocabulary and sanctions of Holy Scripture.

The fact that the average worshiper made no distinction between the deities to whom he prayed at Buddhist temples and the *kami* of the shrines indicates the thoroughness of the transformation of Buddhism into an aspect of the *kami* cult. Buddhist doctrines of transmigration and of heaven and hell gained a hazy currency among the people, who gladly added magical masses for the dead to the rituals that enhanced their ancestral *kami*. They accepted the doctrine of endless deaths and rebirths

as a convenient explanation of the eternal incongruity of moral excellence unaccompanied by prosperity; in the same doctrine they discovered a rationalization to justify the miserable lot of women, peasants, and others whom the patterns of Japanese society condemned to inferiority. If one encounters misery in this life, he receives the just recompense of evil deeds in a previous incarnation; so there is no need of wasting sympathy on him or attempting to better his lot. This doctrine suited the ends of whatever oligarchy held power and simultaneously provided a measure of consolation to the exploited underdog. Nor did it conflict with any important feature of the *kami* cult.

VI

The protracted Ōnin wars that followed the Ashikaga debacle nurtured a new code of morals among the rising warrior class. While the name of *Bushidō* (Way of Samurai) did not gain currency until the Meiji era, Japanese military mores can be traced to the medieval vogue of a Chinese novel—Lo Kuan-chung's *San Kuo Chi Yen I* ("Tale of Three Kingdoms"), a blood and thunder narrative of derring-do in the Chinese civil wars of 220-280 A.D. These tales of loyalty, suicide, and other virtues of ancient Chinese "chivalry" deeply impressed the Japanese warriors. As the samurai attained primacy in feudal Japan, their mores blended with the *kami* cult in a code of conduct that might have startled Lo Kuan-chung. Under the Tokugawa regime this hybrid of Shintō and Bushidō acquired the dual sanctions of antiquity and upper-class acceptance. This period cannot receive detailed treatment here. The Tokugawa Shōguns meticulously paid reverence to the emperor and maintained the rituals that insured *kami* protection. In time, however, the urban-minded *daimyō* at Yedo grew careless of divine matters to the point of contempt for the emperor.⁵²

The final overthrow of Tokugawa power in 1867 came about through a revival of Shintō; Perry's "opening of Japan" played a role less important than many Occidental writers assume. This revival founded in the work of several brilliant historians who unearthed old Shintō documents and thus discovered that Shōguns owed their power to the imperial *kami*. This idea fanned the growing disaffection with the Tokugawas, and patriots rallied about the emperor.

The scholars responsible included Kada Azumamaro (1669-1736), Kamo no Mabuchi (1697-1769), Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), and Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843).⁵³ It was they who repudiated Buddhism and Confucianism as corrupt foreign teachings, and who proclaimed a return to the *kami* cult through exaltation of the Sun Goddess and the emperor. Their movement, *Fukko Shintō* (Restore-Antiquity-Shintō) provided the impetus that effected the Meiji restoration and made Shintō the dominant ideology of modern Japan. Brief excerpts from their writings indicate the main ideas:

So long as the sovereign maintains a simple style of living, the people are contented with their own hard lot. Their wants are few and they are easily ruled. But if the sovereign has a magnificent palace, gorgeous clothing, and crowds of finely dressed women to wait on him, the sight of these things must cause in others a desire to possess themselves of the same luxuries; or if they are not strong enough to take them by force, it excites their envy. If the Mikado had continued to live in a house roofed with shingles, and whose walls were of mud, to wear hempen clothes, to carry his sword in a scabbard wound round with the tendrils of some creeping plant, and to go to the chase carrying his bow and arrows, as was the ancient custom, the present state of things would never have come about. But since the introduction of Chinese manners, the sovereign, while occupying a highly dignified place, has been degraded to the intellectual level of a woman. The power fell into the hands of servants, and although they never actually assumed the title, they were sovereigns in fact, while the Mikado became an utter nullity [Mabuchi].⁵⁴

From the central truth that the Mikado is the direct descendant of the gods, the tenet that Japan ranks far above all other countries is a natural consequence. No other nation is entitled to equality with her, and all are bound to do homage to the Japanese sovereign and pay tribute to him [Motoori].⁵⁵

It is most lamentable that so much ignorance should prevail as to the evidences of the two fundamental doctrines that Japan is the country of the gods, and her inhabitants the descendants of the gods. Between the Japanese people and the Chinese, Hindoos, Russians, Dutch, Siamese, Cambodians, and other nations of the world, there is a difference of kind rather than of degree. *It was not out of vainglory that the inhabitants of this country called it the land of the gods.* The gods who created all countries belonged, without exception, to the Divine Age and were all born in Japan, so that Japan is their native country, and all the world acknowledges the appropriateness of the title. The Koreans were the first to become acquainted with this truth, and from them it was gradually diffused through the globe, and accepted by everyone. . . .

As it was Japan which lay directly opposite to the sun when it had sprouted upwards and separated from the earth, it is quite clear that Japan lies on the summit of the globe. It is equally evident that all other countries were formed at a much later period by the spontaneous consolidation of the foam of the sea and the collection of mud in various localities, when Izanagi and Izanami brought together the eight islands of Japan, and separated the land from the water. Foreign countries were of course produced by the power of the creator gods, but they were not begotten by Izanagi and Izanami, nor did they give birth to the Goddess of the Sun, *which is the cause of their inferiority.* The traditions about the origin of the world which are preserved in foreign countries are naturally incorrect, just as the accounts of an event which has happened at the capital become distorted when they travel to a province, and it finally comes to be believed the province was the actual scene of the event. The fact is patent that the Mikado is the true Son of Heaven, who is entitled to reign over the four seas and the ten thousand countries [Hirata].⁵⁶

The basis of contemporary Shintō ideology is apparent. So much has been written on that topic that further comment is unnecessary. The importance of the magical aspects of the

modern government, however, often suffers neglect by students who look at Japan through Occidental eyes. The process by which that ideology became official deserves notice.

When the extreme nationalists inspired by *Fukko Shintō* combined with anti-Tokugawa *daimyō* to oust the *Shōgun* and restore the emperor, it was logical that one of the first imperial edicts issued by the young Meiji *kami* should sanction the *Fukko* dogmas: "The worship of *kami* and regard for ceremonies are the great proprieties of the Empire and the fundamental principles of national polity and education . . . the Emperor shall reign in person. First of all rituals shall be initiated and the administration of law and order shall be established. Thus the Way of *saisei itchi* shall be revived."⁵⁷ *Saisei itchi* means "government-worship-unity." Significant in this connection is another common word, *matsurigoto*, which means "affairs of state" or "affairs of worship and ritual" interchangeably. The new imperial regime provided immediately for *kami* and *matsurigoto* in order to attain *saisei itchi*. Official boards and bureaus were created to supervise ritual, maintain shrines, and to regulate the empire through the magic of the imperial *kami*. *Shintō* was disentangled from its age-long association with Buddhism; *Ryōbu Shintō* ceased to exist, and Buddhism was disestablished.

By way of compromise with insistent demands from Occidental powers for guarantees of religious freedom, State *Shintō* was instituted and differentiated from religious *Shintō* by a specious quibble. Officially, State *Shintō* comprised the ritual and ideology of patriotism, and *Shintō* as a religion was relegated to private cults. All Japanese subjects thus incurred the obligation to participate in the state cult. Public officials were compelled by law to serve as ritualists and recite *norito* at specified rites.⁵⁸ The *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* suddenly acquired the status of inspired scripture; their tales, somewhat expurgated, provided most of the "history" in school textbooks. If State

Shintō no longer was a religion, the priests and the common folk failed to understand the change; the state shrines sold charms, conducted divination, and allowed worshipers to pray exactly as did the "religious" shrines. The modern Japanese government is government by ritual and magic, and very ancient magic at that.

The cult of State Shintō, however, was carried too far. Hundreds of hoary shrines to food gods and fox-*kami* suffered eclipse or were abolished to focus popular devotion upon the national and provincial shrines. In the first thirty-odd years of the twentieth century, the total number of Shintō shrines decreased by more than 86,000, while the number of imposing government shrines of higher rank increased significantly.⁷⁹ For example, many a humble shrine to *Benten*, patron *kami* of female beauty, was abolished or converted to worship of the national *kami*—much to the distress of feminine worshipers and the financial embarrassment of adjoining beauty parlors. "It's splendid to worship the national *kami*, but why did *Benten-sama* have to go?" was asked in local communities.

Moreover there is a real difference between sauntering forth casually on a sunny day to worship at a fox-shrine or a wayside phallic shrine of one's choice and being forced by the police to turn out with the crowd to bow en masse in Nazi style at a government shrine. School children dutifully obeyed their teachers and paid homage to the imperial *kami* at new fireproof school shrines; but many a school janitor complained that children were entering school grounds via the janitor's house to avoid bowing before the *kami* in the new shrine at the main gate. Taxpayers dared not grumble, but their enthusiasm waned as bills for the new shrines—especially the school shrines—had to be met. Urban Japan, always less credulous of the potency of *kami* than the peasants, wearied of the constant bowing and interruption of work. Whenever a street car passed a sacred spot the passengers had to rise and bow; who knew

whom they consult in every personal crisis. In the peasant's eyes the great are great because they have *kami*—or rather, because they are *kami*. What those personages do and decree is as unquestioned as were the inscrutable works of Jehovah among the ancient Hebrews.

The aristocracy acquire a wider outlook through foreign travel. But they are not disposed to disillusion the peasants. By the peasant's labor the aristocrat eats daintily. Against mere human rulers the peasant might be disposed to revolt—against *kami* no man dares raise a hand. History shows that rulers who stray from the Way of *Kami* do not survive long in Japan. In very truth *kami* regulates the empire and maintains order. When peasants do resort to violence, their fury aims at a specific landlord or rice merchant. Never have they questioned the system.

In Japan Bagehot's "cake of custom" is an observable reality. Elsewhere it may appear only in history books. But the Japanese have never been able to emigrate or travel abroad; nor has the even tenor of magical routine been upset by waves of immigrants who acknowledged no *kami*. Even in modern times Japan's rulers have screened every foreign idea through the protecting medium of the Japanese language. Shrewdly and conscientiously they saw to it that no revolutionary ideology gained a foothold. Zealously they have exhorted the people to maintain the ancient *kami* ritual and to cling to the ways of their *kami* ancestors. The exhortations were superfluous; compulsive routines of magic, learned in earliest infancy, took care of that. Thus it came to pass that, in the political crises prior to Pearl Harbor when premiers constantly faced assassination, the emperor called upon Prince Konoye, a member of the highest hereditary *kami* nobility, to act as premier. There could be no thought of assassinating one thus charged with *kami*. And in the dark hour of surrender, only the *kami* of the

emperor and Prince Higashikuni, plus that of Prince Konoye, could cope with the disaster.

If the Japanese oligarchy have profited throughout the centuries by the popular faith in *kami*, they could hardly have looked upon themselves as exploiters. After all, Japan's rulers are bound by mandate of the Heavenly *kami* to maintain the Eight Great Island *Kami-Country* "from ages eternal" "upon a basis which is to last forever."

The story of Nippon's *kami* may give pause to those who expect Japan suddenly to achieve political democracy. Can the mundane secular ritual of the ballot, even fortified by the excitement of political campaigns, evoke in the Japanese masses that vivid sense of participation in their government that was nurtured by the familiar compulsive routines of worship at the shrines of family and national ancestral *kami*?⁶²

One opportunity awaits astute democratic leadership. Throughout Japan's history, military defeat has certified the magical efficacy of the victor and rendered impotent the *kami* of the loser. Can the Japanese people accept the idea that the *kami* of Heaven and Earth no longer avail in a world of science that has discarded magic?

NOTES

The author acknowledges gratefully the courtesy of Mr. Langdon Warner, who read the manuscript and offered pertinent criticisms. Mr. Warner, however, should not be held responsible in any way for its contents.

1. The concept of individual modifiability, accurately understood, renders the instinct controversy irrelevant. See C. Judson Herrick, *Introduction to Neurology* (5th ed.; Philadelphia, 1931), esp. pp. 352-374.

2. Wm. Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, 1906), stimulated a flood of books on this topic.

3. Pertinent comment on morale appears in Franklin H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society* (New York, 1922), chap. ix and xiii, esp. p. 206.

4. Homogeneity means, not that every individual is completely like every other, but that the people are alike in certain fundamental habits that for

purposes of practical daily living outweigh all differences. Homogeneity is not an objective attribute. It is an abstract generalization based on varied data descriptive of the Japanese people and their ways of living. Comparison with data obtained in other societies reveals a higher degree of uniformity in Japanese behavior than in that of most other peoples. Hence the appraisal: relatively very homogeneous. Cf. Giddings, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-262; also D. G. Haring, "Populations," in W. E. Mosher and associates, *Introduction to Responsible Citizenship* (New York, 1941), pp. 146-153.

5. *Magic* here denotes all attempts to influence the course of objective events by ritual and verbal command. Such behavior apparently arises in human habits of controlling other people by gesture and speech. Learned by the infant when the mother first provides food in response to his restlessness and crying, all such habits involve doing or saying something in order to evoke responses in another person. Activity so effective with fellow-humans then is applied to events not otherwise subject to control. For example, with elaborate ritual gestures rain is commanded to fall; disease, personified in fantasy, is ordered to depart; an aviator wears a sweater that has "brought luck" to influence the events of his flight.

Religion is used here in the most general sense. Whatever activities through repeated performance ameliorate the individual's misgivings concerning himself and the world, and whatever rationalizations serve a like purpose in fortifying his self-confidence, constitute religious behavior. Definitions in terms of belief in supernatural power are not sufficiently general; belief in supernatural beings indeed provides the commonest means of fortifying the will to live despite ever recurring tokens of individual inadequacy. But non-supernaturalistic religious behavior is an observed phenomenon, as in primitive Buddhism. Religious behavior sometimes includes magical practices; again, self-consciously, "superstition" is excluded.

6. Chapter III, above.

7. E. I. Sugimoto, *A Daughter of the Samurai* (Garden City, 1927), chap. ix.

8. Ernest W. Clement, *Japanese Floral Calendar* (Chicago, 1911); John F. Embree, *Suye Mura, A Japanese Village* (Chicago, 1939), pp. 236-298; W. H. Erskine, *Japanese Festival and Calendar Lore* (Tókyó and Bethany, Pa., 1933).

9. Linguistic research affords a hint that may be more substantial than a mere analogy. Languages related as branches of a common linguistic stock manifest uniform differences. For example, an "f" in one tongue always reappears in another as a "v," a "k" in the one becomes a glottal stop in the other. So regular is the pattern of these consistent phonetic shifts that, from the form of a word in one language, its variant in another can be predicted. Language, like magic and religion, is cultural behavior. Would further research disclose that, in diffusion from one people to another, other cultural features undergo regular changes according to a consistent pattern?

In the case of Japan, the possibility of Japanese origin of the cultural features may be dismissed on the basis of historical evidence. The extravagant

claims of Japanese chauvinists of Nippon's priority in civilized attainments are so fantastic that only a people ignorant of world history could have given them credence. See Otto D. Tolischus, *Tokyo Record* (New York, 1943), Appendix B; *Through Japanese Eyes* (New York, 1945); and Robert O. Ballou, *Shintō, the Unconquered Enemy* (New York, 1945), pp. 144-159, 181-183, 189-190.

10. G. Nye Steiger, H. Orley Beyer, and Conrado Benitez, *A History of the Orient* (Boston, 1926), pp. 47, 107 ff.; Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara, A History of the East Indian Archipelago* (Cambridge, 1943), pp. 14 ff.

11. For theology and ritual of Hindu divine kingship, and description of Fijian practice, see A. M. Hocart, *Kingship* (Oxford, 1927); also his *Kings and Councillors* (Cairo, 1936). Also Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power in the Indian Theory of Government* (New Haven, 1942). On Siam, see H. Quaritch Wales, *Siamese State Ceremonies* (London, 1931). See also Robert Heine-Geldern, 'Conceptions of State and Kingship in S. E. Asia,' *Far Eastern Quarterly*, II, 15-30 (November 1942).

A critique of Hocart, together with discussion of the Japanese and Polynesian royal institutions, appears in D. G. Haring, "The Position of the Ruler in Japan," *Proceedings Sixth Pacific Science Congress* (Berkeley, 1939), vol. IV. Important in this connection is D. C. Holtom, *The Japanese Enthronement Ceremonies* (Tōkyō, 1928).

12. On the magical role of the Chinese emperor, see Marcel Granet, *Chinese Civilization* (London, 1930), pp. 378-389; Richard Wilhelm, *A Short History of Chinese Civilization* (New York, 1929), pp. 106 ff.; and E. T. Williams, *China Yesterday and Today* (4th ed., rev.; New York, 1929), chap. xiii.

13. Sir George B. Sansom, *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London and New York, 1931), pp. 18-19, 28-30. James Murdoch, *A History of Japan*, I (Kōbe, 1910), 37-40.

14. Haring, "The Position of the Ruler in Japan," for sources and discussion.

15. The earliest books of Japanese history were dictated to Korean scribes by venerable reciters. Of these, the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* are the best known.

16. Cf. B. H. Chamberlain, tr., *Translation of Kojiki, or Records of Ancient Matters* (2nd. ed.; Kōbe, 1932), pp. 74, 304; W. G. Aston, tr., "Nihongi," in *Transactions and Proceedings of the Japan Society, London*, Supplement I, vol. I (London, 1896), p. 245, n. 1. Even Occidental scholars attempt to explain away the references.

17. *Kojiki*, cited in note 16 above, pp. 21-22. Here and elsewhere the numbers "eight," "eighty," "eight hundred," and "eight hundred times ten thousand" imply only an indefinite number, but of the order of magnitude thus indicated. These numbers should never be taken literally in either a Japanese or a Chinese context.

18. The jewelled spear and "heavenly august pillar" both were phallic. At first the procreation ritual failed because of improper circumambulation of the pillar and wrong order in the ritual words. On subsequent trials it was highly successful, and the details given in the *Kojiki* so affected Chamber-

lain's sensibilities that he rendered the passage in Latin. The "hall of eight fathoms" corresponds to the nuptial hut used in early Japan to avoid pollution of a dwelling by the initial intercourse of newly wedded persons. The parturition hut also was common in Japan, and for a like reason. The latter institution occurs in practically all societies bordering the North Pacific. See *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*; also Katō Genchi, *A Study of the Development of Religious Ideas among the Japanese People, as Illustrated by Japanese Phallicism*, *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, second series, I, supplement (Tōkyō, 1924), 8-9.

19. Edward S. C. Handy, *Polynesian Religion* (Bulletin 34, Bernice P. Bishop Museum, Honolulu).

20. D. C. Holton, *The Political Philosophy of Modern Shintō*, *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, XLIX, part II (Tōkyō, 1922), 197 ff.

21. Holton's translation. D. C. Holton, *The National Faith of Japan* (London, 1938), p. 24. Note untranslatable verb form, *kamii*. The peach always is a kteic symbol in Japan.

22. R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians* (Oxford, 1891). See also Raymond Firth, "The Analysis of Mana: An Empirical Approach," *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, XLIX (1940), 483-510.

23. Elsdon Best, *The Maori* (Wellington, N. Z., 1924), vol. I, chap. iii. S. Percy Smith, tr., *The Lore of the Whare Wānanga* (Part I, New Plymouth, N. Z., 1913; Part II, scattered in vols. XXII, XXIII, XXIV, *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, 1913-1915), esp. Part I, pp. xii-xiii, 81 ff., 89-90, 95, 130-131; Part II, *Jnl. Polyn. Soc.*, XXIV, 53. Note distinction between Celestial and Terrestrial in the Polynesian lore. On sacredness of sexual organs and latrines among the Maori, see Smith, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 84 ff., esp. note 14 on p. 88, and p. 98 with footnotes.

24. D. C. Holton, "The Meaning of 'Kami,'" *Monumenta Nipponica* (Tōkyō, 1940-1941), vols. II, IV. See his other writings for additional details. *Kami* closely approaches Durkheim's technical use of "sacred" but does not correspond to the popular implications of "sacred" in the United States. For a summary, see Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937), chap. xi.

25. W. G. Aston, *Shinto the Way of the Gods* (London, 1905), pp. 202-203. D. C. Holton, *The National Faith of Japan*, pp. 18, 28. Katō Genchi and Hoshino Hokoshirō, trs., *Kogoshūi, Gleanings from Ancient Stories* (Tōkyō, 1926), a translation of ancient myth and legendary history prepared in defense of *Imbe* prerogatives.

26. *Kojiki*, pp. 67, 130. The mirror probably was the Sun Goddess in literal fact. Cf. Haring, "The Position of the Ruler in Japan." The word for mirror (*ka-gami*) implies concentrated *mana*.

27. N. G. Munro, *Prehistoric Japan* (Yokohama, 1911), frontispiece and pp. 454-459. *Magatama* occur in archaeological sites in Japan and southern Korea, not in China.

28. Rev. John Batchelor, *The Ainu and Their Folk-lore* (London, 1901),

chap. xxvi; *Ainu Life and Lore* (Tōkyō, 1927), chap. vi. Basil Hall Chamberlain, *The Language, Mythology, and Geographical Nomenclature of Japan Viewed in the Light of Ainu Studies* (Memoirs, Imperial University, no. 1, Tōkyō, 1887), pp. 12-41.

29. See the Meiji Constitution, especially Arts. I and III; the Imperial Oath and Speech on the Promulgation of the Constitution, and especially the Imperial House Law (reprinted herewith in Appendix A). The Imperial House Law takes over many European rules and ideas. The English translation, however, often presents a European idea quite different from the Japanese original. The Imperial Rescript on Education states:

"Know ye, Our Subjects: Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue: Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof

"The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places."

In its original implication of *mana*, the English word "virtue" as used above neatly conveys the sense of the Japanese text. For complete text and valuable discussion, see Willis C. Lamott, *Nippon: the Crime and Punishment of Japan* (New York, 1944), pp. 137-138.

30. Robert O. Ballou, *Shinto, the Unconquered Enemy* (New York, 1945), p. 20.

31. *Kojiki*, pp. 120 ff.

32. Heavenly offences include: breaking dikes between fields, blocking irrigation ditches, removing water pipes, "sowing seed over again," planting wands (to influence the land magically?), flaying alive, flaying backwards. Earthly offences are: cutting of living bodies, cutting of dead bodies, leprosy, *kokumi* (a disease, not identifiable), incest of a man with his mother, daughter, mother-in-law, or stepdaughter (but not with his sister!), bestiality, calamities from creeping things, from the high gods (lightning?), from high birds (!), killing animals, bewitchment.

On Heavenly and Earthly Deities and Offences, see *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* (note 16, above). Also Aston, *Shinto the Way of the Gods*, pp. 296-305. *Norito* and translations appear in "Ancient Japanese Rituals" by Sir Ernest Satow (first three papers) and Dr. Karl Florenz (fourth paper), *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, first series, vol. VII, parts ii, iv; vol. IX, part ii; vol. XXVII, part ii. A number of *norito* appear in D. C. Holtom, *Political Philosophy of Modern Shintō*, pp. 286-291 n.

33. On rectification of names, see Derk Bodde, *China's First Unifier* (Leiden, 1938), pp. 201-203. On use of the ordeal for this purpose in Japan, see Sansom, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

34. Quoted from the Chinese sources by Murdoch, *A History of Japan*, I, 143. Motoori's comment, with source, also is cited here.

35. Steiger, Chapter III, above.

36. Arthur Waley, *The Analects of Confucius* (New York, 1938), pp. 88, 99. A penetrating discussion of ritual and music appears on pp. 54-69.

37. Sansom, *Japan, A Short Cultural History*, pp. 101-102. Murdoch, *op. cit.*, I, 158 ff.

38. A lucid statement of this doctrine is in Grover Clark, *The Great Wall Crumbles* (New York, 1935), pp. 90-94. His descriptions of folk government in China convey a vivid, objective picture of the conduct of practical affairs under a governmental regime absorbed in ritual. Few if any writers have shown so concretely that in Chinese thinking many administrative functions are not even remotely conceived of as governmental—i.e., such matters are practical, not ritual. See also Lin Yutang, *The Wisdom of Confucius* (New York, 1938), pp. 149 ff.

39. Murdoch, *op. cit.*, III (London, 1926), 486.

40. Hillis Lory, *Japan's Military Masters* (New York, 1943), p. 244. His appendix reprints the full text of this rescript.

41. Murdoch, *op. cit.*, I, 112-113.

42. Steiger, Chapter III, above.

43. Sir George B. Sansom, tr., "The Imperial Edicts in the Shoku-Nihongi," *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, second series, vol. I (Tôkyô, 1924), Edict No. 1, p. 10. The original word *kami* is substituted for his rendering, "God."

44. *Ibid.*, Edict No. 12, p. 26. The coincidence of Three Treasures in Buddhism and Three Sacred Treasures in Shintô hints at late development of the Shintô Treasures in imitation of Buddhism—a process easily accomplished under *Ryôbu Shintô*. The Christian Trinity, the Taoist Trinity, and other threes in other religions afford parallels; the psychoanalysts, at least, offer an explanation.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

46. Anesaki Masaharu, *History of Japanese Religion* (London, 1930), p. 99.

47. For details of these sects, see Sir Charles Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism* (London, 1935), chap. ix; A. K. Reischauer, *History of Japanese Buddhism* (New York, 1917), pp. 89-101.

48. In conversation with the writer, a scholarly Japanese once observed that the speedy adoption of Zen could not be explained by its ideology. He pointed out that all other Buddhist sects required warriors to undergo prolonged, expensive ceremonies of purification after battle to gain absolution from the sin of killing. Zen introduced a simple, inexpensive absolution rite and "walked away with the business." Unable to verify this assertion from sources available at present, it is reproduced for what it may be worth.

49. Eliot, *op. cit.*, chap. x.

50. Anesaki Masaharu, *Nichiren, the Buddhist Prophet* (Cambridge, 1916);

Eliot, *op. cit.*, chap. xi; Nichiren, *The Awakening to the Truth, or Kaimoku-sho* (Tōkyō, 1941).

51. This typhoon was the original *kamikaze* (*kami* gale). See Steiger, Chapter III, above.

52. Murdoch, *op. cit.*, III, 646. *San Kuo Chi Yen I* is available in English: C. H. Brewitt-Taylor, tr., *The Three Kingdoms*, 2 vols. (Shanghai, 1925).

Murdoch, *op. cit.*, I, 36-37 n., refers to the *San Kuo Chi Yen I*, its origin, and its influence in Japan. See also H. H. Gowen and Josef Hall, *Outline History of China* (New York, 1926), p. 107.

The standard English discussion of Bushidō is by Nitobe Inazō, *Bushidō* (New York, 1905). Some educated Japanese ridicule this book and apply to Nitobe the epithet *go yō-gakusha* (honorable useful scholar), implying that he lent himself to the government's propaganda. In the present connection, the book is interesting as the ideas of a Japanese Quaker who modified both Bushidō and Christianity to effect a synthesis that recalls the fate of Buddhism in *Ryōbu Shintō*.

53. Sir Ernest Satow, "The Revival of Pure Shintau," *Trans. Asiatic Society of Japan, Reprints*, vol. II (Tōkyō, 1927); Holtom, *The National Faith of Japan*, pp. 44-52. Murdoch, *op. cit.*, III, 467-496.

54. Satow, "The Revival of Pure Shintau," p. 177 (quoted from Holtom, *The National Faith of Japan*, pp. 47-48).

55. Satow, "The Revival of Pure Shintau," p. 197 (quoted from Holtom, *The National Faith of Japan*, p. 49).

56. Murdoch, *op. cit.*, III, 491-492.

57. Based on translation in Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (Chicago, 1943), p. 5, with substitution of some original Japanese words. For the general process of accomplishing *saisei itchi* in modern Japan, see Holtom, *Political Philosophy of Modern Shintō*, ch. i; Ballou, *op. cit.*; and D. G. Haring, *Blood on the Rising Sun* (Philadelphia, 1943), chaps. i, iii, ix.

58. A sample *norito* recited by mayors and other officials at public rituals, pertinent to the theme of Japan's world ambitions, follows:

"From the Great House of the Sovereign to the people of the land, guard and prosper (all) continuously and widely. Bring it to pass that this Food Country, (extending far) under heaven, with its unnumbered countries and unnumbered islands, with none omitted, with not one left out, (as far as) the limit where the wall of heaven stands, (as far as) the boundaries of lands standing afar off—bring it to pass that (all) may look up to the great glory of the Great Emperor and that (all lands) may be covered with the august light of the Imperial land." Holtom, *The Political Philosophy of Modern Shintō*, p. 289.

59. D. C. Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (Chicago, 1943), pp. 42-43. On the artificial fabrication of State Shintō, the classic document is Basil Hall Chamberlain, *The Invention of a New Religion* (London: Ra-

tionalist Press Association, 1912); reprinted as Appendix I of the same author's *Things Japanese* (reprint, 5th rev. ed.; London and Kōbe, 1927).

60. Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism*, p. 117.

61. On official promotion of local festivals and revival of local legends, see Helen Mears, *Year of the Wild Boar* (Philadelphia, 1942), chaps. vi-viii. Other pertinent material appears in Willard Price, *Japan and the Son of Heaven* (New York, 1945).

Comment on the *kami*-mindedness of contemporary Japanese is carried further in D. G. Flaring, *Blood on the Rising Sun*, chap. iv. See also the same author, *The Land of Gods and Earthquakes* (New York, 1929), pp. 1-5, 29-31, 44-45, 69-70, 108-111; and W. C. Lamott, *op. cit.*

62. On the future of Shintō, see D. C. Holtom, "Shinto in the Postwar world," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIV, no. 3 (Feb. 14, 1945), 29-33; and "New Status of Shinto," *Far Eastern Survey*, XV, no. 2 (Jan. 14, 1946), 17-20.

A caution, perhaps superfluous, is added here. This paper attempts to describe and show the ramifications of the *kami* cult; it does not present an interpretation of all Japanese society. When any cultural complex is studied an entire society must be examined; hence it seems as if the whole can be interpreted in terms of a single principle. This fallacy has imparted an air of credibility to one-factor interpretations of all sorts, whether economic, political, religious, geographical, or technological. The *kami* cult does not provide an interpretation of everything Japanese; it represents a cultural reality that cannot be ignored and is presented as such.

Only after completion of this paper did the writer have opportunity to read Benedict's accurate summary of Japanese morals and ethics, which rounds out the picture from another angle: Ruth F. Benedict, *Japanese Behavior Patterns*, Office of War Information, Area III, Overseas Branch, Foreign Morale Analysis Division, Report No. 25 (Washington, 1945, mimeographed).

CHAPTER VIII

THE CHALLENGE OF JAPANESE IDEOLOGY

Douglas G. Haring

Abiding peace with Japan is contingent upon the pattern of ideas that finds welcome in Japanese minds. Man lives by his ideas. This fact is evident in wartime; individuals choose death in preference to sacrifice of a cherished way of living and thinking. Peace also is no mere cessation of hostilities. Peace is an achievement in human adjustment that involves general acceptance of specific patterns of thought and action. The impact upon Japanese tradition of certain universal human issues will determine the history that impends.

Ideology involves both specific local traditions and broader issues forged in the long development of human thinking. Franz Boas, fortified with abundant supporting evidence, concluded that "the behavior of everybody, no matter to what culture he belongs, is determined by the traditional material he handles, and man, the world over, handles the material transmitted to him according to the same methods."¹

The Japanese, like other human beings, act with reference to the patterns of ideas which they cherish. Their war against the world emerged from habits of belief and thought embodied in the Shintō cult and the political philosophy of Kōdō. These systems of dogma and practice are stated explicitly by numerous apologists. As long as a majority of the people accept these systems they will scheme to impose Japanese domination on the world.

Officially and unofficially, in textbooks and documents both learned and popular, Japanese spokesmen have reiterated the claim that their nation is a peculiar people whose political constitution is unique and unexcelled, whose history is a supernatural manifestation enacted by a divine race headed by a supreme emperor-deity. As such they claimed immunity from normal problems of human existence and exemption from those ethical limitations that circumscribe ordinary human beings. The unique way of life of this tribe-nation—Kōdō, The Imperial Way—is a mystical blend of theology and political absolutism. All other peoples were deemed merely human and all other rulers were regarded as scheming political upstarts. Japan's destiny was conceived as the salvation of mankind through abolition of human rulers and bestowal of the blessings of divine governance upon a stubborn world.² Kōdō merges indistinguishably with the state cult of Shintō.

Military defeat will render Nippon's fanatics temporarily impotent beyond the borders of their own country. Their ideas, however, will not necessarily change; they are quite capable of assuming outward docility and pretending to have adopted new ideas in order to deceive foreigners. In the 1930 decade Japanese leaders assured their people that the conquest of the world might require a century of sublime sacrifice and dire suffering—that many a setback would precede the dominion to which Japan ultimately is destined. Any present defeat, therefore, may be rationalized as a temporary setback that in no wise invalidates Kōdō dogma. Persistent devotion to the same objective throughout successive generations despite superficial concern with other matters is claimed by Japanese writers as an exclusive racial virtue. The oft-told tale of the Forty Seven *Rōnin* epitomizes precisely this alleged virtue.

Unless ideological victory be achieved, military victory over Japan is sterile.³ Ideological victory implies development of new habits of thought and feeling that facilitate integration of

the Japanese in a common human society that transcends nationalism.

To peoples other than the Japanese, Kōdō and Shintō seem puerile, even ridiculous. Scientifically, their content is refuted by a wealth of data: (1) Facts of biology, especially physical anthropology, afford no evidence that the Japanese, as living organisms, differ essentially from other human beings. They do not even constitute a genetically pure race.⁴ (2) Historical data, critically examined, refute the pseudo history taught in Japanese public schools. (3) Ethnologists trace the origins of Shintō and Kōdō, not to divine inspiration, but to cultural elements widely distributed among southeastern Asiatic and Oceanic peoples.⁵ (4) Japanese statistics of crime, degeneracy, morbidity, mental disease, and statistics of social and economic situations give the lie to claims of divinity and racial superiority. Their problems and weaknesses are the same as those that beset other peoples. Even divine emperors suffer from epilepsy. (5) Police have meticulously "supervised the thoughts" of all Japanese subjects. Someone in power evidently distrusted the popular devotion to Kōdō and feared imminent revolt.

Such evidence appeals no less forcibly to scientifically minded Japanese than to other persons. Scientifically minded Japanese, however, are all too few. All Japanese have been forbidden to study or to think about such topics and their implications. For decades past, "dangerous thoughts" have guaranteed incarceration in a Japanese jail. Foreign ideas nevertheless found limited acceptance. New concepts of human value have stimulated varied efforts at social reform, welfare work, peasant and labor movements, and intellectual freedom.

How does it happen that, despite technological proficiency, the Japanese seem to have avoided the fundamental world view of the scientist? Since they so readily adopt telephones and tanks, railways and electric lamps, how can they so emphatically repudiate the scientific mood when history and social phenom-

ena are considered? The explanation, in large part at least, lies in the traditional patterns of Japanese cultural life—or rather, in the absence from those patterns of elements that have shaped the history of the Occident. Man acts according to patterns that he has learned, individually, from his fellows. He can hardly be expected to do what he has not learned to do. In other words, he rarely if ever transcends the limitations of what some sociologists have termed his "cultural base."⁶

Any attempt either to understand or to alter Japanese ideology involves recognition of the historical incommensurability of the Japanese cultural heritage and the cultural background of Euro-American civilization. Occidental societies are the end results of a prolonged historical process that was well advanced when Japan's pseudo divine ancestors drifted across uncharted seas into the islands of Nippon. In the Occident the struggles that gave birth to the ideal of freedom and responsibility under law are epitomized in terms such as Greek culture, Hellenism, Roman law, Renaissance, Reformation, British common law, American and French revolutions, scientific revolution. None of these spiritual rejuvenations penetrated the ideological milieu of the Japanese, except as dry words in books of foreign history.

A summary of patterns of thought and practice that find no place in Japan's traditional cultural heritage may aid perspective.

1. Most conspicuous in the cultural arsenal of democracy is faith in the potential worth of every human individual. This belief fosters the ethics of "live and let live"—a revolutionary ethic that postulates no hard and fast rules of conduct. Perhaps it may be described as the insistence that righteousness consists in the refusal to use another person as a means to an end that he does not acknowledge freely.

2. A corollary to respect for persons is the ideal of telling the truth. The systematic effort to be honest that is called science embodies the most conspicuous approach to this ideal. The con-

cept of a scientific fact as "the close agreement of many observations or measurements of the same phenomenon"⁷ appeals to thoughtful minds. Freedom to investigate whatever falls within the scope of human senses and instruments of observation; critical verification by repeated observations; repudiation of pompous authority in favor of the self-critical verdicts of sensory perception—of such is the essence of research.⁸

3. The ideal of freedom in creative activity, whether the thinker be styled artist, philosopher, or reformer, is another precious heritage of Occidental civilization. Scientific research is not the sole function of a free mind. The man of integrity demands that his thinking pertain consistently to objective facts. In consequence, creative personalities frequently advocate innovations. In art, philosophy, or literature the orthodoxy of political or religious absolutism invites rebellion. One who achieves awareness of the limited competence of any human mind suspects all idea "systems"—theological, political, economic, and just systematic. A system is one individual's rationalization of his finite knowledge in harmony with his unanalyzed personal desires. Even those imposing systems of ideas that have been fabricated by many minds over long periods of time—such as Catholicism or doctrinaire communism—merely dazzle by their command of authority, tradition, or temporal power, and afford no corresponding guarantee of validity of content. The physical universe and the human world of creative endeavor alike transcend the compass of any system of ideas. Freedom of creative effort and critical thought is essential in the ideals of Occidental civilization. Such freedom is deeply feared in Japan.

4. Out of faith in individual worth and the struggle for freedom have been born political inventions to safeguard individuals and their aspirations. In world-wide adoption of these political inventions—or of others adequate to the same ends—rests the possibility of diminishing the frequency of wars.

Constitutional law embodies the most notable of these inventions. Government through laws rather than government by caprice is an ideal toward which tangible progress has occurred in some countries. This ideal requires that the men who formulate public policy be held responsible to those whose lives their decisions affect. Constitutional law is designed to govern public officials to the end that they may serve the people and not dominate them. To maintain official responsibility there must be freedom of public assembly and open debate of the merits of proposed policies. Accountability of officials and heads of state hinges upon a crucial safeguard: all public monies must be expended in strict accordance with openly debated budgets, the status of whose makers is contingent upon support by a popular majority. Secrecy in public finance is the taproot of tyranny. Here is the significance of the slogan, "No taxation without representation!" Public control of the use of force is the foundation of law, and publicity in finance safeguards lawful use of both police and military power. Use of private funds to create and maintain private instruments of coercion is forbidden. Private coercion is gangsterism. Ultimately gangsterism supplants even an autocratic government. Responsible democracy depends upon responsible, nonsecret control of finances, of police power, and of military power.⁹

5. Legal inventions have implemented popular control of public policy. Defining constitutional law loosely as law to control officials, statute and common law serve to control citizens. These latter laws are framed by legislators and judges responsible under a constitution. Their execution is a function of police and courts whose powers are limited under law. All laws and penalties are published in advance of enforcement; ex post facto laws are banned. There must be no irresponsible deprivation of freedom for anyone—a principle embodied in the practice of *habeas corpus* and the doctrine that a man's house is his castle. In trial of accused persons and imposition of

penalties, fact must outweigh opinion or dogma. The ideal requires open trials in accordance with scientifically valid rules of evidence. Personal whims of judges are negated by legal definition of penalties.

6. Institutional safeguards of the individual function only to the extent that an informed citizenry continues jealous of rights and sensitive to duties. Ready access to education is a *sine qua non* of democracy. Indoctrination, a subversive pseudo education, is feared and opposed by those who accept democratic ideals. An aspect of education is provision of adequate, honest news. The criterion of honesty is verifiability, not intent of the newsmonger. Sectarian, partisan, governmental, or other interested control of news perverts democratic society. Democratic education further implies that children be reared in homes where individual rights are respected without discrimination of age, sex, or function. Children reared in a family dominated by a petty autocrat or organized as a hierarchy go through life expecting to submit to an autocrat.¹⁰ Even quarrelsome families may produce independent, self-reliant children if all members participate equally.

7. The economic implications of democracy are gaining recognition. Monopoly and economic tyranny override individuals and render them powerless to control their own affairs. In special situations where efficiency demands economic or technological monopoly, control should reside in persons responsible under law for their decisions and activities. Individual economic freedom also may be facilitated by extension of the principle of insurance.

These seven items at least indicate the ideals of societal order that constitute the core of democracy. Invented in the Occident, they are praised universally by Americans and British, and supported devotedly by a sound minority. That Occidentals fall short of consistent practice of these principles does not detract from their importance as goals consciously acknowledged

and pursued. These germinal ideals are integral in democratic societies. Human existence is a never-ending pursuit of objectives; the continuing struggle enriches life with meaning despite the fact that total achievement of any lofty ideal is impossible. The human life-span is finite; hence a new generation forever is discovering and striving for societal goals. Imperfect attainment does not invalidate a goal.

Perhaps the democratic ideals listed above sound commonplace. The boredom evoked by their recital, however, is a measure of their central position in democratic societies. No such boredom greets their exposition in the Orient, for *these ideal goals differentiate Occidental and Oriental cultural heritages*. They were as completely absent in the Japan of 1850 as was the locomotive. Neither the Japanese, the Chinese, the Hindus, nor the Indonesians have yet understood or desired these patterns of living. Their traditions omit or deny all such ideals, despite the folk democracy apparent in many aspects of Chinese society. In both China and Japan, Confucianism embodies the very opposite of responsible political democracy—and folk democracy has not achieved political safeguards efficient in large societies.

The absence of these ideals from Japanese tradition is the crux of the ideological aspects of the recent war. Believers in the dogma of a universally occurring sequence of stages of societal evolution dismiss the question by assigning the Japanese to an inferior and earlier stage of evolution. "We took centuries to go through it; so will they" sums up that attitude; complacently they wait for the centuries spontaneously to produce a democratic Japan. Despite storms of learned controversy, however, the doctrine of unilinear evolution of human societies has not been verified.¹¹ No societal change occurs inevitably in consequence of inscrutable laws that automatically carry every people through the same stages of evolution. Societies are achievements, in part at least deliberately planned.

In other words, no type of society occurs inevitably. If men wish to live in a specific way they must work to do so. Individual goals pursued by many persons who think alike, together with decisions of specific leaders at crucial times, everywhere constitute the stuff of societal patterns.

The Japanese, therefore, may not be regarded as primitives retarded in an early evolutionary stage from which inevitably they will graduate into sweetness and light. Their society is unique in a sense quite different from that of which they boast. Their societal constitution is the result of much effort directed consciously to the only goals they have understood. In their eyes the objectives of Occidental democracies seem irrelevant and subversive. They do not struggle blindly toward democracy half perceived. No man strives for that of which he remains basically ignorant.

Democratic ideals should not be stigmatized as Occidental. They are human ideals. Nothing about democratic patterns of living is inherently congenial to Occidentals and unattainable for Orientals. Both are human, organically of one species. Democracy comprises patterns of thought and action by which men of many kinds may live and work together in safety. There is no question of imposing upon Orientals an ill-adapted Occidental pattern of governance. Whatever cultural elements the Japanese rightly conserve from their past, it is essential to the general welfare that they replace their political patterns with some trustworthy variant of the proven democratic safeguards. The vital issue is whether the Japanese can reorder their society in conformance with a tested way of living that is conducive to individual security—which boils down to whether they learn to want things that way. Such a revolution in Japan is essential to the security of many other nations, and incidentally promises a new freedom and security in Japan itself.

Japanese leaders—by which is meant the ruling oligarchy—ever since their first contacts with the modern world have

cringed psychologically before the threat to Kōdō implicit in the new ideals. Subconsciously they perceived that democracy and science confronted the traditional ideology with basic challenges of a sort already dramatized in the history of Europe and America. The devotees of Kōdō learned just enough about these exotic ideals to provide vocabulary for their invective. Vociferously they acknowledged the challenge inherent in Euro-American idealisms; in season and out they proclaimed "destruction of the pernicious doctrines of individualism and democracy" as the goal of Japan's holy war.

Defenders of many an outmoded ideology have manifested bitter hatred and cruel, ruthless outbursts against those whose continued existence threatens their beliefs. The Japanese are no exception. The threatened ideological conflict has imparted to Kōdō nationalism much of its frenzied intensity. The frightened traditionalists have projected the conflict into international politics, asserting that foreign political machinations endangered their way of life and rendered inevitable a resort to arms. Out of psychological necessity they discovered tangible antagonists to attack by force in a neurotic hope of blotting out the nameless threat from within. Few Japanese nationalists are able to perceive that, in fact, foreign consideration of Japanese sensibilities actually has bolstered Kōdō, or that foreign political pressure was directed at Japanese imperial aggression—not at traditional Japanese beliefs.

Repressed dread of discovering that the imperial divinity is fictitious has lent malevolence to the fanatic advocacy of Kōdō. Frantic coercion to effect complete conformity has intimidated not only the Japanese people but also foreign missionaries and even American diplomats—who had to respect the official fabric of falsehood in order to deal with the Japanese at all. That habit is hard to unlearn.

The inner insecurity and haunting fears of Nipponese fanatics were intensified by the artificiality inherent in the recent origin

of State Shintō. This synthetic cult was fabricated deliberately from half-forgotten mythology, woven into a pattern of emperor-worship borrowed from Imperial Rome.¹² As recently as 1930, there still lived Japanese who remembered when State Shintō was created. Such a national cult was deemed a necessity lest internal disunity render Japan an easy prey to European imperialists. Shintō united religion and politics in a rigid orthodoxy of practice enforced by every coercive agency of an authoritarian state. The artificiality of State Shintō aggravated the psychological insecurity of individuals and inflamed the zeal of fanatics. The slightest fancied affront to Kōdō or Shintō seemed to endanger every aspect of national existence. The very facts of history in existing Japanese books, so often discrepant with chauvinist claims, appeared to be innovations written maliciously by enemies of the state and were purged accordingly. And a "foreign insult" to Japan could be wiped out only by bloodshed, even at risk of national suicide.

Facts as to the extent of covert opposition to Kōdō are essential to any estimate of the course of postwar events in Japan. Such facts, however, are not yet available; stories of crowds shouting "Down with the Emperor" should not be taken too seriously. The protean agencies of the oligarchy are capable of producing the semblance of widespread "opposition" as a means of placating the occupying power. It is possible only to speculate about the future. The genuine but timid and intangible opposition to Kōdō vanished with the onset of war, and it will be some time before facts can be obtained to indicate the extent of its underground survival. Numerous straws in the wind, even during the war, hinted that not a few Japanese were fed up with forced-draft patriotism. What ideas they held that might take its place remains to be seen.

To an Occidental it would seem inevitable that Japan's defeat must spotlight the fallacies of Kōdō dogma. The traditionalists have insisted that no foreign foot ever can pollute the sacred

soil of Nippon; that *kamikaze* (a divine gale) will destroy enemy ships before troops can land; and that *Amaterasu ōmikami*, the Sun Goddess, miraculously will strike dead the emperor's enemies. The collapse of such notions should have been hastened by the bombs that fell squarely on the Grand Shrine of Amaterasu at Ise. Possibly, visible demonstration of the emptiness of Shintō boasts may impel the sensitively intelligent Japanese to discard Shintō as outmoded. But no American can afford to yield to wishful thinking and assume the inevitability of this outcome. The ingenious Japanese "will to believe" is capable of rationalizing defeat in devious ways—and history fails to record many instances of defeated peoples who have achieved wisdom and sanity in the process.

The oft-voiced boast of Japan's national uniqueness perhaps finds no more vivid justification than in this ability to pretend that unpleasant facts do not exist. To an extent not observed elsewhere, the Japanese again and again have shut their eyes to facts and have shouted to a skeptical world that their officially sanctioned fictions were true. The act of surrender to the United Nations was nearly converted into an exhibition of Japanese hospitality to foreign visitors. Thus is maintained the fiction that the sacred soil of Nippon never can suffer invasion—did not the foreign troops enter by the emperor's gracious permission?

By virtue of this habit of mind an overwhelming majority of the Japanese have evaded the societal and ideological connotations of that Occidental civilization whose technology they have adopted. If and when these broader implications find acceptance in a significant number of Japanese minds, the issues of individualism and of scientific investigation will be fought through, no matter how hysterically the traditionalists strive to postpone the cataclysm. But the problem must be brought home to many thoughtful Japanese. Ideas do not stalk through the world on their own power, nor do they appear spontane-

ously in many minds by virtue of some mysterious evolutionary compulsion. Ideas can be kept from an entire population by imprisonment and murder of those who hold them, as several governments have demonstrated. In the modern world of mass propaganda the notion of a free field for any idea collapses. The Japanese can, and may, find means to prevent spread of new idealisms even in the hour of national defeat. But if and when enough Japanese grasp the fundamental concept of individual integrity, they can no more escape the trends of world thinking than Europeans could avert the Renaissance; their authoritarians will be unable to evade the implications of ethics and scientific discovery. The immediate question is whether non-Japanese can force the issue and speed up history in the interests of international peace.

The problem of cultural autonomy emerges whenever efforts to change national ideologies are discussed. "The right of each people to determine its own form of government," "self-determination," and similar slogans imply that the Japanese, like other nations, should be left to develop as they please. In a world of rapid intercommunication, however, it becomes necessary to develop a new kind of law that restrains nations from interference with such freedoms as their neighbors have achieved. International peace is attainable only if all strong peoples live according to certain consciously achieved patterns of responsible political action. Once democracy has been invented, absolute and authoritarian governments can survive only by discrediting and attacking the free peoples; they cannot afford exposure of their own subjects to democratic examples. The dictators and oligarchs perceive clearly that the world cannot continue half slave and half free, and they act accordingly. The principle of "live and let live," however, fosters in the democracies a reluctance to interfere with the very governments that threaten their survival, until they actually are attacked. Thus the form of government of any strong nation

becomes the concern of all nations. It is no more true that every people has a right to choose its own form of government than it is true that individuals have a right to live by robbery. On a smaller scale, the same issue was faced when the United States Constitution guaranteed the preservation of a republican form of government in each of the states of the Union. No people may choose certain forms of government without menacing other nations.

Back of the form of government of a nation is the general ideology of its people. Not only political autonomy but cultural autonomy also requires limitations carefully defined in terms of law and responsibility. The notion that every people should remain undisturbed in enjoyment of traditional mores and stateways is a sentimental by-product of such considerations as the desire of anthropologists to preserve specimen societies intact for study. Only those traditional ways that involve no disturbance of the freedom of other peoples can be tolerated in a rapidly dwindling world. When the people of a nation cherish ideas that threaten the peace, the alternative to war is to change those ideas.

The cultural egotism that inspires conquest is a luxury too expensive for the modern world. The orthodox Kōdō doctrine, namely, that subjects have no rights but only duties, since their very existence is an unutterable condescension on the part of the god-emperor, automatically nurtures that fatal egotism. As a shrewd device to maintain in power a predatory oligarchy by convincing the people of the divinity of the ruling class, it has provided an ideal cultural foundation for conquest. Oligarchies can be eliminated only by changing the ideology that maintains them in power over their own people.

Throughout recorded history the Japanese have submitted to the dominance of tyrannous oligarchies.¹³ Armed with modern weapons, the current oligarchy menaced all the peoples bordering on the Pacific and Indian oceans. Their actions

demonstrated that the goals of tyranny are inherently incompatible with cultural diversity and individual worth; that in the long run an absolute government is forced by the type of society it fosters to challenge, fight, and dominate other governments.¹⁴ Can defeat by armed force alone lead the Japanese to discard the dogmas of Kōdō and to overthrow their dominant oligarchy?

The fact that Japan is class ridden under the sway of a self-appointed elite posits for Japanese reformers no issues unknown in the Occident. Kōdō apologists used to ask why Japan should be expected to come to grips with the issues of freedom before Occidental nations had realized their dreams of democracy. The reply is that such a struggle within Japan would indicate simply that the Japanese belong to *genus homo*. It might indicate further that Japan can still lead the Orient—neither China nor India nor Malaya has faced on a nationwide scale the revolutionary schism that sets a man against his brother, in which one's enemies are of his own household. The Oriental phase of the struggle for freedom, however, may be rendered more cataclysmic by knowledge of the new technologies. Nevertheless the quarrel rages within man's own soul, and the Japanese cannot forever lurk halfheartedly beyond the pale of human affairs. They are neither gods nor devils. If and when they strive for freedom, they thereby afford proof of their oneness with the rest of mankind.

Democratic ideals cannot be handed over lightly to a people unacquainted with their content and not habituated to their practice. Each people must face any universal human issue and achieve their own salvation. The Japanese will forswear Kōdō only when numerous persons accept and propagate the fundamental postulate of the value of each and every human individual. The process may not be peaceful. It has not been peaceful elsewhere. Once these ideals have emerged in history, all serious minds face them recurrently. The struggle to attain demo-

cratic ideals has transformed Occidental history from a monotonous chronicle of dynasties and intrigues into a thrilling pageant of human dignity come to birth. The decade following Japan's defeat will indicate whether the Japanese can break with their political heritage and enter into that new world whose technology they had hoped to use without facing its idealisms.

Nor is it necessary to assume that changes of this sort in a nation's ideology must occupy several generations. That superstition is based on the defunct belief in inheritance of acquired characteristics; it is assumed that a man cannot hold an idea unless his fathers held it before him.¹⁵ Apart from the scientific data, the dictators have demonstrated the rapidity with which the political ideology and societal patterns of a people may be changed. If the Japanese cannot change, further use of force may be expected.¹⁶

If, after a reasonable lapse of time, the Japanese fail to repudiate Kōdō, part of the onus of failure will be shared by the United Nations. For those nations that defeated Japan incur a further responsibility—a responsibility implicit in the utterances of their official heads. This is the duty of achieving a new ideology in Japan. Such a responsibility reaches deeper than official pronouncements; it weighs upon every citizen who claimed to fight for survival of the democratic way of life.

Human beings typically strive not only to maintain accustomed patterns of living but also to propagate their ideals. Imperialists aggressively propagate ideas that facilitate exploitation and domination. In self-defense the exponents of individual worth and democracy are called upon to win adherents to democratic ideals. The survival of democracy is precarious unless it spreads—there must be enough strong democratic nations to defend effectively the stateways of responsible govern-

ment. The pattern of its diffusion is the winning of minds, not the enslavement of bodies and the control of livelihood.

Could the United Nations hasten the democratization of Japan by forbidding the practice of Shintō? Is it incumbent upon them to destroy all governments and religions based on falsehood? Yes—if there no longer exists a vital faith in man's ability to weigh ideas. But if that faith be extinct, then democracy is moribund and no crusade is necessary. Forceful suppression of a doctrine often multiplies believers. The remedy for distorted, mendacious propaganda is vigorous dissemination of facts. When facts are denied access to men's minds, only force can clear the way. Force has been used. Force has cleared the way. But force does not change minds reared on falsehood. Shintō need not be suppressed if new ideas can be presented effectively in Japan.¹⁷ Men can be persuaded to change their minds, to discard old ideals in favor of new ideals that carry conviction.

New ideals will carry weight in Japan only if they come as ideals for all mankind. Propaganda in favor of "our ideals" evokes opposition. But education in appreciation of concepts that demonstrably appeal to men of every race and condition may anticipate a favorable response. Here the advantage lies with democratic idealism; its principles are appealed to by small nations and oppressed peoples and do not come as the exploitative ideology of a tyrannous government. Mere denunciation of Kōdō and Shintō by the agents of Japan's defeat can intensify Kōdō fanaticism.

Emphasis upon the unity of mankind and upon the universal nature of the struggle between traditionalism and the ideals of individual worth and scientific honesty actually won followers in Japan during the 1920 decade. The same thing can be done again if those who take democracy seriously manifest vigor, devotion, and resourcefulness. This time, however, it will need to be done thoroughly. The facts that negate Kōdō

and Shintō must become accessible to all Japanese. The number of persons to be reached must exceed the numbers who have encountered such ideas at any time in Japan's history. No one can set a numerical goal and decide that when a specific number of Japanese recite the slogans of democracy the task will have been accomplished. Nor will mere destruction of former ideologies suffice. New ideals must find enthusiastic advocacy, perhaps in forms of Japanese devising. When a considerable number of Japanese begin to teach scientific thinking, to present to their countrymen the facts of history, to educate women equally with men, to reorganize their homes so that children are reared to respect facts and to rely upon themselves instead of cowering before authority, and when in the face of persecution these Japanese stand like men unintimidated and free in spirit, their country will have entered upon the new way of life. If such a transformation does not guarantee peace, at least it will open the way to participation in world society.

Ideas cannot be exported in boxes and dumped on an unwilling people. Ideas must be taught by individuals to individuals whom they know. Friendship and the give and take of personal association are essential to effective teaching. Ideas can be exported only in human packages. Whatever the verdict upon their doctrines, the missionaries have shown the way; an ideal must be both proclaimed and lived in the presence of those whom it is desired to stimulate. The Japanese must be won, not coerced, to think in new patterns.

It is not easy to decide how far it will be necessary to maintain foreign control over Japan's educational system in order to effect the desired ideological transformation. Such control will be fraught with danger to the very goals intended. It may be advisable to establish numerous new schools of all grades in which democratically minded foreign and Japanese teachers can be protected while they create a nucleus of young Japanese who feel at home in the cultural heritage of a broader world.

The Japanese school system already is very extensive. Every child of school age had to complete six grades. Higher education, however, was limited deliberately to provide just enough leaders, executives, and technicians to man the government and the industrial establishments. Women found but scant opportunity to advance beyond junior high school. New higher schools, therefore, are necessary in any case. Nor should the new schools be subject to the current Japanese policy of emphasis upon technical education at the expense of the social sciences and humanities. Japan needs thinkers.¹⁸

The American occupation authorities face a major problem in the composition of teaching staffs of the elementary and middle schools. Prewar "thought control" focused on the school system; liberal teachers were intimidated and many of them were weeded out. The jealous eyes of inspectors and supervisors made certain that Kōdō received continuous emphasis in every schoolroom. Teachers in service at the time of surrender were presumably incapable of changing deeply rooted habits overnight in obedience to General MacArthur's order to eliminate militarism and to introduce democratic ideas in the school system. Those responsible for the sifting and replacement of Japan's teaching personnel may remember with profit the story of the establishment of the school system at the time of the Meiji restoration. The declassed samurai, left unemployed by the social changes of the restoration, included many illiterate men who found a new occupation in teaching school. There is no great mystery in the subsequent militaristic bias of Japanese education. The occupation authorities can afford to plan carefully lest the displaced military personnel of 1945 repeat the story of Meiji days.

Funds to enable Japan's best students to study abroad should be made available. Future teachers in particular should have opportunity to know democratic societies at first hand. Prior to the war, a wily government selected and indoctrinated those

students who went abroad, with an eye to preventing contamination of Kōdō. Consequently technologists studied in Europe and the United States far more frequently than did teachers. Some of these technologists were selected because they could read and write but could not converse in the English language. The purpose was to prevent fraternization and possible interest in democracy.¹⁹ The new Japanese education should be proof against that kind of perversion.

The physical presence in Japan of foreign teachers capable of unfeigned friendship, and of numerous Japanese students abroad, will be essential. "Fraternization" is called for—and the motive should be higher than the Army drive to control unpleasant diseases. Foreign teachers going to Japan should receive thorough training in the Japanese language. They also should be personally willing to accept a measure of privation in their standard of living, lest their prosperity oppose a barrier to free association with the people.

Such an educational program will cost money. The expense of the regular Japanese educational system will be borne by the Japanese taxpayer as heretofore. But the new schools dedicated to democracy should be subsidized by the United Nations to insure complete freedom. After all, the cost is negligible compared to the cost of assuming that physical and economic coercion can produce responsible self-government.²⁰

Schooling alone will not transform Japan. More fundamental is the home experience of infants. The patterns of Japanese home life have produced children who feel at ease only in an authoritarian society. These patterns can change as women receive equal education with men and more nearly equal pay in industry. Then Japanese homes may assume new patterns of give and take. Any resulting sacrifice of domestic tranquillity may be compensated by gain in individual adequacy. Honesty and integrity no longer need be subordinated to obedience and conformity. Here again personal contacts count;

teachers sent to Japan should establish homes there in which democratic home life is manifest to their students and acquaintances.

A free Japanese press may not be feasible for some years to come. To a degree hardly comprehended by Americans, freedom of publication has meant to the Japanese freedom to lie, slander, blackmail, fabricate, and misrepresent. The rigid censorship was directed to maintenance of the imperial dignity and to political ends. Because the censors controlled what appeared, libel laws were ineffective and little used. The censors ignored slander of individuals, invention of stories from thin air, a flood of fly-by-night sheets operated solely for blackmail, and yellow journalism against which individuals were powerless. That kind of freedom, like the cheap bohemianism of the *mobo* and *moga* ("modern boy" and "modern girl"), denies all responsibility. Liberty has connoted license and irresponsibility.

The immediate aim should be an honest, responsible press. Control by foreign administrators will be extremely difficult, since foreigners rarely command the Japanese language to the degree required for such work. Yet ways and means to create a trustworthy press can be discovered. Granting that libel laws in the Occident constitute an unsolved problem, some kind of libel laws should be instituted in Japan as a basis for further development. Such laws should have teeth adequate to protect individuals from slander and to permit recovery of substantial damages when business enterprises suffer loss by false statements—a serious evil in prewar Japan. Laws against blackmail and training of police in their enforcement would not only raise journalistic standards, but would also help to break the backs of the criminal political gangs that played so large a part in driving Japan into war. The Japanese press is a going concern. Habits of reading are widespread; periodical and newspaper circulations are prodigious. The large, well-established news-

papers may present less serious problems of control than will the ephemeral gossip and blackmail sheets. In the long run, of course, the journalistic problem is ethical.

The Japanese also read books avidly. Not only books in the vernacular but also foreign books—especially in English—are conned eagerly by the intellectuals. A concrete suggestion is that provision be made for stocking the libraries of Japan's universities with the best American and British publications since 1930 in all fields. Special attention should be devoted to provision of the kinds of books formerly proscribed by the police—such as history, sociology, economics, and government. If democracy is to have its chance in Japan, the literature of democracy must be accessible to the best minds. Perhaps copies of important books should be donated to a well-chosen list of individuals. Such books assuredly would circulate, for in preference to relying on public libraries, the Japanese habitually sells a book after he has read it. Scholars and students haunt the long rows of secondhand bookshops, buy what they wish to read, and later resell each book for a few sen less than its purchase price. The fires that leveled so much of Tōkyō gutted the bookstore area in Kanda. The field is open to the far-sighted nation that restocks the sources of supply for Japan's book-reading public.

No one who hopes to reach the Japanese people can afford to neglect the cinema and the radio. Both are accepted features of Japanese life, although the ideal of a radio in every home is scarcely worth discussing until substantial improvement in the general standard of living can occur. The moving pictures, however, reach everyone at some time or other, and reach some people almost constantly. A test of the extent to which the United Nations, or their individual citizens, really intend to promote democracy in Japan will be the thought and funds invested in well-planned films designed to promote a new, democratic way of living to replace the old Kōdō regimen.

Very few if any other media can teach patterns of human behavior as effectively as the cinema. Presumably, also, the Japanese have not entirely lost their prewar devotion to American movies; enough of this feeling may persist to offer a real asset to promotion of democratic ideals through the cinema.

If freedom of press and education be unattainable by fiat, even less can freedom of debate and discussion be achieved by order. Too many ancient class distinctions persist. General participation in discussion characterizes family councils, village assemblies, and committee meetings. Habits of discussion, however, are fixed in tradition. Freedom in debate as understood by democratic peoples is alien to Japanese tradition. The conventional *sōdan* (meeting for discussion) calls for expression of opinion, first by those inferior in status, then by persons successively higher in position, until finally the most important male present utters his decision. No vote is taken.²¹ From the discussion the superior learns what he can get away with and then announces the conclusions of the gathering.

Much learning of the patterns of free debate among equals, directed toward majority decision, must occur before Japanese stateways can become democratic. Here especially the presence in Japan of foreign teachers and friends habituated in democratic expression can count heavily. The teaching of democracy is not characteristically a function of an occupying army. Military orders commanding the Japanese to become democratic mean little until certain habits of democratic living can be established. Even though the Japanese assert that the past decade has witnessed the abolition of class distinctions, the contribution to democracy of these alleged societal changes is dubious. The drive against class distinctions was not directed toward establishment of democracy, but rather toward the egalitarianism that dictators usually foster. The universal obedience to the emperor in the hour of surrender testifies to the depth of the popular reverence for social superiors.

The effort to win Japanese minds to new ideals may not be a simple race between Kōdō and democracy. Competition probably will be in order. Propaganda of all sorts can be expected. Communists will advocate Marxism; divers religious cults—both Asiatic and Euro-American—will be active. There may be new versions of Shintō, already protean in expression. There will also be a host of new indigenous religious cults. The Japanese are system minded. Those who renounce Kōdō will seek a new idea-system in its stead. Avoidance of critical thinking is a universal human trait which the Japanese exhibit in full measure. They are prone to conversions. In prewar days individuals were converted emotionally to religious cults of all sorts, to communism and other "causes"—and then converted back to Kōdō by the police. Any simple system of belief presented as a panacea may gain sudden wide acceptance. Amidst the devastation of war the people are stunned, bewildered, inert, open mouthed. The first leader who dramatizes a pattern of behavior and provides a cue to action may set the patterns of Japanese life for years to come.

Democracy, in contrast to ready-made beliefs and dogmas, is not a system. Openness of mind and critical search for facts are personal achievements, the fruit of tedious effort. Those who lack knowledge of democratic ideals and practice cannot attain democracy by sudden emotional conversion. One cannot accept it at all unless he is critical of democracy itself. Democratic ideals intrinsically demand that a people work out their own salvation, and this may happen in varied ways. The responsibility for making sure that enough Japanese understand democratic ideals to start the process rests upon the United Nations and upon the handful of Japanese liberals abroad and in jails at home. The responsibility of the United Nations stops short of the attempt to realize these ideals fully in Japan. There is enough to do to maintain democracy in the home countries.

Military victory *per se* neither vindicates nor destroys ideologies. Force shows which side is stronger, not which side is "right." A rare historical opportunity enables the United Nations to follow military victory by ideological victory—if indeed they rise to the occasion. Japan's defeat can serve to demonstrate the fallacy of doctrines of racial divinity and superiority. The demonstration inheres in the situation; the Axis postulated their own victory as a corollary of their inherent racial superiority. Victory for democratic ideals is more difficult of achievement than victory by force of arms. This task requires imagination, ingenuity, individual devotion of high order—and perhaps no small expense. But until ideals of individual worth and scientific honesty, together with practical political expression of those ideals, gain spontaneous acceptance in Japan, the wartime toll of flesh and blood will have been paid in vain.

NOTES

1. Franz Boas, *Primitive Art* (Oslo, 1927), p. 1.
2. D. C. Holtom, *The Political Philosophy of Modern Shintō* (Tōkyō, 1922); D. C. Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (Chicago, 1943); W. C. Lamott, *Nippon: The Crime and Punishment of Japan* (New York, 1944); Otto D. Tolischus, *Tokyo Record* (New York, 1943), Appendices A and B. Also, for the general tenor of Japanese chauvinism, though not for a representative selection, see Otto D. Tolischus, *Through Japanese Eyes* (New York, 1945).
3. John M. Maki, *Japanese Militarism, Its Cause and Cure* (New York, 1945). For the tale of the Forty Seven Rōnin, see Lord Redesdale, *Tales of Old Japan* (London, 1871), first tale. Comment on the modern function of the story appears in D. G. Haring, *Blood on the Rising Sun* (Philadelphia, 1943), pp. 57-60, 105-108, 135-138.
4. On the significance of racial differences, see Franz Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life* (rev. ed.; New York, 1932), chap. ii. For the concept of a genetic race, see D. G. Haring and M. E. Johnson, *Order and Possibility in Social Life* (New York, 1940), chap. 15.
5. D. C. Holtom, *The Political Philosophy of Modern Shintō*; D. G. Haring, "The Position of the Ruler in Japan," *Proceedings Sixth Pacific Science Congress* (Berkeley, 1939), vol. IV.
6. For discussion of cultural limitations on behavior, see D. G. Haring and

M. E. Johnson, *op. cit.*, chap. 34. More briefly and arbitrarily, the idea is presented in W. E. Mosher and associates, *Introduction to Responsible Citizenship* (New York, 1941), pp. 68-69.

7. Franklin H. Giddings, *Inductive Sociology* (New York, 1901), p. 13.

8. A competent technician may fall short of scientific-mindedness. The Japanese have fostered technological attainment and have shunned scientific-mindedness, especially the investigation of human affairs. As the numbers of scientifically minded Japanese increase, such minds will not evade the implications of research for the puerile mythology and distorted history hitherto orthodox in their country. They will arrive at their own condemnation of Shintō.

9. According to press reports of October 10-12, 1945, neither the Japanese Army nor Navy rendered any financial accounting to the imperial government during or immediately prior to the late war. See Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination* (New York, 1942), for the story of political gangsters and intrigue in Japan.

10. Erick Homburger Erikson, "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth," *Psychiatry: Journal of the Biology and Pathology of Interpersonal Relations*, vol. 5, No. 4 (November 1942).

11. That some persons—including orthodox Marxians—believe in a universal sequence of societal evolution does not constitute verification. The historical sequences of contrasting patterns of human effort and organization have conformed to no single prospectus, uniform for all times and peoples. Some of these patterns have been chosen more or less purposefully; more often their selection is fortuitous. Human effort sometimes achieves its goals and again effects the unexpected. The literature on societal evolution is voluminous. Pertinent works include: Lewis Henry Morgan, *Ancient Society* (New York, 1878); Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York, 1920). Cf. the bibliography accompanying Leslie A. White, "Diffusion vs. Evolution: An Anti-Evolutionist Fallacy," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 47 (1945), pp. 339-356. Data underlying the writer's approach appear in D. G. Haring and M. E. Johnson, *op. cit.*

12. Basil H. Chamberlain, *The Invention of a New Religion* (1912), reprinted as Appendix I of his *Things Japanese* (Kōbe, 1927); D. G. Haring, *Blood on the Rising Sun*, chap. 1; Andrew Roth, *Dilemma in Japan* (Boston, 1945), pp. 107-111.

13. Maki, *op. cit.*

14. The Japanese, Germans, and Italians never overcame mutual jealousies in achievement of full coöperation. They worked along parallel lines to abolish the democracies. Had they succeeded, sooner or later they must have fought each other. Their more vocal apologists foresaw precisely that outcome.

15. For summary of the evidence, cf. D. G. Haring and M. E. Johnson, *op. cit.*, Books II and III.

16. At the moment there is a vivid expectation that world organization may become effective to the point where future aggressors will not "wage war" in the old sense. Failing adaptation to world order, a recalcitrant nation may be restrained by force lest it wreck what its people do not understand. Such restraining force must be wielded in accordance with criteria of responsibility; *order must come through law, not by dominance of ambitious personages*. World officials should be responsible servants of the peoples of the world. No better way to peace is known.

17. Disestablishment of State Shintō should be distinguished from suppression of Shintō in general.

18. Earned doctorates conferred in all Japanese universities in 1935:

Field	Men	Foreigners	Women
Law	11	0	0
Medicine	801	2	3
Pharmacy	3	1	0
Engineering	35	0	0
Literature	10	1	0
Science	33	0	0
Agriculture	18	0	0
Forestry	1	0	0
Veterinary	0	0	0
Economics	6	0	0
Commerce	2	0	0
Politics	0	0	0

Data from Imperial Ministry of Education, *A General Survey of Education in Japan* (1937).

19. The question most frequently put to the writer by Japanese scientists in the United States—after they found they could talk freely in Japanese—was: "Do you suppose I was selected to study in the United States because my English is so poor that I can make no friends?"

20. By United States standards, education in Japan is cheap. Cost per pupil, for the year 1935, of Japanese public schools:

Elementary	¥ 26.79
Middle schools	¥ 78.22
Girls' High Schools	¥ 66.08
Junior Colleges	¥ 314.05
Universities	¥ 762.91

(Dollar equivalents are difficult to state. Division of these figures by two would yield a very generous approximation of purchasing power in United States dollars.)

21. John F. Embree, "Japanese Administration at the Local Level," *Journal of Applied Anthropology*, vol. 3 (1944), pp. 11-18.

CHAPTER IX

MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Merle Fainsod

The objectives of this chapter are to describe and, so far as it is possible at this time, to appraise the training of military government officers for Japan, the planning for the occupation, and the pattern of control which is presently being utilized in Japan.

Advance preparations for the military government of Japan were strongly influenced by two streams of experience: (1) the experience in the combat phase of military government operations in Italy and Germany and (2) the experience of occupying Japanese-held islands in the Pacific from the Marshalls and the Gilberts through Saipan, Guam, Tinian, and finally Okinawa. On the basis of these experiences, it was widely assumed by those responsible for training and planning that an invasion of the main islands of Japan would have to take place, that resistance would be severe, damage great, and native administrative agencies would be substantially disorganized. In Italy, Germany, and the Pacific islands military government officers functioned as integral parts of the combat forces; their special mission was to relieve tactical commanders of the burden of dealing with civilian populations who were overrun by the advancing armies. In carrying out this mission military government officers organized the civilian population and

utilized such native administrative agencies as remained at their disposal. Refugee camps were established; starving civilians were fed; essential community services were restored; precautions were taken to control epidemics among civilians and thus protect the health of the armed forces. These and analogous problems loomed large in the first stages of previous ventures in military government, and it was virtually taken for granted that the major initial responsibility of military government officers would be to accompany the assault forces in the invasion of Japan. It is easy to understand, therefore, why military government officers were trained and recruited with such problems primarily in mind and why plans were made on the assumption that problems of the combat phase of operations had the first priority.

The sudden unconditional surrender of Japan posed a new and unexpected problem. There was to be no bloody and bitterly resisted invasion and no combat phase; military government was to begin as a post-surrender accompaniment to peaceful occupation. This development caught unawares those who were charged with the responsibility of training for and planning the military government of Japan. The sudden collapse of Japanese resistance had not been anticipated. Improvisation became the order of the day.

To understand what happened, it is necessary to bear in mind the allocation of responsibilities for training, planning, and operations in military government. Responsibility for training army officers for military government duties in Japan was vested in the office of the Provost Marshal General, who operated under directives prepared by the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. The military government division of the office of the Provost Marshal General arranged for instruction to be provided at the school of military government at the University of Virginia and six civil affairs training schools located at Chicago, Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, Stan-

ford, and Yale universities. The normal course of instruction included a six-weeks indoctrination course in the general principles of military government at the University of Virginia, followed by a six-months course at one of the civil affairs training schools. The latter course embraced instruction in the Japanese language, in the institutions and culture of Japan and peripheral areas, and in military government with special application to Japan. Military government instruction at the University of Virginia and at the civil affairs training schools tended to emphasize problems of the combat phase; relatively little attention was devoted to the post-surrender phase of the occupation, since authoritative information on projected American post-surrender policies was unavailable, and the directives under which the schools operated did not encourage exploration of such policy problems. By and large, instruction at the schools assumed a gradual occupation of Japan with detachments of military government officers operating at the level of the *Shi* (city) and *Ken* (province); the possibility that the entire Japanese governmental structure would be taken over intact was hardly envisaged. The pattern of instruction reflected the influence of Italian and German military government operations. Little, if any, attention was devoted to Korea. If those charged with making plans conceived Korea, or any part of it, as an American area of responsibility, they failed to make adequate provision in the training program for preparing military government officers to operate in that area.

Responsibility for planning military government policies for Japan is a joint concern of the State, War, and Navy departments.¹ The State-War-Navy Coöordinating Committee formulates policies for the president's approval on questions of basic importance. In performing this function, it is assisted by its Far Eastern subcommittee, on which the three departments are also represented. Responsibility for State Department planning is located in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, War Department

planning in the Civil Affairs Division, and Navy Department planning in an Office of Military Government which works closely with the Civil Affairs Division. Joint army and navy responsibilities are coördinated through a Joint Civil Affairs Committee under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who also advise the State-War-Navy Coördinating Committee on the military aspects of policies which it is formulating. The policies thus prepared are transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the supreme commander in the theater, General MacArthur, and are designed to govern his further planning and operational activities.

Subject to the policy directives transmitted to him by the joint chiefs of staff, General MacArthur as supreme commander has final responsibility for and control of military government planning and operations in Japan. His is the authority to decide how military government shall be organized on the ground, what personnel shall be utilized in military government, and what powers shall be vested in them. While operating within the framework of the broad policies emanating from Washington, the supreme commander, nevertheless, exercises a considerable measure of discretionary authority. He has great freedom in interpreting the general policies under which he operates and an even greater freedom in choosing ways and means of carrying them out.

This brief summary of the allocation of responsibilities for training, planning, and operations in military government may help to throw some light on the confusion which developed during the early days of the occupation of Japan. As General Marshall has recently revealed, the invasion of Japan was planned for November 1945. General MacArthur did not assume command of all United States Army Forces in the Pacific until April 6, 1945. Up to that point, responsibility for theater planning for the military government of Japan had not been localized. During the summer Brigadier General Crist, who had served as chief military government officer in Oki-

nawa, was entrusted by General MacArthur with the responsibility of developing theater plans for the military government of Japan. The publication of the Potsdam unconditional surrender declaration on July 26 set forth a policy framework within which plans could begin to be made. At the time of General Crist's appointment approximately 2500 officers trained for military government duties were available for service. Several hundred were located in the Philippines. A much larger contingent was awaiting call in a staging area on the West Coast. The remainder were completing their studies at the University of Virginia and the various civil affairs training schools. Soon after his appointment General Crist flew to the United States in order to inform himself on high policy and to recruit a planning staff for the occupation. Arrangements were made to establish a military government planning group and theater school in the Philippines. A small group of officers was then called forward to the Philippines to form the nucleus of the planning group.

At this stage events began to outstrip the theater arrangements for military government. On August 9 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. On August 10 the Japanese government offered a qualified surrender to be followed on August 15 by the final surrender. On August 28 came the first American landings on Japan to be followed two days later by the arrival of General MacArthur in Yokohama. Meanwhile, on August 29 the substance of the State-War-Navy directive on post-surrender policy was communicated to General MacArthur by radio, though it was not until September 6 that the final document as approved by the president was transmitted to the supreme commander.

In the midst of these hectic events, an organization for the military government of Japan had to be hammered out. General Crist's military government section in Manila was ostensibly charged with this responsibility. Its members worked

feverishly preparing recommendations, instructions, plans, and proclamations. Urgent requests were sent to the United States to call forward needed military government officers. Elaborate organization charts were constructed providing for the detailed supervision of Japanese administrative activities by military government personnel. An advance echelon of the military government section was dispatched to Yokohama to continue planning activities on the ground.

But obstacles soon began to interpose themselves. The work of General Crist's planning group was proceeding on a concept of military government growing out of experience in Europe and the Pacific islands. Implied in this concept was the necessity of a large staff of military government officers engaged in the active direction and supervision of the Japanese administrative structure, and operating not only at headquarters but at the level of the *Ken* governments and in important *Shi* as well.

This concept of military government was rejected by General MacArthur and his top headquarters staff. The proclamations, plans, and instructions prepared by General Crist's military government planning group were swept aside or ignored. Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of staff, was quoted as saying that the military government organization under General Crist would be dissolved.² General Sutherland in the same interview stressed that the extensive military government organizations established in Germany and Italy would not be reproduced in Japan. "In order to get a minimum commitment of people and resources here," he continued, "we're going to continue to exercise authority through the Emperor's government."³ What then would happen to the military government personnel trained to administer Japan? General Sutherland was frank. "We'll do the same thing with military government people that we'll do with the [fighting]

divisions—we'll release 'em. They were originally set up for a combat landing like the divisions. We're using those who are needed and releasing the rest—and some of those released are inevitably going to be high-powered people. It can't be helped.”⁴

The concept of military government upon which General MacArthur and his advisers proceeded involved leaving the existing Japanese governmental machinery largely intact. The Japanese Cabinet would operate subject to directions from General MacArthur's headquarters. These directives would be transmitted to the Cabinet through a Japanese central liaison office through which most contacts between General MacArthur's staff and the Imperial Japanese Government would be channeled. Given this conception of military government, there seemed to be no need for the large military government establishment contemplated by General Crist's planning group. Instead a small number of staff sections was created as part of General MacArthur's headquarters to deal with the political, social, and economic phases of the occupation, as distinguished from the purely military tasks. Each section was directed to undertake studies appropriate in its own field and to prepare recommendations for General MacArthur, which might, on approval, be embodied in the form of directives to the Japanese government. On October 11, 1945, the establishment of eight staff sections was announced. Their titles and a description of their proposed functions follow.⁵

1. *The General Procurement Office*—will handle regulations governing the acquisition of supplies, labor, and real property by the occupation forces; will determine civil sources of these supplies and allocate them to prevent competition among different branches of the armed forces.

2. *Natural Resources Section*—will investigate production potentials in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and mining; will

formulate policies for the rehabilitation of Japan's economy and recommend the order of rehabilitation among Japan's basic industries.

3. *Economic and Scientific Section*—will be responsible for exports, imports, production and distribution of essential goods for civilian use and for the occupation forces; will concern itself also with transportation, utilities, conversion of war plants, banking, and stabilization of prices.

4. *Civil Communications Section*—will investigate and make recommendations on problems in the field of civil communications.

5. *Public Health and Welfare Section*—will concern itself with problems of disease control, sanitation, hospitalization, medical supplies, and the regulation of the narcotics industry.

6. *Legal Section*—will handle war crimes, war criminals, and general legal matters.

7. *Civil Information and Education Section*—will utilize the Japanese press, radio, motion pictures, schools, churches, and social and political organizations to "remake Japan's thinking, impress war guilt on the nation, and expedite the Four Freedoms."

8. *Government Section*—“will advise the Supreme Commander on the status and policies of the military government in Korea and the internal structure of Japan's civil government; will recommend steps in demilitarization of the Japanese government and the elimination of feudal and totalitarian practices.”

It should be noted that the heads of these sections have, for the most part, been recruited from General MacArthur's staff, rather than from those who have been formally trained and prepared to carry out military government responsibilities. Military government personnel originally intended to form part of General Crist's organization have in some cases been transferred to the newly established staff sections.

An analysis of the scheme of organization described above reveals that so far as functions covered are concerned, it does not in principle differ from headquarters military government organizations as they were developed earlier in the European theater. The unique features of General MacArthur's organization for military government are these: (1) it is exclusively a headquarters organization; (2) it utilizes the Japanese channel of command from top to bottom; no military government field organization is created with representatives at the lower echelons of Japanese civil government; (3) it avoids direct contact with the Japanese civilian population; all orders and directives originating in General MacArthur's headquarters are addressed to the Imperial Japanese Government, rather than to the populace at large. The ordinary Japanese citizen receives his instructions from his own government; the occupying power may be seen but it is not directly heard.

What are the policies which guide the military government activities of General MacArthur as supreme commander? The disquiet occasioned in the United States by reports that the emperor would be used as the chief instrument of Allied control and that General MacArthur contemplated a reduction of the occupation force to 200,000 within a period of six months led many observers to conclude that military government would be conducted on a basis of "military expediency," that a quick withdrawal from Japan was contemplated, and that the objectives outlined in the Potsdam declaration stood in danger of being compromised. In part to meet this disquiet, Acting Secretary of State Acheson in a press review of September 19, 1945, issued a sharp reminder that "the occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy."⁶ This was followed on September 22 by a White House release of the official instructions sent to General MacArthur.

This official statement of United States initial post-surrender policy for Japan is of major importance.⁷ Part I of this docu-

ment states the ultimate objectives of the United States as follows:

(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world. (b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government. . . . The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.

These objectives are to be achieved by limiting Japan's sovereignty to the main islands and minor outlying islands, by completely disarming and demilitarizing Japan, by taking measures to eliminate the authority of Japanese militarists, by stimulating the Japanese people to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, by encouraging them "to form democratic and representative organizations," and by affording the Japanese people "opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met."

Part II of the statement of policy contains instructions on the relationships which are to prevail between the supreme commander and the Japanese government. The following passage is particularly worth noting:

In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration. This policy, however, will be subject to the right and duty of the Supreme Commander to require changes in governmental machinery or personnel or to act directly if the Emperor or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of

the Supreme Commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, moreover, does not commit the Supreme Commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of United States objectives. The policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, not to support it. Changes in the form of government initiated by the Japanese people or government in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to be permitted and favored. In the event that the effectuation of such changes involves the use of force by the Japanese people or government against persons opposed thereto, the Supreme Commander should intervene only where necessary to insure the security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation.

Part III of the statement of policy is devoted to the political objectives of the occupation. Disarmament and demilitarization are to be carried out promptly. High army and navy officials and leaders of ultranationalist and militarist organizations are to be taken into custody and "held for future disposition." Active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism "will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility." Ultranationalistic or militaristic societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited, and doctrines and practices of militarism and ultranationalism are to be eliminated from the educational system. War criminals are to be apprehended. Freedom of religious worship is to be proclaimed promptly on occupation. As officially interpreted by John Carter Vincent, the director of the State Department Office of Far Eastern Affairs, freedom of religious worship means that "Shintoism, in so far as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not to be interfered with" but "Shintoism . . . as a state directed religion is to be done away with. People will not be taxed to support national Shinto, and there will be no place for Shintoism in the schools."⁸ Democratic political parties are to be encouraged. Laws, decrees, and regulations which establish discrimination on

grounds of race, nationality, creed, or political opinion are to be abrogated. Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authorities on political grounds are to be released. The judicial, legal, and police systems are to be reformed with the object of protecting individual liberties and civil rights.

Part IV of the statement of policy outlines the economic objectives of the occupation. A program of economic demilitarization designed to destroy the economic base of Japanese military strength is to be enforced. Japan's heavy industries are to be limited to the minimum necessary to satisfy future peaceful requirements. Encouragement is to be given to associations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. Policies are to be favored "which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade." The large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry are to be dissolved. "Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can be effected without causing starvation, widespread disease and acute physical stress." The Japanese authorities will be required to develop programs: "(a) to avoid acute economic distress (b) to assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies (c) to meet the requirements for reparations deliveries agreed upon by the Allied Governments (d) to facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied." Restoration of identifiable looted property is to be required. Japan is to "be permitted eventually to resume normal trade relations with the rest of the world." Under suitable controls it is to be permitted during the occupation "to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods that it may need for peaceful purposes, and to export goods to pay for approved imports."

These guideposts to policy, summarized above, are necessarily

general in character, but they represent in substance the governing instructions under which General MacArthur is presently operating. Whether they can or will be translated into effective action still remains to be seen.

At this writing General MacArthur is still in the opening phases of the occupation, and the scanty information available on developments in Japan hardly provides the materials for a satisfactory appraisal of performance. News accounts from Tōkyō report a steady stream of directives flowing from General MacArthur's headquarters to the Japanese Imperial Government. Japanese forces have been disarmed and demobilized. War criminals have been arrested. Laws restricting political, civil, and religious liberties are ordered abrogated, and persons held in jail under these laws are to be released. The educational curriculum is to be purged of militarism. The Zaibatsu are to be dissolved. Elections have been authorized. These and other orders originating in General MacArthur's headquarters would appear to give assurance that the fundamental objectives of the occupation are being speedily and smoothly attained.⁹

But study of these orders indicates that they are little more than targets which have been set for the Japanese government, and that no machinery of inspection or supervision has been established to ensure their execution, with the exception of a requirement that the imperial government submit reports describing action taken to comply with the provisions of the directives. The theory upon which the occupation has so far proceeded is that it is enough to specify goals; that the Japanese government can safely be entrusted to find ways and means of translating them into action. "By utilizing the Japanese governmental structure," General MacArthur has said, "the purposes of the surrender terms can be accomplished with only a small fraction of the men, time and money originally projected."¹⁰ Major General Hildring, director of the War Department civil affairs division, has expanded the same theme:

The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the national government are enormous. If there were no Japanese Government available for our use, we would have to operate directly the whole complicated machine required for the administration of a country of 70 million people. These people differ from us in language, customs, and attitudes. By cleaning up and using the Japanese Government machinery as a tool, we are saving our time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are requiring the Japanese to do their own house cleaning, but we are providing the specifications.¹¹

The advantages of having the Japanese "do their own house cleaning" are so patent as hardly to need argument. But one of the crucial questions in Japan today is whether those Japanese who have been entrusted with the responsibility of "house cleaning" can be safely depended on to do the job. Is the democratic potential of Japan being fully mobilized and utilized? Available information on appointments to and removals from office below the level of the national cabinet is so meager as to make it almost impossible to come to an informed judgment. Consequently it is hardly possible at this point to do more than raise questions.

Every occupation in which the United States has been so far engaged in World War II has precipitated differences of opinion between those military government officers and policy makers who favor minimum interference with the local governmental machinery and personnel and those who wish to see that machinery and personnel are remolded in a democratic direction. The issue is usually put in terms of efficiency versus political reliability. Advocates of the first course insist that the chaos and disorganization which follow in the wake of war can be overcome only by utilizing enemy administrative personnel with experience and know-how, that these are the qualities which are likely to be found in incumbents in office at the time of occupation, and that dubious political antecedents or connections must be disregarded in the interest of obtaining efficient

administration with a minimum commitment of American resources. Advocates of the second course urge, on the other hand, that efficiency is only an incidental, or secondary, objective of occupation, that the prime purpose of military government should be to remove from office those who bear any share of responsibility for the war or who are hostile to democracy, and that the constant concern of military government officers must be to bring to the fore elements which, from the American point of view, are politically reliable and which can safely be trusted to build toward a democratic and peaceful world.

Experience in both Italy and Germany indicates that the tendency in the past has been to begin on the first course, and then, as criticism develops, to veer toward the second. In part, this is a matter of timing. In the combat phase of an occupation the necessity of relying on whatever enemy administrative personnel are at hand is almost unavoidable. But these necessities do not press with the same urgency in the later phases of an occupation; there is time to test the political reliability of those to whom power has been entrusted and to seek substitutes for those who have been found politically untrustworthy. Yet too often this second stage of "purification" is embarked on reluctantly or not at all, either out of sheer inertia, or because of unwillingness to demoralize or interfere with what appears to be a smooth-working administrative operation.

The statement of policy on Japan clearly contemplates the necessity of many removals from office to attain the objectives of the occupation. But no time schedule is imposed, and the execution of policy is, of course, left to the supreme commander. It remains to be seen how General MacArthur will resolve the dilemma which has plagued military government in Italy and Germany. Critics have insisted that he is moving too slowly, that by working through the existing national governmental machinery he has made it difficult for the democratic potential of Japan to assert itself, and that by failing to utilize the trained

military government personnel which has been placed at his disposal he has seriously crippled his own ability to fulfill his mission. These criticisms must await the verdict of history. Impatience at this stage of the occupation is premature.

The problems which face General MacArthur in Japan are complex and difficult, but in some ways the problems which confront him in Korea are more immediately serious. By a curious oversight, which remains to be explained, no arrangements were made to train American military government officers for the specific purpose of occupying Korea. This oversight, if such it can be called, appears strange indeed, since it was a matter of common knowledge that the government in Korea was largely manned by Japanese administrators, and that the Cairo declaration promised independence for Korea only "in due course." As a result of the absence of advance preparations to replace Japanese administrators in Korea, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, in command of the American occupation zone, felt himself compelled to announce on landing that Japanese officials would be permitted to retain their offices for the time being, but without the power of "independent action." This announcement was immediately followed by Korean demonstrations of protest, and reports that Japanese military police were firing on Korean demonstrators. Korean criticism of American policy quickly resulted in an order of General MacArthur to General Hodge to replace all Japanese in governmental positions as rapidly as possible "consistent with the safety of operations." As this policy is carried into effect the absence of trained American military government officers with a knowledge of Korea will be deeply felt. The lack of Koreans experienced in administration will probably mean a temporary deterioration in the quality of governmental services. This, however, is one of the prices of liberation which Koreans may be expected to pay gladly. More serious difficulties threaten in connection with the selection of Koreans to replace Japanese

official personnel. The announcement on October 5, 1945, by General Arnold, commander of American occupation forces in Seoul, of the creation of a Korean advisory council, composed of eleven selected Korean leaders to recommend major appointments, represents a statesmanlike first step toward the solution of the problem. But Korean inexperience in self-government and the proliferation of political groupings which has already appeared on the scene promise to make the life of the American military commander far from dull. Almost inescapably he will be open to the charge of favoring one political group or another; the wisdom of a Solomon will be required to do even-handed justice and emerge from the occupation without leaving resentments behind.

The division of Korea into two occupation zones with the Soviet Union in control north of the 38th parallel and the United States in control to the south serves further to accentuate possible difficulties. In the absence of agreement and coöperation between the Soviet Union and the United States, it is almost inevitable that two conflicting regimes will develop in Korea, one gravitating to the Soviet orbit and the other to that of the United States. The integrated economic development of Korea and the prospects of economic reconstruction will continue to be impeded as long as the zones are insulated one from the other. To further the future political and economic development of Korea as well as to facilitate the effective discharge of American occupational responsibilities, it is imperative that every effort be made to reach an agreement with the Russians on the basis of which a common occupational policy can be established. Otherwise, the emergence of Korea as an independent national state will be long delayed.

The reluctance so far demonstrated both in Korea and in Japan to resort to condominium and international administration undoubtedly reflects the difficulties which have developed in operating inter-Allied control councils in European occupa-

tions. A condominium is at best a precarious form of international administration. Unless there is thorough agreement at the highest policy level among the participating powers, it is almost inevitable that coöordination at the top will become a fiction, and that national policies will dictate the conduct of zone commanders. If there is to be effective international administration in the Far East, the major Allied Powers will have to demonstrate their ability to come to an agreement on joint policy. The search for such an agreement is an essential prerequisite both to a constructive solution of the problems of the Far East and, ultimately, to the success of our own occupation efforts in that area.

NOTES

1. For an official description of the planning organization for Japan see "Our Occupation Policy for Japan," *Department of State Bulletin*, October 7, 1945, pp. 538-539.

2. See Richard Tregaskis, "Road to Tokyo," *Saturday Evening Post*, October 27, 1945, p. 116.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

5. This summary is based on a news account in the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 12, 1945, pp. 1-2.

6. *Department of State Bulletin*, September 23, 1945, p. 427 (full text in Appendix A).

7. For official version see the *Department of State Bulletin*, September 23, 1945, pp. 423-427 (full text in Appendix A). The quotations in the text are all taken from this source.

8. *Department of State Bulletin*, October 7, 1945, p. 544.

9. The only official texts of these directives available to the author are contained in copies of the *Nippon Times*, October 29, 1945, *et seq.*, English-language newspaper published in Tōkyō.

10. *Amerasia*, October 1945, p. 280.

11. *Department of State Bulletin*, October 7, 1945, p. 541.

CHAPTER X

PROSPECTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

Frederick M. Watkins

Only a very wise or a very foolish man would dare at the present moment to predict the course of Japanese politics. In the face of current necessities for drastic readjustment, it is by no means certain that any constitutional system, however well established, will prove capable of lasting survival in any part of the world. For a country like Japan, which must face the uncertainties of the postwar period as a defeated and economically prostrate power, the difficulties of the immediate future will be particularly tragic and may lead to incalculable political consequences. But even in times of crisis political and social habits often prove surprisingly persistent, and the circumstances of Japan's surrender have been such as to save that country from the worst extremes of physical and social devastation. Contrary to general expectation the Japanese constitution and the classes which used it as the instrument of their rule have managed to survive the war substantially intact. For better or for worse the chances are that existing institutions will be used in large measure as the basis for postwar reconstruction. Under these circumstances it is not unreasonable to look to the past for guidance in interpreting the future. In the light of past performance, is there any reason to believe that a political system erected on such a basis will tend to move in the direction of constitutional democracy? If such a tendency exists, is it likely to be helped or hindered by the circumstances of Allied occupa-

tion? These are the questions which must be of concern to anyone interested in the future of Japanese politics.

As American troops take over the responsibilities of occupation, the prevailing mood in this country is remarkably pessimistic. The fact that so great a victory should have been greeted with so little genuine enthusiasm is typical of the defeatist spirit which has done so much to paralyze liberal initiative during the past twenty years. Ever since the aftermath of the first World War, when the hope of making the world safe for democracy was followed by an uninterrupted series of fascist and communist triumphs, most people have been all too fully conscious of the difficulties involved in any attempt to propagate constitutional government. Many liberals have even begun to take a certain pride in their weakness, regarding it as a sign of aristocratic distinction. The enjoyment of free institutions, once aggressively proclaimed as the right of all peoples, has come increasingly to be looked upon as the exclusive privilege of a highly select circle of West European nations, to which no barbarous outsider can reasonably hope to aspire. This is expressed in the widely accepted doctrine that constitutionalism can succeed only in countries which have had long experience in the use of parliamentary institutions, and that other countries can attain the blessed state, if at all, only as a result of protracted tutelage under a colonial or some other form of authoritarian regime. In spite of the comparative success of the Philippine experiment, the American people have never been greatly interested in the assumption of colonial responsibilities. They have therefore embarked upon the occupation of Japan in a rather dreary spirit.

It is true that, even within the framework of contemporary liberal pessimism, the prospects of constitutional democracy in postwar Japan would seem at first glance to be comparatively bright. According to the rules of the exclusive liberal club, nations may properly be considered for membership if they can

show parliamentary institutions of acceptably ancient pedigree. This clause may serve to keep out many undesirable candidates, but it is hard to apply in the case of Japan. After an exhaustive study of Western models, the statesmen of that country adopted a parliamentary constitution in 1889. This constitution has remained in force down to the present time. In other words, Japan has already had more than half a century of experience with the institutions of constitutional government. This is a longer period of continuous operation than most non-European and many European constitutions are able to boast. In a club where pedigree is a primary consideration, this would seem at the very least to qualify the possessor for probationary membership.

There are, however, many members of the rules committee who would refuse to allow any such claim. Although the Japanese constitution was based on Western models, it is much less liberal and above all much less democratic than any comparable Western document, and contains many provisions without parallel in contemporary Western experience. Competent observers all agree, moreover, that Japanese politics are even more singular in actual operation than in legal form. All this has led many people to the belief that Japanese constitutionalism has never been anything more than a superficial imitation of Western ways essentially unconnected with the realities of political life. According to this point of view, the ruling classes of feudal Japan adopted the forms of Western politics simply as a Machiavellian device to disguise the continuation of an essentially medieval political system. Behind the reassuringly modern façade of parliamentary government, it is believed that the alien and inscrutable forces of Asiatic despotism continue to hold sway. From this it is natural to conclude that if constitutional democracy is ever to become an effective force in Japan, it will have to come as a revolutionary creation, gradually built up from new beginnings with little or no reference to past ex-

perience. This idea has been widely received and does much to account for the mood of deep depression which overwhelms most Americans when they contemplate the problems of post-war occupation.

There can be no doubt that there are many profound and perplexing differences between Occidental and Oriental modes of thought and action. These differences are by no means great enough, however, to justify the opinion that Japanese constitutional experience is intrinsically incommensurate with that of the West. The prevalence of this opinion is due, indeed, to the fact that many otherwise excellently qualified observers of the Japanese political scene have suffered from a curious lack of historical perspective. When European squadrons began entering Japanese waters in the course of the nineteenth century, they encountered warships and coastal forts of curious design, which many of the uninvited guests assumed to be quaint products of Oriental ingenuity. Actually they were not Oriental at all, but typical examples of the military science of sixteenth-century Europe, introduced by the Portuguese and other explorers in the earliest period of Japanese contact with the West and maintained by the conservative Tokugawa shogunate long after they had been superseded in the lands which gave them birth. A similar time lag has led to similar misinterpretations in the field of politics. Like the Tokugawa navy, many of the constitutional provisions and usages which are farthest removed from contemporary Western experience, and which are therefore apt to be regarded as typically Oriental, were actually borrowed from Europe and represent nothing more than the belated survival of institutions, now forgotten, which once played an important part in the evolution of Western democracy. The fact that they are still to be found in Japan is proof, if proof were needed, in comparison with peoples who have had several centuries to devote to the development of constitutional government, that Japanese are still in some respects quite

backward. But it also indicates that their constitutional evolution, so far as it goes, can be measured in terms of Western political accomplishment.

The need for historical perspective is nowhere more obvious than in connection with the perennial problem of emperor worship. The fact that Japanese political loyalties have taken the form of a superstitious reverence for quasi-divine monarchs is often taken as a strictly Oriental phenomenon, and used to prove that Japanese and Western modes of thought and action, in spite of all superficial similarities, are really poles apart. But the imperial institution of Japan, while making shrewd use of native traditions, is in reality no less clearly borrowed from the West than are parliaments, railroads, and other admittedly unoriental devices. It represents a unique case of the persistence under twentieth-century conditions of a political device perfected in seventeenth-century Europe, but long since superseded in the land of its origin. So glaring an anachronism is bound to seem strange in the modern world, and may indeed be dangerous. It can never be understood, however, unless it is recognized for what it is, a historically familiar stage in the evolution of modern government.

The initial problem faced by Japanese reformers of the nineteenth century was to create for their own country that peculiar form of political organization known as the sovereign state. In most times and places the exercise of political power has been rather widely dispersed. Even under the Tokugawa shogunate, which was much more effectively centralized than most so-called feudal systems, a considerable area of direct responsibility for the administration of government was vested in the hands of local clan bureaucrats. By the time Japan resumed her contact with the West, however, all of the world's leading countries were extensive and populous territorial units, ruled by central bureaucratic organizations, which claimed the undivided allegiance of all citizens. The famous American phrase had a country, right

or wrong" is an extreme but realistic statement of the unlimited claims made in the name of these organizations. So drastic a concentration of moral and political authority could hardly be matched in the earlier history of the Orient, and was bound to encounter serious opposition. But by providing the basis for an absolute concentration of physical energies in the pursuit of a common purpose, the sovereign states of the West were able to achieve unparalleled technical efficiency. Total war, which involves the mobilization of all resources in the service of the state, is only the most striking example of an achievement which extends to all the varied arts of war and peace. In the face of such competition, other peoples have had either to emulate or to succumb to this overwhelmingly successful form of political organization. The Japanese were among the first to decide that emulation was the proper choice.

When faced with the problem of creating a modern sovereign state, the Meiji reformers were naturally interested in discovering the conditions under which these states first came into existence in the West. This inquiry served, curiously enough, to confirm the view, long current among enemies of the Tokugawa shogunate, that the best road to political reconstruction lay in strengthening the institution of monarchy. In the earlier history of Europe, the work of breaking down feudal and other particularist loyalties and of concentrating authority in a single administrative center was normally accomplished in the name of hereditary sovereigns. The very term "sovereign state" is a reflection of this historical experience. Although the kings of Europe had lost much of their actual power by the end of the Middle Ages, they had never ceased to be recognized in theory as overlords of the entire feudal system. When the advance of political and economic techniques in the late medieval and early modern period made it possible to attempt the construction of more centralized political institutions, those interested in accomplishing that result found that the revival of half-forgotten

claims on behalf of hereditary monarchs provided the most effective lever for the dislodgment of opposing political forces. In England the disorders of late feudalism were overcome and the foundations of a modern state administration were laid in the course of the sixteenth century by an able group of statesmen and administrators who acted as servants of the Tudor dynasty. At a somewhat later date a similar work of political consolidation was accomplished by similar groups of royal servants in the various countries of continental Europe. In the year 1868, which marks the beginning of the Meiji restoration in Japan, all the major states of the West were monarchies, the governments of which, however thoroughly constitutionalized, still continued to rule in the name of hereditary sovereigns. Switzerland, which even at that time was pleasantly unassuming, and the United States, which had just been torn by the most destructive civil war in history, were hardly likely to be taken as models by any ambitious power. Thus it was inevitable that the Meiji reformers, in their attempt to emulate the political achievements of the West, should have seen the problem in terms of the establishment of an effective hereditary monarchy.

They were realistic enough to see, moreover, that the essence of monarchy lay in its association with the forces of religion. It is true that by the middle of the nineteenth century the political thought of Western nations had already been largely secularized. After generations of subjection to centralized administration, Europeans were so well used to obeying the orders of a sovereign state that supernatural sanctions were increasingly unnecessary. When those same states were first created, however, the situation was quite different. The importance of monarchy during this period lay in the fact that the religious sanctions at its disposal were far stronger than those available to any of its competitors. Even when the effective power of medieval kings was at its lowest ebb, they had never ceased to

be recognized as sacred beings, vested through the rites of consecration with a quasi-priestly status. It should not be forgotten that the custom of touching the sacred person of the king as a cure for scrofula was not abandoned in England until after the reign of Queen Anne. Medieval theory regarded kings, in all matters outside the province of the church, as the supreme representatives of God on earth, and preached the duty of obedience as a religious obligation. Although these religious sanctions were not sufficient under medieval conditions to prevent the actual decline of royal power, they remained as a powerful weapon in the hands of people who later became interested in the establishment of centralized authority.

The creation of sovereign states in Europe was regularly accompanied by an intensive campaign of propaganda designed to stress the religious sanctity of kingship. The theory of the divine right of kings, which was developed in seventeenth-century England, is a well-known case in point. The Protestant Reformation, by allowing kings to assume the position of God's earthly vicar in spiritual as well as in temporal matters, still further strengthened the bonds between political and religious authority. All this was designed to make people believe that resistance to the authority of the monarch was not only a crime to be punished in this life but also a sin to be punished throughout eternity. It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of that belief as a factor in the creation of the modern sovereign state.

As students of Western constitutional history the Japanese could hardly have failed to be impressed with the political importance of religious sanctions. But in order to make any comparable use of monarchy in their own country it was necessary for the Meiji reformers, to an even greater extent than their European predecessors, to build up the prestige of monarchy by artificial means. Although the Tennō, as the descendant and highest earthly representative of the Sun

Goddess, was no less clearly a sacred personage than the European vicars of God, and had always been recognized as the legitimate source of authority, the actual predominance of the shogunate had long since reduced him to a position of impotence and neglect unparalleled in feudal Europe. Although the Shintō revival in the late Tokugawa period had already served in some measure to restore the imperial position, much still remained to be done before any such figure could be made into an effective center of national veneration.

The need for a particularly strenuous propaganda effort was also imposed by the peculiar difficulties of nineteenth-century politics. In Europe the basic institutions of sovereignty were developed several centuries earlier, at a time when active participation in public life was still limited to a small minority of the population. But in the case of Japan it was necessary to lay the foundations of modern statehood and at the same time to introduce universal military service, mass industrialization, and other institutions without which no nineteenth-century country could long hope to survive, and which required the active participation of the entire population. To persuade a backward peasantry, long deliberately excluded from military and other public functions, that they must be prepared, like the peoples of the West, to sacrifice their lives on demand in the service of the state was a really desperate problem. In order to solve it, all the resources of modern propaganda were mobilized and used to spread a new spirit of reverence for the imperial authority among the masses of the Japanese people.

The resulting extremes of emperor worship have struck most foreign observers as being alien and grotesque. The exaggerated character of the methods used to promote it is in itself an indication, however, that the imperial idea was by no means native to the Japanese mind. Within the space of a single generation it was necessary to accustom the country to a concept of sovereignty which in its European homeland had taken cen-

turies to develop. If the proponents of emperor worship tended from time to time to grow a trifle shrill in their insistence, the desperate urgency of their task may be cited in partial extenuation.

The revival of monarchy was also important from the stand-point of administration. No modern state can exist without the services of an efficient civil and military bureaucracy. This means that a substantial share of the nation's talent must be attracted to the public service and inspired with a sense of devotion sufficient to insure the proper performance of their functions. The experience of European countries shows that the most effective way of accomplishing this is to give civil and military officials the status of royal servants. This has the effect of making them heirs to the social prestige, and also to the obligations of personal loyalty which in former days were reserved for the ruling feudal classes. This device was used by the Meiji reformers, with gratifying results. Every possible effort was made to build the military and civil services around the imperial institution. Attracted by the honor of belonging to the imperial service, socially ambitious Japanese began a strenuous competition for admission, thus providing the administration with an ample supply of well-trained talents for recruitment. Out of a quasi-feudal sense of personal loyalty to the emperor, in whose name they enjoyed their enviable position, the successful candidates soon developed an intense *esprit de corps*. The result was to give Japan a military and civilian bureaucracy able to stand comparison with the leading administrative organizations of the West.

Unfortunately the very success of this effort served to place serious restrictions upon the future development of Japanese government. According to the theory of constitutional democracy, all nonjudicial agencies of the state should be prepared to serve as loyal and unquestioning instruments of the popular will, as represented by parliaments and other duly constituted

organs. But as servants of the emperor, Japanese officials had from the first a strong tendency to regard themselves, and to be regarded by others, as people superior and set apart, whose mission was to rule and instruct rather than to follow the wishes of ordinary men. The notorious independence of the military caste, who repeatedly succeeded in forcing the rest of the country to follow policies of their own choosing, is a natural consequence of the self-confidence of men who feel that they alone are qualified to advise and represent the emperor in a particularly vital sphere of the national interest. A similar if less spectacular independence has also been characteristic of Japanese civil servants. With all their limitations, these are the men who are mainly responsible for the creation of modern Japan, and who still monopolize most of the administrative and other skills needed for the maintenance of that country on a level of modern technical efficiency. Close identification with the throne has led them in the past to discourage and resist all efforts to establish popular control over the basic agencies of national administration. This attitude will undoubtedly continue as a factor in the period of postwar reconstruction.

Serious as the resulting difficulties may be, it would be a great mistake to suppose, however, that they are in any sense peculiar to Japan. In the earlier history of most European states similar conditions also prevailed. The subsequent experience of those countries is proof that the existence of a royally oriented public service is not in itself sufficient to prevent genuine constitutional growth. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, political authority everywhere was exercised in the name of absolute monarchs by popularly irresponsible military and civil officials. The history of modern democracy in the West has consisted in the gradual extension of parliamentary control over these originally absolute agencies. First in England and then in the several countries of continental Europe, more or less popularly elected bodies, designed originally for the performance of in-

ermittent legislative functions, began to assume a position of increasing responsibility and control in the field of administration. By using their legislative and budgetary powers to make life miserable for recalcitrant administrative officials, they finally succeeded in establishing the principle of cabinet responsibility, whereby the supreme direction of civil and military affairs was taken out of the hands of bureaucrats and placed under the control of parliamentary leaders. As the powers of the legislature increased, moreover, its popular base gradually was broadened. Parliaments which served at first to represent the organized opinion of no more than a minority became increasingly representative, and gained acceptance as the normal channel of political activity for ever more numerous elements of the population. Even in the more advanced areas of constitutional democracy these developments took place fairly slowly and were never quite complete. In England, where the principle of cabinet responsibility was already fairly well established by the middle of the eighteenth century, there are still people, particularly on the left wing of the Labour Party, who doubt the ability of cabinets to maintain effective control over a hostile civil service. In France and Germany, where the same principle gained recognition only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries respectively, the dangers of bureaucratic independence have been even more apparent. The completely representative character of the best modern parliaments is also open to question. But in spite of all difficulties and limitations it still can be said that many parliamentary governments have succeeded in asserting a reasonably effective degree of popular control over bureaucracies which once found their strength in the reflected prestige of royalty.

If this result is to be accomplished, however, it is necessary that popular representatives should have a considerable amount of skill in the use of parliamentary procedures. The principle of cabinet responsibility means that the day-to-day work of

administration cannot normally continue without the support of a legislative majority. In order to accomplish this, parliamentarians must be prepared not only to join in opposition to an unpopular government but also to provide a working majority for some alternative government of their own choosing. To unite a considerable body of men even momentarily in support of a single concrete proposal is a task calling for no small acquaintance with the arts of negotiation and compromise. But if governments are to achieve any reasonable degree of continuity in the development of administrative policy, it is necessary that they should remain in office not for a moment only but for a considerable period of time. This involves the organization of majority parties, or of majority coalitions of parties, stable and disciplined enough to assume long-range responsibilities. The experience of England and other successful constitutional democracies shows that these conditions are most likely to be realized in countries where the powers and responsibilities of parliament are originally quite modest. When parliaments gain power by their own efforts, the skill and constancy of parliamentary leadership are formed and tested in the course of protracted struggles to gain control over a reluctant executive. But when responsibilities are entrusted to them by fiat from above, before parliamentarians and parties have had a chance through their own efforts to learn the skills necessary for stable and effective parliamentary organization, the result has usually been to bring lasting discredit upon the institutions of popular government.

In Japan the movement toward parliamentary control of the executive began at a fairly early date, and under conditions which, in the light of European experience, seemed singularly promising. The Meiji reformers on the whole were unfavorable to the idea of having their actions subjected to any sort of popular or constitutional restraint. As men dedicated to the task of adjusting a backward agrarian people to the require-

ments of modern life, they were in the same historical position as the bureaucrats of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, and like them felt the need for unrestricted power. Both at home and abroad they were under serious pressure, however, to make Japan appear as modern as possible, and constitutionalism was regarded by nineteenth-century opinion as the height of political modernity. The resulting conflict was finally resolved, after more than twenty years of hesitation, by creating a constitutional system, complete with a more or less popularly elected Diet, but by giving that Diet the least possible amount of effective power. Like the parliaments of earlier European history it was allowed no direct control in matters of administration, and even on legislative and budgetary questions its authority was limited by the retention of substantial prerogative powers in the hands of the imperial government. This meant that the new legislative body, in the days of its inexperience, would be in no position to inflict decisive harm upon itself or the nation, and that any subsequent development of its powers would have to come as a result of its own demonstrated capacity to prevail in the arena of competitive politics.

The demonstration of this capacity was soon forthcoming. From modest beginnings and in clear defiance of the intentions of the founding fathers, Japanese parliamentary institutions at once began to show signs of vigorous growth along lines strikingly similar to those observed in the earlier stages of Western constitutional history. The desire for patronage, as in the case of eighteenth-century England and nineteenth-century America, was the motive which stimulated the organization of political parties and the mobilization of parliamentary powers. During the early Meiji period, most of the important offices of state were divided among the various clansmen and aristocrats who had taken the lead in overthrowing the Tokugawa shogunate. Since the Chōshū and Satsuma clans were larger and more powerful than the other members of the partnership, they

showed an all too human tendency to take more than their proper share of the spoils. Members of the lesser clans resented this fact. Finding that the civil and military bureaucracies were securely in the hands of their rivals, the leaders of these lesser clans soon hit on the idea of trying to gain control over the Diet and using the resulting power as a lever to force patronage concessions from the dominant administrative clique. Soon after the adoption of the constitution, men like Ōkuma and Itagaki accordingly began to build up a parliamentary following and to organize party machines among the electorate. Their efforts were strongly opposed by the dominant group of Meiji reformers. Like George Washington and other eighteenth-century worthies, these statesmen felt that the formation of political parties, or "factions," was strictly immoral. For a time they even tried to suppress the rising opposition by force. But in spite of the much advertised Japanese tradition of subservience to police authority, the government was never successful in controlling elections by these means. As Diet followed Diet, the lesser clansmen always managed to retain a substantial majority. Limited as its constitutional powers may have been, a strongly organized Diet was in a position to impose considerable hardships upon any administration which refused to meet its terms. Thus patronage concessions had finally to be granted, and the country was given its first practical demonstration of the advantages to be gained by effective parliamentary action.

An interesting consequence of these developments was the unusually early appearance of a tendency toward the two-party form of organization. In many European countries, parliamentary government was introduced at a time of strong ideological cleavages. These cleavages generally were reflected in the creation of many different parties, whose mutual rivalries made it difficult to proceed to the formation of stable majorities. But in nineteenth-century Japan, just as in the formative periods of English and American party experience, a relatively undivided

state of public opinion made it possible for the organizers of political parties to proceed without major ideological commitments to the accomplishment of practical objectives. If the Diet was to be used as a means of enforcing patronage concessions, it was necessary that its leaders be able to count on the support of a stable and well-disciplined majority, since it was only by maintaining continuous pressure that they could hope to wear down the resistance of the government. Although the creation of such a majority called for a complicated process of negotiation and compromise between conflicting group interests, the prospect of patronage rewards provided a sufficient motive for mutual concessions. Where patronage is a prime object, there is no real point in remaining in public life unless one can belong either to a majority party, or to a minority party large enough to be reasonably hopeful of acquiring a majority. Thus in England and America, where patronage considerations tended to dominate the earlier period of party development, the tendency has always been toward the establishment of two major parties, with minor parties either remaining quite insignificant or rapidly replacing one of the earlier major groups. In Japan like effects followed from like causes. Although there have always been many cliques and blocs in the Japanese Diet, as in the corruptionist parliaments of eighteenth-century England, and frequent changes of party labels, major party organizations like the Minseitō or the Seiyūkai have generally been able to gain the allegiance of all but an inconsiderable minority. The experience of Western politics seems on the whole to show that two-party systems are more effective than multi-party systems as a basis for constitutional democracy. In this respect the Japanese would therefore seem to have been peculiarly fortunate.

As soon as the Japanese Diet had solved the problem of party organization, it began in much the same way as its European counterparts to seek an increased measure of control over the executive branch of government. It is true that parliaments

often can gain a fair amount of patronage without themselves taking any sort of administrative responsibility. In eighteenth-century England, parliamentary groups frequently sold their support to the highest bidder, without in exchange demanding any direct control over the administrative process. In Japan there was a marked tendency to use parliamentary power in this fashion, forcing the government to grant favors in return for the passage of needed legislation, without making any attempt to change the government itself. But the principle of cabinet responsibility, which serves to place the entire administrative machine under the direction of party leaders, is obviously the most thoroughgoing way of achieving patronage objectives, and it was not long before the Japanese Diet had begun moving in this direction.

The first party cabinet was formed as early as 1898. The resulting orgy of spoils politics, which for a time threatened to undermine the professional competence of the civil service, convinced many people that the experiment was premature. The ensuing reaction was so vigorous that there was no question of appointing another party cabinet for many years thereafter. By the end of the first World War, however, the movement toward cabinet responsibility was vigorously resumed. Under the experienced and aggressive direction of a new generation of parliamentary leaders, of whom Hamaguchi and Hara were the most notable, this movement made considerable headway. Although only a few of the governments formed during the years 1920-1935 were actually dominated by party leaders, most of the premiers were men who found it wise at least to affiliate themselves with a major party organization. People thus came increasingly to accept the proposition that no government could be expected to operate effectively without the support of a parliamentary majority. As in many of the countries of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, the principle of parliamentary responsibility was not yet firmly established in

the law or usage of the Japanese constitution. In the light of Western experience there was every reason to believe, however, that that result was well on the way to accomplishment.

During this same period the popular basis of Japanese parliamentarism was also widening steadily. Universal manhood suffrage came by gradual stages to replace the original, more narrowly limited electorate, and an ever larger number of organized interests began to appear as active participants in politics. In the case of England, active interest in parliamentary affairs was confined during the eighteenth century almost entirely to the gentry. It was not until the nineteenth century that the capitalist middle classes and not much before the twentieth century that the urban working classes had become politically conscious enough to play an equally responsible role. In Japan the growth of political consciousness, under the impact of similar economic developments, took place in precisely the same order. During the Meiji period interest in parliamentary government was largely confined to the narrow group of clan leaders, and Japanese political parties, like the Whigs and Tories of eighteenth-century England, did little more than reflect factional rivalries within the ruling aristocracy. By the end of the first World War, however, middle-class industrialists, headed by the great Zaibatsu interests, had become strong and self-confident enough to enter the political arena on their own account, using established political parties as vehicles for the expression of their interests and rivalries. During the later part of this period, and above all in the years following the great depression, preliminary steps were also taken toward the organization of proletarian parties. Although hampered by police repression, these groups also were able to make some progress. Thus it seemed that it would not be long before the urban working classes were also ready to assume a more active and responsible role in politics.

By the middle of the thirties, therefore, Japan had already

gone a long way on the traditional road to constitutional democracy. It is true that she was still appreciably less advanced than many of the countries of contemporary Europe. In many respects, the closest parallel to the Japanese situation is to be found in the later years of Imperial Germany. In both countries the army and civil bureaucracy were still self-confident and more or less arrogant forces, as yet imperfectly subject to popular control. The principle of cabinet responsibility, on the other hand, was gaining increasing recognition in both countries, with a consequent weakening of the tradition of bureaucratic independence. It is significant, for example, that Japanese party leaders, in the face of lively opposition from the privy council and the armed forces, were able during the period of their greatest influence to secure ratification of the naval limitations agreement. So far as the popular basis of parliamentary government is concerned, Japan was even less advanced than Hohenzollern Germany, where a highly developed socialist movement had already gone far beyond anything the Japanese were able to offer in the way of working-class participation in politics. Otherwise the situation of the two countries offers many interesting points of comparison.

During the years which followed the great depression, the hitherto prevailing course of political evolution was suddenly altered. In Japan as well as elsewhere, the immediate effect of economic dislocation was a setback to the growth of constitutional democracy. Although parliamentary parties had been operating for some time and had been gaining increased influence over the executive, their popular basis was not yet broad enough to withstand the pressures of a situation which in all countries was leading to a reaction against established political procedures. Close association with big business interests made the Japanese parties particularly vulnerable in a time of economic collapse and anti-capitalist bitterness. Since the masses of the newly enfranchised people did not feel any deep-seated

loyalty to the party organizations for which they had been voting, it was easy for army and other extremists to capitalize upon the depression to discredit the whole idea of party government. A long tradition of police repression and the failure of all but the upper classes to achieve effective political organization did much to encourage the use of violence and assassination among people who in other countries would have been willing to seek more peaceful channels for the expression of their grievances. Even in the period of its greatest success, Japanese parliamentarism was seriously weakened by the recurrent assassination of its more effective leaders. With the advent of the depression, political violence increased without inspiring any sort of effective reaction by the supporters of constitutional government. The result was the capture of power by army extremists and the reorganization of Japanese political life on a basis of renewed bureaucratic absolutism.

It is interesting to note, however, that the rise of militarist extremism constituted a much less serious interruption of constitutional tradition in Japan than did the concurrent rise of national socialist and fascist movements in Europe. Historical backwardness is no less characteristic of the anti-constitutional than of the constitutional phases of Japanese political life. When free institutions fell in Germany and Italy, vigorous and disciplined mass parties were already organized and proceeded without delay to the systematic destruction of established political and social forms in the interests of a new totalitarian order. In Japan the party basis of totalitarianism was lacking, and every attempt to breathe a trace of fanatical life into the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and other pseudo-totalitarian parties met with ignominious failure. Because of the absence of any genuinely revolutionary party agency, there was no possibility, as in Europe, of imposing sweeping changes upon the traditions of Japanese politics. Although the first tentative beginnings of proletarian organization were crushed effectively

for the time being, none of the major forces which previously dominated the political scene, such as the army, the civil service, the court, or the Zaibatsu, was radically uprooted. Even the Diet, normally the first victim of totalitarian repression, continued down to the very end to exercise its basic functions. It is true that political parties were legally dissolved, and that wartime sessions of the Diet tended to be little more than occasions for the rubber-stamping of government-sponsored measures. But the temporary abandonment of party rivalries and the uncritical acceptance of government leadership are in themselves perfectly normal adjustments to the requirements of a serious wartime emergency, as witness the recent party truce in England. Even in the final crisis of the war, moreover, there were certain episodes, such as the refusal to pass the original version of the Extraordinary War Measures Act and the failure of many parliamentarians to join the last of the so-called totalitarian parties, which showed that the Japanese Diet was never entirely without capacity for independent action. In comparison with the really professional work of European fascists, the Japanese attack on constitutional government was distinctly amateurish.

So far as the future of constitutional democracy is concerned, the relative intactness of Japanese parliamentary institutions may be taken in itself as a hopeful sign. Important as a sound traditional basis may be, however, it by no means is sufficient to insure the continuation of wholesome constitutional development. We have seen that Japanese constitutionalism, in the period of its maximum growth, had reached a stage comparable to that achieved by more seasoned constitutional systems in the course of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. If the modern history of Japan had been entirely peaceful, and above all if we were still living in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, there would be good reason to hope that Japan would continue to evolve in the direction of constitutional democracy.

Unfortunately the problems of postwar Japan will be those

of a militarily defeated and exhausted country living under twentieth-century conditions of social and economic change. In other parts of the world the necessities of large-scale and long-run planning implicit in the present state of technological development have served to strain the capacities of well-established constitutional governments. As the power of the state becomes more important in all phases of human life, ability to control the state becomes a matter of life and death for everyone. If any major interest group fails under these conditions to find satisfaction for its minimum requirements within the framework of free institutions, the chances are that it will withdraw its confidence from those institutions and seek to impose its will by force. Although the possibility of such a breakdown exists in all countries, it is most serious in those which face the severest problems of postwar readjustment, and in which the habits of parliamentary action are least firmly and broadly based. The Weimar Republic, which fell heir to a constitutional tradition rather more mature than that of Japan, proved incapable of solving the problems of Germany after the first World War. The difficulties faced by Japan after the second World War will be incomparably more severe. Under these circumstances great skill and foresight will clearly be needed on the part of all concerned to insure the survival of constitutional government.

From the standpoint of Americans, who are apt to feel that there ought to be a law, a process of constitutional amendment will immediately suggest itself as the best way of improving the Japanese political structure. In its present form, the Japanese constitution contains many features which clearly serve to inhibit the activity of popular forces. The constitutional document itself, which like many constitutional charters of nineteenth-century Europe is based as a matter of legal form on the will of an absolute monarch, is incompatible with the democratic conception that all constituent authority should be derived

from the will of the people. The extensive though ill-defined powers of the privy council, a nonpopular body essentially representative of the bureaucracy, have frequently served to thwart the policies of more democratically constituted organs of government. The custom of reserving the War and Navy ministries for high ranking army and navy officers has been in the past an even more serious obstacle to the creation of responsible party cabinets. All these features are without counterpart in the structure of more highly developed constitutional systems. According to the terms of the Potsdam declaration, the military occupation of Japan will not be discontinued until the Allied Powers are satisfied that "there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government." Insistence upon the adoption of certain constitutional changes in the direction of popular responsibility would seem, therefore, to provide the occupying authorities with an obvious means of strengthening the forces of constitutional democracy.

But desirable as these and other constitutional changes might be, they could never be expected to accomplish more than a superficial reform of Japanese politics. The question of the imperial institution provides an interesting case in point. The recognition of a semidivine monarch as the source of all authority, while common enough in the earlier stages of constitutional evolution, is undoubtedly an anachronism at the present time. On the grounds that emperor worship has made the Japanese people dangerously docile and rendered them easy prey to the demands of militarists and others who claimed to act in the emperor's name, there are many people who believe that the abolition of the imperial institution would constitute a major step in the political reeducation of Japan. But in reality the imperial institution is nothing more than a convenient symbol for concepts of sovereignty and patriotism which lie at the basis

of political life in all modern nations, and derives its specific character, whether for good or for ill, from the general political and social characteristics of the Japanese people themselves.

If the Japanese people are disposed in the postwar world to assume increased democratic control over their own affairs and to take a place as peaceful members of the family of nations, there is no reason why the existence of the monarchy should present any serious obstacle to their will. The principle that a Japanese emperor, like a British king, is bound to follow the advice of responsible parliamentary advisors would constitute no particular shock to the traditions of an institution which from its inception has practically always been content to act through advisors of one sort or another. If the Japanese people, on the other hand, are disposed in the postwar world to give their unquestioning obedience to the cause of aggressive imperialism, there is no reason why they should be deterred by any measures that could possibly be taken against the imperial institution. After several generations of experience under the conditions of modern sovereign statehood, the chances are that they are now capable, like other nationalists, of being mobilized to fanatical devotion by abstract rather than by concrete personal symbols. If not, there is no reason why there should ever be any lack of real or false pretenders to continue the imperial name. After the first World War, many Americans believed that the institution of the German emperor was an essential part of the structure of militarism and aggressive nationalism in that country. It was not long before the triumph of an even more aggressive militarism under Hitler had demonstrated the superficiality of this solution. To permit the same mistake to be made at the end of a second World War would be hardly less absurd than tragic.

The danger of concentrating on purely political changes of this sort is not so much that these changes are necessarily undesirable in themselves as that they serve to distract attention

from the real crux of the problem. If constitutional democracy is to become an effective force in postwar Japan, it is necessary that a decisive majority of the Japanese people should be given some concrete reason to be interested in the development of their country along peaceful lines, and induced to protect that interest by responsible political action. The fact that no such development has taken place in the past is due not so much to the inadequacies of Japanese constitutional machinery as to the existence of social and economic conditions inimical to the assumption of full political responsibilities on the part of more than a small minority of the Japanese population. No real independence of political action is possible for the peasant majority of the country as long as farmers are held to the barest level of subsistence by an overwhelming burden of debt, rent, and taxes. No vigorous development of the urban middle classes is possible as long as a few great family combines are enabled, by the monopolization of banking and other resources, to occupy all the more profitable fields of industrial and commercial enterprise. No intelligent Japanese of any class can be expected in the long run to support constitutional democracy or any other form of government unless it offers some reasonable prospect of being able to provide the country with a standard of living in line with the requirements and possibilities of modern civilization. All of the resulting issues reach well beyond the field of politics, and most of them can only be solved within a framework of international agreement and coöperation. The sooner people stop worrying about the details of Japanese constitutional structure, which is relatively sound, and begin to face the problems of Japanese social and economic organization, which is not, the more likely are they to provide an effective basis for the growth of constitutional democracy. Since the strategy of surrender has left the ruling classes in control, it is unlikely that thorough-going changes will take place on the initiative of the Japanese themselves. To insist upon the introduction of necessary social

and economic reforms will therefore be a particularly important responsibility of the occupying powers.

Even under the most optimistic estimate of future conditions there can be no assurance, of course, that the political future of Japan lies in a constitutional rather than in a totalitarian direction. It is true that the Japanese, as we have seen, in the past have shown a considerable aptitude for the earlier and more aristocratic phases of constitutional evolution. This in itself does not prove, however, that the final phase of democratization is equally within their capacity. Up to the present time, the only societies which have gone far along the road to constitutional democracy belong either to western Europe or to areas colonized by a population of predominantly West European extraction. This lends some color to the theory that the extension of popular government is possible only among people whose sense of individual initiative and responsibility has been shaped by the Western family system, by the Western brand of Christianity, and by all the other factors which have served to make Western civilization. There can be no doubt that the growth of democratic initiative in Japan in the past has been inhibited by a spirit of docility which owes much to the Japanese system of family relations, to a strongly conditioned respect for police authority, and to other deeply rooted elements of the Japanese tradition. The experience of recent decades goes to show that, even in the Far East, modern industrialism is a great leveler and destroyer of traditions. It still remains to be seen, however, whether the result of modernization in any of these countries will be favorable or unfavorable to the establishment and maintenance of constitutional government.

To discount the prospects of constitutional democracy in Japan nevertheless would be extremely unwise. As the balance of world power gradually shifts away from western Europe and hitherto dependent peoples acquire ever new importance, the survival of free institutions as a living form of government will

depend increasingly on their demonstrated ability to meet the needs of men brought up outside the narrow sphere of West European culture. Of all the possible areas for such a demonstration, Japan is by all odds the most promising. To a far greater extent than any other non-European people, the Japanese already have shown the ability by their own efforts to lay the foundations of an imperfect but substantial constitutional structure. To a degree unparalleled by any living people, with the possible exception of the British, they have that peculiar sense of history which makes it possible to combine radical innovation with a conservative respect for established forms, a trait eminently favorable to the development of constitutional morality. They also are characterized by a marked capacity for group action, and for the various arts of conciliation and compromise which play a vital part in any government by consent. All these traditions should be regarded as potential assets, not for Japan only but also for the world at large. To put them to good use is one of the most challenging of the many tasks now faced by the supporters of constitutional democracy.

CHAPTER XI

RUSSIAN POLICIES IN THE FAR EAST

William Henry Chamberlin

History and geography have made Russia a great Far Eastern power. Its weight in the scales of international power politics in the Orient was enhanced by the crushing of Nazi Germany. This obviously increased the amount of military and political pressure which the Soviet Union could bring to bear in the Far East. The subsequent defeat of Japan has further magnified the role of the Russians.

Soviet aims in Asia were less clearly proclaimed in words and deeds than Soviet aims in Europe—at least until the summer of 1945. But certain Soviet objectives may be gauged by reviewing Russian and Soviet policies in the Orient before and after the Revolution of 1917. Some Soviet trends in foreign policy possess deep historical roots. But other policies and certain methods of implementing these policies are strongly influenced by the special character of the Soviet state.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Russia came to the Far East and got into contact with China and Japan by an overland route through Siberia, and by a process of colonization. This was in contrast to the experience of the larger West European nations and of the United States, which reached the Far East by maritime routes and under the

impulse of commercial motives, such as the search for markets and sources of raw material.

Russia's position in the Far East contained one special element of strength and one conspicuous element of limitation. Alone among the world powers it could maintain powerful military forces in the Orient on its own soil, without dependence on sea power and maritime transportation. However, until and unless it becomes a great naval power, its sphere of interest and pressure is limited to those areas of East Asia which are within range of its land-based military forces.

Russian Cossacks, adventurous military pioneers who were not unlike some of the early American frontiersmen, entered Siberia in the sixteenth century. The occupation of this huge but sparsely populated region, inhabited by primitive tribes, involved little military difficulty. The Arctic Ocean was reached in 1636, the Pacific in 1639.

One of the Cossack chieftains named Khabarov occupied the basin of the Amur River in 1649. Russia then came into contact with the Chinese Empire. Russia was not very energetic in pushing its expansion into regions which were under regular Chinese administration, and relinquished the Amur Basin by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, signed in 1689. The mountains north of the Amur were accepted as the boundary between the two countries. Another Russo-Chinese treaty, signed in the border town of Kiakhta in 1727, provided for the opening of commercial relations and gave Russia the right to maintain an ecclesiastical mission in Peking.

Vitus Bering, a Danish navigator in Russian service, discovered in 1728 the strait which bears his name. His voyages of discovery led to the occupation by Russia of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. These vast territories, however, were very imperfectly developed; the fur trade was the main commercial interest. Russia's career as an American power came to an

end when Alaska was sold to the United States for \$7,200,000 in 1867.

Siberia increased in population very slowly, partly because of the severe natural conditions, partly because of slow development of transportation. The population was 2,700,000 in 1861, 5,700,000 in 1897, and 11,000,000 in 1914.

Russia shared in the general opening up of Japan to foreign intercourse in the middle of the nineteenth century. The first Russo-Japanese treaty was signed at Shimoda in 1855. An exchange of the Kurile Islands, which were assigned to Japan, for the large island of Sakhalin (Japanese Karafuto), which became Russian territory, was arranged in 1875.

Russia participated in the general expansionist impulse of the Western powers in relation to China in the nineteenth century. It acquired title to territory north of the Amur River by the Aigun and Tientsin treaties of 1858. An energetic Siberian viceroy, Muraviev, seized the region between the Ussuri River and the Pacific Ocean and founded Vladivostok, which became the largest Russian port and fortress on the Pacific Ocean. Russian interest in the Orient was stimulated by the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which began in 1891.

In coöperation with France and Germany, Russia vetoed the Japanese desire to annex the Liaotung peninsula in South Manchuria after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Under the Li-Lobanov treaty of 1896 Russia gave China secret assurances of assistance against Japanese aggression and acquired the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway across Northern Manchuria, with a southward branch to Dalny (later renamed Dairen by the Japanese), a port at the southern tip of Manchuria. Russian "protection" of China assumed a rather imperialist aspect when China, by familiar methods of diplomatic pressure, was induced to grant Russia a long-term lease of strategic points in the Liaotung peninsula. Dalny was de-

veloped as a commercial port and Port Arthur as a naval base. Russia utilized the suppression of the Boxer Uprising in 1900 as an occasion for increasing its military forces in Manchuria.

Russian expansion in Manchuria and disputes over economic concessions in Korea were among the causes of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). This war marked a check to Russian advance in the Far East and gave Japan its first firm foothold on the mainland of Asia.

The decisive battles of the war were at Mukden (March 4-9, 1905), where the Russian Army was driven back into Northern Manchuria, and in the Strait of Tsushima, on May 27, 1905. The Russian fleet which had sailed half way around the world was destroyed by the Japanese Navy under Admiral Togo. The distance of the military theater from the main centers of Russian population and industry and an upsurge of revolutionary unrest in Russia were important contributing causes of the Russian defeat.

Japan suffered heavy losses in the war, notably in the capture of Port Arthur, and its financial and manpower resources were severely strained. By the summer of 1905 both governments were willing to accept the mediation of President Theodore Roosevelt, which led to the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5, 1905. Japan took over Russia's leases and concessions in South Manchuria and acquired the southern half of the island of Sakhalin. Japan's hegemony in Korea was undisputed after the war, and that country was annexed to the Japanese Empire in 1910. Russia retained ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway (with a southward spur as far as Changchun, the later Hsinking) and a political and economic sphere of influence in North Manchuria.

There was a subsequent political rapprochement between Russia and Japan, and the two governments united in opposing a proposal of the American Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox, which aimed at opening up Manchuria to railway de-

velopment by American capital. When the first World War broke out an adjustment of interests between Russia and Japan had taken place, and this was confirmed by secret treaties which the two governments signed in 1910 and 1916.

REVOLUTION, ECLIPSE, AND REEMERGENCE

The first effect of the Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent civil war on the Russian position in the Far East was one of weakening and disintegration. The Japanese took a leading part in the intervention in Eastern Siberia, occupied the northern half of Sakhalin, and for a time dominated Siberia east of Lake Baikal with the aid of local puppet anti-Bolshevik leaders. An international commission took over the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The Russian claims and rights, however, were gradually reasserted as the Soviet regime established itself as the victor in the civil war. The Japanese evacuated Vladivostok, their last foothold on Russian soil, toward the end of 1922. When diplomatic relations were restored between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1925, the Japanese withdrew from North Sakhalin, while the Soviet government granted long-term concessions for Japanese exploitation of part of the oil and coal reserves of this region.

Still earlier, in 1924, the Soviet government, after negotiations with China, concluded an agreement for joint Sino-Soviet operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway. There was more provision for Chinese participation in the management of the railway and the Soviet Government did not assert the prewar Russian right to maintain a large force of armed railway guards in North Manchuria.

RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND CHINA UNTIL 1931

The course of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations ran rather smoothly from 1925 until the Japanese occupation of Manchuria

in 1931. There was some haggling over the terms on which Japanese fishing companies could lease fishing grounds in Soviet waters, and the Japanese police looked out vigilantly for Japanese communists, spreaders of "dangerous thoughts," returning from Moscow. But trade relations were cultivated on a limited scale and Japan pointedly refused to associate itself with the action of Mr. Henry L. Stimson, then American secretary of state, in calling the attention of the Soviet Union and China to the terms of the Kellogg Pact when armed conflict broke out between the two countries late in 1929.

This conflict was preceded by the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Chinese nationalist government, which accused Soviet employees of the railway of carrying on communist propaganda. The Soviet government concentrated troops at both ends of the railway. After a series of border skirmishes in which each side accused the other of being the aggressor, the Soviet forces struck hard and decisively in November. The Chinese resistance quickly crumbled and the *status quo* in the administration of the railway was restored.

Japanese diplomatic support of the Soviet Union on this issue reflected a certain community of interest, since Chinese success in reclaiming the Chinese Eastern Railway might easily have been the prelude to similar demands for the retrocession of the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway.

Meanwhile Soviet relations with China followed a much stormier course of ups and downs. The revolutionary Soviet regime started out with certain assets in its dealings with China. It renounced the extraterritorial rights which Russians, along with nationals of other major powers, had formerly enjoyed in China. It took every occasion to emphasize its belief that China should be treated on a basis of full equality with other powers.

The Russian Revolution itself, with its daring social and economic experiments, exercised a magnetic attraction for con-

siderable numbers of the Chinese educated classes. The leader of the Chinese nationalist revolution, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, after several conferences with a Soviet unofficial envoy, Adolf Joffe, invited Soviet political, economic, and military specialists to come to the headquarters of the Chinese nationalist movement, which was then in Canton. Because of Chinese inexperience in modern politics and economics these specialists wielded an influence out of proportion to their numbers. The leading figure among them was Michael Borodin, a Russian communist who had lived for some time in the United States. A relatively small Chinese Communist Party developed side by side with the Kuomintang (National People's Party) which was the main organizing force in the Chinese nationalist revolution.

This very strong Russian and communist influence on the Chinese nationalist movement ended abruptly in 1927. The nationalist armies had swept northward and brought a large part of China under their occupation. Differences in political, economic, and social objectives between the more conservative nationalists and the communists flared up into open civil war. Chiang Kai-shek placed himself at the head of this more conservative wing of the nationalist movement and has remained an outstanding figure in the nationalist government ever since.

Borodin and other Soviet advisers went back to Moscow. Several Soviet consular officials were executed in Canton after an unsuccessful communist uprising in that city was put down in December, 1927. Relations between the Soviet government and the Chinese nationalist regime were chilly and strained for several years. The Chinese communists organized armed forces and held out for some years in the provinces of Kiangsi and Fukien, in southeastern China. Pushed out of these regions by Chiang Kai-shek in 1934, they carried out a long march and finally established a new base in Shensi Province, in northwestern China.

FROM THE SEIZURE OF MANCHURIA TO THE
SOVIET-JAPANESE NONAGGRESSION PACT

The seizure of Manchuria by the Japanese Army in 1931 inaugurated an era of tension between Tōkyō and Moscow and brought Russia and China more closely together in the face of the common threat of aggressive Japanese expansionism. Before 1931 neither Japan nor Russia had much reason to fear hostile action on the part of the other. There was a fairly clear line of demarcation between the Russian sphere of economic interest in the North and the Japanese sphere in the South. Manchuria was nominally a part of China; and the virtually independent local administration, headed first by Chang Tso-lin, later by his son and successor, Chang Hsueh-liang, functioned as a kind of buffer state.

This situation was sharply altered when the Japanese Army drove out Chang Hsueh-liang and a new satellite state of Manchoukuo, completely dependent upon Japan, was set up. A new long military frontier between Japan and Russia came into existence. Crack Japanese military units replaced the old-fashioned, poorly armed and disciplined semifeudal Chinese levies. The Japanese Army leadership was generally hostile to Russia both as a traditional enemy and as the center of communism, a doctrine contradictory of the Japanese military and traditional scale of values.

During the decade 1931-1941 there were hundreds of border incidents between Japanese and Soviet forces, and these included two serious pitched battles. One of these took place on the heights of Changkufeng, in the area where the frontiers of Siberia, Manchuria and Korea come together, in the summer of 1938. The other was around Nomonhan, in Outer Mongolia, in the following year. In both these battles the Soviet forces, which were heavily armored, gave a good account of themselves. The Japanese seem to have sustained a severe defeat at

Nomonhan, where Marshal Zhukov, one of the most prominent military leaders in the subsequent war against Germany, was in command.

It was the design of the Soviet government during this decade to avoid war with Japan by a mixture of firmness and restraint. It was evidently impossible to retain operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway under the new conditions and the Soviet government disposed of this property nominally to Manchoukuo, actually to Japan, for ￥170,000,000 (about \$50,000,000). By this action the Soviet government signalized its willingness to step out of Manchuria, and most Soviet citizens left after the transfer of the railway.

At the same time the Soviet military authorities hit back hard when there were cases of border violation. Outer Mongolia, a huge, sparsely populated area northwest of China proper, which had been under effective Soviet control since 1921, was brought more closely into the Soviet defense system through the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance in 1936.

A race in military preparedness between the Japanese in Manchuria and the Soviet regime in Eastern Siberia set in. The railway mileage of Manchuria was quickly doubled with the construction of new lines leading up to the Soviet frontier in several places and connecting Manchuria with North Korea. Japanese colonization in North Manchuria was encouraged, although it was only in the late thirties that any considerable numbers of Japanese peasants were induced to migrate. The rolling plains of Manchuria were dotted with air bases. Industrial development went hand in hand with railway building. There was a considerable development of heavy industries on the basis of utilization of Fushun coal and Anshan iron and Mukden swelled rapidly in population as it became a center of heavy industries.

Meanwhile the Soviet government was making active preparation on its side of the frontier. The Trans-Siberian Railway

was double-tracked. A secondary line, branching off from the main line of the Trans-Siberian at Taishet, skirting the northern shore of Lake Baikal, with a terminus somewhere on the lower course of the Amur River, was rushed to completion in an atmosphere of great secrecy. The natural line of defense represented by some of the big rivers along the boundary, the Amur, Argun, and Ussuri, was strengthened by the construction of a network of forts and pillboxes.

As a method of political insurance against Japanese attack the Soviet government did everything in its power to encourage Chinese resistance to Japanese expansion. Full diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and China were restored in 1932. A nonaggression pact between the two countries, pledging each to take no part in any combination hostile to the other, was concluded in August 1937, after the Japanese had launched an all-out attack against China.

Between 1937 and 1941 a limited amount of Soviet aid, largely in the form of trucks and airplanes, reached China by way of the overland route from Soviet Central Asia across Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkestan. Some of this aid was apparently on a lend-lease basis, while some of it was compensated by Chinese exports of tea and raw materials to Russia. It ceased in 1941, partly because of the Soviet-Japanese nonaggression pact, partly because of Soviet preoccupation with the war against Germany.

It was hardly an accidental coincidence that the Chinese Communist Party, always responsive to Moscow leadership, revised its original tactics in the middle thirties. The Chinese communists had started out as advocates of fierce, uncompromising agrarian class war and the establishment of a Soviet system in such areas as they were able to occupy. Members of the well-to-do classes were often exterminated. There was intense hostility to foreigners and missionaries. A war to the death against Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, represented as agents of reactionary capitalist dictatorship, was proclaimed.

But after the removal of the communist base to the Northwest there was a notable softening of these class-war policies. Instead of destroying the landlords the communists contented themselves with rent reductions. There was frequent expression of a desire for a united front with noncommunist armies and political groups, insofar as these were willing to resist Japan.

When Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by mutinous Manchurian troops in Sian in December, 1936, the communists interceded to save his life. Before the Japanese attacked China in the summer of 1937 an unofficial accommodation between the Kuomintang and the communists had been patched up. Hostile action on both sides ceased, the communists were left undisturbed in the area which they occupied, and it was understood that in the event of war the principal communist military force, the Eighth Route Army, would operate under the general command of Chiang Kai-shek.

These changes in communist policy were in line with the united front tactics which communists were putting into effect in France, Spain and other countries at the same time. It seems probable that the Soviet government favored this shift to a moderate policy because a union of all Chinese forces against Japan was more necessary to Soviet political interests than the continuation of an uncompromising class civil war in China.

RUSSIA'S FAR EASTERN POLICIES, 1941-1945

An important new turn in Soviet Far Eastern policy was marked by the conclusion of a pact of neutrality and nonaggression with Japan in April, 1941. The project of such a pact had been suggested by the Soviet government soon after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. The Japanese government, strongly under the influence of the anti-Russian army leadership, which probably dreamed of territorial gains at Soviet expense in Eastern Siberia and Outer Mongolia, was cool and negative in its response.

When Japan signed the anti-Comintern pact with Germany in 1936 the Soviet government made no secret of its displeasure and of its belief that this pact was directed against Russia. Certain economic reprisals in the form of cutting down shipments of pig iron to Japan and repudiating a long-term fisheries agreement were inflicted.

Hitler's pact of nonaggression and neutrality with Stalin in 1939 came as a shock and surprise to Japan. The Japanese government began to manifest an interest in the possibility of a similar pact with the Soviet Union. It was Moscow's turn to be cool and indifferent.

But by the spring of 1941 both governments had apparently reached the belief that a relaxation of tension along the Siberian-Manchurian frontier would serve their interests. Stalin was undoubtedly conscious of the danger that Nazi Germany, after conquering almost the whole of Europe, would fall on the Soviet Union. It was definitely in his interest to make the coming war a one-front war, so far as Russia was concerned.

The Japanese government was apparently kept in ignorance of Hitler's intention to attack Russia. Uninformed of this new development, it saw advantages in obtaining a gesture of friendship from the Soviet Union. This might have been expected to have a discouraging effect in China and to free Japan's hands for the aggressive southward push which began with such dramatic suddenness with the onslaught on Pearl Harbor.

So, when the Japanese foreign minister, Matsuoka Yōsuke, stopped off in Moscow on his return trip to Japan after a visit to Europe, he found the situation ripe for the signature of a pact. The Soviet-Japanese treaty, signed on April 13, 1941, bound the two powers to "maintain peaceful and friendly relations" and to respect each others' "territorial integrity and inviolability." This last obligation was extended to cover Manchoukuo and Outer Mongolia. The term of the pact was set at

five years, and either signatory might denounce it one year or more before the date of expiration.

The signature of the pact was followed by an era of calm along the previously troubled border. It stood the strain of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Had there been a Soviet military collapse, Japan in all probability would have moved into Eastern Siberia and established a military frontier along Lake Baikal, if only to forestall a German advance to the Pacific. But there was no such collapse. And after Stalingrad and the turn of the tide in the Pacific war against Japan, the initiative clearly shifted from Tōkyō to Moscow.

It would have been little short of madness for an increasingly hard pressed Japan to attack the Soviet Union. It could only be the Japanese hope that Russia would not attack Japan. Even before the defeat of Germany the Soviet government began to extract diplomatic benefits from the altered balance of forces in the Orient.

An agreement between the Soviet and Japanese governments, providing for the surrender by Japan of the long-term oil and coal concessions in North Sakhalin, was announced in March 1944. The same agreement gave Japanese firms a five-year contract for fishing in Soviet waters, although at the price of higher rentals and of a withdrawal of certain areas from these fishing operations. Japan had been obtaining little oil or coal from the concessions—certainly not enough to weigh heavily in the maintenance of its war industries. But the termination of these last foreign concessions on Soviet soil, concessions which were political rather than economic in origin, was a moral victory for Russia and a sign of increased Russian strength.

The little straws by which a totalitarian state, with a strictly controlled press, sometimes foreshadows changes in policy, indicated a stiffer Soviet attitude toward Japan. Stalin, in a speech of November 6, 1944, characterized Japan as an "aggressive"

nation which had pursued an "aggressive" policy and drew a parallel between Japan's attack on American and British possessions in the Orient and Germany's attack on Russia. About the same time appeared a long historical novel, dealing with the Russo-Japanese War in the patriotic spirit that has again become fashionable in Russia. A review of this novel in a leading Russian literary magazine described Port Arthur as "the very symbol of the fatherland, of Russian soil, as precious and holy to Russia as the soil of Tambov and Ryazan." (These are two provinces in the heart of European Russia.)

More decisive as an indication of a shift of Soviet policy away from strict neutrality in the Far Eastern war was the denunciation of the neutrality pact with Japan early in April, 1945. The reason given for this action was alleged Japanese aid to Germany, an enemy of Russia. The official announcement of the repudiation of the pact contained the words: "The neutrality pact between Japan and the U.S.S.R. has lost its meaning and the prolongation of the pact is becoming impossible."

The charge that Japan had broken the pact by giving aid to Germany left the Soviet Government free to intervene in the Far Eastern war at any time, although the pact was not to expire until April 24, 1946. Up to the end of July, however, there was no further overt action on Russia's part.

Rumors of Russian mediation in the Far Eastern war during the Potsdam conference in July received no immediate confirmation. Stalin was participating in this conference when the American, British, and Chinese Governments addressed an ultimatum to Japan, presenting the alternatives of surrender or destruction. But the Soviet government did not officially associate itself with this step.

Some commentators saw a reflection of American hope for ultimate Soviet intervention in the Far Eastern conflict in the earlier announcement that lend-lease shipments to Russia by way of Siberia were being continued, despite the end of the

European war. The official reason given for this prolongation was the service which Russian troops on the Manchurian border were rendering to American interests by immobilizing considerable Japanese forces.

Soviet relations with China are of considerable importance for the future pattern of reconstruction in East Asia. Up to the summer of 1945 the united front policy between the Kuomintang and the Chinese communists, with their capital in the cave city of Yenan, in Shensi, had not been working out satisfactorily.

There has been much recrimination between admirers and critics of the communists; and individual judgment is no doubt often clouded by partisan sympathy. But the following facts seem indisputable. The Chinese communists have maintained an independent state and an independent army. While it is almost impossible to estimate with certainty the precise strength of the Red armies, or the number of people who are living under communist sovereignty, it seems clear that the communists, with their experience in mass organization and propaganda, have considerably extended their influence under the favorable conditions of guerrilla warfare and suspension of the normal Chinese local administration. There have been clashes between Kuomintang and communist military units, each side usually accusing the other of aggression. One such conflict was reported late in July.

There had been some efforts at American mediation, but these did not lead to success up to the summer of 1945. The American ambassador to China, General Patrick Hurley, announced a policy of sending aid to the nationalist government only. General Hurley resigned in December of 1945 and General George C. Marshall went to China as a special envoy. The American Government announced a policy of favoring a cessation of civil strife in the unification of China under the leadership of a broadened and liberalized National Government. An

armistice between the Government and Communist troops was arranged in January, 1946.

A situation has thus been created in which the communists have established a strong basis of political support in the provinces of North China and in scattered areas elsewhere. Lacking artillery, they were not able to drive the Japanese from large cities. But since the collapse of the Japanese military occupation of China, the communists have been in a position to seize control of much of the territory north of the Yellow River. There are also definite geographical and political possibilities of linking up with Red Army forces in Outer Mongolia and in Manchuria.

The Soviet government had not until February of 1946 committed itself by any overt act to political support of the Chinese communist regime. But the leaders of this regime, Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, judging from their public statements, are entirely devoted to Moscow leadership. The Soviet press became increasingly critical of the Chungking government during the war on the ground that it had failed to mobilize the national energy and resources for the struggle against Japan.

The Chinese prime minister and foreign minister, T. V. Soong, visited Moscow and conferred with Stalin in July, 1945. The content of these talks is a closely guarded secret. But the meeting was followed by the conclusion of a Soviet-Chinese treaty, the terms of which are discussed later.

There has been a rather obscure interplay of Soviet and Chinese influence in the remote province of Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkestan, where the majority of the population is composed of Turki tribes which are sometimes restless under Chinese rule. Soviet troops entered Sinkiang in 1934 to support the tottering authority of the Chinese governor, General Sheng Shih-tsai, and Soviet influence was very strong for some years. Non-Russians were barred from most of the province and factories and roads were built on a fairly large scale, considering

the primitive economy of the region, with Soviet technical aid.

There was a reassertion of Chinese authority in Sinkiang during 1942 and 1943. Perhaps Soviet military weakness up to the time of the battle of Stalingrad was a contributing factor. Chinese officials again visited the province and portraits of Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang slogans appeared. Soviet advisers were withdrawn and industrial equipment was dismantled and removed. Russian troops withdrew from their former station at Hami.

An obscure border clash between Chinese troops and Kazakh nomads, involving a violation of the frontier of Outer Mongolia, according to Tass, the Soviet official news agency, was reported in April 1944. The replacement of Sheng Shih-tsai by Wu Chung-hsin as governor was interpreted in some circles as a gesture of conciliation toward the Soviet Union.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE JAPANESE COLLAPSE

The spectacular succession of events which led up to the unconditional surrender of Japan in August threw light on a number of Soviet Far Eastern policies which had hitherto been a matter of speculation. Two days after the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima, the Soviet Union entered the Far Eastern war, on August 8.

The Soviet forces apparently did not meet any formidable resistance, possibly because of the reported withdrawal of crack units of the Kwantung army to Japan for the purpose of resisting the anticipated American invasion. By early September the Soviet military forces were in occupation of Manchuria, northern Korea, southern Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. The two latter territories were destined for annexation to the Soviet Union. For Korea a temporary regional condominium was established, with the Soviet Union occupying the north and America the south. Both countries recognize the desirability of the ultimate independence of Korea.

emphasized this note of security, along with satisfaction that the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1904-05 had been avenged:

For forty years have we, men of the older generation, waited for this generation, waited for this day. And now this day has come.

Today Japan has acknowledged her defeat and signed the act of unconditional surrender. This means that southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands will pass to the Soviet Union and from now on will not serve as a means for isolating the Soviet Union from the ocean and as a base for Japanese attacks on our Far East. . . .

From now on we can consider our country saved from the threat of German invasion in the West and of Japanese invasion in the East.

Acquisition of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin gives Russia a window on the Pacific Ocean and a potential chain of offshore bases. One of the Kuriles, Paramushiro, had already been considerably developed by the Japanese. Regaining of the old Russian preferred position in South Manchuria and of a strong element of control of that region's relatively well-developed railway system enhances Soviet military and political power in the Far East.

2. The Soviet government will desire to wield in China an influence not inferior to that of the United States. There were two methods by which this objective could conceivably have been realized. There would have been the method, already employed on a large scale in Eastern Europe, of utilizing the Chinese communists as the nucleus of a Soviet-oriented regime in China. With the aid of the Red Army such a regime could probably have easily won control of China north of the Yellow River, if not farther south.

Such a policy would have led to a kind of informal partition of China and would have produced a serious crisis in American-Soviet relations. America is traditionally committed to the maintenance of China's political unity and administrative sovereignty. This was one of the important reasons for the conflict between America and Japan.

The other method, which the Soviet government seems to have chosen, for the time being, at least, is that of recognizing the Chungking regime as the legitimate government of China, driving a fairly hard bargain so far as Soviet economic and strategic interests in Manchuria are concerned but not presenting any demands which it would be impossible for a Chinese nationalist regime to accept.

It is unlikely that the last word has been said in the complicated triangular relationship between Moscow, Chungking, and the Chinese communists. It is not yet clear whether the old Kuomintang-Communist feud will be healed, or how much territory the Chinese communists will be found to control after the elimination of the Japanese. But the Soviet government has abstained from taking action that would, in all probability, have led to a dangerous international crisis, with the Soviet Union backing one side, and America the other, in a Chinese civil war.

3. Soviet policy in regard to postwar Japan has not found such clear expression as the Soviet determination to reassert historical Russian interests in the Chinese borderlands and to deal, for the present at least, with the Chungking regime. It is not yet known to what extent Russia will participate in the occupation of Japan.

A Japanese communist named Okano Susumu has been active in Yenan, the Chinese communist headquarters, during recent years, and has been given propaganda facilities for work among Japanese deserters and war prisoners. As yet the forces of the extreme left have not obtained representation in the Japanese administration which is functioning under the supervision of General MacArthur.

For the moment the Soviet government seems more interested in obtaining military and political guaranties for its predominance in northeastern Asia than in promoting any particular type of social order in Japan.

CHAPTER XII

INTERNATIONAL AND IMPERIALIST PROBLEMS

DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIALIST ISSUES INVOLVED
IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT
OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE

Carl J. Friedrich

Cairo and Potsdam spelled the doom of the Japanese imperial dominion overseas. By these agreements the "Three Great Allies" provided that Japan should be deprived of her entire colonial empire. "It is their purpose," reads the Cairo declaration, "that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first world war in 1914, and that all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."¹ This was followed in the Potsdam declaration by the statement that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine."² Thus Potsdam, where the United States, Great Britain, and the Republic of China were speaking, made plain the intent of the Cairo declaration, which spoke of the signatories' intention of "expelling" Japan "from all other territories which she has taken by violence or greed." The subsequent declaration of war on Japan by the Union of Socialist

Soviet Republics ended the long uncertainty concerning the Soviet's role in the future of Japanese imperialism.³

Both declarations make it clear that in the opinion of the Allies, the objective of the war against Japan is to "restrain and punish the aggression of Japan." This objective, of course, is the time-honored and generally recognized one of a "just" war. The Potsdam declaration links this aggression to "irresponsible militarism" and expresses the view that such militarism must be "driven from the world" in order to enable "a new order of peace, security and justice" to come into being. It seems to subscribe to the view that this militarism is a willful human creation, for it insists that the authority and influence of those exponents of militarism "who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest" must be eliminated. It also demands the right to punish war criminals, but without defining what constitutes a war criminal, except to say that it includes "those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners."

An interesting special point in the Potsdam proclamation is contained in the wording "the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces" as contrasted with the "unconditional surrender of Japan" in the Cairo declaration. In making this change in wording, the Potsdam declaration returned to more traditional views; for the meaning of "unconditional surrender" of armed forces is a well-known institution of the law of war, whereas the "unconditional surrender" of a whole country or nation was unknown to international law or the practice of civilized nations until the phrase was put forward at Casablanca in 1942. It has frequently been criticized as an oratorical device, and spoken of as harmful, meaningless, or even illegal.⁴ On the other hand, it has been acclaimed as the very core of Allied objectives in the war, because the destruction of fascism, nazism, militarism, and the forces allied with them could not, it was asserted, be achieved without ruthless dictation of peace

terms. Thus Winston Churchill explicitly stated it as his view that the provisions of the Atlantic Charter did not apply to the enemy, after having made it clear earlier that they also did not apply to India—nor presumably to any other British dependency.⁵ Thus what were once hailed as the general principles of a world order of peace became restricted to those who happened to be in a position to make good a claim to benefit therefrom.

Without entering into the moral implications of this sort of “idealism,” it is important to face the parallel to this approach found in the Cairo declaration. For there it was solemnly stated that the three great Allies (Great Britain, the United States, and China) do not “covet gains for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.” In this connection it is worth recalling that more than one person in American public life has advocated retention of the islands occupied by sacrifice of American lives in various parts of the Pacific area. A typical phrasing of this view has been, “All we have to do is to hold on to them till we want to let them go.” High ranking officers of the United States Navy have voiced the demand for retention of all islands that had been won with the sweat and blood of American soldiers and sailors. Furthermore, in confirming the Cairo terms, the Potsdam statement contained no suggestion that this clause denying that the Allies coveted gains for themselves had been superseded by a different principle. Yet it was known generally that the debate at San Francisco concerning the trusteeship provisions in the general charter had provoked lively discussions as to who was to take what from among the spoils of the Japanese empire.⁶

Although the Allies had “no thought of territorial expansion” at Cairo at all, nor at Potsdam either, it appears that these thoughts occurred to them with astonishing suddenness after the capitulation of Japan. The Soviet Union, always somewhat more candid in its approach to these power problems, has laid

claim to all of Sakhalin and all of the Kurile Islands. Similarly, though less blatantly, the United States seems determined to retain such islands in the Pacific as are deemed desirable for national interests. These observations are not made in any spirit of controversy or with the thought that any of these islands should be returned to Japan or ceded to any other power. Candor, however, obliges one to admit some discrepancy between the Allied profession of altruism and the actual performance. Perhaps only the pedant or the theorist worries over such slight discrepancies of word and deed. After all, we are human.

A similar hesitant note of criticism may possibly be applied to another set of words employed in the Cairo declaration. One who reads that Japan has "stolen" Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores from China may be pleased to think that all territorial acquisition by conquest is to be viewed in analogy to the private law of "theft." But when he subsequently discovers that territorial acquisitions based on conquest by the Allies—some of them made at the very time Japan "stole" lands from China—are being exempted from the operations of the provisions for international trusteeship in the United Nations Charter, the impartial student wonders if the only powers from whom conformance to such a legal and moral code is expected are the Allies' enemies. This despite the fact that their previous conduct renders their conforming to such expectations highly improbable—especially when they discover that the preaching is contrary to the example. Putting it in terms of manners rather than morals, the student not versed in practical affairs is led to conclude that the document is written in the impolite language which seems to be gaining ground in contemporary diplomacy.⁷

The shortcoming in this attempt to compare armed conquest with the private crime of "theft" is that there exists a statute against theft and one can therefore readily speak of somebody

"stealing" something that belongs to someone else: he violates the law of property. To speak of the crime of theft in connection with territorial acquisitions means, therefore, an implied revival of natural law. Natural law traditionally has been brought into play to provide standards of moral evaluation where the positive statutory law was inadequate. The notable revival of natural law in our time, especially in international concerns, is an understandable concomitant of the breakdown of the "positivism" which dominated the approach of a time in which all states professed a common outlook and civilization.⁸ Hence it must be acknowledged that the positive side of the divergencies between word and deed which we have noted in Allied policy toward Japan, as far as the general approach to the Cairo and Potsdam declarations is concerned, lies in the general sense of a world community projecting itself into these budding natural law ideas.

II

The specific provisions of the Cairo declaration deal with the Pacific islands, the presumably Chinese territories, Korea, and the colonial possessions of the powers. It would greatly exceed the limited space of this brief article to analyze the political, strategic, and economic aspects of the transfer of each and all of these territories from Japan to other powers. It has been said by authorities of standing that the proposed transfer of all her conquests would reduce Japan to a third- or fourth-rate power. It certainly would make Japan dependent upon international trade to an unprecedented extent. Whether she could survive in her islands, without such international trade becoming available on a large scale, is seriously doubted by many experts.⁹ There is no doubt, however, that she will lose these possessions.

The Pacific islands to which the Cairo declaration refers first include not only the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas groups

which were mandated to Japan after the first World War, and whose status under international law therefore is doubtful,¹⁰ but also the Paracel, the Spratley group, and the Pratas Islands. The latter are small but important from a strategic and military viewpoint. Not only mandated but also other islands come under this provision of the Cairo declaration, as obviously under the more sweeping provisions of the Potsdam declaration. The latter, by explicitly restricting Japan to its main islands, also covers the Bonin Islands and the smaller Volcano Islands, annexed by Japan in 1876 and 1891 respectively. There also is Marcus Island. These islands, being Japanese territory proper and conquered by the United States, will become United States possessions unless another disposition is made of them.

To the objection that none of the signatories of the Cairo declaration desired territorial expansion, the ingenious answer has been made that this hardly could be considered "territorial expansion" because the total area is very small, the population indigenous, and the economic value insignificant. By the same token, the acquisition by the United States of Gibraltar from Great Britain, or the taking of the Panama Canal Zone by a foreign power would not be "territorial expansion." Such interpretation of "territorial expansion" is likely to find opponents among the United Nations. Hence the commitment of the United States to "no territorial expansion" leaves open the question of the disposition of these islands. Presumably some form of international control, with United States trusteeship, will be worked out to take the curse off United States acquisition of actual control of these territories.¹¹

When we turn to the territories which are described in the declaration as "stolen from the Chinese" one difficulty lies in the use of the expression "such as" before naming Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores. Presumably this expression was employed to avoid a definitive commitment regarding the Liu Chiu Islands which link Kyūshū with Formosa. The ex-

pression "stolen from China" is rather far-fetched in its application to these islands, even if it were admitted with reference to the territories named. The Liu Chius were semi-independent and acknowledged a measure of dependence to both Japan and China by paying tribute to both. As a result of disputes in the 1870's the Japanese secured sovereign control over this archipelago, which is inhabited by a population distinct from both Chinese and Japanese. Since the Liu Chius occupy a strategic position in relation to the East China Sea, any power in actual possession of them can greatly hamper the foreign trade of China. They also provide an excellent jumping-off point for the invasion of Kyushū. It may be asserted without risk of too much contradiction that control over these islands should be vested in China, perhaps reinforced by some international safeguards and bases for the United States.¹²

Formosa and Manchuria admittedly constitute Chinese territory whose economic loss is very serious for Japan.¹³ It may be noted in passing that the argument advanced in favor of Britain's retaining Hongkong—namely, that she developed the island—could be urged with equal justice in favor of Japan. It is acknowledged generally, though not universally, that these territories owe a good part of their economic significance to skillful integration into Japan's economy. Their proposed transfer to the Republic of China has serious economic implications both for Japan and for the territories themselves. It is the expectation of some experts that Americans will take over the role of the Japanese as capitalist enterprisers in Formosa if not in Manchuria. The proximity of the Soviet Union probably will act as a deterrent for American capital in Manchuria. The adjacent Chinese communist territory also will be a factor of uncertainty. It might be mentioned in passing that the words "such as" presumably also cover the provinces of Jehol and Charhar, as well as those sections of Inner Mongolia occupied by Japan between 1933 and 1938. In a recent treaty between

China and the Soviet Union,¹⁴ this presumption was sanctioned; the Soviet Union secured important economic and railway rights in return for a full acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty. For the time being at least, this treaty also laid the ghost of a separate communist North China fostered by the U.S.S.R. Apparently Soviet diplomacy skillfully used the threat of civil war resulting from local communist activity in order to obtain concrete advantages, and as elsewhere the local communists were abandoned to their fate—at least temporarily.

The vastness of the issues involved in the proposed settlement for Korea stands in inverse proportion to the size and intrinsic importance of the country. Since the Cairo declaration undertook to guarantee Korean independence "in due course," the country has been occupied by the Russians and the Americans. They divided Korea between them along a line that roughly allots the northwestern 57 per cent to Russia and the southeastern 43 per cent to the United States.

There was no indication in the Cairo declaration as to the meaning of "in due course." It has since been clarified. The reason for the original formula is seen in the alleged lack of available leadership for an independent Korea,¹⁵ although the argument is contested hotly by Koreans and their friends.¹⁶ The fact that the old ruling class has been wiped out or assimilated by the Japanese is certainly not a sufficient argument in support of this contention, and the vigor with which Koreans have maintained a number of centers abroad, operating in the Chinese, American, and Russian spheres of influence, certainly would argue in favor of the presumption that new leadership groups will crystallize rapidly. Here as elsewhere the Soviet Union's readiness to accept proletarian elements as promising material for effective political organization is certainly more imaginative than the British and American tendency to assume that leadership presupposes a vigorous middle class.

Since the Japanese developed very considerable economic

activity in Korea, essentially controlled and directed by Japanese capital,¹⁷ the problem of who comes into possession of these capital resources is a most important one. It is unfortunate that the Cairo declaration in no wise concerned itself with this question, but the Potsdam statement carries the inference that the Japanese will lose control over these capital resources as individuals no less than as a nation. It is to be hoped that the Korean people will be given the opportunity to acquire them on terms which will insure their future growth. This seems most likely to be the case, if they become part of a government-controlled pattern of economy. Unfortunately, such a solution is apt to be misunderstood in the United States.

III

It has been ably argued that the stripping of Japan of her colonial overseas possessions will effectively cripple her future war-making power, because of the limited natural resources within the reach of the Japanese on their home islands.¹⁸ There can be little question that under modern conditions, lack of natural resources greatly limits *direct* war potential. However, the indirect war potential of a nation of the size of Japan is obviously closely related to the propensity of the nation to go to war, and this in turn is a matter to some extent of internal tensions and consequent outward projections of internal instability and the anxieties resulting therefrom. Indeed, some close students of the Japanese mentality and social structure have maintained that depriving Japan of her empire will in no sense prevent her from waging war again. They plead that an internal revolution must be induced. "What Japan must go through is the political, economic, social, intellectual, and moral equivalents of the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Reformation, the Industrial Revolution, and the Renaissance." "This she can do only with the encouragement of others outside her borders, but the major part of the responsibility must be shouldered by the Japanese."¹⁹

Leaving aside for the moment the practicability of outsiders "encouraging" such development, it would seem that these voices echo the approach first suggested by Thorstein Veblen in *An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation* (1917). While the argument was cast primarily with regard to Imperial Germany, a direct parallel is suggested with Imperial Japan throughout. In essence, Veblen thought that Germany and Japan were the best instances of the "Dynastic State" "bent on dominion," and since the "dominion is not to be had except by fighting for it, both are in effect incorrigibly bent on warlike enterprise."²⁰ Therefore, evidently, "in the presence of these two Imperial Powers any peace compact will be precarious." He then goes on to suggest that there are two ways of maintaining peace: "Submission to their dominion, or elimination of these two powers." He was quite convinced that any attempt to make peace with either of them, without eliminating the social structure upon which rested "the imperial enterprise of the dynastic state," was foredoomed to failure. The "Imperial frame of mind" would sooner or later "devote all its powers of force and fraud" to the resumption of the "pursuit of Imperial dominion." Hence Veblen felt that only a protracted period of disabusing the Germans and the Japanese of their feudal propensity to support loyally the dynastic enterprise could possibly lead to a lasting peace. Insisting that the Japanese case is completely parallel to that of Germany,²¹ Veblen urged elimination of the imperial military clique, even though the Germans (and the Japanese) would not like it, abolition of all trade discriminations by or against Germany, elimination of all "colonial possessions," including British colonies, disarmament on a progressive scale, and presumably the continuation of firm controls, until democracy had struck secure roots in German (Japanese) soil.²²

All this does not mean that Veblen was unaware of the war-making propensities of competitive business enterprise; far

from it. But he did think the free institutions of the Western powers provided the common man with a chance to vindicate his interests against the vested ones. What he would have thought of the Soviet Union's place in a permanent peace order is anybody's guess. But at the end of his discussion he considered briefly the problem of "Peace and the Price System" and concluded:

The decision, or the choice, lies between two alternatives: either the price-system and its attendant business enterprise will yield and pass out; or the pacific nations will conserve their pecuniary scheme of law and order at the cost of returning to a war footing and letting their owners preserve the rights of ownership by force of arms. . . . the preservation of the present pecuniary law and order with all its incidents of ownership and investment, is incompatible with an unwarlike state of peace and security.²³

Therefore Veblen would like to have the peacemakers start "the present abatement and eventual abrogation of the rights of ownership and of the price-system in which these rights take effect."

The kinship of this approach with the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism is apparent, although the stress on "dynastic state" and "dynastic enterprise" is not. War, according to this theory, is the result of the clashing interest of monopolists who enlist the fighting power of modern nations in support of their special interests in giant exploitative enterprises.²⁴ Hence, the only road which leads from war to lasting peace is the road of social revolution which liquidates capitalism and more especially the monopolies. Peace between capitalist countries is nothing but an armed truce. Hence the sooner a liquidation of the property and price system can be achieved, the better it will be for lasting peace. These views have repeatedly been stated as official Soviet doctrine by Stalin and others, and hence it is not surprising to find them reflected in the Potsdam statement which clearly implies a socialist commonwealth, both in Ger-

many and Japan, since the vast changes in social structure and institutions can only be brought about through the discipline of a planned economy.

The foregoing observations are not made with any desire either to commend or to condemn the Marxist-Leninist doctrines. If what has been said condemns them in the eyes of many American readers, this merely shows how far apart the erstwhile Allies are in their approach to problems of peace and war. It will be necessary for Americans to face the facts as they are, insofar as they can be ascertained. Conclusions from these facts will vary in accordance with preconceived notions and *a priori* assumptions. The author himself has to admit that he is unable to say whether the Leninist analysis of imperialism is correct or not and hence likewise unable to determine whether a program of international settlements based upon the application of this idea to Japan and Germany, without a similar application to other countries, will produce a regime of enduring peace or not.

IV

The emerging international order, if an order is emerging, is presumably going to be patterned after the Charter of the United Nations, drafted at San Francisco and adopted by the United States and other nations in the course of the summer and fall of 1945. This charter provides for the eventual membership of enemy nations, and since it is based upon the "sovereign equality of all peace-loving states" presumably this membership is going to await the time when the enemy states are deemed to have become "peace loving." In the absence of any explicit standards as to what constitutes "peace lovingness," it is to be assumed that this means in effect that these enemy states will be admitted when it pleases a sufficient number of their former enemies. There will, if we admit the precedent of the League of Nations, take place an extended period of bickering prior to

admission, and it would not be too surprising if the initiative for admitting an enemy nation itself proved to be related to a new struggle for power within the United Nations.²⁵ There are already clear indications that the several great powers who are the originators of the United Nations Organization have begun to appraise the situation of Japan in relation to a balance of power in Eastern Asia.²⁶

However, quite apart from membership, the international prospects of Japan appear to be bound up with the future of the United Nations Organization. The Potsdam declaration announced that "access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted." It added that "eventual participation in world trade relations shall be permitted." Unless considerable changes take place in her agriculture,²⁷ it is indeed difficult to see how Japan can possibly maintain her present population, tied as it is to the unrestricted exploitation of vast colonial territories which will be taken from her forthwith, unless Japan is given access to raw materials.²⁸ But even the international credit facilities provided for by the Bretton Woods agreements will be desperately needed by the Japanese, in order to enable them to bridge the gap between exports and imports in the initial period. The Economic and Social Council and its several commissions and councils will be vital to the Japanese. Yet, whether those in control will be prepared to facilitate Japanese reconstruction may be considered more than doubtful.

There exists, however, one counterbalancing factor in the situation which, if efficiently exploited, may help the Japanese to transform themselves into the new kind of society which the Cairo and Potsdam declarations impose. It is the result of enforced demilitarization. Like Germany (and many other nations) the Japanese devoted a very considerable share of the national dividend to armaments and preparation for war. This consumption of guns, rather than food, provides a substantial

leverage for capital accumulation, especially under a controlled, socialized economy such as our policy makes highly probable. To put it another way, the vast sums employed for keeping Japanese men unemployed so as to make them serve in the armed forces can be used to start fresh enterprise in which to employ them. The state of Japanese statistics makes it impossible to do more than indicate the general consideration.

v

In conclusion, it can be said that the destruction of the Japanese imperial dynastic enterprise and its continuous threat to the peace should progress rapidly under the provisions of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, if they are applied without subterfuge and equivocation. Whether these policies will in point of fact eliminate Japan as a threat to the peace is another matter which it is impossible to assess at the present time. Perhaps new and unforeseen factors will inject themselves which will make Japan an ally of a power which desires to wage war upon another power before another twenty-five years. The United States can forestall such a development only by continuously pressing for a fuller development of the international peace structure, while at the same time remaining practical and realistic in keeping the instruments of war away from Japan. Occupation and strict control of the import trade should go a long way in implementing this policy. It rests basically and at the outset upon depriving Japan of her colonial empire—a policy now firmly settled through the declarations issued at Cairo and Potsdam and included in the Japanese surrender terms. The doubtful moralist who is troubled by what this may do to the Japanese people may be able to console himself with the thought that nothing could be worse than to allow the Japanese to travel the road of the Germans, and to get themselves thus involved in national self-destruction through an imaginary revival of the fascist type.

NOTES

1. See full text, with citation of official source, in Appendix A. A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938), *passim*, for historical background, as well as T. A. Bisson's study, *America's Far Eastern Policy* (New York, 1945).

2. See full text, with citation of official sources, in Appendix A.

3. The U.S.S.R., in declaring war on Japan on August 8, 1945, included this significant phrase in the statement to the Japanese government: "Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the Declaration of the Allied Powers of July 26th." The reference is to the Potsdam declaration, and places the Soviet Union on record with respect to that document. *N. Y. Times*, August 8, 1945.

4. E.g., Commander Stephen King-Hall repeatedly in Parliamentary debates during October 1944. Captain G. H. Liddell Hart was reported by *Worldover Press* as writing that "unconditional surrender is delaying victory." H. G. Wells attacked it sharply. See also *N. Y. Times*, January 15, 1945, for an Italian criticism. At the same time, various "conditions" were being developed until the *N. Y. Times* wrote editorially (January 25, 1945) that "no conditional surrender can imaginably be loaded up with conditions as is the usual statement of the case for unconditional surrender." Cf. also the *Economist* (London) for repeated criticism.

5. Speech by Prime Minister Churchill, House of Commons, September 9, 1941. Quoted in Winston S. Churchill, *The Unrelenting Struggle* (Boston, 1942), p. 248.

6. *N. Y. Times*, May 17, 18, 19, 1945.

7. It is strange to follow this development. In former barbaric times diplomats were in the habit of calling a power a "friend" unless they were about to deliver a declaration of war. Today, the diplomatic representatives of "allied" powers suggest that their opponents are all sorts of immoral things, Bevin even suggesting that Molotoff is not a proletarian, like himself. Cf. Harold Nicolson's interesting remarks on this score, in his *Lord Curzon* (London and New York, 1934). See also C. J. Friedrich, *Foreign Policy in the Making* (New York, 1938).

8. Cf. the treatment given in C. Grove Haines, *The Revival of Natural Law Concepts* (Cambridge, Mass., 1930), ch. xi.

9. For both sides of the discussion see Harold G. Moulton and Louis Marlio, *The Control of Germany and Japan* (Washington, 1944). William C. Johnstone, *The Future of Japan* (New York, 1945) ch. x, takes the view that internal reorganization and dissolution of the Zaibatsu are the central task. He would have Japan become an "Asiatic Sweden." T. A. Bisson, *op. cit.*, also takes this view. Edward Ackerman in Chapter VI of the present book argues in favor of the ability of Japan to maintain herself with very limited imports.

10. It all turns upon whether one accepts one or another of the current doctrines concerning sovereignty in relation to mandates under the League. This is a highly controversial question, for which see Quincy Wright, *Mandates Under the League of Nations* (Chicago, 1930). If sovereignty is not attributed to the mandatory power, the question of who is the sovereign still remains open. The League? The Allied and Associated Powers? The United Nations? Nor is it at all clear what might be the lawful consequences of "conquest" under any of these alternatives. Much loose talk has been used by men—some in high positions—who never faced the issues involved here, and who talk as if the United States had been at war with the League. (See also references in next two footnotes.)

11. Cf. Huntington Gilchrist, "The Japanese Islands: Annexation or Trusteeship?" *Foreign Affairs* (July 1944). See also T. A. Bisson, *America's Far Eastern Policy* (New York, 1945), ch. xv. Bisson favors trusteeship.

12. For a different point of view, see E. Herbert Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York, 1940), pp. 194 ff.; he argues that the struggle for independence led to expansion. His is the most convincing analysis of Japanese governmental development.

13. See E. B. Schumpeter, ed., *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940* (New York, 1940), *passim*; William C. Johnstone, *The Future of Japan* (New York and London, 1945), p. 55; Owen Lattimore, *Solution in Asia* (Boston, 1945), p. 164.

14. Full text in "The Chinese-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance," *Contemporary China* (New York, Chinese News Service), vol. v, nos. 8-9, (September 1945). The Li-Lobanov treaty between China and Russia in 1896 makes interesting reading in this context. A comparison of the two has been made by Raymond Dennett, "Sino-Soviet Accord," *Far Eastern Survey* (1945), pp. 275 ff.

15. This appears to be the official American and Soviet view. Both countries are believed to favor an international trusteeship as an interim solution. More extreme was Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination* (New York, 1942), p. 359, who stated the view that the Koreans cannot govern themselves and suggested Japanese (*sic!*) trusteeship.

16. See R. T. Oliver, *Korea—Forgotten Nation* (Washington, 1944). Cf. also Andrew J. Grajdanzev, *Modern Korea* (New York, 1944), ch. xvi, esp. pp. 279 and 280, where the issue is adumbrated with care: "Thus there are in Korea people with an ability to organize, with education, with some experience in handling public affairs; and there is no reason to think that the new country would be handicapped in that respect any more than Yugoslavia or Lithuania was after 1918. . . . Therefore there appears to be no reason why Korea should not be given a right to organize herself as an independent state." The great powers have come close to accepting this contention when they agreed at Moscow late in 1945 to recommend a trusteeship for a period of five years. This trusteeship under a high commissioner and a council composed of representatives of the great powers and perhaps some

smaller ones might collaborate with a Korean elected legislature for a fixed term, say five years, after which independence would be granted. The way is left open, however, to dispense with the trusteeship and to grant independence before the five years have elapsed. See text of Secretary Byrnes' address, *New York Times*, December 31, 1945.

17. See Andrew J. Grajdanzev, *op. cit.* See also E. B. Schumpeter, ed., *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940*, chs. ix-xi; G. C. Allen, *Japanese Industry—Its Recent Development and Present Condition* (New York, 1940), pp. 55-58, 98-99.

18. See Harold G. Moulton and Louis Marlio, *The Control of Germany and Japan* (Washington, 1944), ch. v. Cf. also the study by Edward A. Ackerman in Chapter II for supporting facts and figures.

19. John M. Maki, *Japanese Militarism, Its Cause and Cure* (New York, 1944), pp. 3 ff. and pp. 229 ff. Maki even adds the demilitarization of Japan to this decolonization and still considers it inadequate.

20. From *The Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation* by Thorstein Veblen. Copyright 1917 by The Macmillan Company, 1945 by Ann B. Sims. By permission of The Viking Press, Inc. First edition, p. 82. Veblen is ironically insistent upon his not being concerned with the intrinsic merits of peace and war, and hence his not wishing to imply disapprobation of these two powers. "The facts are to be taken impersonally for what they are worth in their causal bearing on the chance of peace and war; not at their sentimental value as traits of conduct to be appraised in point of their goodness or expediency" (p. 82).

21. *Op. cit.*, p. 117 and elsewhere. The extraordinary developments between 1919 and 1939 cannot be said to contradict Veblen's analysis, on the score of either Germany or Japan. The latter, it will be remembered, had a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations.

22. *Op. cit.*, pp. 258 ff. A somewhat different scheme is outlined on pages 271-272 where Veblen puts the matter of the necessary conditions of a lasting peace vis-a-vis Germany, Japan, etc., thus:

"(1) The definitive elimination of the Imperial establishment, together with the monarchical establishments of the several states of the Empire and the privileged classes;

(2) Removal or destruction of all warlike equipment, military and naval, defensive and offensive;

(3) Cancellation of the public debt, of the Empire and its members—creditors of the Empire being accounted accessory to the culpable enterprise of the Imperial government;

(4) Confiscation of such industrial equipment and resources as have contributed to the carrying on of the war, as being also accessory;

(5) Assumption by the league at large of all debts incurred, by the Entente belligerents or by neutrals, for the prosecution or by reason of the war, and distribution of the obligation so assumed, impartially among the members of the league, including the peoples of the defeated nations;

(6) Indemnification of all injury done to civilians in the invaded territories; the means for such indemnification to be procured by confiscation of all estates in the defeated countries exceeding a very modest maximum . . . the kept classes being properly accounted accessory to the Empire's culpable enterprise." (Quoted by permission of the publisher.) It will be noticed that these conditions closely parallel the Cairo and Potsdam declarations not only for Japan but also for Germany.

23. *Op. cit.*, p. 366, quoted by permission of the publisher.

24. N. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Latest Stage in the Development of Capitalism* (1917; tr. Detroit, 1924). Karl Renner, *Marxismus, Krieg und Internationale* (Stuttgart, 1918). E. M. Winslow, "Marxian, Liberal and Sociological Theories of Imperialism," *Journal of Political Economy* (1931), pp. 731 ff., and the recent analysis by Paul M. Sweezy, *The Theory of Capitalist Development* (New York, 1942), ch. xiii-xix, esp. chs. xiii and xviii. Cf. also J. Stalin, *Leninism* (New York, 1942), esp. pp. 298 ff., 434 ff.

25. For the process of admission of Germany into the League and its relationship to the reappearance of the balance of power within and around the League see C. J. Friedrich, *Foreign Policy in the Making—the Search for a New Balance of Power* (New York, 1938). The development contains lessons which the strategists of the United Nations Organization seem to have cast to the wind.

26. This approach was set forth with amoral candor by Nicholas J. Spykman in *America's Strategy in World Politics—the United States and the Balance of Power* (New York, 1942) esp. ch. v. Further on p. 470 we read: "If the balance of power in the Far East is to be preserved in the future as well as in the present, the United States will have to adopt . . . a protective policy toward Japan." And on p. 69 that "the main difficulty of the post-war period will not be Japan but China." We abstain from detailed documentation of present trends, since it would have to be done rather sketchily in any event, and the blanket of censorship has deprived us of any definite knowledge of what went on at Potsdam or London, except to say that the Soviet Union insisted upon and has now secured a share in the occupation of Japan.

27. The contradiction of this statement with Ackerman as stated in Chapter II is apparent, not real. If additional capital and other factors contributing to social change were available, which are lacking, the above sentence would read differently.

28. Cf. however the line of argument developed by Ackerman in Chapter II.

APPENDIX A

Official texts of:

THE CAIRO DECLARATION

THE POTSDAM PROCLAMATION

UNITED STATES INITIAL POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN

THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN (Meiji Constitution)

With Imperial Oath, Imperial Speech on the Promulgation
of the Constitution, and Imperial House Law

THE CAIRO DECLARATION

From the *Department of State Bulletin*, Washington, December 4, 1943,
p. 393

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL IN NORTH AFRICA

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa.

The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

THE POTSDAM PROCLAMATION

From the *Department of State Bulletin*, Washington, July 29, 1945,
pp. 137 ff.

PROCLAMATION DEFINING TERMS FOR JAPANESE SURRENDER

[Footnote in original] This proclamation issued on July 26, 1945, by the heads of governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and China was signed by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at Potsdam and concurred in by the President of the National Government of China, who communicated with President Truman by despatch.

(1) We—the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, *will* mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the

Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established *and* until there is convincing proof that Japan's warmaking power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To

this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

*FIRST PUBLISHED DIRECTIVE TO
GENERAL MACARTHUR*

From the *Department of State Bulletin*, Washington, Sept. 23, 1945,
pp. 423-427.

U. S. INITIAL POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN

The following statement of general initial policy relating to Japan after surrender was prepared jointly by the Department of State, the War Department, and the Navy Department and approved by the President on Sept. 6. The document in substance was sent to General MacArthur by radio on August 29 and, after approval by the President, by messenger on September 6.

U. S. INITIAL POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN

Purpose of this Document

This document is a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan after surrender. It has been approved by the President and distributed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to appropriate U. S. departments and agencies for their guidance. It does not deal with all matters relating to the occupation of Japan requiring policy determinations. Such matters as are not included or are not fully covered herein have been or will be dealt with separately.

Part I—Ultimate Objectives

The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform, are:

- (a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.
- (b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and

responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.

These objectives will be achieved by the following principal means:

(a) Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined, in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and other agreements to which the United States is or may be a party.

(b) Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic, and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed.

(c) The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and the press. They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.

(d) The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met.

Part II—Allied Authority

1. *Military Occupation*

There will be a military occupation of the Japanese home islands to carry into effect the surrender terms and further the achievement of the ultimate objectives stated above. The occupation shall have the character of an operation in behalf of the principal Allied powers acting in the interests of the United Nations at war with Japan. For

that reason, participation of the forces of other nations that have taken a leading part in the war against Japan will be welcomed and expected. The occupation forces will be under the command of a Supreme Commander designated by the United States.

Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied powers, in the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern.

2. Relationship to Japanese Government

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.

In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration. This policy, however, will be subject to the right and duty of the Supreme Commander to require changes in governmental machinery or personnel or to act directly if the Emperor or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, moreover, does not commit the Supreme Commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of United States objectives. The policy is to use the existing form of Government in Japan, not to support it. Changes in the form of Government initiated by the Japanese people or Government in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to

be permitted and favored. In the event that the effectuation of such changes involves the use of force by the Japanese people or government against persons opposed thereto, the Supreme Commander should intervene only where necessary to ensure the security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation.

3. Publicity as to Policies

The Japanese people, and the world at large, shall be kept fully informed of the objectives and policy of the occupation, and of progress made in their fulfillment.

Part III—Political

1. Disarmament and Demilitarization

Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination. Every effort shall be made to bring home to the Japanese people the part played by the military and naval leaders, and those who collaborated with them, in bringing about the existing and future distress of the people.

Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police organization, or any civil aviation. Japan's ground, air and naval forces shall be disarmed and disbanded and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff and all secret police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval materiel, military and naval vessels and military and naval installations, and military, naval and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered and shall be disposed of as required by the Supreme Commander.

High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and General Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultra-na-

tionalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited.

Militarism and ultra-nationalism, in doctrine and practice, including para-military training, shall be eliminated from the educational system. Former career military and naval officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, and all other exponents of militarism and ultra-nationalism shall be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions.

2. *War Criminals*

Persons charged by the Supreme Commander or appropriate United Nations Agencies with being war criminals, including those charged with having visited cruelties upon United Nations prisoners or other nationals, shall be arrested, tried and, if convicted, punished. Those wanted by another of the United Nations for offenses against its nationals, shall, if not wanted for trial or as witnesses or otherwise by the Supreme Commander, be turned over to the custody of such other nation.

3. *Encouragement of Desire for Individual Liberties and Democratic Processes*

Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly on occupation. At the same time it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultra-nationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.

The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture, and the accomplishments of the United States and the other democracies. Association of personnel of the occupation forces with the Japanese population should be controlled, only to the extent necessary, to further the policies and objectives of the occupation.

Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and public discussion, shall be encouraged, subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the occupying forces.

Laws, decrees and regulations which establish discriminations on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion shall be abro-

gated; those which conflict with the objectives and policies outlined in this document shall be repealed, suspended or amended as required; and agencies charged specifically with their enforcement shall be abolished or appropriately modified. Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authority on political grounds shall be released. The judicial, legal and police systems shall be reformed as soon as practicable to conform to the policies set forth in Articles 1 and 3 of this Part III and thereafter shall be progressively influenced, to protect individual liberties and civil rights.

Part IV—Economic

1. Economic Demilitarization

The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.

Therefore, a program will be enforced containing the following elements, among others; the immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment, maintenance, or use of any military force or establishment; the imposition of a ban upon any specialized facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft; the institution of a system of inspection and control over selected elements in Japanese economic activity to prevent concealed or disguised military preparation; the elimination in Japan of those selected industries or branches of production whose chief value to Japan is in preparing for war; the prohibition of specialized research and instruction directed to the development of war-making power; and the limitation of the size and character of Japan's heavy industries to its future peaceful requirements, and restriction of Japanese merchant shipping to the extent required to accomplish the objectives of demilitarization.

The eventual disposition of those existing production facilities within Japan which are to be eliminated in accord with this program, as between conversion to other uses, transfer abroad, and scrapping will be determined after inventory. Pending decision,

facilities readily convertible for civilian production should not be destroyed, except in emergency situations.

2. Promotion of Democratic Forces

Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activity in support of military ends.

To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

- (a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends; and
- (b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry.

3. Resumption of Peaceful Economic Activity

The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and confronted them with the prospect of economic difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction, deeply to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities and institutions, and to find useful employment for their people along lines adapted to and devoted to peace. The Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due time.

Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can be effected without causing starvation, widespread disease and acute physical distress.

The Japanese authorities will be expected, and if necessary directed, to maintain, develop and enforce programs that serve the following purposes:

- (a) To avoid acute economic distress.
- (b) To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.
- (c) To meet the requirements for reparations deliveries agreed upon by the Allied Governments.
- (d) To facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied.

In this connection, the Japanese authorities on their own responsibility shall be permitted to establish and administer controls over economic activities, including essential national public services, finance, banking, and production and distribution of essential commodities, subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander in order to assure their conformity with the objectives of the occupation.

4. Reparations and Restitution

REPARATIONS

Reparations for Japanese aggression shall be made:

- (a) Through the transfer—as may be determined by the appropriate Allied authorities—of Japanese property located outside of the territories to be retained by Japan.
- (b) Through the transfer of such goods or existing capital equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supplying of the occupying forces. Exports other than those directed to be shipped on reparation account or as restitution may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange. No form of reparation shall be exacted which will interfere with or prejudice the program for Japan's demilitarization.

RESTITUTION

Full and prompt restitution will be required of all identifiable looted property.

5. Fiscal, Monetary, and Banking Policies

The Japanese authorities will remain responsible for the management and direction of the domestic fiscal, monetary, and credit policies subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander.

6. International Trade and Financial Relations

Japan shall be permitted eventually to resume normal trade relations with the rest of the world. During occupation and under suitable controls, Japan will be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods that it may need for peaceful purposes, and to export goods to pay for approved imports.

Control is to be maintained over all imports and exports of goods, and foreign exchange and financial transactions. Both the policies followed in the exercise of these controls and their actual administration shall be subject to the approval and supervision of the Supreme Commander in order to make sure that they are not contrary to the policies of the occupying authorities, and in particular that all foreign purchasing power that Japan may acquire is utilized only for essential needs.

7. Japanese Property Located Abroad

Existing Japanese external assets and existing Japanese assets located in territories detached from Japan under the terms of surrender, including assets owned in whole or part by the Imperial Household and Government, shall be revealed to the occupying authorities and held for disposition according to the decision of the Allied authorities.

8. Equality of Opportunity for Foreign Enterprise within Japan

The Japanese authorities shall not give, or permit any Japanese business organization to give, exclusive or preferential opportunity

or terms to the enterprise of any foreign country, or cede to such enterprise control of any important branch of economic activity.

9. *Imperial Household Property*

Imperial Household property shall not be exempted from any action necessary to carry out the objectives of the occupation.

THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN

Granted by the Emperor Meiji, in 1889; together with the Imperial Oath, the Imperial Speech on the Promulgation of the Constitution, and the Imperial House Law.

Official text of official translation, from *The Constitution of Japan with Laws and Regulations Appertaining Thereto*, published by the "Rising Generation," Okazaki-ya, Kanda, Tōkyō.

IMPERIAL OATH AT THE SANCTUARY OF THE IMPERIAL PALACE.

We, the Successor to the prosperous Throne of Our Predecessors, do humbly and solemnly swear to the Imperial Founder of Our House and to Our other Imperial Ancestors that, in pursuance of a great policy co-extensive with the Heavens and with the Earth, We shall maintain and secure from decline the ancient form of government.

In consideration of the progressive tendency of the course of human affairs and in parallel with the advance of civilization, We deem it expedient, in order to give clearness and distinctness to the instructions bequeathed by the Imperial Founder of Our House and by Our other Imperial Ancestors, to establish fundamental laws formulated into express provisions of law, so that, on the one hand, Our Imperial posterity may possess an express guide for the course they are to follow, and that, on the other, Our subjects shall thereby be enabled to enjoy a wider range of action in giving Us their support, and that the observance of Our laws shall continue to the remotest ages of time. We will thereby to give greater firmness to the stability of Our country and to promote the welfare of all the people within the boundaries of Our dominions; and We now establish the Imperial House Law and the Constitution. These Laws

come to only an exposition of grand precepts for the conduct of the government bequeathed by the Imperial Founder of Our House and by Our other Imperial Ancestors. That We have been so fortunate in Our reign, in keeping with the tendency of the times, as to accomplish this work, We owe to the glorious Spirits of the Imperial Founder of Our House and of Our other Imperial Ancestors.

We now reverently make Our prayer to Them and to Our Illustrious Father, and implore the help of Their Sacred Spirits, and make to Them solemn oath never at this time nor in the future to fail to be an example to Our subjects in the observance of the Laws hereby established.

May the Heavenly Spirits witness this Our Solemn Oath.

IMPERIAL SPEECH ON THE PROMULGATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Whereas, We make it the joy and glory of Our heart to behold the prosperity of Our country, and the welfare of Our subjects, We do hereby, in virtue of the supreme power We inherit from Our Imperial Ancestors, promulgate the present immutable fundamental law, for the sake of Our present subjects and their descendants.

The Imperial Founder of Our House and Our other Imperial Ancestors, by the help and support of the forefathers of Our subjects, laid the foundation of Our Empire upon a basis which is to last forever. That this brilliant achievement embellishes the annals of Our country, is due to the glorious virtues of Our Sacred Imperial Ancestors, and to the loyalty and bravery of Our subjects, their love of their country, and their public spirit. Considering that Our subjects are the descendants of the loyal and good subjects of Our Imperial Ancestors, We doubt not but that Our subjects will be guided by Our views, and will sympathize with all Our endeavours, and that, harmoniously coöperating together, they will share with Us Our hope of making manifest the glory of Our Country, both at home and abroad, and of securing forever the stability of the work bequeathed to Us by Our Imperial Ancestors.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN.

Having, by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the throne of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give development to, the moral and intellectual faculties of Our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favoured with the benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors; and hoping to maintain the prosperity of the State in concert with Our people and with their support, We hereby promulgate, in pursuance of Our Imperial Rescript of the 14th day of the 10th month of the 14th year of Meiji, a fundamental law of State, to exhibit the principles by which We are to be guided in Our conduct, and to point out to what Our descendants and Our subjects and their descendants are forever to conform.

¶ The rights of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants. Neither We nor they shall in future fail to wield them, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution hereby granted.

We now declare to respect and protect the security of the rights and of the property of Our people, and to secure to them the complete enjoyment of the same, within the extent of the provisions of the present Constitution and of the law.

The Imperial Diet shall first be convoked for the 23rd year of Meiji, and the time of its opening shall be the date when the present Constitution comes into force.

When in the future it may become necessary to amend any of the provisions of the present Constitution, We or Our successors shall assume the initiative right, and submit a project for the same to the Imperial Diet. The Imperial Diet shall pass its vote upon it, according to the conditions imposed by the present Constitution, and in no otherwise shall Our descendants or Our subjects be permitted to attempt any alteration thereof.

Our Ministers of State, on Our behalf, shall be held responsible for the carrying out of the present Constitution, and Our present and future subjects shall forever assume the duty of allegiance to the present Constitution.

CHAPTER I—THE EMPEROR.

Article I.—The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.

Article II.—The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by Imperial male descendants, according to the provisions of the Imperial House Law.

Article III.—The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.

Article IV.—The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them according to the provisions of the present Constitution.

Article V.—The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article VI.—The Emperor gives sanction to laws, and orders them to be promulgated and executed.

Article VII.—The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives.

Article VIII.—The Emperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, issues, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial Ordinances in the place of law.

Such Imperial Ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve the said Ordinances, the Government shall declare them to be invalid for the future.

Article IX.—The Emperor issues or causes to be issued, the Ordinances necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws.

Article X.—The Emperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration, and the salaries of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the same. Exceptions especially provided for in the present Constitution or in other laws, shall be in accordance with the respective provisions (bearing thereon).

Article XI.—The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy.

Article XII.—The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy.

Article XIII.—The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties.

Article XIV.—The Emperor proclaims the law of siege.

The conditions and effects of the law of siege shall be determined by law.

Article XV.—The Emperor confers titles of nobility, rank, orders and other marks of honour.

Article XVI.—The Emperor orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments, and rehabilitation.

Article XVII.—A Regency shall be instituted in conformity with the provisions of the Imperial House Law.

The Regent shall exercise the powers appertaining to the Emperor in His name.

CHAPTER II—RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF SUBJECTS.

Article XVIII.—The conditions necessary for being a Japanese subject shall be determined by law.

Article XIX.—Japanese subjects, may, according to qualifications determined in laws or ordinances, be appointed to civil or military offices equally, and may fill any other public offices.

Article XX.—Japanese subjects are amenable to service in the Army or Navy according to the provisions of law.

Article XXI.—Japanese subjects are amenable to the duty of paying taxes, according to the provisions of law.

Article XXII.—Japanese subjects shall have the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits of law.

Article XXIII.—No Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried, or punished, unless according to law.

Article XXIV.—No Japanese subject shall be deprived of his right of being tried by the judges determined by law.

Article XXV.—Except in the cases provided for in the law, the

house of no Japanese subject shall be entered or searched without his consent.

Article XXVI.—Except in the cases mentioned in the law, the secrecy of the letters of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate.

Article XXVII.—The right of property of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate.

Measures necessary to be taken for the public benefit shall be provided for by law.

Article XXVIII.—Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.

Article XXIX.—Japanese subjects shall within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meeting, and association.

Article XXX.—Japanese subjects may present petitions, by observing the proper form of respect, and by complying with the rules specially provided for the same.

Article XXXI.—The provisions contained in the present Chapter, shall not affect the exercise of the powers appertaining to the Emperor, in times of war or in cases of a national emergency.

Article XXXII.—Each and every one of the provisions contained in the preceding Articles of the present chapter, that are not in conflict with the laws or the rules and discipline of the Army and Navy, shall apply to the officers and men of the Army and of the Navy.

CHAPTER III.—THE IMPERIAL DIET.

Article XXXIII.—The Imperial Diet shall consist of two Houses, a House of Peers and a House of Representatives.

Article XXXIV.—The House of Peers shall, in accordance with the Ordinance concerning the House of Peers, be composed of the members of the Imperial Family, of the orders of nobility, and of those persons who have been nominated thereto by the Emperor.

Article XXXV.—The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members elected by the people, according to the provisions of the Law of Election.

Article XXXVI.—No one can at one and the same time be a Member of both Houses.

Article XXXVII.—Every law requires the Imperial Diet.

Article XXXVIII.—Both Houses shall vote upon projects of law submitted to them by Government, and may respectively initiate projects of law.

Article XXXIX.—A Bill, which has been rejected by either the one or the other of the two Houses, shall not be again brought in during the same session.

Article XL.—Both Houses can make representations to the Government, as to laws or upon any other subject. When, however, such representations are not accepted, they cannot be made a second time during the same session.

Article XLI.—The Imperial Diet shall be convoked every year.

Article XLII.—A session of the Imperial Diet shall last during three months. In case of necessity, the duration of a session may be prolonged by Imperial Order.

Article XLIII.—When urgent necessity arises, an extraordinary session may be convoked, in addition to the ordinary one.

The duration of an extraordinary session shall be determined by Imperial Order.

Article XLIV.—The opening, closing, prolongation of session and prorogation of the Imperial Diet, shall be effected simultaneously for both Houses.

In case the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve, the House of Peers shall at the same time be prorogued.

Article XLV.—When the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve, Members shall be caused by Imperial Order to be newly elected, and the new House shall be convoked within five months from the day of dissolution.

Article XLVI.—No debate can be opened and no vote can be taken in either House of the Imperial Diet, unless not less than one-third of the whole number of the Members thereof is present.

Article XLVII.—Votes shall be taken in both Houses by absolute majority. In the case of a tie vote, the President shall have the casting vote.

Article XLVIII.—The deliberations of both Houses shall be held.

in public. The deliberations may, however, upon demand of the Government or by resolution of the House, be held in secret sitting.

Article XLIX.—Both Houses of the Imperial Diet may respectively present addresses to the Emperor.

Article L.—Both Houses may receive petitions presented by subjects.

Article LI.—Both Houses may enact, besides what is provided for in the present Constitution and in the Law of the Houses, rules necessary for the management of their internal affairs.

Article LII.—No Member of either House shall be held responsible outside the respective Houses, for any opinion uttered or for any vote given in the House. When, however, a Member himself has given publicity to his opinions by public speech, by documents in print or in writing, or by any other similar means, he shall, in the matter, be amenable to the general law.

Article LIII.—The Members of both Houses shall, during the session, be free from arrest, unless with the consent of the House, except in cases of flagrant delicts, or of offences connected with a state of internal commotion or with a foreign trouble.

Article LIV.—The Ministers of State and the Delegates of the Government may, at any time, take seats and speak in either House.

CHAPTER IV.—THE MINISTERS OF STATE AND THE PRIVY COUNCIL.

Article LV.—The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it.

All Laws, Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the State, require the countersignature of a Minister of State.

Article LVI.—The Privy Council shall, in accordance with the provisions for the organization of the Privy Council, deliberate upon important matters of State, when they have been consulted by the Emperor.

CHAPTER V.—THE JUDICATURE.

Article LVII.—The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law according to law, in the name of the Emperor.

The organization of the Courts of Law shall be determined by law.

Article LVIII.—The judges shall be appointed from among those who possess proper qualifications according to law.

No judge shall be deprived of his position, unless by way of criminal sentence or disciplinary punishment.

Article LIX.—Trials and judgments of a Court shall be conducted publicly. When, however, there exists any fear that such publicity may be prejudicial to peace and order, or to the maintenance of public morality, the public trial may be suspended by provision of law or by the decision of the Court of Law.

Article LX.—All matters that fall within the competency of a special Court shall be especially provided for by Law.

Article LXI.—No suit at law, which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the executive authorities, and which shall come within the competency of the Court of Administrative Litigation especially established by law, shall be taken cognizance of by a Court of Law.

CHAPTER VI.—FINANCE.

Article LXII.—The imposition of a new tax or the modification of the rates (of an existing one) shall be determined by law.

However, all such administrative fees or other revenue having the nature of compensation shall not fall within the category of the above clause.

The raising of national loans and the contracting of other liabilities to the charge of the National Treasury, except those that are provided in the Budget, shall require the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article LXIII.—The taxes levied at present shall, in so far as are not remodelled by new law, be collected according to the old system.

Article LXIV.—The expenditure and revenue of the State require the consent of the Imperial Diet by means of an annual Budget.

Any and all expenditures overpassing the appropriations set forth in the Titles and Paragraphs of the Budget, or that are not provided for in the Budget, shall subsequently require the approbation of the Imperial Diet.

Article LXV.—The Budget shall be first laid before the House of Representatives.

Article LXVI.—The expenditures of the Imperial House shall be defrayed every year out of the National Treasury, according to the present fixed amount for the same, and shall not require the consent thereto of the Imperial Diet, except in case an increase thereof is found necessary.

Article LXVII.—Those already fixed expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the Government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet, without the concurrence of the Government.

Article LXVIII.—In order to meet special requirements, the Government may ask the consent of the Imperial Diet to a certain amount as a Continuing Expenditure Fund, for a previously fixed number of years.

Article LXIX.—In order to supply deficiencies, which are unavoidable, in the Budget, and to meet requirements unprovided for in the same, a Reserve Fund shall be provided in the Budget.

Article LXX.—When the Imperial Diet cannot be convoked, owing to the external or internal condition of the country, in case of urgent need for the maintenance of public safety, the Government may take all necessary financial measures, by means of an Imperial Ordinance.

In the case mentioned in the preceding clause, the matter shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet at its next session, and its approbation shall be obtained thereto.

Article LXXI.—When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year.

Article LXXII.—The final account of the expenditures and revenue of the State shall be verified and confirmed by the Board of Audit, and it shall be submitted by the Government to the Imperial Diet, together with the report of verification of the said Board.

The organization and competency of the Board of Audit shall be determined by law separately.

CHAPTER VII.—SUPPLEMENTARY RULES.

Article LXXIII.—When it has become necessary in future to amend the provisions of the present Constitution, a project to that effect shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order.

In the above case, neither House can open the debate, unless at least two-thirds of the whole number of Members are present, and no amendment can be passed, unless a majority of at least two-thirds of the Members present is obtained.

Article LXXIV.—No modification of the Imperial House Law shall be required to be submitted to the deliberation of the Imperial Diet.

No provision of the present Constitution can be modified by the Imperial House Law.

Article LXXV.—No modification can be introduced into the Constitution, or into the Imperial House Law, during the time of a Regency.

Article LXXVI.—Existing legal enactments, such as laws, regulations, Ordinances, or by whatever names they may be called, shall, so far as they do not conflict with the present Constitution, continue in force.

All existing contracts or orders that entail obligations upon the Government, and that are connected with expenditure, shall come within the scope of Art. LXVII.

THE IMPERIAL HOUSE LAW.

CHAPTER I.—SUCCESSION TO THE IMPERIAL THRONE.

Article I.—The Imperial Throne of Japan shall be succeeded to by male descendants in the male line of Imperial Ancestors.

Article II.—The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by the Imperial eldest son.

Article III.—When there is no Imperial eldest son, the Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by the Imperial eldest grandson.

When there is neither Imperial eldest son nor any male descendant of his, it shall be succeeded to by the Imperial son next in age, and so on in every successive case.

Article IV.—For succession to the Imperial Throne by an Imperial descendant, the one of full blood shall have precedence over descendants of half blood. The succession to the Imperial Throne by the latter shall be limited to those cases only, when there is no Imperial descendant of full blood.

Article V.—When there is no Imperial descendant, the Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by an Imperial brother and by his descendants.

Article VI.—When there is no such Imperial brother or descendant of his, the Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by an Imperial uncle and by his descendants.

Article VII.—When there is neither such Imperial uncle nor descendant of his, the Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by the next nearest member among the rest of the Imperial Family.

Article VIII.—Among the Imperial brothers and the remoter Imperial relations, precedence shall be given, in the same degree, to the descendants of full blood over those of half blood, and to the elder over the younger.

Article IX.—When the Imperial heir is suffering from an incurable disease of mind or body, or when any other weighty cause exists, the order of succession may be changed in accordance with the foregoing provisions, with the advice of the Imperial Family Council and with that of the Privy Council.

CHAPTER II.—ASCENSION AND CORONATION.

Article X.—Upon the demise of the Emperor, the Imperial Heir shall ascend the Throne and shall acquire the Divine Treasures of the Imperial Ancestors.

Article XI.—The ceremonies of Coronation shall be performed and a Grand Coronation Banquet (Daijōsai) shall be held at Kyōto.

Article XII.—Upon an ascension to the Throne, a new era shall be inaugurated, and the name of it shall remain unchanged during the whole reign, in agreement with the established rule of the 1st year of Meiji.

CHAPTER III.—MAJORITY. INSTITUTION OF EMPRESS AND OF HEIR-APPARENT.

Article XIII.—The Emperor, the Kōtaishi, and the Kōtaison* shall attain their majority at eighteen full years of age.

Article XIV.—Members of the Imperial Family, other than those mentioned in the preceding Article, shall attain their majority at twenty full years of age.

Article XV.—The son of the Emperor who is Heir-apparent, shall be called "Kōtaishi." In case there is no Kōtaishi, the Imperial grandson who is Heir-apparent shall be called "Kōtaishi."

Article XVI.—The institution of Empress and that of Kōtaison shall be proclaimed by an Imperial Rescript.

CHAPTER IV.—STYLES OF ADDRESS.

Article XVII.—The style of address for the Emperor, the Grand Empress Dowager, the Empress Dowager, and of the Empress shall be "His," or "Her," or "Your Majesty."

Article XVIII.—The Kōtaishi and his consort, the Kōtaison and his consort, the Imperial Princes and their consorts, and the Princesses shall be styled "His," "Her," "Their," or "Your Highness" or "Highnesses."

CHAPTER V.—REGENCY.

Article XIX.—When the Emperor is a minor a Regency shall be instituted.

When He is prevented by some permanent cause from personally governing, a Regency shall be instituted, with the advice of the Imperial Family Council and with that of the Privy Council.

Article XX.—The Regency shall be assumed by the Kōtaishi or the Kōtaison being of full age of majority.

Article XXI.—When there is neither Kōtaishi nor Kōtaison, or when the Kōtaishi or the Kōtaison has not yet arrived at his majority, the Regency shall be assumed in the following order:—

* Kōtaison: eldest grandson of Emperor, direct line.

1. An Imperial Prince or a Prince.
2. The Empress.
3. The Empress Dowager.
4. The Grand Empress Dowager.
5. An Imperial Princess or a Princess.

Article XXII.—In case the Regency is to be assumed from among the male members of the Imperial Family, it shall be done in agreement with the order of succession to the Imperial Throne. The same shall apply to the case of female members of the Imperial Family.

Article XXIII.—A female member of the Imperial Family to assume the Regency shall be exclusively one who has no consort.

Article XXIV.—When, on account of the minority of the nearest related member of the Imperial Family, or for some other cause, another member has to assume the Regency, the latter shall not, upon the arrival at majority of the above mentioned nearest related member, or upon the disappearance of the aforesaid cause, resign his or her post in favour of any person other than of the Kōtaishi or of the Kōtaison.

Article XXV.—When a Regent or one who should become such, is suffering from an incurable disease of mind or body, or when any other weighty cause exists therefor, the order of the Regency may be changed, with the advice of the Imperial Family Council and with that of the Privy Council.

CHAPTER VI.—THE IMPERIAL GOVERNOR.

Article XXVI.—When the Emperor is a minor, an Imperial Governor shall be appointed to take charge of His bringing up and of His education.

Article XXVII.—In case no Imperial Governor has been nominated in the will of the preceding Emperor, the Regent shall appoint one, with advice of the Imperial Family Council and with that of the Privy Council.

Article XXVIII.—Neither the Regent nor any of his descendants can be appointed Imperial Governor.

Article XXIX.—The Imperial Governor cannot be removed from

his post by the Regent, unless upon the advice of the Imperial Family Council and upon that of the Privy Council.

CHAPTER VII—THE IMPERIAL FAMILY.

Article XXX.—The term “Imperial Family” shall include the Grand Empress Dowager, the Empress Dowager, the Empress, the Kōtaishi and his consort, the Kōtaison and his consort, the Imperial Princes and their consorts, the Imperial Princesses, the Princes and their consorts, and the Princesses.

Article XXXI.—From Imperial sons to Imperial great-grandsons, Imperial male descendants shall be called Imperial Princes; and from Imperial daughters to Imperial great-great grand-daughters, Imperial female descendants shall be called Imperial Princesses. From the fifth generation downwards, they shall be called, male descendants Princes, female ones Princesses.

Article XXXII.—When the Imperial Throne is succeeded to by a member of a branch line, the title of Imperial Prince or Imperial Princess shall be specially granted to the Imperial brothers and sisters, being already Princes or Princesses.

Article XXXIII.—The birth, namings, marriages, and deaths in the Imperial Family shall be announced by the Minister of the Imperial Household.

Article XXXIV.—Genealogical and other records relating to the matters mentioned in the preceding Article shall be kept in the Imperial archives.

Article XXXV.—The members of the Imperial Family shall be under the control of the Emperor.

Article XXXVI.—When a Regency is instituted, the Regent shall exercise the power of control referred to in the preceding Article.

Article XXXVII.—When a member, male or female, of the Imperial Family is a minor and has been bereft of his or her father, the officials of the Imperial Court shall be ordered to take charge of his or her bringing up and education. Under certain circumstances, the Emperor may either approve the guardian chosen by his or her parent, or may nominate one.

Article XXVIII.—The guardian of a member of the Imperial Family must be himself a member thereof and of age.

Article XXXIX.—Marriages of members of the Imperial Family shall be restricted to the circle of the Family, or to certain noble families specially approved by Imperial Order.

Article XL.—Marriages of the members of the Imperial Family shall be subject to the sanction of the Emperor.

Article XLI.—The Imperial writs sanctioning the marriages of members of the Imperial Family, shall bear the countersignature of the Minister of the Imperial Household.

Article XLII.—No member of the Imperial Family can adopt any one as his son.

Article XLIII.—When a member of the Imperial Family wishes to travel beyond the boundaries of the Empire, he shall first obtain the sanction of the Emperor.

Article XLIV.—A female member of the Imperial Family, who has married a subject, shall be excluded from membership of the Imperial Family. However, she may be allowed, by the special grace of the Emperor, to retain her title of Imperial Princess or of Princess, as the case may be.

CHAPTER VIII—IMPERIAL HEREDITARY ESTATES:

Article XLV.—No landed or other property, that has been fixed as the Imperial Hereditary Estates, shall be divided up and alienated.

Article XLVI.—The landed and other property to be included in the Imperial Hereditary Estates, shall be settled by Imperial writ, with the advice of the Privy Council, and shall be announced by the Minister of the Imperial Household.

CHAPTER IX.—EXPENDITURES OF THE IMPERIAL HOUSE.

Article XLVII.—The expenditures of the Imperial House of all kinds shall be defrayed out of the National Treasury at a certain fixed amount.

Article XLVIII.—The estimates and audit of accounts of the expenditures of the Imperial House and all other rules of the kind, shall be regulated by the Finance Regulations of the Imperial House.

CHAPTER X.—LITIGATIONS. DISCIPLINARY RULES
FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE IMPERIAL FAMILY.

Article XLIX.—Litigation between members of the Imperial Family shall be decided by judicial functionaries specially designed by the Emperor to the Department of the Imperial Household, and execution issued, after Imperial Sanction thereto has been obtained.

Article L.—Civil actions brought by private individuals against members of the Imperial Family, shall be decided in the Court of Appeal in Tokyo. Members of the Imperial Family shall, however, be represented by attorneys, and no personal attendance in the Court shall be required of them.

Article LI.—No member of the Imperial Family can be arrested, or summoned before a Court of Law, unless the sanction of the Emperor has been first obtained thereto.

Article LII.—When a member of the Imperial Family has committed an act derogatory to his (or her) dignity, or when he has exhibited disloyalty to the Imperial House, he shall, by way of disciplinary punishment and by order of the Emperor, be deprived of the whole or of a part of the privileges belonging to him as a member of the Imperial Family, or shall be suspended therefrom.

Article LIII.—When a member of the Imperial Family acts in a way tending to the squandering of his (or her) property, he shall be pronounced by the Emperor, prohibited from administering his property, and a manager shall be appointed therefor.

Article LIV.—The two foregoing Articles shall be sanctioned, upon the advice of the Imperial Family Council.

CHAPTER XI.—THE IMPERIAL FAMILY COUNCIL.

Article LV.—The Imperial Family Council shall be composed of the male members of the Imperial Family, who have reached the age of majority. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the President of the Privy Council, the Minister of the Imperial Household, the Minister of State for Justice, and the President of the Court of Cassation shall be ordered to take part in the deliberations of the Council.

Article LVI.—The Emperor personally presides over the meeting of the Imperial Family Council, or directs one of the members of the Imperial Family to do so.

CHAPTER XII.—SUPPLEMENTARY RULES.

Article LVII.—Those of the present members of the Imperial Family of the fifth generation and downwards, who have already been invested with the title of Imperial Prince, shall retain the same as heretofore.

Article LVIII.—The order of succession to the Imperial Throne shall in every case relate to the descendants of absolute lineage. There shall be no admission to this line of succession to any one, as a consequence of his now being an adopted Imperial son, Kōyushi, or heir to a princely house.

Article LIX.—The grades of rank among the Imperial Princes, Imperial Princesses, and Princes and Princesses shall be abolished.

Article LX.—The family rank of Imperial Princes and all usages conflicting with the present law, shall be abolished.

Article LXI.—The property, annual expenses, and all other rules concerning the members of the Imperial Family, shall be specially determined.

Article LXII.—When in the future it shall become necessary either to amend or make additions to the present Law, the matter shall be decided by the Emperor, with the advice of the Imperial Family Council and with that of the Privy Council.

The original continues with:

LAW OF THE HOUSES (Covering the Diet)

IMPERIAL ORDINANCE CONCERNING THE HOUSE
OF PEERS

LAW OF ELECTION FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THE LAW OF FINANCE

For full text, see W. W. McLaren, ed., "Japanese Government Documents," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* (Tōkyō, 1914), vol. XLII, pt. 1.

APPENDIX B

MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR JAPAN

By Carl J. Friedrich and Douglas G. Haring

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MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR JAPAN

By Carl J. Friedrich and Douglas G. Haring

The invasion of the Japanese Empire will pose a series of new problems for the United Nations. As fast as the invading armies gain territory, military government will begin to function in the occupied area. Such government is essential to maintenance of order in the zone of communications to the rear of the armies. Irrepressibly, Americans inquire: Will this temporary military government be able to transcend its stipulated task and contribute something tangible to the ultimate objective—the establishment of lasting peace—or will it be said, as it has been said of the Rhineland occupation, that “the occupation of the Rhineland had contributed more to the growth of Chauvinism than all pan-Germanist agitators combined”? ¹

The functions of military government (or “Civil Affairs”) are limited to “maintaining order, promoting security of the occupying forces, preventing interference with military operations, reducing active or passive sabotage, relieving combat troops of civil administration, and mobilizing local resources in aid of military objectives and carrying out governmental policies” Civil Affairs officers must bear in mind that “local laws, customs, and institutions of government be retained except where they conflict with the aims of military government or are inimical to its best interests.” ² Two questions arise immediately: Can non-Japanese personnel conduct orderly government in a bitter, defeated Japan, short of wholesale slaughter of the recalcitrant population? If military government actually functions, can it remain within the limits of the above-quoted regulations? Such questions will receive their answer in the events of coming months. They constitute the disturbing background in practical planning of such government.

Current discussions of the occupation of Japan often ignore the

limited functions and duration of military government. Such discussions becloud the issue by failure to differentiate sharply between military government and high policy of the United Nations. Civil Affairs officers are not permitted to determine general policy toward the vanquished. General policy is one burden which military government supposedly does not carry.

This limitation excludes from discussions of military government in Japan a host of questions. The Governments of the United Nations—not the Civil Affairs officers—decide, for example, whether the imperial institution of Japan shall continue; whether Japanese industry is to be reconstructed, and if so, along what lines; whether Japan shall be permitted access to foreign raw materials; whether the Shinto cult is to be prohibited or permitted; and a host of similarly perplexing issues.

OFFICERS MUST MAKE POLICY EFFECTIVE

The political heads of the United Nations may decide matters of policy in advance of the invasion of Japan. It is possible, as past experience elsewhere hints, that such decisions may be delayed or even evaded. In the latter case Civil Affairs officers must arrive at decisions of great moment as occasion arises. Their actions will provoke controversy, even condemnation, among their own people as well as the Japanese. Civil Affairs officers face a task whose inherent difficulty is augmented by the probability that little appreciation will be forthcoming.

Whatever the trend of high policy may be, the fact remains that statements of policy are one thing, and the carrying into effect of those policies is another. Any minor decision oft-repeated becomes a policy—for in the trivial choices of everyday living habits are established that determine the future of societies more effectively than do the documents signed by diplomats. High policy, for that matter, becomes real only as the behavior of men and women approaches conformity to the prescribed patterns. In theory Civil Affairs officers execute policy decided from above; in practice they also shape policy by every personal contact with the people they supervise.

The regulations defining Civil Affairs activities assume that the people to be governed are accustomed to living under their own law. The Civil Affairs officer is asked to maintain "local laws, customs, and institutions of government." This principle may work as long as we stay within our western cultural patterns. Even in Germany it is possible to appeal to older ideas in setting up military government in occupied territory. After we move into Germany, every German judge, prosecutor, notary, and lawyer is obliged to take the following oath:

I swear by Almighty God that I will apply and maintain the laws at all times to nobody's disadvantage, fearlessly and without prejudice, with justice and fairness towards everyone without taking into account religion, race, descent, or political conviction.

That I will obey German laws and all laws of the Military Government in letter and spirit. And that I will always do my best to maintain the equality of all before the law. So help me God.³

Such an oath makes perfect sense to a German, lawyer or layman, because it simply revives the old *Rechtsstaat* tradition. And when the Office of War Information tells them that military government "will act on the basis of written law," this will come as a great relief to many who have been hurt by the lawlessness of the Nazi regime.

But suppose that military government is confronted with a populace whose "law" is personal loyalty to leaders and obedience to official whims, a population who think of law as a sort of advance notice of official intentions that are subject to change as a result of official caprice? Japan presents approximately such a situation. Japan has laws, but the Japanese habitually obey orders without any idea that officials also should be responsive to law and responsible under the law. Some Japanese laws must be obeyed, but not because they are law. Obedience is due to officials, not to law as such. Other Japanese laws serve only as ornaments to impress the Occident or to placate local pressure groups; they are neither enforced nor honored. Japan's government is government by men, not a government of law.⁴

RESPONSIBILITIES FACING ADMINISTRATORS

In Japan, therefore, military government will encounter a cultural situation that does not fit the pattern of the *Manual*. Neither the rules of military government nor the probable political decisions of the United Nations will meet the actual situation. Civil Affairs officers, accordingly, will face recurrent dilemmas in which their decisions forge the policies that actually work.

The training of Civil Affairs officers for the occupation of Japan assumes importance for citizens of the democracies. Inevitably these officers will represent the democratic nations to the Japanese. Their actions are fraught with crucial consequences for those ultimate war aims for which common men sacrifice their lives.

The nature of democracy carries implications for the quality and training of Civil Affairs officers. The democratically minded are skeptical of policies formulated in advance by an all-knowing elite. Democratic populations approximate the practice of "live and let live." Diverse programs and organizations coexist, subject only to general policies adopted by majorities and to the requirement that minorities be free to attract adherents. In democracies problems cannot be solved by fiat. Historically they have been solved by intelligent, practical persons who come to grips with reality and try out courses of action based on facts. Solutions are not necessarily standardized; varying local adjustments meet specific conditions.

For the authoritarian, superimposed master plan, democratic peoples substitute sound education of the "men in charge." By sound education for administration is meant a goodly variety of different approaches, but they share two basic features. One is insistence on the technical competency of the administrator to understand the things he is to handle. The other, stressed equally, is the administrator's grasp of the human factor—his broad understanding of the human beings affected by the job he is trying to accomplish.

Through such education democratic leaders are equipped to engineer consciously directed social change. In occupying Japan, the people of the United States envisage such changes. It is therefore in

keeping with the basic American approach, to develop a novel educational program. The training of Civil Affairs officers as set up by the United States Army and Navy presumably is conceived to accomplish the two tasks above outlined.

Students in training for Civil Affairs are Army and Navy officers who have volunteered for this service from many branches of the armed services, and who retain their affiliations with those branches. Many have served in the active theaters of war. With few exceptions, all have completed courses in Military Government offered at Charlottesville. Careful winnowing has eliminated the apathetic and incompetent. Others, discovering that Civil Affairs is not to their taste, have obtained assignments to other military duties. Most student-officers have had practical administrative experience in business, law, engineering, journalism, higher education, and other fields. In consequence, the average age is about thirty-five.

TRAINING OF OFFICERS DESCRIBED

The following paragraphs describe the training of Civil Affairs officers, largely as done at Harvard. However, the general pattern at the other five schools—Yale, Michigan, Chicago, Northwestern, Stanford—is very similar, since all conform to the same general directive. The discussion here is limited to describing how the officers are trained: it seemed best at present, with rather brief experience, not to enter upon the question of how they ought to be trained.

Teaching personnel, civilian and military, is selected for specific knowledge of Japan, of military government, or of pertinent fields of research such as public administration, government, anthropology, geography, or sociology. The resources of the faculty are augmented by specialists from other institutions, by non-academic experts on Japan, and by Army and Navy officers who have completed a Civil Affairs course on Japan. The department of Japanese language is supplemented by so-called native informants (language drill-masters) to whom Japanese is a mother-tongue.

The curriculum has been held rather closely to that prescribed in a directive of the Provost Marshal General. Subsequent directives

probably will embody modifications based on experience. The prescribed course covers two three-month terms for each class of student-officers. The curriculum includes three main divisions: Area, Language, and Military Government. During the first term, Area occupies two hours daily, Language four hours, and Military Government two hours. In the second term Military Government receives major emphasis; Language continues at a fast pace, but Area study is reduced sharply. In terms of the criteria of educational preparation aimed at conscious direction of social change, as suggested in the general analysis above, Area and Language serve to prepare the officer for the essential human understanding, while training in Military Government provides the necessary technical knowledge.

INTENSIVE AREA AND LANGUAGE STUDY

Area studies comprise Japanese geography, history, economics, agriculture, government, industry, trade, transportation, education, social and family organization, religion, welfare, art, customs, and other cultural features. Information is presented by lectures, panels, interview sessions, moving pictures, and required reading. Nearly every week, Area discussion groups of fifteen to twenty student-officers are conducted by faculty members. Specialists from industry, government, and other universities visit the School to lecture on their respective fields. Despite heavy pressure of scheduled work, most of the student-officers go beyond the assigned reading to study "on their own." In the second term, the student-officers are divided among specialist groups—economists, lawyers, bankers, engineers—to work together on problems of Military Government and Area peculiar to their specialties. A genuine, unsentimental insight into Japanese civilization constitutes the basic objective of Area study.

A special course in the Japanese language has been prepared at Harvard for Civil Affairs officers. Three lectures a week orient the student to the drill periods and to work with phonograph records. The informants who conduct the small, intensive drill sessions share in planning the lessons and prepare hour by hour for an exacting

technique of making sure that each individual masters the work. Daily assignments dovetail with topics currently studied in Area and Military Government. For example, vocabulary of rural life accompanies study of Japanese agriculture, and specific Military Government problems are paralleled by appropriate vocabulary. All effort concentrates upon conversational ability; study of Japanese writing is limited to introductory practice. The official Romazi spelling is used.

Military Government work concentrates on specific problems formulated to present situations expected in the field. These problems indicate the range and complexity of military government, the principles governing its administration, and the conditions under which decisions must be made. Most of the problems are integrated with topics currently studied in Area. Especially in the second term, intensive study of selected regions of Japan familiarizes the officers with detailed data pertinent to military government, and specialist groups pursue the same objectives further. Visits to local Boston installations serve to vivify the study of administration of municipal government, ports, markets, fire and police services, public health, utilities, etc. Civil Affairs officers returning from service abroad lecture on their experiences in actual conduct of military government. Teaching methods combine mass-training techniques, lately developed in the armed services, with elements of traditional University education. The staff gained experience in working together—in planning integrated Area training, and in organizing and conducting previous courses for men destined for Europe and other areas.

HIGH MORALE BASED ON UNDERSTANDING

To say that morale among Civil Affairs officers is excellent glosses over the difference in Civil Affairs morale and the morale of combat troops. A lively appreciation of the social and cultural situation about to be faced and of the responsibilities devolving upon military government is essential in Civil Affairs officers. The development of such appreciation brings intervals of baffled discouragement. The wider an officer's range of accurate information, the more keenly he

realizes the intricacy and critical importance of the responsibilities that lie ahead. Not only is he vividly aware of the dependence of the fighting forces upon wise and firm conduct of military government in the zone of communications, but he perceives the relevance of his duties to the hope of ultimate peace in the Pacific. He realizes that changes in high policy may undo all his plans and habits overnight. It is not surprising that the probable lines of United Nations policy toward Japan are discussed whenever the crowded program affords a moment's opportunity.

Civil Affairs officers know that they have volunteered for an onerous and perilous task. Few harbor illusions about acquiring power, glory, personal advancement, or even appreciation from their countrymen. They are devoted, self-reliant, resourceful Americans who are determined to perform a thankless and almost impossible task because it must be done. Given sound general policies for military government of Japan as a framework within which to operate, officers trained thus thoroughly ought to be able through their activities to facilitate the transformation of Japanese society toward patterns that will fit into a peaceful world.

1. Ernst Fraenkel, *Military Occupation and the Rule of Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 115. See also B. T. Reynolds, *Prelude to Hitler, a Personal Record of Ten Postwar Years in Germany* (London, 1933), *passim*.

2. *Joint Army-Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*, November 4, 1943, par. 4, 9-h (generally known as FM 27-5). See also C. J. Friedrich, "Military Government as a Step Toward Self-Rule," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 7, no. 4 (Winter 1943), as well as remainder of issue.

3. See *New York Times*, December 9, 1944.

4. R. K. Reischauer, *Japan: Government-Politics* (New York: T. Nelson & Sons, 1939).

APPENDIX C

A GUIDE TO READING ON JAPAN

Each book or article is listed in full but once, under the general subject heading that it fits most appropriately. Many items, however, contain important material on other topics. When this is conspicuously the case, the principal listing is followed by the letter, or letters, denoting the other subject headings under which the same book also should be mentioned. Thus:

Sansom, Geo. B., *Japan, a Short Cultural History*

appears under H. HISTORY. It contains material of equal importance to E. ECONOMICS, L. LITERATURE AND FINE ARTS, P. POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT, and R. RELIGION AND MORALS. The complete listing thus becomes:

Sansom, Geo. B., *Japan, a Short Cultural History*
(New York, 1931, 1943) (E) (L) (P) (R)

Abbreviations used in the following lists refer to journals and periodicals, and will be clear upon reference to that heading (A).

Categories used in the following classification:

A. Annuals, Periodicals, Journals, Proceedings	I. International relations and U. S. policy toward Japan
B. Bibliography	J. Journalism, Propaganda, Education
C. Comprehensive and general works	L. Literature, Fine arts, Philosophy
E. Economics, Finance, Industry, Trade	M. Military Government
F. Farming, Rural life, Agrarian problems	P. Politics and Government
G. Geography	R. Religion and Morals
H. History (including Prehistory)	S. Sociology, Population, Social problems

A. ANNUALS, PERIODICALS, JOURNALS, PROCEEDINGS

Amerasia, New York.

American Oriental Society, Journal (abbreviation, JAOS), Philadelphia.

Asiatic Society of Japan, Transactions and Reprints (abbreviation, TASJ; old series up to 1923; new series thereafter), Tōkyō.

Cultural Nippon, Tōkyō.

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, Mitteilungen, Tōkyō.

Far Eastern Quarterly, Menasha.

Far Eastern Survey (American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations), New York.

Fortune (various special issues), New York.

Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Cambridge.

Institute of Pacific Relations (various publications, such as reports of meetings, "Inquiry Series," pamphlets, etc.) (abbreviation IPR).

International Congress of Orientalists, Transactions.

Japan Advertiser, The, Tōkyō. English-language daily. American owned until 1940.

Japan Christian Yearbook (1903-1939), Tōkyō.

Japan Chronicle, The, Kōbe. English-language daily. British owned, prior to war.

Japan-Manchukuo Yearbook, Shanghai.

Japan Society of London, Proceedings (abbreviation, JSL), London.

Japan Times, The, Tōkyō. English-language daily. Japanese owned, govt. mouthpiece.

Japan Yearbook, Tōkyō (supplanted in late 1930's by other annuals).

Monumenta Nipponica, Tōkyō (Catholic University of Japan).

Pacific Affairs, New York (Institute of Pacific Relations).

Pacific Science Congress, Reports (originally Pan-Pacific Sci. Cong.).

Tourist, The, Japan Tourist Bureau, Tōkyō.

Trans-Pacific, The (weekly edition, *The Japan Advertiser*, until 1940), Tōkyō.

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